CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday 9 September 1978 CG NIDC 78/211
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National Intelli ence Daily Cable for Saturday, 9 September 1978.
The NID Cable is for the purpose o informing
senior US o icials.
CONTENTS
IRAN: Muslims Press the Shah
LEBANON: Situation Report
NICARAGUA: Strike Letting Up
YUGOSLAVIA-ROMANIA-USSR: Tensions
SPAIN-CUBA: Official Visit
FRG: Hijacker Prosecution
BOLIVIA: Pereda's Election Game
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Emigration
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Radical forces within Iran's Muslim fundamentalist
opposition are forcing the pace of events in Tehran, where 58
protesters were killed yesterday in clashes with troops. Muslim
militants apparently are following general, if not specific,
instructions from Ayatollah Khomeini, exiled in the mid-1960s
to Baghdad for activity against the Shah. Directives from mod-
erate clergymen urging restraint are having no observable ef-
fect.
Khomeini, whose photograph is frequently seen promi-
nently displayed by Muslim protesters, has. become increasingly
strident in the past few weeks in his calls for the overthrow
of the Shah. The Shah is clearly concerned about Khomeini and
has. tried to persuade the Iraqi Government to rein him in.
The Shah appears to have concluded that he must re-
assert his authority and crack down on religious-instigated
demonstrations, which have racked the country for the last
eight months. The Shah's decision to declare martial law yes-
terday in Tehran and several other cities was made in response
to large-scale protest marches Thursday staged in defiance of
a government ban on demonstrations.
Perhaps the most difficult problem facing martial law
authorities is how to handle any further illegal demonstrations
without firing on the demonstrators.
The latest reporting indicates that curfews and other
restrictions issued under martial law are being fairly well ob-
served in the capital and other cities where they have been im-
posed.
There are new indications that Iranian terrorists may
be trying to add fuel to the civil unrest. Two terrorist opera-
tions on Wednesday, one targeted against a police installation 25X1
and the other against a bus carrying British nationals, were ap-
parently designed to demonstrate the terrorists' support for
Muslim-instigated protests against the Shah's rule.
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LEBANON: Situation Report
Fighting between Syrian troops and Christian niZitia-
men in East Beirut resumed last night, according to press re-
ports, when militiamen attacked a Syrian position. The militia
leadership remains divided over what strategy to pursue in the
struggle with the Syrians.
The sporadic fighting in Beirut since late August
has been centered in the Christian district of Ayn Rummanah--
a Phalangist stronghold--and the Christian suburbs southeast of
the capital. Neither side appears to want the fighting to get
out of hand at this time, but the clashes are likely to continue.
The Maronite Christian community in Lebanon clearly
is becoming alarmed about its situation. Tens of thousands of
refugees have flooded into the diminishing areas under Christian
control since early July; the population is becoming restless
and urging the militia leadership to "do something."
NICARAGUA: Strike Letting Up
//The effectiveness of the national strike in
Nicaragua appears to be waning. Commercial activity could
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return to normal in the course of the coming week if there
are no new guerrilla actions to give the movement new impetus.
As the domestic challenge eases at least temporarily, Presi-
dent Somoza will be increasingly concerned about growing in-
ternational interest in the Nicaraguan situation.//
//Many businessmen hope that the strike can last
through next Friday, but a few enterprises are already begin-
ning to reopen and the month-and-a-half-long hospital workers'
strike has apparently been settled. The end of the national
work stoppage is being hastened by government countermeasures,
business reluctance to incur major economic losses, and the
virtual absence of guerrilla activities.//
//The fading of the strike will not deflect the
opposition rom its goal of ousting Somoza. Few oppositionists
expected the strike to topple the government, and it never had
clearly defined realistic objectives.//
//Moderate opposition leaders are concerned that
Somoza's tenacity will encourage recourse to radical alterna-
tives. Some moderates, consequently, may be more inclined than
before the strike to begin tentative discussions with the gov-
ernment, but the opposition as a whole i.s not likely to change
its basic position of "no dialogue."//
//The decline in the strike will boost Somoza's
confidence, but he is concerned about the possibility of in-
ternational involvement in his country. Venezuelan President
Perez, Somoza's most active hemispheric critic, has asked for
the Organization of American States to convene a meeting of
foreign ministers to look into Nicaraguan developments. Costa
Rican President Carazo is conferring with Honduras, El Salvador,
and Guatemala about the possibility of offering Central American
mediation to the opposing sides in Nicaragua.//
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The Soviets continue to indicate their displeasure
over CkZnes-e Party Chairman Hua Ku:o-feng's visit to Romania
and Yugoslavia. Thus far, Belgrade is more the target of Soviet
ire than Bucharest.
