NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031100130002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 15, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Reports
D
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Alert Memorandum
China-Vietnam-USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Briefs and Comments
Afghanistan: Death of Ambassador Dubs . . . . . 7
Vietnam: Oil Exploration Renewed . . . . . . . 8
Portugal: Budget Vote . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Uganda: Domestic Unrest . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Chile: Foreign Investment . . . . . . . . . 10
Jamaica: Government Violence . . . . . . . 11
Special Analysis
Iran: An Assessment of the Left . . . . . . . . 12 25X1
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The security situation in Iran is deteriorating
rapidly. Iranian press reports indicate that there have
been clashes in Tehran, Tabriz and Qazvin between forces
Zo aZ to the Bazar an government and various opponents.
//The attack on the US Embassy yesterday was the work
of a radical leftist terrorist group, the Chariks, ac-
cording to fragmentary reports. They have denied respon-
sibility but the sophistication of the operation suggests
they were involved. Prime Minister Bazargan told the
British Ambassador that the attack was clearly aimed at
undermining the authority of his government, but he did
not identify the attackers.//F I 25X1
I Ireported considerable fighting in
the capital yesterday; at one point, Tehran radio briefly
reported that it was under attack and appealed to
Ayatollah Khomeini's forces to defend it. In Tabriz, the
government radio station reported fighting between 25X1
Khomeini supporters and former employees of the security
forces and other alleged monarchists.
In addition to coping with the breakdown in secu-
rity, the Bazargan government will test its ability to
restart the economy on Saturday, when both Khomeini and
Bazargan have called on workers to return to their jobs
and end their "strikes, resistance, and deprivations."
In the critical oil sector, however, the new govern-
ment is likely to have great difficulty resuming produc-
tion for export because of the resistance of entrenched
radical leftists. Some workers--particularly in the
public sector--have grown accustomed to receiving pay-
checks without doing any work. Others will be forced out
of their jobs because of curtailed operations or be
forced out of business entirely following months of fuel
shortages, bank closures, and non-delivery of essential
imported goods.
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Approve
25X1 CHINA-VIETNAM-USSR
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nese could attack at any time. Moreover, with the re-
turn of Vice Premier (and Chief of Staff) Deng Xiaoping
to China, some political restraints deriving from his
presence in the US and Japan have now been removed.
i-nue to e zeve that from a military viewpoint the Chi-
There remain political, economic, and military argu-
ments against an attack. The Chinese must consider US
and Japanese advice to exercise restraint, possible So-
viet reaction, the demonstrated ability of the Pol Pot
forces to bleed Vietnam in Kampuchea without direct Chi-
nese intervention, as well as the impact of major fight-
ing on Beijing's cherished modernization campaign. More-
over, Chinese forces have not engaged in extended combat
since 1953 and may not be fully efficient. In the past
week, a number of Chinese officials have adduced some
of these factors as reasons for China not to strike
against Vietnam, and some of these officials appeared
to be speaking on foreign ministry guidance. Neverthe-
less, Deng Xiaoping himself has repeatedly stated in
public and in private that Vietnam must be "taught a
lesson," and this theme was echoed in a Chinese response
to a US demarche in Beijing on 10 February, which cau-
tioned against Chinese military action.
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I On balance we believe
there is about a 60 percent chance that the Chinese will
in fact attack in res onse to real or contrived provoca-
tion.
The size of the buildup on the border suggests if
the Chinese attack it would be on a scope larger than
we had originally thought likely--a brief and shallow
incursion. The Chinese have a wide range of options
open to them, beginning with a limited cross border at-
tack designed to inflict heavy casualties on Vietnamese
border defense forces. One likely option would be to
rout the border forces and drive far enough into Vietnam
to threaten but not actually attack Hanoi, with a view
to withdrawal after several weeks. We cannot exclude an
attack on the capital itself, but we think this unlikely
for both political and military reasons (the Chinese
probably could not achieve air superiority in the vicin-
ity of Hanoi).
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We continue to believe that the eventual Soviet
choice in reacting to any Chinese attack on Vietnam will
be contingent on the extent and severity of the Chinese
action and its political effects. In response to rela-
tively small-scale and shallow Chinese attacks, the So-
viets are likely to restrict their active response to
Vietnam proper, consulting under the Treaty, making con-
spicuous deliveries of military assistance, and probably
issuing strong warnings. Against Chinese attacks in the
middle range--which went so far as to begin to threaten
Hanoi--the Soviets would increase their aid in Vietnam
but might in addition mount military demonstrations on
the Sino-Soviet border, seize islands in the border
rivers, or even make quick small raids across the fron-
tier, all of which they could do without reinforcements.
