NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010154-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 154
• Publication Date: January 4, 1979
• Content Type: REPORT

Director of
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National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
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CG NIDC
January 1979
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable)
CONTENTS
ret
IRAN: Oil Situation Report . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHINA: Leadership Shakeup . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
CUBA-US: Anniversary Speech. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
BRIEFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Spain
China
FEATURE ARTICLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
TURKEY: Prospects for Ecevit
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IRAN: Oi,]. Situation Report
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Despite exiled religious Leader Khomeini's recent
call to produce enough oil for Iran's domestic needs oil
workers are remaining away from their jobs.
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Oil production has been below 300,000 barrels per
day for the past five days and cannot be increased sub-
stantially for domestic use until workers return to the
refineries now shut down by strikes. Normal production 25X1
levels at these refineries could reportedly be reached
within two weeks after workers return.
A pipeline to Tehran from Abadan--site of Iran's
only currently operating refinery--was damaged, presumably
by sabotage, on Tuesday. The flow of refined products may
be interrupted only tem oraril ; repairs reportedly are
under way.
//There have been only a few minor incidents of sabo-
tage at oil facilities to date, and the Shah's opponents
have not given any indication that they intend to inflict
serious damage to the nation's most im ortant industry.//
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CHINA: Leadership Shakeup
Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) ap-
parently has engineered a major shakeup of the Chinese
Communist Party apparatus that makes his closest asso-
ciate and protege Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-pang) the most
powerful official of the younger generation. Hu, 63, has
inherited Deng's former job as secretary general of the
party, the key official in the party who supervises all
of its activities and has displaced an associate of
Chairman Hua Guofeng (Hua KuO-feng) as head of the party
propaganda department. The move in effect informally
designates Hu as Deng's successor.
The post of party secretary general has been vacant
since Deng lost the job when he was purged in the mid-
1960s. The party leadership apparently had been unable
to agree for more than a decade on a candidate to fill
the powerful post. It probably selected Hu as secretary
general of the central committee plenum last month; at
that time the Chinese announced only that Hu was a new
member of the ruling Politburo. Deng undoubtedly regards
Hu's selection as secretary general as the best way to
insure the continuation of his pragmatic policies.
Hu's appointment as propaganda chief reflects Deng's
evident dissatisfaction with some of China's main media,
which have failed to endorse his campaign to move China
away from rigid adherence to Maoist ideology. The former
propaganda chief, who has longstanding ties to Chairman
Hua, was recently attacked in posters for urging others
not to go along with the desanctification of Mao. Hu,
by contrast, has apparently written articles arguing
Hu's career has paralleled Deng's since the two
served together in the army in the 1930s. Both were
transferred to Beijing (Peking) in the 1950s, when Deng
became party secretary general and Hu became the head
of the party's youth apparatus. Both were purged during
the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. Hu prospered again
(luring Deng's first return to power in the mid-1970s but
fell with Deng in 1976. He returned shortly before Deng
in 1977 and was Deng's main lieutenant in the purge of
followers of the fallen Gang of Four.
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Deng apparently was willing to make some compromises
for Hu's elevation. For example, two former province 25X1
chiefs who were harshly criticized and stripped of their
posts recently at Deng's apparent instigation have since
appeared in the capital in evident good standing.
An editorial in People's Daily published three days
after the party plenum last month departed significantly
from the communique issued by the plenum and seemed to
represent Deng's "dissenting" views. The editorial, un-
like the communique, explicitly endorsed the use of wall
posters as a way for the people to express their opinions.
In fact, the failure of China's three leading media or-
gans to greet the conclusion of the plenum with a joint
editorial suggests continuing disagreement within the
leadership.
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CUBA-US: Anniversary Speech
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Cuban President Fidel Castro used his speech on
1 January commemorating the 20th anniversary of the tri-
umph of the Cuban revolution to deliver his strongest
condemnation of the US since the Carter administration
took office. The harshness of Castro's Language reflects
his frustration over what he sees as Washington's failure
to respond to his friendly gestures during the past sev-
eral months and indicates that Castro has all but written
off the possibility of improved relations in the near 25X1
term. The Cuban President refrained from criticizing
President Carter personally and was careful to Leave the
door open for an eventual normalization of relations.
Castro has been aware for some time that Cuba faces
a period of prolonged austerity unless it can sell its
major export products--sugar and nickel--to the US.
