NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010124-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 124
• Publication Date: July 25, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
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Tuesday 25 July 1978 CG NIDC 78/172
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 25 July 1978,
25X1 The NID cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ISRAEL: Minister's ;Resignation
Page 1
CHILE: Consolidating Support
Page 1
LEBANON: Situat
i
on Report
Page 2
BOLIVIA: Proble
m
s for Pereda
Page 4
NORTH YEMEN - SOUTH YEMEN: Military
Page 5
NONALIGNED: Min
i
sters' Meeting
Page 6
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ISRAEL: Minister's Resignation
Israeli Industry and Commerce Minister YigaeZ Hurvitz
yesterday indicated his intention to resign, apparently in pro-
test over approval of a supplementary budget he considers in-
flationary. Hurvitz's action underscores growing dissatisfaction
in Prime Minister Begin's ruling Likud bloc with Finance Minister
Ehrlich's economic policies.
Begin is said to be attempting to dissuade Hurvitz
from leaving the cabinet, and both men have sought to play down
rumors of a serious cabinet crisis. It is not clear whether any
of Hurvitz's colleagues in the small rightwing Laam faction of
Likud, which holds eight seats in the parliament, will drop out
of the coalition if he does not withdraw his resignation. Hurvitz
has left himself some room for compromise, indicating in an in-
terview yesterday that he would meet with Laam figures opposed,
to his resignation and that he would consider retracting it if
new arran ements could be worked out concerning the supplementary
budget.
CHILE: Consolidating Support
I I The Chilean press is speculating that Manuel Contreras,
e o mer head of the Chilean National Intelligence Directorate,
will be among those indicted next week in the assassination of
one-time Ambassador to the US Orlando Letelier. Because it is
widely believed that Contreras would not have acted without
President Pinochet's consent, the President expects a rough time
ahead and has been working to consolidate his political position.
Air Force General Leigh's ouster yesterday from the ruling junta
was a. move in this direction.
Leigh's ouster was the culmination of his longstanding
feud with Pinochet over the political future of the country. In
this instance, Leigh's personal criticism of Pinochet during
an interview with a foreign correspondent was too much for the
President, who was supported by the other junta members and the
Council of Ministers. Leigh's removal eliminates Pinochet's most
critical colleague and strengthens the President's control over
the junta.
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Pinochet apparently believes his position is shaky. In
recent weeks, he has been campaigning throughout the country
for a continuation of his government. He has been arguing that
many of Chile's domestic problems would become unmanageable if
he were removed. Pinochet also has been successful in playing
upon fears that Chile is being encircled by unfriendly govern-
ments and that it is often the victim of foreign intervention
in its domestic affairs.
One result of his campaign has been the formation of a
personalist political vehicle supporting the President. The
Christian Democrats and other opposition politicians have been
critical of this, but they are not in a position to hinder it
if Pinochet judges that the public is in favor. The President
has substantial popular appeal, but personal movements have had
less success in Chile than in other Latin American countries.
I I Despite Pinochet's efforts, some military officers are
repot a to have been conducting low-key discussions on the
possibility of replacing him. For the few who have considered the
President a liability for some time, the prospect that Contreras
may be indicted argues for a clean sweep of the current leader-
ship.
For the majority who still support Pinochet, however,
the only way to preserve the accomplishments of the military
regime is to keep him in power. Although they have little else
in common, both groups believe that Contreras and Pinochet will
be condemned anew by the world media and that Chile's interna-
tional reputation will be even more tarnished.
I Whatever happens during the next several weeks, it is
clear that Pinochet is prepared to fight any move to oust him.
His inclination is to tough it out, relying on his military and
popular support as well as on his belief that he himself cannot
be indicted in the Letelier murder. Whether he will be able to
ride out the storm is an open question.
LEBANON: Situation Report
Sporadic fighting between Syrian peacekeeping forces
and Christian militiamen continued yesterday in the Christian
suburb of Hadath south of Beirut. Tensions in northern Lebanon
are increasing.
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The fighting in Hadath appeared to be less intense yes-
terday than it was over the weekend. Small-arms firing is con-
tinuing, but the Syrians did not resume their large-scale bom-
bardment of the town during the day.
I I The new fighting nonetheless poses a threat to the
stability of the two-week-old cease-fire in Beirut. If the
clashes cannot be brought under control within the next few
days they will almost certainly spread to the capital. Lebanese
President Sarkis would probably feel obligated to tender his
resignation again, and Israel might consider it necessary to
threaten intervention to prevent the Syrians from seriously
weakening the Christian militias.
While the Israelis say they are counseling the militias
against provoking a new crisis, their actions--including their
resupply of the militias--seem to be encouraging the Christians
to act provocatively.
I Many Christians are convinced that, if they get into
trouble, Israel will have to rescue them to maintain its credi-
bility as a reliable ally.
