NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY (CABLE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A031000030002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 10, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed
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Copy
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
Contents
Briefs and Comments
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Namibia: UN Representative's Visit . . . . . . 1
Nigeria: Threat to Transition . . . . . . . . 2
Jamaica: Demonstrations. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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Djibouti-China: Diplomatic Relations . . . . . 3
Special Analysis
Vietnam-Kampuchea: Hanoi's Prospects . . . 5
Overnight Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 25X1
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NAMIBIA: UN Representative's Visit
Martti Ahtisaari, the UN Secretary General's special
representative for Namibia, will go to Windhoek later
this week to discuss with the South African Administra-
tor General the problems blocking implementation of the
UN independence program. Ahtisaari's mission will test
whether South Africa, in order to gain international
support for a Namibian government, will drop its demands
for modifications in the UN program that probably would
be unacceptable to the Security Council.
South African Prime Minister Botha has agreed to
a UN-supervised election in Namibia that would, in ef-
fect, nullify the election conducted by the South
Africans last month. There is, however, still a wide
separation between the conditions demanded by the South
Africans and the stipulations of the UN program. Among
other things, the South Africans still insist that they
will withdraw no troops until they are satisfied that
the South-West Africa People's Organization has ceased
all guerrilla operations. The UN plan stipulates that
South African and SWAPO forces withdraw simultaneously
within three months of a truce. The two sides apparently
also still differ on the size of the planned UN peace-
keeping force.
Ahtisaari's trip to Namibia challenges Botha to
make a quick decision to accept at least an advance
contingent of UN soldiers on the premise that remaining
problems will be resolved later. Secretary General
Waldheim has informed Botha that a UN force must begin
arriving by late February if Botha's goal of an elec-
tion by September is to be reconciled with the UN plan.
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If Botha agrees to the early arrival of a first UN
contingent, he will still hold high cards. All Namibian 25X1
political groups except SWAPO share his wariness of UN
"partiality" for SWAPO and may back the government in
its efforts to limit the actual deployments of UN
soldiers and the activities of the UN civil staff.
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Last month we reported that ethnic and regional
divisions were threatening the process that is supposed
to culminate in the restoration of civilian rule in
October. We are now becoming increasingly doubtful
that the changeover will in fact take place.
The country's new political parties are showing
themselves prone to the same regional, ethnic, and re-
ligious lines of conflict that undermined the first
republic in the 1960s. Interparty differences seem
to be growing sharper. Regional and national elections
scheduled to be held during the year are not likely to
be peaceful. There probably will not be a clear-cut
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There is a growing chance--particularly if ethnic
politicking triggers communal violence--that the transi-
tion will be aborted at some point during the year,
either by the present military regime or by disgruntled
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A civilian government would be less able than the
military to cope with the ethnic and regional divisions
and with the growing economic and social tensions
arising from helter-skelter economic development, urban
growth, and inflation. Events could well convince the
military that it alone is capable of governing the coun-
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Jamaica's opposition party on Monday launched
demonstrations that have disrupted urban business activ-
ity and may have partly shut down the bauxite industry--
the nation's leading foreign-exchange earner. The pro-
test could escalate into a general strike before its
scheduled end on Friday. The demonstrations are the most
effective opposition action since Prime Minister Manley
was elected nearly seven years ago and come at the low-
est point in his popularity. The opposition's eventual
aim is to force an early election on Manley, whom most
Jamaicans blame for the country's severe economic down-
turn. F77 I
DJIBOUTI-CHINA: Diplomatic Relations
China and Djibouti earlier this week established
diplomatic relations and agreed to exchange ambassadors
as quickly as possible. For the Djibouti Government,
the decision is clearly an effort to balance the
diplomatic presence recently established by the USSR.
