NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010108-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: December 6, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
State Dept. review completed Top Secret
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National Intelligence Daily (Cable) I I Top Secret
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
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SPAIN: Atmosphere Tense . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
North Yemen - Saudi Arabia
China
SPAIN: Constitutional Referendum
IRAQ: New Regional Role
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USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Treaty
The Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship, Good Neigh-
borliness and Cooperation signed yesterday in Moscow
obliges the two sides to consult and take appropriate
measures to ensure the security, independence and terri-
torial integrity of each and to continue developing co-
operation in the military field, but there is no mutual
defense agreement. A Soviet-Afghan treaty signed in 1931,
however, prohibits Afghanistan from allowing its terri-
tory to be used for actions inimical to the USSR, and the
two sides yesterday reaffirmed their commitment to the
"aims and principles" of the 1931 treaty.
The treaty is somewhat unusual because it contains
a clause specifically endorsing Afghan nonalignment and
because it does not call for closer political coopera-
tion. The recent Soviet treaties with "socialist" Ethio-
pia and Communist Vietnam contained clauses calling for
such cooperation.
The treaty also differs from the USSR's treaties
with other Asian states in that it contains a clause
calling for joint efforts to facilitate creation of an
effective Asian security system. Although the previous
Afghan Government had already gone further than any
other Asian country except Mongolia in endorsing Soviet
President Brezhnev's proposal in 1969 for an Asian col-
lective security system, Kabul's neighbors will almost
certainly interpret this clause as additional evidence
that Afghanistan has fallen irretrievably under Soviet
sway. I
Both countries clearly see advantages in having
such a political document as the basis of their relation-
ship. The Afghans may have been more anxious to conclude
it at this time in hope that it will serve as a deter-
rent to both domestic and foreign opponents. The USSR
shares Afghan concerns about both Pakistan's and Iran's
capabilities to "destabilize" the new government, but
its interests in Afghanistan were already protected by
the existing treaties, and Moscow is probably concerned
that the treaty not give India additional cause to ac-
celerate its moves to improve relations with China and
the West.
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The treaty, like the recently concluded Soviet-
Vietnamese treaty, however, is valuable to Moscow in
countering recent Chinese diplomatic successes in Asia.
1 -1
In his first public remarks about Romania's refusal
to go along with increases in Warsaw Pact defense spend-
ing, Soviet President Brezhnev last night said that the
socialist states would not weaken their defenses in the
face of "imperialism's" growing military strength no
matter what "demagogic arguments" are used. Brezhnev
made his remarks at a dinner for visiting Afghan Presi-
Brezhnev's formulation was clearly a rebuke to
Romanian President Ceausescu, who made five public
speeches last week arguing against the need for increas-
ing Pact defense spending. The description of the
speeches by the leader of another Pact country as "dem-
agogic" is unusually harsh, but Brezhnev refrained from
mentioning Ceausescu by name and did not threaten any re-
taliatory measures against Romania. F77 I 25X1
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SPAIN: Atmosphere Tense
//The atmosphere in Spain was tense Zast night as
extremists continued their bid to disrupt the referendum.
Three policemen were shot to death yesterday in the
Basque region, presumably by the Basque Fatherland and
Tiberty terrorist organization--ETA--which apparently
hopes that the steady demoralization of the security
forces will provoke the government to impose martial Zaw.
anish security officials have received reports that ETA
is threatening to kill Basques who turn out to vote and
Lo blow up polling stations; many poZZin officials have
reportedly refused to show up today.//
//There are also some reports that the ultraright
will attempt to disrupt the referendum in Madrid, but
security officials have not discovered specific plans
about such operations.//
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0
Zambian President Kaunda warned on Monday that Rho-
desian and South African forces are planning to attack
Zambia before the end of the week in order to disrupt
the presidential election next week. Kaunda is reacting
partly out of longstanding fears of such an invasion and
partly for domestic political reasons.
Zambia's failure to respond to past Rhodesian in-
cursions has surpassed the country's shaky economy as
the main issue in the campaign. Kaunda, who was in
southern Zambia, designed his remarks to deflect crit-
icism from the population of that area--the hardest hit
by the Rhodesians. He stated that his government is bol-
stering its defenses and would not let further incursions
go unchallenged.
