CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010100-8
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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Thursday 28 September 1978 CG NIDC 78/~
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret
(Security Classification) 25X1
Toa Secret
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National Intelli ence Daily Cable for Thursday, 28 September 1978.
The NIZ) Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CHINA-US-VIETNAM: Relations
BRAZIL: Troubles for Opposition
SOUTH AFRICA: Political Problems
PORTUGAL: Political Moves
ITALY: Socialist-Communist Polemic
NAMIBIA: Election Postponement
BRIEFS:
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CHINA-US-VIETNAM: Relations
//Recent comments by Chinese officials sug-
gest that Peking does not now favor the normalization of rela-
tions between the US and Vietnam. The Chinese apparently have
come to believe that Vietnam would try to use diplomatic ties
with the'US to mask its close alignment with the USSR and
that any US aid to Vietnam that might result from narmaZiza-
tion would only relieve the Soviet economic burden. China has
not warned, however, that US-Vietnamese normalization would
seriously affect its own relations with the US.//
From the end of the Indochina-war until
early this year, the Chinese appeared to support US-Vietnamese
normalization in the hope that it would offset growing Soviet
influence in Hanoi. //As the dispute between China and Vietnam
escalated this summer, however, some Chinese officials began
to convey different signals. Since late August, comments on
US-Vietnamese normalization have been uniformly negative. One
Chinese diplomat has said that normal relations between the US
and Vietnam would "falsely" present Vietnam's foreign policy
as independent rather than as "dictated by the Soviet Union."//
Teng Eisiao-ping, moreover, told Japanese newsmen early this.
month that aid to Vietnam is a "waste of money" and asserted
that the USSR is "instigating" Vietnam to obtain aid from the
US, Western Europe, and Japan.
//One diplomat linked the normalization issue to
US criticism of Cambodia's human rights record by saying that
Cambodia's "internal difficulties" are a direct result of the
threat Vietnam poses with Soviet assistance. He said it would
be wrong for the US to move closer to Vietnam without taking
this into consideration.//
//China has apparently concluded that a prolonged
period of 5ino-Vietnamese hostility is in the offing, that So-
viet influence in Vietnam will grow, and that Chinese interests
therefore lie in isolating Hanoi. Although Chinese officials
are not warning that US--Vietnamese normalization would seri-
ously-affect China's relations with the US, they do appear
intent on making their preference clear to Washington.//
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BRAZIL: Troubles for Opposition
//The opposition candidate in Brazil's p~esi-
entza election, General Euler Bentes Monteiro, may be ;~Zan-
ning to rvzthdraw before the balloting by the electoral c~~ZZege
on 15 October. The move would not affect the outcome--a ;~overn-
ment victory is virtually assured in any event--but the +~ucces-
sion process u~ouZd Zose an important if ZargeZz~ symbolic part
of its democratic trappings.//
Both the moderate and radical wings of the opposition
party now appear to have serious qualms about Euler's campaign.
From the outset, many of the moderates harbored fears of for-
mally taking on the official candidate, Joao Baptista Fic~ueiredo,
and many either did not vote on Euler's nomination at a1:L or
voted against him. The radicals, o:n the other hand, have become
disillusioned with Euler because of his relatively cautious cam-
paign.
Until recently, Euler and the party seemed pre~~ared to
go a cad in the face of almost certain defeat. By capita~_izing
on popular dissatisfaction with the regime, they hoped to im-
prove- the already good prospects for opposition candidatE:s in
November's congressional races. They also apparently hoped to
influence the government somewhat by constantly raising ~rital
issues to which the official candidate would have to res~~ond.
To some extent, they seem to have succeeded; same observers
believe, for example, that the regime issued its political re-
form plan sooner than it would have without apposition px?essure.
The party, however, may have made a serious mistake
by abstaining from the recent congressional vote that ap~~roved
the reform plan--which does advance the cause of political
liberalization to same extent. The opposition contended that the
changes did not go far enough, but in the eyes of many Brazilians
it appeared to be obstructing the very kind of progress it ad-
vocated.
Political survival now is uppermost in the minds of
a number of opposition leaders, and they may be pressing Euler
to desist rather than face ignominious defeat next month. These
leaders believe it is now in their interests to stop struggling.
