NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A031200170001-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 14, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 20, 1979
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A031200170001-6.pdf | 518.12 KB |
Body:
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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
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Contents
Briefs and Comments
Afghanistan: Insurgency . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
USSR-Afghanistan: Soviet Warning . . . . . . .
2
Grenada: New Government . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
Laos-China: Reports of Incursions . . . . . . .
4
Rhodesia: Preelection Atmospherics . . . . . .
5
USSR: Relations with US . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
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USSR: Reaction to Middle East Treaty
Iran-Pakistan: Nonaligned Movement
Special Analysis
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Fighting broke out on Thursday between troops and
civilians who apparently oppose the Marxist government
of President Taraki on religious grounds. Some troops
anDarently were in the streets shouting Islamic slogans.
believes that a large part
of the infantry division tioned in Herat had deserted
to the insurgents.
More damaging than the near loss of Herat and the
defection of some troops there would be the effect on the
loyalty and morale of other military units. The armed
forces were already unhappy over their involvement in
the increasing fighting against tribes in the east.
Kabul has accused the Iranians of infiltrating
7,000 men into the Herat area and of murdering 3,000
Afghan workers in Iran. The charges are intended pri-
marily to counteract widespread rumors of rebel suc-
cesses but may also reflect a belief that Iran helped in-
stigate the Herat rebellion. There is no good evidence
of Iranian involvement in the current clashes, but the
new leaders in Tehran have made no secret of their op-
position to the leftist regime in Kabul. Iran has closed
its border with Afghanistan.
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special flights had evacuated
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Czechoslovak and ovie technicians from Herat; two of
the Soviets allegedly died in the fi htin . The US
Embassy in Kabul has also learned
that the Soviets on Sunday removed to Kabul all or ei
technical personnel in a textile plant project in
southern Afghanistan. 25X1
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Warning
Moscow's decision to publish an authoritative "I.
AZeksandrov" article in Pravda yesterday alleging that
Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, and China are interfering in
Afghan internal affairs probably is aimed at deterring
these countries from actively supporting opponents of
President Taraki. The warning apparently was triggered
by the outbreak of significant urban opposition to Taraki
and Moscow's worry that the Pakistani=based Afghan exiles
who recently declared a "holy war" against the Taraki
regime might attract significant foreign support.
The author is much harder on the Pakistanis and the
Chinese than on the Iranians, which suggests that Moscow
does not want to upset the new Iranian Government unduly.
Soviet concern about Iran's capability to meddle, how-
ever, is reflected in the decision to replay in Pravda--
in a separate, less authoritative piece--Kabul radio's
charge that disguised Iranian soldiers are behind the
25X1 current unrest in Herat.
The Aleksandrov article reiterates that the Soviet
people support the Afghan Government but does not invoke
any of the USSR's treaties with Afghanistan, and there
are no other indications for now as to how Moscow might
respond to further opposition to Taraki.
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GRENADA: New Government
The new socialist regime in Grenada has effectively
consolidated its control and is concentrating on gaining
international recognition. Aside from general pronounce-
ments meant to reassure its neighbors, however, the 25X1
evolving government of Maurice Bishop has yet to detail
convincingly its future policies.
Other Caribbean states have delayed recognizing the
New Jewel Movement's regime because the smaller islands
fear the precedent for coups. Last week's meeting of the
Caribbean Common Market was inconclusive; representatives
of the smaller West Indies Associated States will meet 25X1
today in another attempt to determine a common position.
The left-leaning administrations of Jamaica and Gu ana
will probably extend recognition soon in any case.
//Cuba has limited itself to cautious press treat-
mnn+- +-n ANrn; r3 maki nrr the new regime appear too radical.
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We have no confirmation of substantial foreign in-
volvement in the coup; Bishop has made several statements
that seem purposely misleading--for instance, that his
movement wa given arms by disaffected Grenadian security
personnel.
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LAOS-CHINA: Reports of Incursions
Accusations of Chinese aggression against Laos have
come as much from the USSR and Vietnam as from Laos,
which suggests that the Lao-Chinese relationship has been
manipulated in order to portray China as posing an "an-
nexationist" threat. Until Laos leveled its charges,
China continued its aid and roadbuilding projects in Laos
that had been reduced at Laotian request last year. Chi-
nese diplomats, moreover, routinely expressed "understand-
ing" for the Lao Government's dependence on Vietnam and
sounded the same theme in a Foreign Ministry note on TO
March responding to the Lao denunciations. The note went
on, however, to deliver a veiled threat of Chinese sup-
port to Lao resistance groups. China had previously
quashed rumors of contacts with resistance forces, but
25X1 it may now believe it has an opportunity to put pressure
on Vietnam by supporting dissidents in Laos.
