NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300100002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 12, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
r ada9or Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300
Intelligence
25X1
National Intelligence Daily
Thursday
12 April 1979
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
Top Secret
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300 - 4 8
Copy
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
Briefs and Comments 25X1
Iran: Radical Turn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
25X1
Grenada: Outside Support . . . . . . . . . . .
Rhodesia-Zambia: Another Air Raid .
USSR: Veto Threat in UN . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Special Analyses
Afghanistan: Prospects for the Insurgents
Overnight Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
25X1
The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the
final section of the Daily, will often contain materials
that update the Situation Reports and Briefs and Comments.
Approvea or Release 08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO3130Q
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
The Iranian revolution appears to be entering a more
radical phase marked by executions of former officials
essentially because of their participation in the Shah's
regime or acquiescence in its policies. Most previous
executions were carried out for specific crimes of vio-
lence.
Ayatollah Khomeini appears to have interpreted the
referendum victory for his Islamic Republic as a license
to eradicate any vestiges of the Shah's regime. The sum-
mary trial and execution of former Prime Minister Hoveyda
late last week was followed by the similar liquidation of
more than 15 other former government leaders over the
25X1
past two days. 25X1
Prime Minister Bazargan has had little to say about
the resumption of executions, but he was quoted in an
interview published yesterda as saying he supported the
execution of Hoveyda.
25X1
Many Iranians--especially members of the middle
class--have been shocked by the new executions. They
had expected public proceedings when the trial... resumed.
The continuation of secret trials has been denounced by
the opposition National Democratic Front, a small liberal
party, which warned on Tuesday that further excesses by
the revolutionary committees would result in a government
worse than the Shah's regime. Some cabinet ministers
also are upset with the situation, and the Minister of
Justice has threatened to resign.
25X1
A . IA-RDP79T00975A0313001q
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
and perhaps Cuban aid to bolster its forces.
countercoup by ousted Prime Minister Eric Gairy, has ap-
pealed for help from Washington, London, Ottawa, and
Caracas and apparently is already receiving Guyanese
GRENADA: Outside Support
The Grenadian Government, which fears a possible 25X1
day e t eight personnel who bypassed immigration con-
trols. Another Cuban flight is expected this weekend.
The British representative in Bridgetown states that a
Cuban vessel with 200 merchant marine cadets is due in
the Cubana flight that stopped in Grenada a ur-
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO313
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Mulungus
i lake
Rhodesia
Lake
Kariba-, i Y
Kilo stars
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Rhodesian aircraft yesterday attacked a major train-
ing base for Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's
Union at Mulungushi, Zambia, where some 5,000 guerrillas
are being organized into new, large units by Zambian,
and perhaps Cuban, advisers. We do not know the extent
of casualties. Two ZAPU command centers were destroyed
and a support camp damaged during Tuesday's air raid on
ZAPU facilities near Lusaka; casualties were light be-
cause most personnel had been dispersed. The guerrillas
around Lusaka are very nervous and have fired on at least
one civil aircraft--an East German transport ferrying
weapons for ZAPU from Angola.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
The USSR continues to threaten to veto any Security
Council action that would redeploy UN troops in the Si-
nai, as called for in the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The
Soviet UN Ambassador has been lobbying Third World dele-
gations with the message that the peacekeeping forces in
the Sinai should not perform any monitoring function
called for under the treaty. The Soviets resent their
exclusion from the Middle East peace process and may an-
ticipate that a UN refusal to support the treaty would
open the way to a larger role for Moscow in the Middle
East. Moscow may ultimately veto a new mandate for the
peacekeeping force because that would force the US to
follow through on its commitment to create an alternative
multinational force. In Moscow's view, the US would
face domestic opposition to stationing its own forces
in the Sinai and would have difficulty getting support
from other nations. A veto would also be highly popular
among most Arab states and elsewhere in the Third World.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31309100002-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
AFGHANISTAN: Prospects for the Insurgents
25X1
The widespread insurgencies in Afghanistan continue
to erode the loyalty of the armed forces--the main prop
for President Taraki's regime. Tribal rebels tack the
strength and organization to confront the Soviet-supported
Army outside their home areas, however, and by themselves
have ZittZe prospect of overthrowing the government. Un-
rest in the cities and more settled areas ma pose a
more difficult problem for the regime.
Muslim tribesmen along the Pakistani border took up
arms almost immediately after the military coup a year
ago that brought the Marxists to power in Kabul. Since
then, many additional tribal groups, motivated mainly by
religious sentiments, have instigated rebellions in their
native areas. A government crackdown last winter against
Muslim clergymen critical of the regime crave new impetus
to the unrest.
