NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031000150002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 24, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Morocco-Mauritania: Troop Withdrawal.
North Korea - South Korea: Pyongyang's
Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Peru: Relations with Neighbors . . . . . . . . 5
Hungary: No Raw Material Agreement . . . . . . 6
UN: Committee on Disarmament . . . . . . . . . 7
Scandinavia-Vietnam: Freeze on New Aid . . . . 7
Special Analysis
NATO: Reactions to Guadeloupe . . . . . . . . . 8
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MOROCCO-MAURITANIA: Troop Withdrawal
//Moroccan King Hassan is beginning to withdraw the
military forces he sent to Mauritania in 1977 to help
fight Algerian-backed PoZisario Front guerriZZas. The
withdrawal is ZikeZy to proceed cautiously, allowing
Hassan time to assess the attitude of the post-Boumediene
regime in Algiers and that of the guerriZZas toward ne-
gotiating a settlement to the Western Sahara conflict.//
Three basic considerations now make a negotiated
settlement more attractive to Hassan: the apparent de-
cision by Mauritania's military leaders to abandon the
struggle against the Polisario; the death of Boumediene,
who made the Polisario cause a matter of personal
prestige; and the evaporation of popular enthusiasm
in Morocco for a military solution.
Hassan seems to recognize that keeping Moroccan
forces in Mauritania in the face of the Mauritanian
Government's requests for their departure would only
further damage relations. He may also now believe that
the political costs of using Moroccan forces to block
a formal unilateral peace between Mauritania and the
guerrillas would be prohibitive.
The defacto truce between Mauritania and the
Polisario, moreover, has largely eliminated the need for
Moroccan troops to protect Mauritanian rail lines and
industrial sites. As a result, Hassan's military
commanders may have urged disengagement in Mauritania
in order to free additional Moroccan forces for service
in the Moroccan-controlled sector of Western Sahara,
where the guerrillas remain very active.
Moroccan forces were sent to Mauritania under
agreements concluded with the Mauritanian civilian regime
that was ousted last July. There are now 8,000 to 9,000
Moroccan soldiers in Mauritania and in the Mauritanian-
claimed part of Western Sahara.
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NORTH KOREA - SOUTH KOREA: Pyongyang's Proposal
As a counteroffer to South Korean President Pak's
decent call for North-South talks, North Korea yesterday
proposed a meeting of representatives of all political
parties and mass organizations of the two Koreas. The
North Korean proposal seems designed to convey a sense
,--f flexibility, but it does present problems for the
mouth. A period of heightened tactical maneuvering b
the two sides seems in prospect.
North Korea proposes that both sides begin a series
of actions to ease tension and that preliminary talks
start in June to prepare for a meeting in early September
in Pyongyang or Seoul of various political groups. The
North Koreans specifically invited Pak but as president
of the Democratic Republican Party rather than as head
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North Korea may have calculated that resumption of
a dialogue might accelerate US troop withdrawals, limit
the amount of US compensatory military assistance to
South Korea, and perhaps lay the groundwork for eventual
contacts with the US. The North probably feels some need
to counter recent publicity in the US over the sizable
increases in estimates of its order of battle. It may
also see its proposal as a means of keeping the initia-
tive on the Korea question during Chinese Vice Premier
Deng Xiaoping's (Teng Hsiao-ping) coming visit to the
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North Korea's latest proposal presents difficulties
for the Pak government, which may well believe that North
Korea's plan is designed to undercut the legitimacy of
the South Korean Government. South Korea, nonetheless,
probably feels under considerable pressure now to avoid
a premature negative reaction. If so, a period of
heightened tactical maneuvering seems likely by both
sides while they consider ways of addressing the issues
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Peru's responses are out of proportion to the low
level of the espionage incidents, and Chile has so far
taken the expulsion calmly. The Chileans had tacitly
acknowledged the spying charges, but they had expected
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Peru has also lashed out at the Ecuadoreans, who
had earlier arrested some seven Peruvians, apparently
on charges of espionage. Peru charges that the Ecua-
dorians tortured the prisoners to extract military in-
formation, and in its formal protest has demanded an
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PERU: Relations with Neighbors
//Peru's expulsion of the Chilean Ambassador and its
strong protest over Ecuador's alleged maltreatment of
a group of Peruvians are demonstrations of Lima's hard-
ening stance toward its southern and northern neighbors.
If continued, this new truculence, which stems largely
from the growing assertiveness and influence of hard-
line officers, could Lead to increased tension among the
Andean nations, especially because this year will mark
the centennial of Peru's military defeat by Chile in the
War of the Pacific.//
The Peruvians on 20 January declared the Chilean
envoy persona non grata to protest acts of espionage
committed by Chilean diplomats and naval personnel late
last year. On the same day, the government executed a
Peruvian airman convicted of helping the Chileans acquire
information.
//Peruvian Army General Richter, who directed the
government's forceful handling of a recent general
strike attempt, led the push for firm action. Scheduled
to become Peru's prime minister on 1 February, he will
undoubtedly be determined to project an image of tough-
ness at home and abroad.
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HUNGARY-USSR: No Raw Material Agreement
Hungary has been unable to persuade the USSR to in-
25X1 crease raw material shipments to Hungary for the 1981-85
plan period or to provide Hungary with a $1-billion loan,
presumable to finance increased purchases from the USSR.