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RHODESIA: Preelection Atmospherics
//Campaigning for the national election next month
is gathering momentum. Political violence is also in-
creasing, particularly in rural areas.
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the government's p Lan or a
ro zng e ec -on z which security forces move from one 25X1
polling area to another over a five-day period should
assure a respectable voter turnout. AZZ able-bodied
white males will be drafted for security duty during the
election. Whatever the outcome, Rhodesia's whites will
remain in a good position to determine the policies of
the new black-Zed government.// F_ I 25X1
//The front-running candidate to lead the new gov-
ernment is Bishop Abel Muzorewa, leader of the United
African National Council. Muzorewa's last major rally
drew more than 120,000 people
//Among Rhodesia's whites, the field has been left
entirely to Prime Minister Smith's Rhodesian Front party.
Smith's determination to stand for election--his name
heads the list of his party's candidates--caused con-
sternation among several officials in the transitional
government who believe that his continued political par-
'
s credibility. A
ticipation will destroy the election
number of other white ministers unacceptable to blacks
will be running unopposed and ill expect cabinet osi-
tions in the new government.
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Speeches by Soviet leaders prior to the Supreme So-
viet election on 4 March, full texts of which have re-
cently become available, revealed a mixture of hope that
a SALT agreement may soon be reached along with consid-
erable uneasiness about the overall course of Soviet-US
relations. They reveal a generally tepid endorsement of
detente by Soviet leaders, particularly when contrasted
with the previous round of such speeches in 1974.
President Brezhnev was alone in his positive assess-
ment of Soviet-American relations. He treated the sub-
ject almost solely within the context of SALT and em-
phasized the benefits of a SALT II agreement. Brezhnev
was careful, however, to make qualifications that re-
flected the statements of his colleagues. His emphasis
on the need for ratification of a SALT agreement, for
instance, acknowledged Soviet concerns over the fate
of the treaty in the Senate.
Brezhnev, moreover, concluded his speech by assert-
ing that the USSR would continue its policies in the
Third World. He thus aligned himself with other speakers
in signaling his refusal to accept linkage between SALT
and Soviet policies elsewhere. This suggests that, even
as he sought to convey a sense of hope for SALT and im-
plicitly for Soviet-US relations, Brezhnev was making
certain that his colleagues knew he was not abandoning
other basic elements of Soviet policy.
Foreign Minister Gromyko appeared to represent the
consensus of the other speakers in conveying a sense of
exasperation with US policy as well as what appeared to
be resignation that a "smoothing out" of relations was
the best that could be hoped for. The general pessimism
about Soviet-US relations can be attributed to Moscow's
frustration with what it sees as "vacillations" in US
policy and possibilities for Chinese-US collusion.
The speeches suggest that the Soviet leaders have
little expectation of progress on other fronts until
SALT II is ratified. Even this hope, however, appears
qualified by concern that the US may be subordinating SALT
to greater cooperation with China.
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Ap
USSR: Reaction to Middle East Treaty
Soviet reaction to the impending Egyptian-Israeli
peace settlement has been unreservedly negative, a re-
flection of Moscow's longstanding opposition to any
separate settlement. No Soviet leader has publicly dis-
cussed President Carter's initiative, but Soviet commen-
tary has criticized US efforts and the treaty's failure
to deal with Palestinian demands and the issue of Israeli
withdrawal from all occupied territory. Moscow is partic-
ularly concerned about the possibility the US will estab-
lish a military presence in the area and has updated old
charges of US plans for regional security alliances and
military intervention to protect US strategic interests.
An authoritative article in Pravda on Saturday said that
the US, by forcing Egyptian President Sadat to "capitu-
late" to US demands, has ignored Arab interests and is
laying the groundwork for a dangerous new heightening of
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IRAN-PAKISTAN: Nonaligned Movement
prevent Pakistan from joining the Movement.
