NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031300090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
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copy
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Situation Report
Tanzania-Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
China-Kampuchea: Political Maneuvering . . . . 2
USSR-Pakistan: Renewed Pressure. . . . . . . . 3
Pakistan-India-US: Reaction to Aid Cutoff. . . 4
Israel-Lebanon: Airstrikes . . . . . . . . . . 5
China-Vietnam: Border Provocations .
Italy: National Election . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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Special Analyses
Turkey: Population Growth and
Socioeconomic Strains. . . . . . . . 7
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Jamaica-USSR: Manley in Moscow . . . . . . . . 10
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traZ Kampala yesterday, after shelling the city.
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TANZANIA-UGANDA 25X1
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- - I- -- - 7
/T
h
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to press reports he is somewhere in eastern Uganda.//
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CHINA-KAMPUCHEA: Political Maneuvering
China's inability to reconcile its two major poZit-
ical and military assets--Prince Sihanouk and PoZ Pot--
has prevented Beijing from pushing for an international
conference on Kampuchea. In the last week, however,
tentative signs have appeared that Beijing will take
advantage of any change in Kampuchea that might allow
25X1 a political solution there.
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statements in the calling tor an international con-
ference. One of the broadcasts implied approval of
linking US-Vietnam normalization to a negotiated Vietnam-
25X1 ese withdrawal from Kampuchea.
Beijing has an interest in an eventual political
solution in Kampuchea, but it is not clear why the Chi-
nese are now floating--however indirectly--the concept
of an international conference. We have no evidence
suggesting that China has resolved its Pol Pot dilemma;
Pol Pot, as the effective head of in-country anti-Viet-
namese forces, may well be instrumental in eventually
forcing Hanoi to bargain. On the other hand, Pol Pot,
because of his previous brutal policies and unacceptabil-
ity to Sihanouk and international opinion, remains per-
haps the major im ediment to an eventual political
25X1 solution.
Nevertheless, Beijing may be beginning to position
itself to take advantage of any sudden change in the
situation in Kampuchea. Sihanouk told Ambassador Wood-
cock in Beijing Monday that China's more "positive" atti-
tude toward an international conference may be due to
the the "deterioration" in Pal Pot's battlefield position.
Sihanouk added that he was pessimistic about the chances
a conference could get underway soon.
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//Recent Soviet diplomatic and propaganda pressure
on Pakistan indicates that Moscow is more concerned about25X1
protecting the Afghan regime than in immediately exploit-
ing Pakistan's withdrawal from CENTO and the recently an-
nounced US aid cutoff.
An article signed by A. Petrov in Pravda yesterday--
the fourth authoritative Soviet commentary on Afghanistan
in less than a month--again charged that Pakistan is the
"main place d'armes" for anti-Afghan subversive activity.
Pravda accused Pakistan's armed forces, along with their
"US, Chinese, and Egyptian military advisers" of al-
legedly training some 5,000 saboteurs for operations into
Afghanistan and said the "Pakistani authorities" not only
tolerate these activities but "obviously connive with
Moscow's warnings are also aimed at any possible
third-country involvement in Pakistan against the Afghan
regime. Premier Kosygin, during his trip to India last
month, reportedly told Prime Minister Desai that Pakistan
was aiding the Afghan exile challenge to the government 25X1
of President Taraki with the assistance of the US.
Petrov, in his Pravda article, also noted that the US
prefers to "remain in the shadows, acting as far as pos-
sible through third countries and proxies."
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PAKISTAN-INDIA-US: Reaction to Aid Cutoff
Pakistani officials are increasing their public de-
nunciations of the cutoff of US aid announced on 6 A ril,
but changes in Pakistan's nuclear or foreign policies do
not appear imminent. In India, where the US action is
widely interpreted as confirmation that Pakistan is de-
veloping nuclear weapons, the government's stated policy
not to develop a nuclear arsenal seems sure to come under
25X1 new pressure.
Government officials and political leaders in Paki-
stan are continuing to characterize the US decision as
an anti-Islamic move aimed at denying Pakistan and its
fellow Muslim states sophisticated nuclear technology.