Yesterday, the acting Zambian Foreign Minister in-
formed Western ambassadors that South African Prime Min-
ister Botha had warned Kaunda that Pretoria is aware
that guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organ-
ization are concentrating in southwestern Zambia for
attacks into Namibia to disrupt the elections now under
way there. Botha hinted that South Africa might take
measures to offset any such attacks.
We have no information that either Rhodesia or
South Africa is preparing any raids into Zambia anytime
in the near future. Either country--particularly Rho-
desia--would be tempted individually to attack if it saw
a favorable military opportunity, but neither would make
raids in order to disrupt Zambia's election. Although
Botha hopes to induce Kaunda to restrain Namibian guer-
rilla infiltrations from Zambia, his message may also
have been intended to divert international attention
from the arrest of SWAPO leaders in Namibia last weekend.
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//The public airing Zast week of British-Guatemalan
differences over the future of Belize has made the ne-
gotiating process even more difficult.//
//The British revealed their proposals
o demonstrate to the UN
General ssem y s committee decolonization that the
UK had kept its promise to work for the "early inde-
pendence" of Belize. As we reported earlier, the UK is
offering the Guatemalans an economic development package
and a modest reconfiguring of territorial waters but no
cession of Belizean territory--far short of Guatemala's
expectations. The move reflects London's determination
to resolve the issue as soon as possible and its view
that Commonwealth nations and most nonaligned states
would not oppose the refusal to cede land.//
Guatemalan Foreign Minister Castillo Valdez re-
sponded to the disclosure in a vitriolic speech that
include a direct attack on UK Foreign Secretary Owen.
Although Castillo Valdez categorically rejected the
British proposals, he did note that his government is
willing to continue negotiations with the UK and--in a
new gambit--to have direct talks "with the people of
Belize."
Short of a precipi-
tate, unilateral British move to grant independence to
Belize, the Guatemalans--in part because of their pre-
occupation with events in Nicaragua--are likely to avoid
taking steps toward any major confrontation.//
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I
North Yemeni President Salih arrived in Saudi
Arabia yesterday amid signs that Saudi confidence in
him is waning. North Yemeni officials have noted the
changes in Saudi attitude and are likely to seek renewed
pledges of political support. They probably will also
urge speedier delivery of military items being obtained
through the joint US-Saudi-North Yemeni military program.
Foreign Minister Asnaj, who is accompanying Salih, has
indicated he plans to raise with Saudi officials the
possibility of a regional defense pact to include Oman
and the United Arab Emirates, as well as North Yemen
and Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan, who bears
the primary responsibility for his country's relations
with the two Yemens, will probably question Salih
closely about the continuing unrest in North Yemen and
about recent personnel changes in the cabinet that dis-
pleased Saudi leaders. The Saudis and North Yemenis will
also closely review their current policies toward South
//A recent statement by Chinese Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping confirms that China's population has passed
one billion.
I
The government hopes to lower the annual population
growth rate substantially by the mid-1980s. The 10-year
economic plan approved at the Fifth National People's
Congress early this year stipulates that population
growth be reduced to 0.9 percent by 1985. Chairman Hua
Kuo-feng stated at the same Congress that China should
strive to lower the annual rate of growth to less than
one percent within three years. Either goal is signifi-
cantly more optimistic than the current US estimate
that the rate of growth will only decline to 1.3 percent
by 1985.
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The Spanish electorate is almost certain to approve
'=he country's new constitution by a wide margin in the
referendum today. Approval will culminate a peaceful
Transition from authoritarian to democratic institutions
by a process of political consensus that is unique in
?panish history. As one Spanish politician noted, this
is the first Spanish constitution that has not been
rammed down the throat of one-half of Spain by the other
"calf. Only one issue--Basque demands for special auto-
anomy rights--proved impervious to consensus. The Basque
issue is so contentious that it could in the Zong run
=pose a significant threat to Spain's hard-won democratic
Prime Minister Suarez' decision to let the entire
parliament--the Cortes--participate in drafting the new
constitution in part reflected the fact that his Demo-
cratic Center Union did not have a majority in the
Fortes, but subsequent events make it clear that Suarez
was consistently willing to compromise in order to im-
prove the prospects for acceptance of the new charter.
0
King Juan Carlos played an important role during
the early months of drafting, which began in August of
last year. His success in projecting himself as a mod-
,'rating influence and symbol of unity, as well as the
popularity he developed among the people, helped confirm
the notion that important decisions should be reached by
consensus. Perhaps even more important was the part he
played in reconciling rightists, particularl the
Military to the need for democratic change.