Deputy Prime Minister Entezam announced on Sunday
that Iran has formally applied for membership in the
Nonaligned Movement. The Nonaligned Foreign Ministers
will review the application at their meeting in Sri
Lanka in June. Iran's decision followed its announce-
ment that it was withdrawing from CENTO. Pakistan is
also expected to seek Nonaligned membership. Its with-
drawal from CENTO removes the excuse India has used to
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IRAN: Restive Minorities
Iran's ethnic minorities, who now make up almost
half the country's population, are reasserting the sep-
aratist pressures they have exerted through history at
times when central control has weakened. Kurdish tribes-
men in the northwest have already established de facto
autonomy; Turkomen in the north, Baluchis in the south-
east, and Arabs in the southwest are seeking similar
status. Iran's new national leaders have strongly op-
posed demands for decentralization, but the central gov-
ernment lacks the armed forces to prevent the minorities
from implementing some of their proposals. The persist-
ence of tribal dissidence provides a temptation for or-
eign nations to become involved.
Kurdish spokesmen assert that they do not want in-
dependence, but say the tribe will fight for its rights
if necessary. Their program, made public at a rally
attended by 200,000 Kurds on 2 March, calls for:
-- Control of an area determined by "historic,
economic, and geographic" considerations.
In Iran, this means Kordestan Province
and large parts of neighboring provinces,
but the Kurds aspire to control Kurdish-
inhabited parts of Iraq and Turkey as
well.
-- A popularly elected Kurdish regional par-
liament and local control of all government,
law enforcement, and military units.
--.Use of Kurdish in the schools and as the
autonomous area's official language.
Guaranteed freedom of speech, press, as-
sociation, travel employment, and union-
ization.
--continued
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Tribal differences are strong among the Kurds and
may erupt as dissident Kurdish leaders try to consoli-
date their control. The foremost Kurdish religious
leader, Ezzedin Hosseini, is accepted as the tribe's
spokesman, but leaders of the resurrected leftist Kurd-
ish Democratic Party, as well as other parties and guer-
rilla groups, claim tribal loyalties..
a general strike closed schools and government offices.
ern provinces, are now demanding autonomy. RecentTurk-
omen demonstrations in towns along the eastern coast of
the Caspian Sea near the Soviet border--in one case
30,000 tribesmen participated--resulted in three deaths;
Serious clashes between unidentified Kurdish dissi-
dents and government forces in and around the provincial
capital of Sanandaj yesterday left at least 170 dead, ac-
cording to press reports. The dissidents seized the
radio station, police barracks, and a military headuar-
ters building before a cease-fire was arranged.
Some of the approximately 600,000 Turkomen, who
are also Sunnis and are scattered throughout the north-
//The Shia Azarbayjanis, Iran's largest minority
with more than 5 million members, have resurrected their
principal nationalist party, which--like its Kurdish
counterpart--briefly led an independent tribal republic
under Soviet tutelage after World War II. So far, the
Azarbayjanis have not publicized any specific demands,
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Appr
investment in the area by the central government.
and military provincial posts, to allow schools to use
Baluchi and teach Sunni rites, and to consider increased
The estimated 600,000 Baluchis, Sunnis who inhabit
the barren southeastern area, have been relatively quiet.
Tribal, religious, and academic leaders, representing
the small Islamic Unity Party the Baluchis formed four
months ago, met late last month with Khomeini and the
Interior Minister. Party leader Maulavi Abdul Aziz, a
Sunni cleric, told a Western reporter that Khomeini
and the minister agreed to appoint Baluchis to civilian 25X1
Angered by later remarks by Khomeini that seemed to
renege on a promise to treat Sunnis equally with the
Shia majority, 3,000 to 4,000 Baluchis staged a protest
demonstration in the provincial capital of Zahedan on
12 March. Unity Party leaders have now demanded written
confirmation of the government's promises and have called
for guarantees of tribal autonomy in the new constitution
and for full tribal representation in the constituent
assembly that will ratify it.I I 25X1
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would greatly magnify the government's problems.
by Kurdish leaders. Cooperation among the major tribes
demand autonomy, according to the local press.
An estimated 10,000 Arabs marched on 10 March in
Ahvaz, the major city in Iran's oil-producing area
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Government Attitudes and Foreign Involvement
Government spokesmen, while admitting that the mi-
norities do have some legitimate claims, have been pub-
licly opposing decentralization, denouncing separatism,
and suggesting that the minorities be patient. With
the military in disarray, however, Tehran has no choice
but to try to negotiate with the tribes in hopes of de-
veloping a modus vivendi that gives away as little as
possible and limits their susce tib' to foreign
influences. ~~ff
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