Djibouti President Gouled, who only reluctantly
acceded to strong and persistent pressure from Moscow
for diplomatic ties, suspects the Soviets will seek to
undermine his fragile regime as well as that of
neighboring Somalia and attempt to pave the way for
increased Ethiopian influence in Djibouti. China has
the same concerns and will attempt to use Gouled's
worries to advance its own anti-Soviet policies in the
Horn of Africa. F7 I
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VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA: Hanoi's Prospects
Vietnam's rapid imposition of a puppet regime in
Phnom Penh and its extended offensive throughout the
country are designed to crush all organized resistance
in the shortest possible time. The outcome--the rapid
establishment of total Vietnamese control or a debil-
itating guerrilla struggle--should become clearer within
a month. In any case, the Vietnamese now appear com-
mitted to a protracted military occupation of Kampuchea,
whatever the cost. F__ I 25X1
In reaching their decision to proceed with an all-
out offensive and military occupation of Kampuchea,
the Vietnamese appear to have banked heavily on being
able quickly to destroy the forces of the Pol Pot regime
and prevent the emergence of an effective Kampuchean
resistance. If this can be done, Hanoi probably reasons
that the cost of an all out offensive will prove to be
no more than that of the previous unending border war.
If Prime Minister Pol Pot and other leaders are
dead or otherwise removed from the scene, the Kampuchean
resistance could quickly fade. 25X1
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I the Kampuchean lea ers
can establish and maintain effective communications,
they might bring considerable pressure to bear on the
widely dispersed Vietnamese forces.
Vietnam will probably have to garrison at least
six to eight divisions in Kampuchea for some time to
control major cities and lines of communication. This
kind of commitment, added to the 30,000 Vietnamese sol-
diers engaged in anti-insurgent operations in Laos, could
in time place a serious strain on Vietnam's military and
economic resources--a strain that could be aggravated
if Western sources of aid dry up in the wake of Viet-
nam's open aggression. This clearly is a cost Hanoi
is prepared to pay, if necessary, and Vietnamese deter-
mination probably is buttressed by a commitment of
Soviet support.
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The extent and duration of Vietnam's military in-
volvement in Kampuchea will also depend on the progress
Vietnam's Khmer clients make in developing an independ-
ent military capability and an administrative infra-
structure throughout the country. The government es-
tablished in Phnom Penh on Monday--and recognized yes-
terday by the USSR--is headed by the same man, Heng
Samrin, who was named as leader of the insurgent "na-
tional front." Some members of the new government were
adherents of the Pol Pot regime who broke awa over is-
sues of policy or power during the last year.
The Chinese will do what they can to ensure that
the Vietnamese occupation develops into a serious, long-
term drain on Hanoi's resources. It may be some time,
however, before the Chinese are able to assess the needs
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support. Thai willingness to cooperate with the Chinese
in such an endeavor is still in doubt.
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(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not
been coordinated within the intelligence community.
They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current
Operations with analyst comment where possible from
the production offices of NFAC.)
India.
Candidates representing former Prime Minister
Gandhi's Congress Party won decisive victories last night
in two parliamentary byelections, the first held since
her one-week imprisonment last month and her expulsion
from parliament--where the Janata Party of Prime Mini-
ster Desai continues to have an overwhelming majority.
The contests were in the south-central state of Andhra
Pradesh, long a Gandhi stronghold. The margins of vic-
tory in each case were much greater than those garnered
there by Congress candidates when the Janata Party won
the national election in 1977; neither Janata candidate
campaigned very effectively on this occasion.
The general strike begun yesterday at the instiga-
tion of leftist labor groups has been a good deal less
effective than its backers had hoped. The strike orga-
nizers, led by the General Confederation of Peruvian
Workers, have failed to paralyze Lima's mass transit,
and most mine and metallurgical workers in the provinces
have refused to go on strike. The stern measures of
the government, including the suspension of constitu-
tional guarantees, have reduced support for the strike.
Egypt
According to the US Embassy, President Sadat has
made clear that he once again regards former War Minister
Jamasi as one of his senior advisers. Jamasi has in
Sadat's entourage for talks with a US Congressman at
Aswan last weekend, although he did not take an active
part in the discussion. While it is not certain what
specific functions Sadat has in mind for Jamasi, the
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President did give precedence to him over Defense Min-
ister Ali in referring to possible participants in a
US-Egyptian assessment of the Middle East - African
situation Sadat has proposed. Jamasi, who lost his de-
fense portfolio in a shakeup of Sadat's inner circle
last October, indicated his pleas having been re-
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