Cuba's hope that the economic embargo would be lifted to
allow access to the US market has been the chief motive
behind its recent gestures concerning human rights, and
Castro was particularly bitter about the Carter adminis-
tration's failure to respond positively.
Castro's biting remarks about the decision to nor-
malize US-Chinese relations arise from his awareness
that China--toward which Cuba has long felt antipathy--
now stands to take advantage of an economic relationship
with the US that is denied to Cuba. Castro emphasized,
however, that Cuba--unlike China--will not abandon its
revolutionary principles to obtain the benefits of com-
mercial relations with the US.
The Cuban President apparently sees no possibility
that local conditions will allow any lessening of Cuba's
military presence in Africa in the near future. In fact,
his remark that Cuba will be "unflinchingly loyal" to
its "revolutionary obligations" implies that Havana will
continue to stand ready to hel its friends in Africa
and elsewhere.
Castro used highly pejorative language in contrast-
ing his government's domestic accomplishments with what
he asserted was the failure of US-supported regimes in
Latin America to overcome their social problems.
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The Cuban armed forces parade Tuesday emphasized
weapons that contribute both to Cuba's defense and to
its military commitments abroad and the increasing mo-
bility of the armed forces. The Cubans showed amphibious
weapons, engineering equipment, personnel transports,
and--in their first public display--armed MI-8 helico -
ters and a unit of naval infantry.
A television documentary shown Tuesday pointed out
that the USSR has provided Cuba all its military equip-
ment free of charge; the commentator put the value of
this equipment since 1959 at several billion dollars.
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Spain
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The assassination yesterday of the military governor
of Madrid and the killings on Tuesday of an Army and a
police officer in the Basque country were probably part
of the campaign by the Basque terrorist group ETA to
provoke the Spanish Government to impose martial law.
Major General Constantino Ortin Gil was the sixth and
highest ranking military officer to be killed since
November 1977 by the terrorists. F7 1 25X1
ETA apparently hopes that the killings will provoke
the military to press the government to impose martial
law. Such a move would draw the military into violent
clashes between security forces and civilians and provoke
further resentment in the Basque area. ETA hopes that
such resentment will make it impossible for the moderate
Basque Nationalist Party to reach an agreement with the
central government on the final form of the autonomy
statute for the Basque area. ETA may also be reacting to
the government's recent step up in arrests of suspected
ETA terrorists.
The government is unlikely to resort to martial law
except in an extreme emergency. Although military leaders
may advise the government to crack down harder on Basque
terrorists, most generals reportedly do not favor im-
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China
China's massive modernization efforts have already
created construction material shortages and bottlenecks.
In anticipation of even larger shortages, the Chinese
have contracted with Japan to deliver 1.5 million to 2
million tons of cement this year. This contract is the
largest cement contract the Ch'n se ever signed with the
West.
China has traditionally been a cement exporter but
bought nearly 200,000 tons of cement from Japan last year.
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The Chinese are importing cement despite their claims
that they produced 67 million tons in 1978--nearl 21
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Imp
orted cement is undoubtedly destined for the 120
major pr
ernment
tion, in
major ci
ojects China plans to complete by 1985. The gov-
is planning a rapid expansion of urban construc-
cluding a doubling of housing in some of the
ties and several tourist hotels designed by
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architects.
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TURKEY: Prospects for Ecevit
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The coming months will test the cohesiveness of the
left-of-center government of Turkish Prime Minister
Ecevit and the resilience of Turkey's democratic insti-
tutions. The declaration of martial Law in 13 provinces
Late Last month has cost Ecevit much of his remaining
political capital in his party, given new opportunities
to the opposition, and Limited further Ecevit's ability
to risk the hard decisions needed to rescue the economy.
It has also reopened the possibility of a political role
for the military. Should Ecevit's precariously poised 25X1
government fall, it is unlikely that a government would
emerge that would be more able and willing to confront
Turkey's domestic and foreign policy problems.
The majority in Ecevit's Republican People's Party
who supported martial law hope it will suppress political
violence, free the government to deal with the economy,
and permit Ecevit and the party to emerge with a healthier
image. The 63 members of the party's increasingly trucu-
lent left wing who opposed martial law remain concerned
that it will fall heaviest against the left and will ul-
timately fortify the right. Ecevit will find it difficult
to cope with the conflicting pressures from within his
party, which have already compelled him to sack his in-
terior minister.