In fact, one prestigious politician who much earlier had pro-
claimed himself a potential opposition candidate has, in effect,
joined the Figueiredo camp. Those opposition leaders who hope
to have any influence whatsoever with the next government are
undoubtedly now scurrying to mend fences.
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SOUTH AFRICA: Political Problems
A parliamentary caucus of South Africa's ruling
National Party today designates a prime minister to succeed
John Vorster, mho announced his resignation a meek- ag'o. Who-
ever is_named is ZikeZy to adhere to existing government
poZicy'fdr-the foreseeable future. National Party- policies
are evolved by consensus, and the party leaders tend td be
more conciliators than innovators.
The most pressing problem facing the new prime
minister results from the South African decision last week-
to break off negotiations-with the UN for a settlement in--
Namibia. The mood of the cabinet, and much of the country,
appears to be one of increasing self-reliance in the face
of international pressure over South Africa's foreign and
domestic policies. Thus the new prime minister is unlikely
to reopen negotiations on Namibia in the immediate future,
notwithstanding the possibility of both internationally
imposed economic sanctions and a long armed struggle with
the South-West Africa People's Organization.
South Africans seem to feel that they could survive
economic sanctions. Most businessmen, in fact, appear to be-
lieve that many countries will not-honor sanctions, even if
imposed by the UN. The country has been preparing for them
for mare than a decade and, except for petroleum products, is
now about 80-percent self-sufficient.
Although an extended conflict with SWAPO could
drain some of the country's resources and might eventually
provide an opportunity for further Soviet and Cuban inter-
vention in southern Africa, the South Africans appear to
prefer that alternative to the prospect of SWAPO's gaining.
control of Namibia. On Rhodesia, South Africa is unlikely
to change its basic policy of providing limited economic and
military assistance to the transitional government and en-
couraging an acceptable international settlement.
Within South Africa, the new prime minister-will
have to deal with a black majority that is increasingly
questioning the government's policy of denying political
rights to blacks outside the "independent" black homelands.
Despite the riots of the past two years ,_ the .government has
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made no genuine political concessions to urban blacks, who
are gradually becoming more politically conscious. A new
constitution giving some political rights to Asians and
Coloreds has been an aim of Vorster's government, and its
implementation will be a priority task for the new leader.
During the last election, Afrikaans- and English-
speaking South African whites joined together for the first
time under the National Party banner. The new prime minister
thus will inherit a unified white electorate. He will face
gradually increasing white sentiment for removal of the more
irritating aspects of racial discrimination, but not for dis-
mantling the web of apartheid laws designed to guarantee the
separate political development of blacks and whites.
Portuguese Socialist leader Soaves told President
Eaves gesterda~ that the Socialists are readg to support
the formation of a nezu gavernment made up of people u~h~~ mark
be partz~ members but who ~vouZd not represent their parties
in the government. This formula was one of tine alternatives
outlined b~ Eaves in a speech Zast week.
Soaves--who has clearly moved a long way from the
trucu ent attitude he displayed following his dismissal as
prime minister by Eaves in August--says his only condition
now far supporting a new government is that the Socialists
must be consulted in advance about the naming of a prime
minister.
Eaves reportedly is being noncommittal toward
oares He has told the Socialist leader that he will first
exhaust the possibilities of his preferred alternative?--
formation of an interparty coalition government--and h~~ has
declined to respond to Soaves' demand for advance consulta-
tion. According to Soaves, there is no possibility of forming
an interparty coalition because the parties cannot rear_h
agreement on a common program.
Eaves may still be smarting from the Sociali:~ts'
repeated refusals to support him during the past two months,
and he may balk at obtaining prior Socialist approval of a
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new prime minister. Although he could s-till choose a candi-
date acceptable to Soares, his refusal to give ground would
narrow the chances of reaching final agreement with the
ITALY: Socialist-Communist Polemic
A sharp ideological debate between Italy's Socialist
and Communist Parties reflects the tense atmosphere in which
poZitioaZ activity has resumed following the reconvening of
parliament Zast week. The debate was touched off by Socialist
chief Craxi's allegation that the Communist Party cannot be
considered democratic until it repudiates Leninism. The dispute
has embittered relations between the two parties, highlighted
the Socialists' internal differences, and ultimately could
jeopardize the current fragile governing arrangement, which
both parties support.