They are terming US policy "discriminatory" for permit-
ting the continued supply of nuclear fuel to India while
penalizing Pakistan for pursuing its own "peaceful" nu-
clear programs. In some circles, the timing of the an-
nouncement--just three days after former Prime Minister
Bhutto's execution--is also seen as a manifestation of
US ire that its pleas for clemency were not heeded. De-
spite their unhappiness, Pakistani leaders are unlikely
to make any significant policy changes until they have
assessed the implications of the aid cutoff in the con-
text of the overall US-Pakistani relationship, especially
25X1 the 1959 defense agreement.
The Indian Government, which has not yet made an
official statement, is likely to be pressed in Parliament
for an official assessment of the implications for its
25X1 own nuclear programs. F I
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Israeli aircraft struck two Palestinian maritime
installations in southern Lebanon yesterday in apparent
retaliation for terrorist incidents in Israel this year.
The airstrikes were the first Israeli military response
to the Palestinians since a cease-fire in late January
ended more than a month of intermittent clashes. The US
defense attache in Tel Aviv believes that the Palestini-
ans are likely to respond with renewed actions against
Israel, although we have not noted any response thus
China's official news agency on Monday accused the
Vietnamese of continuing armed provocations along the
Sino-Vietnamese border. According to the Chinese,
Vietnamese soldiers entered Chinese territory on nine
occasions between 24 March and 8 April, wounding some
Chinese soldiers and civilians and laying mines inside 25X1
China. The ''ietnamese, however, charge that the Chinese
are regrouping their forces and have fired on Vietnamese
troops and frontier posts.
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Prime Minister Andreotti's government yesterday de-
cided to schedule a national election on 3 and 4 June.
Legal technicalities prevented Andreotti from having
the contest on 10 June, the same day as the first di-
rect elections to the European Parliament. Holding the
Italian vote earlier could reduce the effect of broader
European issues on the domestic debate, which is likely
to center on the question of direct Communist partici-
pation in the government. This situation will probably
benefit the Christian Democrats and Communists and will
work against the Socialists and some smaller parties,
which hoped their expected strong showings in the Eu-
ropean election would buoy their vote in the national
contest.
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TURKEY: Population Growth and Socioeconomic Strains
Turkey's current economic troubles, which include a
slowdown in economic growth, burgeoning unemployment, and
accelerating inflation, are part of a Larger complex of
long-term socioeconomic problems associated with the na-
tion's drive for modernization. These problems are pro-
ducing social tensions that will subject Turkey's demo-
cratic institutions to a severe test in the next few
years. A basic ingredient in these problems is the re-
lentless growth of the population. 25X1
The population, estimated at 43.7 million, is grow-
ing at a rate of 2.5 percent, or more than a million
people a year. This rate, typical of other middle-in-
come countries, compares with less than 1 percent for
most developed countries. Turkey's high rate of growth
is unlikely to change substantially in the next decade;
40 percent of the population is now under 15 years of age.
By 1990, the population probably will have increased by
a third and will exceed 57 million. The government has
shown little inclination to take a vigorous role in try-
ing to limit population growth, and the political sensi-
tivity of the issue reduces the prospects for effective
family planning policies. 25X1
Turkey's society is in a transitional stage--it now
is at a middle level of economic development. Growing
industrialization, rapid urbanization, migration of
workers abroad, and a rising level of education have con-
tributed to changes in social values and to demands for
a better life. Rapid population growth is placing a
strain on the country's resources. Probably less than a
third of the secondary-school-age children, for exam le,
have schools available to them. 25X1
Unemployment
Despite impressive growth in the past 30 years, the
economy has failed to provide enough jobs for the grow-
ing labor force. The official unemployment rate, which
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understates the problem, has been more than 10 percent
throughout the 1970s, and the outlook is for a long-term
trend of risin unemployment. The current rate approaches
20 percent.
A strong demand for migrants to work in Western Eu-
rope in the 1960s and early 1970s provided an escape valve
for a time, but migration abroad peaked in 1973 and is
unlikely to provide much relief in the foreseeable future,
despite new opportunities for some migrants in oil pro-
ducing Middle Eastern countries. Many migrants have now
returned to Turkey from Europe; if economic conditions
in Western Europe weaken further, returning migrants will
add substantially to the problem.