The constitutional committee in the lower house pro-
ceeded slowly at first, largely because Suarez' reliance
,n votes from the rightist Popular Alliance triggered
confrontations with the parties of the left. In late May,
however, Democratic Center Union and Socialist party
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leaders struck a pact that opened the way for compromise
language on such controversial points as regional auto-
nomy, the role of the Church, labor relations, divorce,
abortion, and education. II
The reasons behind the pact between Spain's two
largest parties are complex. Suarez saw advantage in
enhancing his left-of-center credentials by moving away
from the Popular Alliance, and Socialist leader Gonzalez
was looking for a way to break in on the cozy tactical
arrangement that had developed between. Suarez and Com-
munist leader Santiago Carrillo. Both Suarez and Gonzalez
share a belief that consensus is essential if democracy
is to take root.
With a few important exceptions, the pact held
firm for the remainder of the constitutional committee's
deliberations and during the subsequennt consideration of
the draft constitution by both houses of the Cortes.
When the leaders could not agree on a particular matter,
they compromised by a general statement that left the
details to future enabling legislation or judicial in-
terpretation.
Under the new constitution, executive power is
centered in the prime minister. He chooses his ministers,
and they are responsible to him; he in turn is respons-
ible to the Congress of Deputies--the lower house of
the legislature. The prime minister serves a four-year
legislative term unless he loses a vote of confidence
or censure, or decides for tactical reasons to dissolve
the legislature early. The Congress' abilit to remove
a government is sharply circumscribed. II
The lower house of the legislature is elected ac-
cording to a modified system of proportional representa-
tion; most of the Senate--the upper house--is directly
elected. The assemblies in autonomous communities ap-
point several Senators.
The King remains Chief of State but his main func-
tions will be consultative and ceremonial; all of his
important acts are subject to countersignature. Juan
Carlos' influence, however, is likely to be important,
and with the military it could be critical.
Reflecting demands for greater self-government
from the Basques and from other "nationalities," the
new constitution provides that those of the 50 Spanish
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provinces that so desire may form autonomous "communi-
ties" and allocates certain powers to these "communi-
ties." All major powers, however are initially reserved
to the central government. III
Basque demands for special status under the auto-
nomy provisions could yet undo the carefully built demo-
cratic structure. Even the relatively moderate Basque
Nationalists, who represent the majority of ethnic
Basques, insisted on constitutional language that in
essence would put their region's "historic rights" out-
side the constitution. For various reasons--but primarily
because the military would not tolerate such a potential
threat to national unity--the overnment could not ac-
cept the Basque demands.
The Basque Nationalists abstained on the final vote
in both houses and are urging abstention in the referen-
dum. The constitution is still likely to win approval in
the Basque provinces, but a high rate of abstention
possibly 50 percent in two of them--is probable.
Nationwide, the government would consider approval
by 70 percent of those casting ballots a victory. Opin-
ion polls forecast a national abstention rate of 25 per-
cent with 5 to 10 percent of those voting coming out
against the constitution.
Until recently, it had seemed that promulgation of
the constitution would signal the end of the consensus
era as the parties turned toward the next national elec-
tion and pressures of partisan politics asserted them-
selves. The major parties, however, have had second
thoughts about the advantage of holding an early election
and the resolution of significant remaining problems--
the economy and the growin Basque problem--still seems
to require consensus. II
Confronted with these challenges and faced with the
prospect of tough legislative battles over enabling
legislation for the constitution, Spain's politicians
may decide to prolong their consensus approach. If the
tension persists, Suarez' Centrists and Gonzalez' So-
cialists may join in a coalition government. Even such
ith
i
ng w
a coalition, however, would have trouble cop
the challenges looming beyond the referendum.
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IRAQ: New Regional Role
The Baathist regime in Iraq, after 10 years of
self-imposed isolation, is now projecting the image of a
responsible party ready to play a positive role in Arab
councils. Whether the change is basic or tactical, Iraq
will almost certainly assume a more significant place in
regional affairs in the next few years. Its emergence as
a regional power is a reflection of its own political
stability as well as its growing economic and military
strength, and of the ZikeZy decline in in Zuence of two
other regional powers, Egypt and Iran.
