NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030800010030-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 5, 2005
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 17, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE 0
Thursday 17 August 1978 CG NIDC 78/192 0
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, 17 August 1978.
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e NID a e is tor e purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Peace Talks
ICELAND: Coalition Failure
EGYPT: New Political Party
BRIEFS:
Zaire-Angola
China-Vietnam
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MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Peace Talks
onsored talks in early August between
French-s
p
Morocco and Algeria on their dispute over Western Sahara ap-
parently made little progress. ALL parties to the dispute--
including Mauritania and the Algerian-backed Polisario Front--
recognize, however, that a military solution is unlike?y, and
they will probably continue a dialogue. Over time, domestic
support for a peace settlement is likely to grow in Mo-occo,
Algeria, and Mauritania, and this may encourage consideration
of concessions previously regarded as politically unac,:-eptable.
A French official has expressed disappointment with
the meager results of the talks, but he did not provide de-
tails. He cited Algerian intransigence as the principal ob-
stacle and speculated that Morocco might accept a compromise
concerning the Mauritanian portion of Western Sahara.
I Both Algeria and Morocco may eventually show greater
flexibility as a result of domestic pressures for a peace
settlement. The Polisario Front's cause is not popular in Al-
geria, and Algerian President Boumediene may come under greater
pressure to accept a face-saving compromise.
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Mauritania clearly wants a settlement and probably
is willing to grant autonomy to its portion of Western Sahara
or to withdraw from the area. The Mauritanians cannot opt for
a unilateral settlement in the near term because of the pres-
ence of a 9,000-man Moroccan military force in their country.
Mauritania may be cautiously trying to gain greater
freedom of action in the event joint negotiating efforts with
Morocco fail. Senior emissaries continue to visit Libya, prob-
ably to talk with Algerian and Polisario representatives, as
well as to seek Libyan financial assistance. The Mauritanians
have also won Morocco's grudging agreement to move one of its
battalions farther to the north, an agreement that Mauritania
may later find useful in seeking withdrawal of some Moroccan
units.
ICELAND: Coalition Failure
//Icelandic President EZdjarn yesterday asked
Lu vik Jose sson, leader of the Communist-oriented People's
Alliance Party, to try to form a new government following the
failure of the other major parties to put together a coalition.
Josefsson's prospects do not appear promising; his only likely
coalition partner,'the Social Democrats, do not have enough
seats to give such a government a majority. The two parties,
moreover, disagree on solutions to the country's economic
problems.//
//Josefsson has said that he will invite the So-
cial Democrats and the right-of-center Progressive Party to
join the People's Alliance in a government, but the Progressives
almost certainly will refuse. Josefsson might then attempt to
form a minority government with the Social Democrats, but ear-
lier talks between the People's Alliance and the Social Demo-
crats broke down over disagreements on possible solutions to
Iceland's economic morass--the key issue facing any new govern-
ment.//
//In addition, many of the Social Democrats elected
to parliament for the first time in June are on the right wing
of the party, and they have voiced objections to working with
the "Communists" of the People's Alliance.//
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//Should Josefsson convince the Social Democrats
to loin in a minority government, he would still have to enlist
the tacit support of the two conservative parties to govern.
One of the conservative parties earlier indicated that it
might abstain from voting in parliament if the People's
Alliance and Social Democrats formed a government, but the
other flatly rejected any form of cooperation.//
//While it is conceivable that a leftist minority
governmen would be able to stay in power for some time, any
attempts to institute controversial economic programs or to
raise sensitive security issues such as the US base at Keflavik
would surely provoke strong opposition.//
25X1 //Should Josefsson fail in his effort to form a
minority government, the Icelandic President will probabl ask
the Social Democrats to try again to form a government.
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EGYPT: New Political Party
Egyptian President Sadat is continuing his effort to
impose his own stamp on Egypt's domestic political structure,
but Egyptians are skeptical that his reforms will seriously af-
fect the manner in or effectiveness with which the country is
governed.
I IOn Monday Sadat told the committee charged with or-
ganizing is new National Democratic Party and developing its
platform that party goals were to help solve food and housing
problems and to restore Egypt's traditional "village values."
He ordered committee members into the countryside to determine
the needs of the populace and announced that he would tour all
25 provinces next month on behalf' of the party.
to dump some of the politicians now on the scene and select new
people to run the party. They cite as evidence Sadat's remark
that Prime Minister Salim's centrist party had "done all it
could," along with the fact that prominent politicians did not
attend the meeting of the committee.
Several Egyptian observers believe that Sadat intends
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I //Even if Sadat does shake up the leadership,
the rank and tile of the new party will apparently come from
Salim's old centrist party. An estimated 230 members of parlia-
ment--most from Salim's party--have applied for membership in
the National Democratic Part
to the'new party's banner. Like the politicians, their immediate
concern is to protect their special interests in the new situa-
tion.
wide appeal.
opposition parties openly, efforts are under way to organize at
least two new parties. No 'opposition party is likely to.have
Sadat's political restructuring has not taken final
form, an many questions remain unanswered. At this point, how-
ever, the "new" system bears close resemblance to the "old" and
no amount of grassroots organizational effort will mask the fact
that Sadat's new party is imposed from the top.
Professional and labor organizations have also rushed
Although few politicians are willing to identify with
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Zaire-Angola
Angolan President Neto will visit Zaire on Saturday
them probably will remain.
at the invitation of Zairian President Mobutu. A series of
meetings between lower level officials that began last month
in Brazzaville has already resulted in a significant lessening
of tensions between Zaire and Angola. The two countries appear
to be on the verge of establishing full diplomatic relations.
The meeting between the two Presidents--longtime ideological
enemies--seems intended to show that relations between their
countries are improving, but the basic mutual distrust between
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China-Vietnam
The first two rounds of talks in Hanoi between the
Chinese and the Vietnamese Vice Foreign Ministers proved to be
acrimonious repetitions of last month's talks at the consular
level, and the attitude of both parties makes it highly unlikely
that there will be any progress soon.
Both China and Vietnam have made clear by publishing
their presentations that they intend to use the talks primarily
for propaganda purposes. Neither side has offered concrete or
new proposals. Since the talks began on 8 August, the Chinese
and the Vietnamese have accused each other of poisoning the
atmosphere by provoking incidents among the thousands of ethnic
Chinese stranded at the border since Peking tightened entry re-
quirements in mid-July.
1C ina s Am assa or
to Thailand also held out little hope for the talks' he stated
last week that Peking does not expect the negotiations to succeed
unless the Vietnamese change their attitude, which he judged to
be unlikely.//
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