NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010084-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 84
• Publication Date: November 21, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

Lu CL Vl
pre or Release 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
Top Secret
Top Secret
CG NIDC 78-0271 C
21 November 1978
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010084-6,
da
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 et
JORDAN: PLO Delegation Visit . . . . . . . . . . .
.
1
25X1
CHINA: Political Atmosphere . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
6
IRAN: Situation R
eport . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
8
NICARAGUA: Situat
ion Report . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
9
EC: ASEAN Ministers to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
10
Oproved For Release 2005/018
25X1
25X1
 25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 a et
JORDAN: PLO Delegation Visit
//The discussions that begin today in Amman
between Jordanian officials and representatives of the
Palestine Liberation Organization are not likely to over-
come the fundamental suspicions that exist between the
two sides. King Hussein will not allow the PLO to increase
its political or military activity in Jordan significantly,
although he may permit a visit to Amman by PLO leader
Yasir Arafat.//
I //A short-lived PLO-Jordanian dialogue early
last year foundered in part because of the lack of any
basis for reconciliation. At present, PLO leaders are at
least pleased with the reserved stand that Hussein took
toward the Camp David accords at the recent Baghdad sum-
mit. The PLO probably hopes that the current talks will
further solidify the Arab front lined up against the ac-
cords and perhaps lead to coordination with Jordan on
future moves regarding the status of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip.//
//Both sides are likely to discuss how to
spend the reported $150 million annually earmarked at the
recent Baghdad summit for use in the West Bank and Gaza.
These funds will be administered by a PLO-Jordanian com-
mittee and channeled through Amman.//
//The PLO may well repeat its longstanding
requests tor permission to station military forces in
Jordan and to expand its political organizing among the
estimated 1 million Palestinians in Jordan. The Jordanians
are almost certain to reject these demands, as they have
in the past.//
took some low-level meetings with Jordanian officials
//The reported inclusion of several pro-
Syrian Palestinians on the PLO delegation suggests that
Syria is keeping a close eye on the proceedings. The
Syrians were angered earlier this year when the PLO under-
without informing Damascus.
25X1
Approve or Release 20051 7: CIA-RDP79T00975AO309000
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000110
CHINA: Political Atmosphere
The political atmosphere in China has heated
considerably since Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping returned
from Southeast Asia earlier this month. The wall poster
that appeared in Peking Zast weekend attacking Mao Tse-
tung for his role in Teng's ouster in 1976 may be outside
the realm of official activity, but it clearly reflects
a popular belief that expressions of anti-Mao sentiment
can influence current deliberations by the leadership.
25X1
Pn 9 November, the Peking municipal party com-
mittee announced that it had launched an investigation
of its recent misdeeds, to be completed in two months.
The investigation undoubtedly will result in major charges
against former Peking party boss Wu Te, who lost his lo-
cal position in October but remains on the Politburo. The
charges against Wu will probably constitute the basis for
his dismissal from the Politburo at the coming plenum.
I I Another likely high-level victim is party Vice
Chairman Wang Tung-hsing, who appears to have come under
increasing fire for his apparent resistance to Teng's
program of setting policy according to needs rather than
on the basis of Mao's teachings.
The Peking party committee announcement also
suggested that former party boss Peng Chen, a leading
victim of the Cultural Revolution, will be rehabilitated.
His return would cast a dark shadow over the legitimacy
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900
10084-6
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03090001'D?18$4ret
F7
of the Cultural Revolution, which now seems to be under-
going a reevaluation. A major article earlier this month
attacked a critique in 1965 of a play written by a Peking
city official; the critique was the opening shot of the
Cultural Revolution.
I IWe do not know whether the wall poster attack-
ing Mao had official sanction. If it did, Teng would ap-
pear to be playing with fire. He is likely to run into
stiff opposition from Mao's chosen heir, party Chairman
Hua Kuo-feng, and others who have acquiesced in indirect
criticism of the late Chairman but would see a direct
assault on him as undermining Hua's position and fuel-
ing a major political confrontation over how far to go
in the effort to desanctify Mao. 777
25X1
25X1
25X1
7 To Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 - 25X1
 To Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900 r- 1 -
IRAN : Situation Report
I Iran appears relatively quiet, and the distur-
bances yesterday in Shiraz and Esfahan have ended. Oil
production and exports continue to increase and are now
approximately two-thirds of their prestrike ZeveZ.
25X1
8 Top Secret
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900
NICARAGUA: Situation Report
//Today's expiration of the opposition-im-
posed deadline for Nicaraguan President Somoza's depar-
ture is the most serious threat to date to the mediation
effort and to the anti-Somoza coalition's own fragile
unity. The Sandinista guerrillas, while clearly better
armed and better trained now than during their offen-
sive in September, are probably still not a military
match for Somoza's strengthened troops. If they decide
to launch another offensive, they would still likely re-
quire a popular uprising to topple the president.//
//While the opposition front reiterated
its time imit to press both the US and Somoza, the coa-
lition recognizes that it cannot afford protracted wran-
gling with Somoza over the terms of a plebiscite on his
rule without risking major defections. Unwilling to com-
promise with Somoza, the members of the front fear an-
other guerrilla offensive could undermine them politic-
ally and possibly expose them to reprisals. In the ab-
sence of a near-term agreement on a plebiscite, these
strains would likely splinter the coalition.//
25X1
9 Top Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO309000 25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030900 a et
25X1
//The Foreign Ministers of the European
Community and the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions conclude today their first meeting and will prob-
ably issue a joint statement on relations between the
two organizations. The meeting in Brussels is primarily
of symbolic importance, but both sides want to expand
political and trade contacts.//
//The EC has been expanding its relations
with other countries, and the exchange with ASEAN com-
plements longstanding EC economic links with Japan and
recent overtures toward China. ASEAN offers a secure
source of raw materials and a small but growing market
for European products.//
//ASEAN is seeking enhanced ties to the
EC in order to balance the role of Japan and the US in
its economic affairs. ASEAN leaders also see the EC as
an important source of technological and developmental
aid. Some members--notably Singapore, Thailand, and
Indonesia--have advocated concluding a formal agreement
with the EC at the meeting in Brussels to institution-
alize economic and political links.//
//Some EC member countries are not enthu-
,
siastic about closer ties with ASEAN, and the Community
wishes to avoid making a political commitment now. West
Germany, which looks upon ASEAN as a major force for
economic and political stability in Southeast Asia, has
been the most interested in improved relations with the
organization. France, Italy, and the UK, however, want
to move slowly. They are concerned that the EC might
arouse unrealistic expectations among ASEAN members and
weaken its traditional links with Africa. They also
want to avoid stimulating demands from areas such as
Latin America.//
//ASEAN has been critical of EC protec-
tionist measures affecting ASEAN exports of textiles,
footwear, jute, and calculators. It has also spoken out
against the EC's preferential treatment of certain de-
veloping nations under the Lome Convention. In Brussels
10 To Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000 - 25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A03090001'O& 84 ret
D
ASEAN will propose a regional scheme--called STABEX--
to stabilize earnings from its commodity exports and
will emphasize the need to establish the Common Fund
currently under negotiation by the UN Conference on
Trade and Development. EC members have already agreed
in principle to create such a fund, but they are not
prepared to agree to the STABEX scheme.//
//The ASEAN countries will also express
their concern with the unabated flow of Indochinese
refugees to their shores and will seek the cooperation
of the EC in expeditiously resettling these refugees.
25X1
11 Top Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0309000 0084-6 25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6
 25X1
l OD Secret
Approved
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2005/08/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30900010084-6