NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030900010046-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: October 28, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Saturday 28 October 1978 CG NIDC 78/252
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Access to this document will be restricted to
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 28 October 1978.
25X1 The NID Cable is tor the purpose of Informing
senior US o icials.
CONTENTS
ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: Negotiations
ARAB STATES: Summit Meeting
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SUDAN: Domestic Disarray
USSR-VIETNAM: Impending Visit
USSR-CHINA: Border Incidents
BRIEFS:
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ETHIOPIA-ERITREA: Negotiations
//Negotiations between the Ethiopian Govern-
men and e various Eritrean guerrilla factions may begin soon,
even though neither side appears ready to make the concessions
necessary for success. They may be ready to begin talks now be-
cause o recent increased pressure from some of their principal
allies.
(Leaders of the three principal Eritrean insurgent
groups assembled in Khartoum, Sudan this week to prepare for
negotiations with the Ethiopian Government. The talks apparently
may begin soon in Tripoli, Libya. The Sudanese, who have long
provided the Eritreans with aid and sanctuary, have threatened
to cut off their support unless the Eritreans establish a uni-
fied negotiating position. The rebels, however, remain deeply
divided over religious, personal, and ideological issues.
Ethiopian leader Mengistu has resisted these pressures thus far,
but he may now be willing to begin talks on the condition that
Soviet.and Cuban military support continues uninterrupted.1
The USSR and Cuba have pressed the Ethiopians for
some time to solve the Eritrean problem through negotiation.
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//Neither the Mengistu government nor the
rebels have thus tar been interested in negotiations except on
their own terms. The Ethiopians are unwilling to grant indepen-
dence to the Eritreans, and the insurgents are unwilling to ac-
cept subservience to Addis Ababa's authority.
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ARAB STATES: Summit Meeting
I IDevelopments in the Middle East during the past few
days pro ably have lessened the likelihood of a major quarrel
erupting between Arab hardliners and moderates when they meet
in Baghdad next week to talk about the Camp David accords. The
successful conclusion of reconciliation talks between Iraq and
Syria this week, Israel's decision to "thicken" West Bank set-
tlements, and speculation about a move of the Israeli Foreign
Ministry and the Office of the Prime Minister to East Jerusalem
have bolstered the hand of the hardliners and made it harder
for Saudi Arabia and other moderates to blunt anti-Egyptian
measures. The moderate tone of the communique issued following
the Iraqi-Syrian talks suggests, however, that an effort will
be made at Baghdad to come up with proposals acceptable to all
the conferees.
with the exception of Egypt, will be represented-at Baghdad.
A preparatory meeting of foreign ministers will begin
on Monday to plan the agenda for the heads-of-state summit
scheduled for 2 November. The 22 members of the Arab League,
Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian
people and for increased moral and financial support to Pales-
tinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza.
The summit will probably call for reaffirmation of
the 1974 Rabat resolution recognizing the Palestine Liberation
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It could also reiterate support for previous Arab
League resolutions that condemn any Arab state that signs a
separate peace treaty with Israel and result in new demands for
imposition of economic and diplomatic sanctions. We suspect
that the hardliners will press for such condemnations and sanc-
tions as a minimal plank and that they will also urge that Arab
League headquarters be moved from Cairo.
I I The hardliners may also call for the creation of a
]oint yrian-Iraqi-Jordanian-PLO command to reestablish the
Eastern Front against Israel. While such a move would probably
be little more than a cosmetic gesture, it would make it more
difficult for Jordan to join the peace negotiations. It is not
clear what position the Arab leaders will take on UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the reconvening of a Geneva
peace conference.
I IThe moderate states seem to have given up on their
attempts to have Egypt at the meeting and to delay the conven-
ing of the Arab heads of state. The moderates appear to have
no strategy for the conferences. They will try to minimize at-
tacks on Egypt and limit any resolutions to bland formulations
on the need for unity.
Egypt has ignored the Baghdad summit because President
Sadat is angered by the lack of public support from Saudi Arabia
and Jordan and the strong condemnations from Syria and Arab
radicals. Sadat has done very little to help the Arab moderates
develop a position from which they can stave off measures that
will further divide Arab ranks and impede efforts at broadening
peace negotiations. Sadat has been in touch with Saudi leaders
and Sudanese President Numayri, but we have no evidence that
the contacts have produced a coordinated strategy. Sadat has
studiously ignored Jordan's King Hussein, and the relationship
between the two leaders is now deeply troubled.
Sadat's disdainful attitude toward the summit conveys
an unrealistic notion that Egypt is invulnerable to Arab crit-
icism. We suspect that at another level Sadat is trying to hide
the fact that he has virtually no ability to influence the
course of the summit and is deeply concerned that the moderate
Arabs will not have the courage to stand up to the more cohe-
sive bloc headed by Syria and Iraq.