On Monday, Moscow indefinitely postponed a visit to
Yugoslavia by candidate Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev
scheduled for Thursday. The Yugoslavs do not accept the of-
ficial explanation that Solomentsev has a "busy schedule" and
believe the postponement is in reaction to Hua's visit. On
Tuesday TASS issued a lengthy summary of a highly critical
Albanian commentary on Hua's Balkan travels.
A Yugoslav diplomat in Moscow asserts that the recent
furry of anti-Yugoslav polemics has the support of certain
leaders in the Kremlin. He added, however, that aside from the
Solomentsev postponement other bilateral contacts have not been
disturbed.
A sign of the Yugoslav regime's unease over Moscow's
reaction is its failure to issue an official assessment of the
Hua visit. Such an assessment may be held up until after the So-
viets comment on the current trip to Peking and Cambodia by
Yugoslav Chief of Staff Potocar. TASS has already expressed Mos-
cow's suspicion that Potocar might conclude a military agreement
with China.
Yesterday President Tito, in his first comment on the
Soviet reaction, expressed surprise at Moscow's verbal attacks
on Yugoslavia and Romania. He argued that China's present inter-
national stance is "positive and useful," and that the time was
right for Belgrade's reconciliation with Peking.
The Soviets have been less acerbic in their comments
on the Chinese leader's visit to Romania, and they have refrained
from attacking President Ceausescu personally. Nevertheless,
Bucharest has felt obliged to rebut "insinuations" that the visit
had any anti-Soviet connotation. In a major speech on Wednesday,
Ceausescu responded to Soviet sniping over Hua's alleged designs
in the Balkans by declaring his own opposition to any "intrigues"
that might endanger peace in the area.
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SPAIN-CUBA: Official Visit
Spanish Prime Minister Suarez arrives in Cuba toda
y
for a two-day official visit. The stop in Havana, following
three days in Venezuela, is part of Spain's continuing effort
to promote close ties with its former colonies; it does not
signal a move closer to Communist countries. Conversations
will focus primarily on economic matters.
Suarez may also see a domestic political an
le in th
g
e
Cuban stopover, expecting that his reception in Havana will do
no harm to his democratic-progressive credentials and will keep
Socialist leader Gonzalez and Communist chief Carrillo from
monopolizing ties with Havana. The visit may also assuage left-
ists unhappy with the announcement that King Juan Carlos will
visit Argentina in November.
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The Cubans will welcome Suarez's visit as an indica-
tion of the Castro regime's respectability despite its military
involvement in Africa. Cuba is likely once again to request
transit rights in the Canary Islands for its flights to Africa.
Spain has rebuffed past Cuban overtures, fearing that the Cu-
bans would use these flights to transport troops.
The major focus of the discussions, however, will be
economic. Despite a major commercial agreement in 1974 that
granted Cuba $900 million in trade credits, bilateral trade
has fallen nearly 40 percent since 1975 to $311 million last
year. Spain, nonetheless, remains Cuba's second most important
non-Communist trading partner, and Cuba is Spain's second
largest export market in Latin America. Both sides would like
to expand the relationship.
Achieving any significant increase in trade will be
difficult. Spain has become self-sufficient in sugar--Cuba's
major export commodity--and in any case Spain has been pushing
hard to reduce the price it pays for Cuban sugar to conform
more closely with the world price. Shortfalls in Cuban tobacco
production may cause serious delays in deliveries of Havana's
second most important export product.
