NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031100080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 9, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Situation Report
USSR-China-Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Briefs and Comments
Turkey: Violence Increasing . . . . . . . . . . 2
Yugoslavia: KardeZj's Death Rumored . . . . . . 3
Portugal: Communist Isolation . . . . . . . . . 4
Spain: Election Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Portugal-China: Diplomatic Ties . . . . . . . . 6
Congo: New President . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Philippines: Fighting in the South . . . . . . 7
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SITUATION REPORT
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USSR-CHINA-VIETNAM
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Soviet media are giving more urgency to the prospect
of a Chinese assault against Vietnam. 25X1
In a Moscow Radio broadcast on Wednesday, the Soviets
said that reports "from reliable sources" point toward
a Chinese armed attack "in the very near future." The
current issue of the Soviet weekly New Times says China
should be careful to keep its troops from "overstepping
the forbidden line." 25X1
The Soviets first raised the prospect of a Chinese
"invasion" in Pravda on 28 January--the day Deng Xiaoping
arrived in Washington--but those charges drew on foreign
press accounts. Moscow's current warning contains a tone
of greater immediacy and is intended to convey the impres-
sion that it originates from more authoritative sources.
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TURKEY: Violence Increasing
The two recent assassinations in Istanbul are sym-
bolic of the general political and sectarian violence
that is on the upswing in Turkey.
Street fighting, which subsided temporarily follow-
ing the establishment of martial law last December, has
gradually increased and the extent of violence is once
again approaching the levels of last fall. In the past
week, 20 people were killed in scattered incidents--most
of them in provinces outside of martial law jurisdiction.
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Clashes between rightists and members of the left-
ist-oriented Alevi Muslim sect in Amasya Province are a
cause of particular concern. The US Embassy compares
the sectarian tension there to that which preceded the
rioting in the southern city of Maras last December.
Following the recent murder of a public prosecutor and
an attack on an Alevi neighborhood by 100 rightists, the
governor declared a curfew and requested the assistance
of military units to restore order.
The Alevis have been strong supporters of Prime
Minister Ecevit's party and Amasya has one of the
largest concentrations of Alevis in Turkey. They suf-
fered--along with other leftist groups--during the mar-
tial law crackdowns between 1971 and 1973, and the ex-
tension of martial law to Amasya could threaten Ecevit's
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Ecevit will likely yield, albeit reluctantly, to
mounting pressures to extend martial law to Amasya and
other troubled provinces. The left wing of his party
opposed martial law and he will have to assess the ef-
fect of conceding wider powers to the military on his
two-seat parliamentary majority.
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YUGOSLAVIA: Kardelj's Death Rumored
the US Embassy report that the
69-year-o E var Kar elj, a key leader in the Yugoslav
regime, has died of cancer. A public announcement re-
portedly awaits approval by President Tito, who is now
in Damascus on the third stop of a Middle East trip.
KardeZj's death could have a far-reaching effect on lead-
ership rivalries and prospects for a smooth succession
once Tito relinquishes power. F__ 1 25X1
Kardelj has been the regime's supreme authority on 25X1
the th
o
ti
l
d
e
re
ca
an
ideological underpinnings of most,
if not all, the major policies of Tito's 35-year rule.
He has no apparent successor as party theoretician.
Without Kardelj, policy debates promise to be less
focused as competing ideological courses are proposed.
No single individual, aside from Tito himself, could
speak as authoritatively as Kardelj in establishing and
defending long-term goals while coping with day-to-day
problems. Vladimir Bakaric, the senior Croat in Tito's
inner circle, would become the most senior and prestig-
ious of the party elders, but his nationality and limited
experience at the federal level make him ill-equipped to
replace Kardelj. 25X1
Tito's recent decision to call off an announced plan
to replace the eight members of the state collective pres-
idency may reflect the current political deadlock. Ba-
karic has fought to keep his seat on this body because it
ensures him unique status among the nominally equal party
Presidium members. Kardelj, in part to strengthen the
position of Presidium secretary Stane Dolanc, had opposed
Balearic's retention of the state presidency position.
Tito apparently decided not to go through with the rota-
tion at this time rather than go against either faction.
Kardelj's death, therefore, will rive Dolanc of a no-
table supporter.1 -del 25X1
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The Portuguese Communist Party appears more poZiti-
caZZy isolated than it has been since 1975 following the
recent success of three anti-Communist political parties
in organizing a new labor confederation. Many politi-
cians--including independent Prime Minister Mota Pinto--
herald the anti-Communist success as a sign of incipient
Communist weakness. In fact, however, the Communists
may ultimately benefit; government policies may spark
growing labor unrest in the months ahead, and the Com-
munists will be best situated to exploit it.