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SUDAN: Domestic Disarray
//Sudanese President Numayri's statement of sup-
port on 21 October for the Camp David accords has resulted in
a threat by Ansar leader Sadiq aZ-Mahdi to resign from the Sudan
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Socialist Union, the country's only ZegaZ political organiza-
tion. Although Sadiq, a leading conservative, has for the mo-
ment been dissuaded from an open break with Numayri, the inci-
dent is an indication of the increasing factionalism in Sudan
and of the heightened struggle for control of the Sudanese So-
cialist Union, the key to government leadership.//
//Numayri's public support of Egyptian President
a a was contrary to the Sudanese Sociaist Union's sentiment
//Sadiq and the Ansars have traditionally been
anti-Egyptian, and Numayri's endorsement of the accords was
also a blow to Sadiq's personal standing. Since his return
from exile last year under Numayri's program of reconciliation
with opponents, Sadiq has been pressed by his followers to
secure both"tangible rewards and policy decisions for his re-
conciliation with Numayri.//
I lOne of the Ansar goals--and a condition for Sadiq's
return-7-was Numayri's apparent agreement in principle to hold
elections for all offices in the Socialist Union, possibly in
early 1979. Most of the present members of the Socialist Union,
many of whom are ex-military officers or technocrats appointed
by Numayri, are opposed to new elections. These officials, in-
cluding Vice President Abul Gassim, who is secretary general
of the Socialist Union, are probably correct in their belief
that they could not win free elections and that the traditional
political groups, like the Ansar's Umma Party, would come
to dominate the Socialist Union.
//Although Numayri has been deft in handling Sudan's
con en ing political groups, failure to make good on his prom-
ises to Sadiq could lead to an open break with the Ansar leader
and stimulate renewed antigovernment plotting.//
USSR-VIETNAM: Impending Visit
The Soviets announced Thursday that North Vietnamese
party chief Le Duan and Prime Minister Pham Van Dong will be
visiting the USSR.
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that Vietnam not undercut the Soviets and Hanoi's recent ef-
forts to improve their position vis-a-vis China in Southeast
Asia or--more important--significantly increase the chances of
a Sino-Soviet confrontation over Indochina. The Soviets, how-
ever, will be inclined to give the Vietnamese some measure of
increased support.
I IThe Vietnamese probably will also ask for and receive
additional commitments of food aid to help overcome additional
food shortages brought on by recent flooding in Vietnam. There
is no evidence at present, however, that the need or will ask
for substantial Soviet military assistance.
USSR-CHINA: Border Incidents
I IThe Soviets attempted to reconvene the Sino-Soviet
border railroad commission recently for the first time in 12
years. The Soviet effort, which was followed by a temporary
lull in polemics against China, suggests that Moscow was trying
to quiet the Sino-Soviet dispute during a period of sensitive
diplomatic discussions with the US.
Meetings between 24 August and 30 September to attempt
to eve op an agenda ended in a complete deadlock, and there is
no indication that further discussions will take place. The Chi-
nese wanted to discuss broader border issues as well as alleged
Soviet maintenance activities on the Chinese side of the border.
The Soviets rejected these suggestions, and no agenda was pre-
pared for further meetings.
Heated, officially sanctioned, exchanges between the
two sides less than two weeks after the talks ended underscore
the current bitterness of the rivalry as well as the failure
of the USSR to achieve even slight improvement in Sino-Soviet
relations. Each side is now accusing the other of unwillingness
to make fundamental changes necessary to improve relations.
The fact that a Chinese official revealed the break-
down in the railroad talks, along with recent Chinese references
to past small-scale border incidents, suggests that Peking seeks
to diminish any impression of progress in Sino-Soviet relations.
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Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee has temporarily
postponed his official visit to China, scheduled to begin on
Monday, because of illness. Vajpayee reportedly became ill last
weekend while visiting Nepal and is hospitalized in New Delhi
for what is described in the press as intestinal inflammation.
Vajpayee was hospitalized and treated for a similar condition
last August.
I I There is no indication that the Indians postponed
the trip for political reasons, even though the decision to
have Vajpayee visit China--a significant forward step in the
normalization of bilateral relations--is somewhat controversial
in India.
Vajpayee intends to assess the prospects for settle-
ment o t e Sino-Indian border dispute while in Peking. Some
Indians question whether New Delhi has adequately considered
all aspects of this complex problem. No dramatic breakthrough
on the border issue is expected, but Vajpayee's impending visit
could lead to closer economic and cultural ties and the
way for border talks.
USSR
I The Soviets have increased by five fold--from one to
live H11 owatts per square centimeter--the maximum allowable
level of microwave radiation for the general population. The
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new limit is part of a revised general population standard al-
lowing two to five times higher continuous exposure levels over
most of the nonionizing electromagnetic radiation spectrum.
I I The new standard apparently represents a compromise
in a ispute between the Academy of Science and the Academy of
Medical Science over interpreting experimental evidence. Further
changes in Soviet electromagnetic radiation safety standards
are probable.
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