NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031100020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Release 2004/07/08: CIA-RDP79T00975AO3110 ret
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
2 February 1979
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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Situation Reports 25X1
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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Angola: Possible Reduction of Cuban Troops
Saudi Arabia - South Yemen: Ismail Visit . . . 13
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Special Analysis
Thailand: Foreign Policy Following Vietnamese
Invasion of Kampuchea . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Overnight Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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Ayatollah Khomeini has not named the members of his
Islamic Revolutionary Council, apparently as a conces-
sion to moderate opposition members who have urged him
to proceed cautiously in his relationship with the govern-
ment. One of Khomeini's aides, however, said that the
Council would be announced within two or three days. The
aide also said that strikes would continue until the es-
tablishment of an Islamic republic. 25X1
Khomeini's remarks indicate he still fears that the
Shah may yet be able to use the military, with help from
abroad, to stage a return, or that divisions within the
opposition might lead to reestablishment of the monarchy.
He advised all foreign advisers to the Iranian Army to
leave, denounced "foreign agents who are trying to bring 25X1
the Shah back and save the regime," and urged intellec-
tuals, members of the opposition, and minority groups to
remain united with the Islamic movement.
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(Khomeini and the op-
position have not yet decide now they will take power
from Prime Minister Bakhtiar and the military. They
will probably try to keep pressure on the government
through strikes and demonstrations while continuing ne-
gotiations to arrange a transition to an Islamic repub-
lic.
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The Liberation Movement of Iran was central to the
negotiations between Khomeini and the military in the
last few weeks and will probably continue in that role.
Loosely associated with the National Front, the Libera-
tion Movement and the 74-year-old Bazargan have emerged
as the most dynamic members of the secular opposition.
Unlike most other secular politicians in Iran, Bazargan
has well-established ties with the Islamic clerical fig-
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The Liberation Movement of Iran does not appear to
have its own broad popular base but rather has tied it-
self to Khomeini's mass following. Bazargan is trusted
by Khomeini but is more moderate in his views than the
Ayatollah. The Movement's leadership may well play a ke
role in any government Khomeini establishes.
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ANGOLA: Possible Reduction of Cuban Troops
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The Angolan charge d'affaires in Havana has told
the US Interests Section that a reduction of Cuban troop
strength in Angola was a major topic of discussion dur-
ing President Neto's visit to Cuba that ended Monday.
Although the Angolan Government apparently is not op-
posed to the reduction of Cuban forces, neither Luanda
nor Havana wants a substantial withdrawal that would
jeopardize Angola's ability to deal with perceived threats
from South African incursions or from Angolan insurgents.
The charge said Neto and some members of the rul-
ing political party--with an eye toward the nonaligned
summit scheduled for September in Havana--believe a
Cuban drawdown will lessen criticism of Angola by Nigeria
and other African moderates. Other Angolan Government
officials fear, however, that the US may interpret the
troop reductions as knuckling under to US pressure.
The charge also asserted that Luanda is disillusioned
because there has been no positive US gesture toward
Angola following visits by Assistant Secretary of State
Moose and Senator McGovern. He added that until diplo-
matic relations are established, Angola probably will
not accept any more visits by US officials to discuss
bilateral affairs, although Angola would still be will-
ing to discuss southern African problems.
We believe Cuba would limit any withdrawal to a few
thousand of its estimated 19,000 to 20,000 military
personnel in Angola. Notwithstanding Neto's decision
to establish relations with China, Cuba has a heavy
stake in the Neto government. Moreover, with the
breakdown of efforts to achieve a political settlement
in Rhodesia, Cuba anticipates mounting pressure from
Mozambican President Machel for protection against Rho-
desian strikes and would probably want to maintain a
large presence in Angola to meet this contingency.
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SAUDI ARABIA - SOUTH YEMEN: Ismail Visit
Saudi Arabia has agreed to receive South Yemeni
President Ismail at the end of his current trip to other
countries in the region. The Saudis reportedly hope to
calm tensions along the border between North and South
Yemen--the scene of recent armed clashes. The visit may
indicate an interest by both sides in easing differences,
but we doubt that the Saudis will persuade Ismail to
relax his efforts to subvert North Yemen's government.
The Saudis have reassured North Yemeni President Salih
that they do not intend to sacrifice their good relations
with his country, whose leaders are nonetheless apprehen-
sive about Ismail's proposed visit.
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THAILAND: Foreign Policy Following Vietnamese Invasion
of Kampuchea
Since the end of the Vietnam war in 1975, Thailand
has sought detente with its Communist neighbors and a
closer relationship with its partners in the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations--while at the same time
maintaining a security lifeline to the US. So far this
approach has been successful, thanks to the skill and
flexibility of Prime Minister Kriangsak--the architect
of Thai policy since the military resumed control of
the Thai Government in October 1976.
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The Thai have reacted with characteristic caution
to the invasion of Kampuchea, trying to keep their op-
tions open until the situation there is clarified. Viet-
nam is doing what it can to reinforce that caution, blend-
ing reassurance that Thailand's security is not threatened
with warnings not to interfere. The Thai are fairly
confident that the task of gaining full control of
Kampuchea will preoccupy Vietnam for some time. They
are, however, deeply concerned about Vietnam's long-term
intentions, fearing that Vietnam will expand its sup-
port to Thai Communist insurgents and might ultimately
try to seize northeast Thailand, a region with close
ethnic ties to Laos.
I Thai leaders
are worrying about China's value as an effective counter-
weight to Vietnam's growing power in the region,
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particularly now that Vietnam has the increased backing
of the USSR. The Thai nonetheless still believe that 25X1
China can lay a useful role in blunting Vietnamese am-
bitions.
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Thai expectations for increased US support are
modest. The Thai are aware that a high US military
profile in Thailand could, in fact, provoke the Vietnam-
ese hostility they hope to avoid. Committed to a policy
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of detente, Bangkok basically seeks reassurance that the
US backstop is still there. Reiteration of Washington's
commitment to the Manila Pact and the Rusk-Thanat Com-
munique--which provides for US intervention if Thai
security is seriously threatened by an outside power--
is a perennial request by Thai overnments and one
Kriangsak is certain to renew. 25X1
The Thai further realize that growth of the insur-
gency in their country--which remains at modest levels--
is more likely than a Vietnamese invasion. Thailand has
the military resources to handle the insurgents. Bangkok,
however, does look for foreign aid in helping to address
some of the insurgency's underlying causes--rural poverty
and an inadequate infrastructure--and may seek an in-
creased US commitment aid ral development projects.
Balancing Act
Prime Minister Kriangsak's announcement this week
that he will visit Moscow in March--a visit the Soviets
have pressed for since last summer--is no doubt part of
his attempt to maintain a cosmetic balance in Thailand's
foreign policy as well as a reflection of Bangkok's
assessment of growing Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.
Bangkok may hope that more cordial relations with the
USSR will pay off in fewer problems for Thailand with
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the USSR's Vietnamese clients.
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(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from the
production offices of NFAC.)
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