Craxi's charge is the latest effort to emphasize
the Socialist Party's autonomy and project it as a political
equal to the Communists and the Christian Democrats. He con-
tends that the Communists are weakening leftist unity by
clinging to remnants of Leninism--such as ties to the U55R
and democratic centralism--and are thereby contributing in-
directly to the political power of the Christian Democrats.
The Communists, while defending Lenin's theoretical
and historical importance, say they will revise the party's
stand on Leninism at their congress in March. At the same
time, they are reminding Craxi that some cooperation between
the two parties will be necessary to overcome Christian Demo-
cratic opposition to their positions on certain issues. They
are advising him to assert Socialist autonomy by advancing
his party's own solutions for Italy's practical problems.
Craxi's thesis has raised questions among Socialist
Party factions. Although many Socialists consider the debate
a useful way to distinguish themselves from the Communists,
they still hope to avoid a complete break with the Communist
Party, the .largest on the Italian left.
The Christian Democrats, for their part, have reacted
ambivalently to Craxi's initiative, welcoming tYie criticism of
the Communists but fearing that the polemic will complicate the
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current governing arrangement and might eventually undermine it--
with no workable alternative in sight. Many Christian Democrats
also have begun to worry that Craxi's efforts are calcul~cted to
draw support from their own left wring.
Craxi's chief constraint in attacking the Communists
will be the desire of all three major parties to sustain the
existing government for the foreseeable future. There is no
consensus on an alternative formula, and none of the parties
relishes the prospect of an election. The Corununists want: more
time to prove their own moderation as part of the governmental
majority and to derive same concrete benefits from this coopera-
tion. The Christian Democrats are uncertain whether Craxi would
be reliable as an ally, and thus remain hesitant to jettison the
Communists. The Socialists themselves need time to establish a
credible image, resolve intraparty differences, and decide if and
on what terms they would accept a new version of the cent:er-left
coalition.
The logic of the Socialist leader's strategy nonethe-
less presupposes confrontations with the Communists and Chris-
tian Democrats on practical issues. Craxi wi l have to tread
carefully if he intends to persist in his autonomist course
and yet .avoid some misstep leading to a premature governmental
crisis that nearly all Italian politicians are seeking to avoid.
NAMIBIA: Election Postponement
The South African Administrator General for Namibia
4as announced that the voting period for selecting a eon~;ti-
tuent assembZg has been postponed from Zate November--the
time he announced Zast week--to 4-8 December. The foreign-based
leaders of the South-West Africa People's Organization have
been calling far a boycott of the election, prtimariZz~ because
it is to be carried out without UN supervision. The Administrator
General is seeking to conuince other Namibian groups--which
have threatened for diverse reasons to loin a bor~cott--to par-
ticipate in the voting.
Initial reactions to Prime Minister Vorster's announce-
ment last week that-South Africa would proceed without UN parti-
cipation to prepare Namibia for independence indicate that the
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election may be boycotted by all Namibian groups except the Demo-
cratic Turnhalle Alliance, which is quietly supported by South
Africa. Such a boycott would further discredit. the election,
which the South Africans are holding despite the UN Secretary
General's recommendation that it take place seven months after
the UN begins to participate in a transitional program.
groups that are undecided on an election
Among the
.
strategy are the Namibian National Front--a coalition of many
ethnic-based parties--and the SWAPO Democrats, who are disaf-
fected with SWAPO President Sam Nujoma. Both groups support the
Secretary General's recommendations and have denounced'South
Africa's election plan. Also undecided is a group of hardline
whites who oppose a UN presence in Namibia but hope that holding
the election later would enable them to catch up with the Turn-
halle group.
According to the South African press, the postponement
to Decen. er was primarily an attempt to accommodate the hardline
white group, which has threatened to boycott unless the election
is postponed until early next year. The press speculates that the
group will soon announce its acceptance of the-two-week postpone-
ment.
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//President Zia .has decided, over Foreign
Ministry objections, that Pakistan will not withdraw from
the Western-oriented Central Treat Or anization,
The Pakistanis tiad
een seriously considering withdrawal, hoping thereby i,o
appease the USSR and to improve their relations with non-
aligned nations. They probably a:1so were seeking to signal
unhappiness over their relations with the West. Pressure
from Iran and China apparently dissuaded Zia.
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(Security Classification)
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Top Secret
(Security Classification)
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