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A severe dilemma would confront them in the event
of a massive, direct Chinese attack on Hanoi, the least
likely Chinese option. Against such a contingency, the
above Soviet measures would not relieve the postulated
threat to Vietnam and would be perceived by world opin-
ion as a Soviet failure of nerve. Even in these extreme
circumstances, the Soviets would wish to avoid large-
scale cross-border ground operations to any substantial
depth that would risk enmeshing the USSR in protracting
fighting inside China and might instead consider air
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In any event, the Soviets continue to be careful
not to commit themselves in advance to any particular
course of action. An authoritative Pravda article of
10 February on the Chinese buildup was notable for its
failure to mention the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty or to
allude to the possibility of a Soviet response if the
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AFGHANISTAN: Death of Ambassador Dubs
The killing of Ambassador Dubs yesterday appears to
have been incidental to a continuing conflict in Afghan-
istan between the Soviet-backed regime and its conserva-
tive Muslim opponents. 25X1
So far, we have no information linking the four ter-
rorists--now all presumably dead--with a larger dissident
organization, and we cannot identify the persons the ter-
rorists demanded be freed in exchange for the Ambassa-
dor's life. The Muslim Brotherhood claimed responsibil-
ity for several assassinations and acts of sabotage last
year. At least two Pakistani-based dissident groups are
said to support continuing unrest by Muslim tribesmen in
several parts of the country. 25X1
The Afghan Government describes the kidnappers as
"anarchists" and asserts that the individuals whose re-
lease was sought were not under detention. These indivi-
duals may, however, have been among the approximately
150 Muslim leaders who were rounded up earlier this
month.
The government's refusal to prolong negotiations
with the terrorists and its decision to ignore US pleas
to avoid precipitate action may have been intended as a
warning to the many opponents of the regime. The police
chief, the Deputy Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister
Hafizullah Amin all refused to talk with Embassy person-
nel throughout the episode.
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VIETNAM: Oil Exploration Renewed
Offshore oil exploration in Vietnam has resumed
after a four-year hiatus. Exploration conducted by US
firms in Zate 1974 indicated commercially exploitable
oil, but drilling halted with the coZZapse of South Viet-
nam in April 1975. Vietnam hopes oil revenues will
boost the country's dismal post-1975 economic performance
and give Hanoi some foreign policy flexibility.
A group of Canadian companies will probably complete
its first well. in the South China Sea, 200 miles south of
Ho Chi Minh City, in three weeks. West German and Italian
firms are likely to begin drilling soon. Hanoi would
like US firms to participate, but US law prohibits it.
Some industry sources believe potential oil reserves
could eventually lead to a production capacity of 500,000
to 1 million barrels per day. Available data do not as
yet support this high a level. Even small amounts of ex-
portable oil could have an impact on Vietnam's economy
within several years. If large amounts are discovered,
Vietnam over the longer run would be able to finance
a major share of its economic development and reduce its
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PORTUGAL: Budget Vote
Prime Minister Mota Pinto's budget may squeak by in
Parliament today, but the political parties have been
angered by his insensitive tactics; pressures to oust
him will continue to grow. 25X1
Since taking office last December as a prime minister
independent of any political party, Mota Pinto has upset
the parties by his determination to move forcefully on
unpopular economic issues and by his abrasive style. The
budget controversy seems more a reflection of the par- 25X1
ties' political disenchantment than of their objections
to the Prime Minister's economic policies.
Only the Center Democrats seem committed to vote for
the budget, which means that Mota Pinto must win support
at least from the Social Democrats to achieve the nec-
essary simple majority. 25X1
//The Social Democrats are torn between the hardline
opposition of their party leader, Sa Carneiro, and mod-
erates, who are sympathetic to the Prime Minister.
Even if Mota Pinto survives the budget vote, his
reprieve may be short-lived. As lower real wages, higher
taxes, and reduced government services take their toll
among lower income groups, both the Socialists and Social
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ing him. The temptation to replace Mota Pinto with a
more innocuous government until after the re ular elec-
tion in 1980 may become difficult to resist.
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Appr~
President Amin evidently is coming under increased
domestic pressure as Tanzania moves its forces farther
into Uganda.
25X1 icers or u anese origin--the'
nucleus of Amin's power base in the army--told Amin re-
cently they want to quit and go home. This and other
reports of disaffection in the Uqandan Army may have
been triggered by a meeting of military personnel in
Kampala late last week. Amin evidently has smoothed
over his immediate problems with the officers, but they
may become less cooperative if conditions continue to
worsen. Uganda's renewed appeal this week to the UN for
a Security Council discussion of the border situation
reflects Amin's efforts to end the conflict without fur-
ther loss of face. Despite Ugandan charges of partisan-
ship by the US and the UK, the Ugandan Foreign Minister
assured the diplomatic corps in Kampala that US and
British citizens in Uganda are safe.
CHILE: Foreign Investment
Chile's economy is becoming increasingly attractive
to foreign investors. A US firm recently organized a
consortium of local and international companies to con-
struct a $130 million ethylene plant in southern Chile--
the largest foreign investment in Chile since the Pino-
chet government took power in 1973. It nearly equals
the $150 million in direct investments recorded last
year. Bank financing for the project has been committed,
and construction could start within 90 days. The US
firm is also eyeing investments in Chile's rapidly ex-
25X1 panding forestry sector. F7 I
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//Prime Minister Manley's government may be provoking
violence to justify further strongarm measures against
the increasingly effective opposition part . An eyewit-
ness alleged that
the Jamaican police last week killed a reformed" opposi-
tion thug who helped negotiate and enforce a year-long
truce among armed political gangs in Kingston's slums.