FRG: Hijacker Prosecution
//AZZied and West German officials have made little
headway in settling the jurisdictional dispute over who should
try the East Germans responsible for the hijacking late last
month of a Polish airliner. US efforts to turn over responsibil-
ity to West Berlin authorities have been stymied by British and
French concerns over Allied rights and by West German fears of
complicating inner-German relations. Bonn also worries that a
lenient verdict by Berlin authorities could encourage Eastern
counteractions and damage its efforts to gain international ac-
ceptance of the antihijacking declaration issued in July at the
summit meeting in Bonn.//
//The West German Government faces a dilemma. On
the one hand, it favors a tough line toward the hijackers to
show its support for the antihijacking declaration and to
counteract recriminations by the USSR, Poland, and East Germany,
which have demanded the hijackers' extradition.//
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//On the other hand,~the government's domestic po-
sition may suffer if the hijackers receive severe sentences.
The public sees.the hijackers as political refugees. The oppo-
sition parties will doubtless take a similar position, even
though they generally favor a tough law-and-order stance.//
//Chancellor Schmidt is also aware that the trial
of East German citizens in a West Berlin court would increase
tensions with East Germany. Soviet criticism would also accom-
pany a Berlin court trial, given Moscow's view that extension
to Berlin of West German ratifications of the Hague and Mon-
treal conventions, which require local authorities either to
prosecute or extradite hijackers, represents an impermissible
exercise of West German sovereignty over West Berlin.//
//The French and British, like the West Germans,
would ice to see a strict sentence imposed by a specially con-
vened US court, which in their opinion has at least concurrent
jurisdiction over air traffic in its sector. With the exception
of the US, neither the allies nor the West Germans have yet
mentioned that if the Berlin courts do not assume jurisdiction,
Western efforts to strengthen West German - Berlin ties will be
diluted. All parties, however, agree that a unified allied po-
sition must be maintained
BOLIVIA: Pereda's Election Game
The issue of rescheduling a presidential election con-
tinues to dominate the political scene in Bolivia as opposition
parties try to force President Pereda's hand.
All major political parties have rejected Pereda's
earlier offer to hold an election in January 1980. They are de-
manding instead that he set a firm date for an election early
next year and that he initiate major electoral reforms. So far,
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Pereda has refused to be bound by a specific time-table-.-espe-
cially one that would immediately make him a lame-duck--although
he has reiterated his intention to lead the nation toward democ-
racy.
Pereda is clearly on the defensive, and his hold on
power remains tenuous. The opposition parties have not only
seized the initiative but have also called international. atten-
tion to their cause. If he remains unresponsive, Pereda will
find it more difficult to build support for his government at
home and to get badly needed international loans and other eco-
nomic assistance. These pressures could force him to become
less stubborn on the timing of an election.
The military, whose backing is key to Pereda's sur-
vival, is divided on the election issue. While the majority of
officers--especially those in top positions--apparently are
against the idea of holding an election anytime soon, many
younger field-grade officers are dissatisfied with the current
leadership in both the government and military.
Junior officers twice tried to overthrow the previous
administration, and Pereda may attempt to appease them either
by replacing some of his civilian advisers with military tech-
nocrats or by moving the election date forward.
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CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Emigration
Some Czechoslovak dissidents, in reaction to the un-
abating pressure of police surveillance and other harassment,
are thinking of leaving the country. .
A signatory of the dissident Charter 77 manifesto
has told the US Embassy that 30
to
50
people
associated with
the Chartist movement may soon
seek
to
leave
Czechoslovakia.
Among these are Charter spokesperson Marta Kubisova and her
husband, who are considering immigration to the US. Kubisova
indicated several months- ago that she will be stepping down as
spokesperson this autumn.
The Czechoslovak authorities offered in early 1977
to let dissidents emigrate and will probably continue this
policy as a means of draining the strength of the movement.
Few dissidents, however, have taken the option and, in any
event, the departure of even as many as 50 signatories little
involved in dissident activism would not seriously weaken the
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