The insurgencies seem to be gaining momentum, and
the government's authority is now being contested to
some degree in nearly every province. Along much of the
eastern border with Pakistan, government control is lim-
ited to major towns and main roads.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO313
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
Uncoordinated Rebellions
There is little cooperation among the various rebel
groups operating in Afghanistan's tribal areas.
Coordination is better among the exile groups in
Pakistan, but despite an announcement on 11 March that
the three most important factions would cooperate, there
has been little indication that they are actually work-
ing together.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
The tribal rebels alone have little immediate pros-
pect of overthrowing the Taraki government. The tribes
can hold their own in the mountains and may even win 25X1
minor victories against the government, but they have
little chance of capturing a major city or ing a suc-
cessful campaign outside the tribal areas.
The government was confronted with a different and
more threatening challenge in western Afghanistan last
month when mobs, aided by personnel from the local mili-
tary garrison, took over parts of Herat, the country's
third largest city. After several days, reinforced gov-
ernment troops regained control of the city, but not the
surrounding areas. This appears to have been a largely
spontaneous uprisin not directl related to the tribal
insurgencies.
In the cities and those rural areas where the gov-
ernment has traditionally maintained control, the people
have fewer arms and are more poorly organized than the
tribesmen. Popular unrest could again erupt into rioting
as it did in Herat, but sustained resistance will depend
on the refusal of government troops to oppose the rebels.
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 1300100009-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
25X1
A few organizations--such as the Muslim Brotherhood--may
still be able to stage isolated terrorist acts in the
cities.
25X1
Foreign Support
Foreign backing for the insurgents is limited.
Pakistan has permitted Afghan exiles, Pakistani re-
ligious organizations, and tribesmen to funnel some help
to the Afghan tribes. There is little Islamabad could
do to prevent Pakistani tribesmen from assisting their
Afghan neighbors across the very porous border, and it is
not inclined to try. The evidence, however, suggests no
significant Pakistani military support for the rebels.
The new regime in Iran is strongly sympathetic to
Afghanistan's dissident Muslim tribesmen but its problems
at home prevent it from furnishing significant material
help. Iran's main contribution has been moral encourage-
ment to the insurgents.
The Afghan Military
Tribal loyalties, religion, heavy casualties, suspi-
cion of Soviet motives, and the slim prospects for an
early end to insurgency have already seriously damaged
morale in the Afghan Army. Purges of suspected disloyal
officers have placed inexperienced men in key positions,
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31
25X1
25X1
25X1
100100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
and desertions occur daily. Some Afghan units reportedly
have fled or surrendered after only token resistance.
The government is taking steps to limit the impact
of these losses. The Army is retaining soldiers beyond
their obligatory terms of service and may have begun re-
calling individuals released from active duty. The Army
also is using tribal irregulars to fight other tribes op-
posing the government. Kabul is undertaking a longer
term program to improve command and control in the eastern
provinces and to expand the Army as a whole. None of
these measures, however, will have any immediate impact
on the military 's ability to cope with the insurgency.
I
The pressure on the military could eventually be-
come so severe that officers who now appear loyal would
advocate the overthrow of the Marxist regime. Both Kabul
and Moscow are attempting to meet this danger. Further
purges, more Soviet advisers and arms, strengthening the
Army, and gestures such as the recent appointment of a
popular officer as Defense Minister may help. At the
same time, these remedies could intensify the problems
in the military by increasing distrust of Soviet inten-
tions, forcing the government to rely even more on inex-
perienced officers, and further revealing the government's
weakness.
Soviet Support
25X1
Even before Taraki came to power last year, the USSR
was Afghanistan's major source of economic aid and almost
25X1
the sole source of military assistance. Since then, the
Soviet role has grown significantly.
Greater Soviet involvement is likely. Soviet as-
sistance is needed to improve the military logistic sys-
tem and increase mobility of its forces. Soviet personnel
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
25X1
25X1
could also become more involved in the fighting in the
hinterlands without seriously risking an adverse foreign
reaction to their role.
The Soviets currently are taking pains to conceal
the extent of their involvement, and it is unclear how far
they are prepared to go to save the present government.
The current visit to Afghanistan by the USSR's ranking
political-military general suggests that Moscow wants a
close reading of the reliability and capability of Afghan
armed forces before deciding on its next steps.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1
 Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO',~1300100002-1
OVERNIGHT REPORTS
(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from the
production offices of NFAC.)
25X1
Egypt
During his speech yesterday, President Sadat called
for a national referendum on 19 April to approve the
peace treaty with Israel and to endorse the dissolution
of Egypt's Parliament, with general elections to be held
within 60 days. Egyptian voters also will be asked to
approve a constitutional amendment governing the forma-
tion of political parties and to support a declaration
of human rights for the Egyptian people. Sadat promised
to form a consultative or "family" council but gave no
25X1 details.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A031300100002-1
 25X1
Top Secret
Approvo
Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO31300100002-1