Manley's security minister has reportedly taken credit
for the murder and has boasted that there will be more
political killings. The respected Jamaican Council on
Human Rights has cast doubt on the official version of
the murder and has called for an independent investiga-
tion of 18 other police killings in the past two months.//
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SPECIAL ANALYSIS
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IRAN: An Assessment of the Left
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firmly entrenched throughout the oilfields.
Oreports that radical left-wing groups have
The attack on the US Embassy in Tehran yesterday
dramatically illustrated the growing power of the left
in Iran. There is no one organization of the left and
its leadership is largely anonymous. The leftists have
long drawn much of their support from students and are
usually highly dedicated. In some cases, they operate
in well-organized clandestine groups.
The left has been very active in recruitina war
in the oilfields.
Founded in 1971 as an outgrowth of earlier Marxist
guerrilla organizations, the Chariks have long engaged
in attacks on Iranian police stations and aar-iai- +., ,-.o,.--
In the early 1970s, the Chariks cooperated with the
Islamic terrorist group known as the People's Strugglers
or Mujahiddin, which is cl y tied to Ayatollah
Khomeini.
The Chariks espouse a vague philosophy they call
Islamic Marxism. They use a good deal of Marxist termi-
nology but also stress their commitment to traditional
Islamic religious principles. We have no information
that the pro-Soviet Communist Tudeh Party is in contact
with the Chariks but we do not rule ou some clandestine
25X1 communications.
The Chariks have received training in the past from
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and
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from South Yemen. The current extent of foreign support
for the Chariks is unknown. 25X1
Late last year, the Chariks stepped up their attacks
on police stations and SAVAK posts in widely separated
parts of Iran. The terrorists were clearly prepared to 25X1
capitalize on the confusion last weekend and they parti-
cipated in several attacks on security positions, obtain-
ing large amounts of arms in the process.
The Tudeh has markedly increased its activities in
recent weeks. It staged its first demonstration on the
streets of Tehran in many years on 21 January drawing 25X1
about 5,000 people. Communists probably have cells on
nearly all university campuses and they now compete openly
with other groups for support.
Tudeh organizers have not appeared openly on any of
the "workers' councils" that now exercise control in such
key areas of the economy as the Central Bank. Unidenti- 25X1
fied leftists who may be party members, however, seem to
provide leadership for some of the councils.
Policy statements from the Tudeh Party leaders in
exile in East Germany suggest that a decision was taken
several weeks ago that the party should become more ag-
gressive in sponsoring activities independent of
Khomeini's Islamic movement. The party has continued to
stress cooperation in a "united front" but a statement
issued in mid-January warned that the Islamic movement
should not seek to dominate other groups. Starting on
13 January, the Tudeh specifically called for the people
to begin an armed struggle. 25X1
The recent increase in Tudeh activities coincides
with a change in party leadership. Iraj Eskandari, who
had been first secretary since 1971, was replaced on
4 January by Nur-ed-Din Kianuri, formerly second secre- 25X1
tary. Kianuri, who at 63 is one of the youngest Tudeh
leaders, is said to be the foremost Tudeh theoretician.
He is virtually unknown outside party circles.
The USSR has always been the Tudeh's principal
patron. Given this close connection it can be assumed
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that Tudeh policies have at least tacit Soviet backing,
but reporting on actual Soviet involvement is not ex-
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At the far left of the political spectrum is the
Revolutionary Oraanization of the Tudeh Party, a Maoist
offshoot that broke away from the official party in the
late 1960s. This group--and possibly other Maoist organ-
izations--is active among students in Europe and probably
also in Iran. It views the official party as too con-
servative and does not eschew the use of revolutionary
25X1 violence.
Other leftist groups are sprouting up rapidly:
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-- A new Marxist party called the Communist
Party of Iran claiming 2,000 members was
announced to the press on 6 February.
-- Press reports yesterday mentioned the
existence of a leftist terrorist rouo
calling itself the "Red Dawn."
The collapse of SAVAK and other internal security
forces in Iran has allowed the left to make considerable
progress in organizing itself. The confusion of recent
days and the widespread distribution of arms in the
capital has enormously benefited various leftist forces,
25X1 especially the Chariks.
The rapidly weakening cohesion of the Iranian mili-
tary is also benefiting the left. The desertion rate
continues to grow in the military and the command struc-
ture has been upset by the recent purges Khomeini has or-
25X1 dered.
Khomeini's own followers are disorganized and have
clearly been unable to restore order to the capital. In
some provincial capitals there appears to be a state of
25X1 near anarchy,
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At this stage the Chariks appear to pose the prin-
cipal obstacle to restoring order. We anticipate further
provocations by the Chariks aimed at weakening the
Bazargan government; they can be expected to resist any
attempt to disarm them. If the government delays forcing
a confrontation with the Chariks, they are likely to
grow stronger and their successful resistance to govern-
ment authority would embolden other terrorist groups.
The ultimate goal of the Chariks appears to be a leftist
government. A Charik spokesman said yesterday the
Chariks are "ready to fight against any regime that is
not sufficiently progressive."
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