The USSR has offered to continue deliveries of raw
materials at the 1980 level and was noncommital about a
loan. The Soviets, moreover, want to stop paying for a
portion of their agricultural imports from Hungary in
hard currency and substitute transferable rubles, begin-
ning in 1981. The USSR also has insisted that Hungary
invest more in developing Soviet natural resources.
Hungary, already -heavily burdened by payments for
oil from the Middle East, will have added hard currency
problems if it cannot increase its purchases of raw ma-
terials from the Soviet Union. Hungarian officials re-
port that a stagnation in deliveries of raw materials
will hurt the next five-year plan, when the rate of
growth is expected to be only 3 to 3.5 percent compared
with an average of over 5 percent in the 1976-80 plan
period. Other East European countries also are attempt-
ing to arrange such agreements with the Soviets but-so
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UN: Committee on Disarmament
//The UN Committee on Disarmament convenes today in
Geneva for its first session since being renamed, reor-
ganized, and expanded to 40 members. Algeria will be
the first to serve as the Committee's chairman, a ro-
tating position that has replaced the permanent US-USSR
cochairmanship. France, represented by Foreign Minister
Francois-Poncet, will participate for the first time
since 1960. China will not be represented but has
reserved the right to take its seat. There are indi-
cations that the USSR and its allies might challenge
this arrangement; the "Group of 21" developing countries
and the Committee's Western members apparently will
support China's request. A limit on the use of chemical
weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban will be the
main topics of discussion.//
SCANDINAVIA-VIETNAM: Freeze on New Aid
//Scandinavian countries, which in earlier years sup-
ported the Hanoi regime, probably will complete projects
now under way in Vietnam, but will delay future economic
aid until Vietnam withdraws from Kampuchea. Parliamen-
tary debates are scheduled this week in Sweden and Norway
where public anti-Vietnam sentiment has been growing.
Swedish Prime Minister Ullsten said the pace of Vietnam's
withdrawal will influence decisions on future Swedish
aid. A Norwegian Foreign Ministry official said Norway
will consider halting current projects if Vietnamese
forces threaten to cross the Thai border. The Danish
Government also has decided to freeze additional aid to
Vietnam, including $30 million that had already been bud-
geted for that purpose.//
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NATO: Reactions to Guadeloupe
//The concern and suspicion being voiced by the
NATO governments that were excluded from the Guadeloupe
summit was intense last week. Some representatives said
the health of the AZZiance's consultative process--which
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//Canada's Permanent Representative led off a NATO
session on 16 January by observing that NATO's consulta-
tion process had been in a state of decline prior to the
Guadeloupe summit, but that Guadeloupe had made matters
worse. NATO Secretary General Luns was more direct: he
said NATO consultations had "failed" in recent months
and went on to point to the increasing number of re-
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//The smaller NATO members always have jealously
guarded their right to play a full role in NATO and have
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strongly objected to any attempts by their larger part-
ners to establish distinct and exclusionary relation-
ships. In large part, this is because Alliance member-
ship provides the smaller states with more than physical
security from aggression.// 25X1
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//Membership also gives them a sense of psychological
security, an opportunity to make their views known, and
a chance to play a larger role in world affairs. The
Guadeloupe summit has revived and heightened their fears
that the Alliance might become a two-tier system in
which their influence would be diminished at a time
when issues that directly affect them are coming to the
fore.//
The divisions within NATO between the large and
the small members could have an impact within the Euro-
pean Community. In the weeks ahead, the European par-
ticipants at Guadeloupe will find it necessary to con-
vince the other members of the EC that they have taken
account of their partners' interests as well as their
own.
//Canada places special importance on the NATO con-
sultative process and the Canadian representative took
the lead at the NATO meeting last week in criticizing
the NATO "big four." He explained that because Canada
is not a member of the EC "NATO is the sole forum open
to Canada for this type of consultation."
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//Although the Italians were relatively quiet at
last week's NATO discussions, Italy is more sensitive to
questions of "presence" and "consultation" than other
members of the Alliance. As the largest of the small
powers, moreover, Italy expects to be included in the
councils of the larger powers. Its exclusion from
Guadeloupe, coming just as the government was seeking to
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putes over EC and NATO issues.//
System, is likely to figure in any future domestic dis-
develop public support for joining the European Monetary
//The decision to give the nonparticipants a second,
more detailed briefing on Guadeloupe smoothed some of
the ruffled feathers, but the smaller allies will be
particularly vigilant for future instances in which they
feel they are being ignored. Some concede that there
are times when the four major NATO members need to meet
alone, but they all insist that the smaller countries
must be kept fully informed about what occurs. This is
particularly the case where the interests of all NATO
members are involved as they were in many of the issues
talked about at Guadeloupe and as they were in the dis-
25X1 cussions of aid to Turkey.//
//Current procedures for consulting with NATO--on
the SALT negotiations, for example--will be strained as
East-West negotiations on "Gray Area Systems" (primarily
theater nuclear forces) approach. The rotational proce-
dures in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group, where such meas-
ures are discussed, could become a source of controversy
as some members of the Alliance become concerned that
crucial decisions will be made without them.//
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