The Socialists joined the more conservative Social
Democrats and Center Democrats in sponsoring the new
non-Communist labor confederation, the General Workers'
Union. In so doing, the Socialists have further blurred
the left-right distinctions separating them from their
allies. As a result, the Communists have a somewhat
clearer claim to be the representatives of the left.
The Communists would benefit especially if Mota
Pinto goes through with his plans to hold wage increases
to 18 percent, levy taxes on workers' Christmas bonuses,
revamp labor laws, and promote denationalization, which
unions allege will increase unemployment. As the only
party in firm opposition to the government, the Communists
could find themselves in the best position to ex loit
any labor unrest that results.
This prospect could offset a succession of blows
suffered by the Communists since Mota Pinto took office
two months ago. At the grass roots levels, moreover,
the Communists are capitalizing on their superior or-
ganization and their ability to focus on concrete local
issues. The party is managing steady, if plodding, gains
in public support and local government representation.
This progress has come largely at the expense of the So-
cialists, who continue to be hurt by their inability to
define their own political ground and the sharp decline
in the prestige of their leading vote winner, former
25X1 Prime Minister Mario Soares.
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Spain's official campaign period for the parliamen-
tary election on 1 March opened this week with Prime Min-
ister Suarez' Center Democrats and Felipe Gonzalez' So-
cialists apparently evenly matched. It is too early to
say whether the voters are sufficiently disenchanted with
the Suarez government to vote a Socialist government
into power.
Suarez characteristically has seized the initiative
by issuing a decree broadening the government's powers to
combat terrorism. He also persuaded the French Govern-
ment to renounce publicly its policy of accordin Spanish
Basques political refugee status. 25X1
In addition, Suarez will cite the progress toward
democracy, point to his success in slowing inflation, and
argue that such problems as unem to ment are the responsi-
bility of all the parties. 25X1
The Socialists have been signaling that the funda-
mental economic and social changes to which they are com-
mitted will be gradual and pragmatic. The Socialists are
likely to stress that the only real progress made by the
government was the result of Socialist pressure on its
conservative economic policies. The Socialists will
focus on unemployment as their major target, in the hope
of appealing to the labor vote. 25X1
The Communists hope to improve on their meager 9.2
percent showing in the June 1977 election. They predict
that the election will result in a Center Democratic-
Socialist coalition in which they mi ht participate--
perhaps on a consultative basis.
The fourth largest vote getter in 1977--Manuel
Fraga's rightist Popular Alliance--has shed its ultra-
rightist factions and hopes to win enough votes to make
Suarez opt for a coalition with them.
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PORTUGAL-CHINA: Diplomatic Ties
Announcement yesterday that Portugal and China have
established diplomatic relations is the culmination of
more than a year of frustrating behind-the-scenes diplo-
macy. The question of whether Macao would be returned
to Chinese sovereignty was left unanswered; no mention
of the 400-year-old Portuguese enclave appeared in the
final communique. Portuguese Prime Minister Mota Pinto,
however, said that Macao will continue under Portuguese
administration, a status which--according to Portuguese
law--can be changed only by approval of the Macao legis-
lature.
CONGO: New President
Colonel Denis Sassou-Neguesso was named President
yesterday by the ruling Congolese Workers Party. He
succeeds General Yhomby Opango, who was ousted on Monday.
The two men, both northerners, had been engaged in a two-
year power struggle that may not yet be over. Congo's
new power structure and policy orientation may not become
clear until after a party congress scheduled for late
next month. Formerly minister of defense, the 36-year-
old Sassou-Neguesso appears to be more leftist and pro-
Soviet than the relatively pragmatic Yhomby Opango.
Nevertheless, the country's need for Western assistance--
particularly from France--to meet its serious economic
problems militates against more radical policies.
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PHILIPPINES: Fighting in the South
//Fighting in the southern Philippines between
Muslim insurgents and the Philippine armed forces appears
to be about as serious as it was in 1975. Government
spokesmen are claiming substantial progress in establish-
ing military control over western Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago. The government seems to be trying to gain 25X1
the best possible situation on the ground in the event
President Marcos decides to resume negotiations with the
Muslim rebels. Marcos apparently believes that even the
prospect of renewed discussions may blunt further criti-
cism of his martial law regime during the review in the
US Congress of the recently concluded amendment to the
Military Bases Agreement and later on at the Islamic
conference in May.//
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