Urbanization
Urban growth has been rapid--as much as 6 percent
a year in the largest cities--further intensifying the
unemployment problem. The percentage of the population
living in cities increased from less than 20 percent
in 1950 to more than 40 percent by 1975. During that
time the population of Ankara mushroomed from less than
300,000 to 1.7 million, and Istanbul went from less than
1 million to more than 2.5 million. The population of
metropolitan Istanbul is now about 4.5 million. Growth
s
i
ce
has severely strained urban infrastructure and serv
and has caused a sharp deterioration in the urban en-
vironment. Water has periodical) been in short supply
in the cities for some years.
The migration from rural to urban areas has created
an explosive force in the cities by bringing together
members of different sectarian or ethnic groups with
longstanding mutual animosities and distrust. They must
compete for jobs in a deteriorating employment market.
Violence, some of it politically inspired, has become
common in the crowded cities and suburbs, where left-
right conflict is superimposed on traditional group
25X1 hostilities.
Other Socioeconomic Pressures
Heightened social tensions also stem from growing
dissatisfaction with the traditional urban elite, which
dominates the highly centralized government bureaucracy.
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The urban middle class includes entrepreneurs of consider-
able wealth and a privileged group of organized skilled
laborers; all are zealous in guarding their interests.
Agrarian, religious, and ethnic minority groups have
challenged the influence of the elite. Cooptation often
occurs but tends to make the elite more diverse and makes
consensus more difficult. Student unrest--reflected in
increasing outbreaks of violence--is fueled by dissatis-
faction with the inadequate ucational system and with
bleak employment prospects. 25X1
All groups are likely to feel the effects of economic
stress in the next few years. Current economic problems
stem to a large extent from a development strategy empha-
sizing capital-intensive import-substitution industriali-
zation. This strategy has not made the most efficient
use of Turkey's abundant labor supply or other resources.
Economic growth has failed to eliminate wide economic
disparities among regions and between the cities and ru-
ral areas. Agriculture has been relatively neglected.
Balanced and sustained development will require a major
shift in the orientation of government policies.
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JAMAICA-USSR: Manley in Moscow
//Prime Minister Manley Is five-day visit to the USSR
this week will add fuel to the bitter controversy in
Jamaica over his growing links with local and foreign
Communists. Despite ManZey's high hopes for his official
visit, which began Monday, it will probably result at
most in modest agreements for reciprocal trade and eco-
nomic cooperation. The trip may boost the Prime Minis-
ter's stock among local radicals, but at the cost of
further strain in his relations with Jamaica's moderates
especially in the crucial private sector.//
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The Prime Minister has publicly described the trip
as part of his long-standing goal to diversify Jamaica's
economic relations. Privately, he is reported to have
expressed the view that Soviet aid does not carry the
stringent conditions imposed by Western donors. His
public assurances, however, have only intensified the
growing opposition and hostility of moderate groups
critical of the government's improving relations with
25X1 the USSR.
To the Prime Minister's critics, Manley's pro-Soviet
line is evident in his speeches to leftist groups, in
the propaganda of government-owned media, and in Jamaica's
voting record in the UN. The increasingly effective op-
position party, the private sector, the independent press,
and some church leaders have accused Manley of consciously
leading Jamaica toward the "Soviet-Cuban brand" of Com-
munism and have denounced his close collaboration with
25X1 the island's Communist Party.
Soviet-Jamaican Relations
The charges of Manley's critics tend to be over-
25X1 drawn. They exaggerate the Prime Minister's ability to
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influence events in Jamaica, where democratic institu-
tions are still strong. In fact, local political and
economic trends now point to the Prime Minister's prob-
able defeat in the election he must call by 1981. The
centrist opposition party led successful antigovernment
demonstrations in January, and Manley apparently expects
more popular protest in the near future. The underlying
concern of his opponents is that Manley--with help from
the Soviets, Cubans, and local radicals--will try to rig
the election or attempt an unconstitutional seizure of
power.
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Prospects
The bilateral talks in the Kremlin will have little
impact on the Jamaican electorate. The small amount of
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aid the Soviets have offered to date--less than $50 mil-
lion worth--would if implemented help Manley's position
only with the Jamaican left, which is becoming his
strongest domestic constituency.
//The Prime Minister's working-class power base seems
likely to continue to erode because of devaluations,
sharply rising food prices, chronic shortages, widening
labor unrest, and growing unemployment that now affects
more than 30 percent of the labor force. Overall, Manley
seems willing to risk a continued deterioration of his
relations with the private sector--which is now crucial
to economic recovery--for the political security he ap-
parently thinks he can get from local radicals, Cuba
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