To Iraqi leaders, Egyptian President Sadat's peace
initiatives and the Camp David accords probably mean
that Egypt--an old competitor--is opting out of Arab
politics and turning its attention to domestic affairs
and toward Africa and Libya. The Iraqis see an opportu-
nity to develop a major leadership role for themselves.
This may explain their reconciliation with Syria in Oc-
tober, their moves to strengthen ties with Jordan, and
their decision to cool their feud with the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
The Iraqi initiative for reconciliation with Syria
this fall followed a decade of hostility between the
rival Baathist regimes. This time, the Iraqis did not
demand, as they had in the past, that Syria abandon its
acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 and
join the rejectionists. In late October, the two regimes
signed their reconciliation agreement, the National
Charter for Joint Action.
It is too soon to tell how far reconciliation will
go, but it clearly does have some momentum. Iraqi Presi-
dent Bakr and perhaps Deputy Chairman Saddam Husayn, the
regime strongman, are scheduled to visit Syrian Presi-
dent Assad in Damascus early this month to review the
work of the joint committees formed in October to en-
hance bilateral cooperation. Iraqi and Syrian leaders
were reported to be planning then to meet Soviet leaders
in Moscow, but that trip now seems uncertain.
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II
Thus far, there has been little of the woolly rheto-
ric that Arab leaders often use to mask the absence of
real progress in their endeavors. Spokesmen for both
.aides are taking a positive view of reconciliation, al-
though the Syrian attitude seems a shade more reserved.
The Iraqis stress that the new relationship with Syria
should be a "unionist" one; the Syrians tend to emphasize
dealing with easier bilateral problems before moving on
A new Iraqi posture was also evident during the
Baghdad summit early last month. Not only did Iraq play
uu restrained role, but it also signed a communique con-
taining a reference to conditions for a "just peace"
with Israel. Iraqi officials deny that they have made a
policy shift, but only a year ago the Iraqi delegate
stormed out of a meeting of the Arab "Steadfastness
.Front" because Syria and the other hardliners would not
renounce the goal of a comprehensive settlement in the
Middle East.
The troubles this year in Iran--Iraq's longtime
rival for predominance in the Persian Gulf--probably
have sparked conflicting reactions in Baghdad. On the
one hand, the Iraqi regime fears that the reactionary
sectarian resurgence in Iran could infect its own Shia
Muslims, who make up about half of the Iraqi population.
Relations with Iran have been good since 1975 when Iran
stopped supporting Iraq's rebellious Kurdish minority.
I=raqi leaders probably would be content to see the Shah
remain in power and bring the disorders to an end.
At the same time, Iraqi leaders probably see the
possibility of benefiting from Iran's problems. Iraq
has long wanted to be the major player in Persian Gulf
affairs. In the past, it has tried to spread its in-
iluence--without much success--by military threats, sub-
version, and aid to local radicals. A corollary has been
Traq's desire to exclude Iranian influence and military
power from the Arab side of the Gulf.
Although Saudi Arabia has been an Iraqi rival for
paramount place among the Gulf Arabs, it has been the
more powerful and aggressive Iran that has been Iraq's
strongest competitor in the area.
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The regime in Baghdad probably has concluded that,
for the foreseeable future, Iran will be forced to look
inward and focus on the socioeconomic problems made
manifest by the unrest this year. Iraq may now feel that
it has the opportunity to gain in the Persian Gulf, and
it would not be surprising to see Iraq revive proposals
for a Persian Gulf security pact among the Arab states
of the area. That goal would require a cooperative ap-
proach and would probably deter Iraq in the near term
from returnin to the heavyhanded tactics it has tried
in the past.
Some Syrian officials who are skeptical of the
sincerity of Iraq's professions of interest in recon-
ciliation believe the Iraqis are motivated mainly by
concern over Soviet intentions in the region. These
Syrians suggest that Iraq feels threatened by recent
Soviet gains in Afghanistan, South Yemen, and elsewhere.
They believe that the troubles in Iran this year tipped
the balance, and led the Iraqis to end their isolation
and seek better relations with their neighbors.
The "new look" in Iraq's foreign posture is moti-
vated by a variety of factors, and concern about the
USSR is undoubtedly one of them. The Iraqis are in fact
nervous about Soviet intentions in Iran--despite their
own arms and technical assistance relationship with the
USSR. Iraq would not want Iran to become another Soviet
client. The USSR might then be able to play off Iranian
and Iraqi ambitions to further its own strategic am-
bitions in the Gulf.
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