The opposition parties, despite having unanimously
approved martial law in parliament, have portrayed Ecevit
as a weak and vacillating leader who allowed events to
get out of hand. Recognizing that the issue of civilian-
military relations is a sensitive one within Ecevit's
party, the opposition parties have taunted the Prime Min-
ister for not increasing the prerogatives of martial law
authorities. Suleyman Demirel, a former Prime Minister
and leader of the principal opposition party, the Justice
Party, has introduced a motion of censure in parliament
and announced that he is placing his trust in the armed
forces. F7 I
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The neofascist National Action Party, which is be-
hind most of the rightist-inspired violence, has pointed
out that the government has not imposed martial law in
leftist-dominated provinces. The party has called for
martial law in seven more provinces. Alpaslan Turkes,
leader of the party and a major participant in the 1960
military intervention, has made no secret of his desire
for another military takeover to stop the alleged drift
of the government and Turkish society toward Communism.
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Only Necmettin Erbakan's Islamic-oriented National
Salvation Party, which is leaving open the possibility
of again joining in a governing coalition, has hedged
its criticism of the Prime Minister. Although the opposi-
tion parties may not be ready to return to power during
this troubled period, their effort to bring Ecevit down
is unlikely to abate.
Ecevit's continuation in office depends on the evo-
lution of civilian-military relations and the military's
effectiveness in reducing violence. Recognizing this,
Ecevit has sought to assure civilian supremacy by utiliz-
ing such devices as daily meetings with General Staff
Chief Evren, formation of a cabinet-level martial law co-
ordination board, and weekly meetings with provincial
martial law commanders. Ecevit hopes to prevent military
excesses and mollify those in his party who distrust the
military as well as to discredit o osition charges that
he is weak. F77
The prospects that martial law will quell political
violence in Turkey are considerably more favorable than
they are in neighboring Iran. Having intervened twice be-
fore in the political process--in 1960 and in 1971--the
Turkish military has had substantial experience in crowd
control methods and law enforcement.
Turkish extremists of the left and right are feuding
and their activities are chiefly aimed against each other
rather than at the government. The extreme left is di-
vided, and Islam is not as strong a political force in
Turkey as in Iran despite the resurgence of the antisec-
ular sentiment in Turkey. Turkish extremist leaders have
so far been unwilling openly to incite their followers
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to commit acts of violence. Perhaps the most important 25X1
difference between Turkey and Iran is that Turkey's demo-
cratic institutions are better able to channel most dis-
content into constructive give-and-take.
The causes of political violence in Turkey will re-
main, however, even if the military is able to limit the
number of killings and demonstrations. Ecevit-will also
find it difficult to end martial law and thus will have
another problem to face. Others include the worsening
economy, the budget debate in late February, his party's
convention in April, and the senatorial election in
June.
Although martial law will sharply reduce the level 25X1
of violence where it is in force, there is always a
danger that an incident could trigger mass rioting. Vio-
lence might also increase in areas not covered by martial
law. Pressure for an expansion of the area covered by
martial law combined with the continuing downslide in the
economy could well cause Ecevit's government to fall.
The combination of the Ataturk tradition and its
earlier unhappy attempts to govern the country thus far
has inclined the military to stay out of politics. Mili-
tary leaders, however, have been deeply concerned over
the growing economic and internal security crisis, which
threaten both military values and its corporate and in-
dividual economic interests. Even before the martial law
decision, however, the military declared its intention
to "go public" with its many economic and morale prob-
lems, in part because of concern that Ecevit's "New De-
fense Concept" will entail a sharp reduction in next
year's defense budget.
In a manner reminiscent of the period before the
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1960 intervention, General Staff Chief Evren criticized
the parliament for hastily enacting legislation adversely
affecting the morale and economic well-being of his offi-
cers.
Such sentiment and the expected civilian-military
strains if political violence is not quelled could impel
the military to be more assertive. Should the Ecevit gov-
ernment fall, the military might decide to play at least
a behind-the-scenes role in putting together a successor
government. Should that Trove impossible the military
could again seize power. 25X1
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The outlook for the Ecevit government is not prom-
ising, and prospects that Turkey will be able to solve
its mounting problems without at least some indirect in-
volvement by the military are only slightly better.
Forced by events to spend a good deal of his remaining
political capital to curb political violence, Ecevit will
be less willing and able to take the measures necessary
to stop the related problems of stopping the economy's
downward slide and ensuring needed international assis-
tance. The same holds true for confronting the quarrels
with the Greeks over Cyprus, the Aegean, and NATO. Such
immobilism will further aggravate the economic situation
and ma also deter an ade uate international rescue ef-
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