In northern Lebanon, Syrian troops arrested 70 members
o the Phalanges Party over the weekend, according to Lebanese
press reports. Those arrested have been accused of rocketing the 25X1
home of a supporter of pro-Syrian Christian leader Sulayman
Franjiyah last week. the US defense attache
in Beirut reports tha ere were a so c ashes between Franjiyah
forces and Phalangists in the Bekaa Valley on Saturday.
Syrian media attacks on the Christian militias, parti-
cularly-1- t e Phalanges, have increased in the past few days in
both scope and intensity. The attacks brand the militias as "out-
laws" and highlight their relationship with Israel. The press
attacks seem designed to prepare domestic opinion in Syria in
the event heavy fighting resumes in Beirut.
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Bolivian President Pereda, who took over Last week
in a oodless coup, is encountering strong civilian resistance
to his efforts to form a new government. Although he now has
the backing of key military Leaders, this support could crumble
quickly if the economic situation worsens or political violence
breaks out. To stay in office, Pereda will have to share power
with the Army generals, who constitute the most important
constituency of Bolivia's military presidents.
//Despite his pledge to form a government of na-
tional unity and not to persecute opposition parties, Pereda
has been unable to attract the support of any leading civilian
politicians. His new cabinet consists solely of military offi-
cers and rightwing supporters.//
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//Leftist former President Siles Zuazo has gone
into hiding, vowing to spearhead a campaign of nonviolent oppo-
sition unless a new election is called. He and left-of-center
ex-President Paz Estenssoro have considerable support among the
country's volatile labor and student groups, which are already
restless because of unresolved economic problems. The two ex-
Presidents were Pereda's leading challengers in the recent an-
nulled presidential election.//
Bolivia has suffered a slowdown in economic growth and
is threatened by a worsening balance-of-payments situation as
petroleum exports decline and rising inflation spurs imports.
Although the government has taken steps to reduce inflationary
pressures, it is counting on the US and other countries to ease
its balance-of-payments problem. A refusal by the US to continue
to provide assistance would almost certainly accelerate Bolivia's
economic decline and undercut Pereda's position.
If strong domestic opposition to Pereda persists, he
may be forced to abandon plans to allow political parties to
operate freely and to offer workers major responsibilities in
the management and ownership of the public enterprises that con-
trol much of the nation's economy. A turn toward a more repres-
sive dictatorship, however, would make him even more dependent
on the armed forces. A return by Bolivia to political and eco-
nomic instability would jeopardize the close ties developed re-
cently between Bolivia and its two most important neighbors,
Brazil and Argentina.
NORTH YEMEN - SOUTH YEMEN: Military
//Despite the tensions between them, both North
Yemen an South Yemen are prevented by domestic considerations
from initiating hostilities against the other. South Yemen
would have an advantage in any fighting between the two not in-
volving outside powers, even though its population is much
smaller than North Yemen's.//
//Both countries' armed forces suffer from insuf-
ficient training and mediocre leadership--the North more than
the South. Both are also weakened militarily by political and
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tribal divisions. South Yemen's militia, which normally could
serve as a reserve force, is apparently at least partly occupied
with shoring up the new regime against internal opposition.//
//The military inventories of both countries con-
sist primarily of obsolescent Soviet equipment, but the Soviets
have continued to provide the South Yemenis with newer items.
North Yemen has received some comparable Western equipment
through Saudi Arabia, but it has not kept up with South Yemen
in either quantity or rate of delivery. The North lags far be-
hind South Yemen in the number and sophistication of fighter air-
craft and air defense systems.//
//North Yemen has 13 infantry and two armored bri-
gades, all significantly understrength. They are stationed in
or near the capital, in the eastern desert region, and along
the coastal plain and the South Yemeni border. Political reli-
ability plays some part in assignment of units; the government
is careful to keep units of proven loyalty near Sana to preserve
the integrity of the regime. Officially, the number of North
Yemeni ground force personnel is about 35,000, but the actual
number may be closer to 10,000.//
//South Yemen's Army of about 15,000 men is organized
in 11 infantry brigades, located for the most part in the west-
ern part of the country, and four armored battalions in Aden.//
//South Yemen has three times as many jet fighter
aircraft as North Yemen--half of them MIG-21s--and twice the
number of Air Force personnel. The North Yemeni Air Force con-
sists primarily of older MIG-15s and MIG-17s, and has no MIG-21s
or their Western equivalent. Soviet technical assistance to the
South Yemeni Air Force is extensive, adding to the country's ad-
vantage over North Yemen.//
//Most of North Yemen's nine naval craft are nonop-
erational because of poor maintenance. South Yemen has better
maintained craft.
NONALIGNED: Ministers' Meeting
I I Foreign Ministers of the nonaligned states are meet-
ing Toad y in Belgrade to set the agenda and discuss the poZiti-
cal and economic declarations to be issued at the 1979 non-
aligned summit in Havana. The Belgrade meeting may serve as an
indicator of the movement's direction.
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The meeting comes at a time of unprecedented divi-
siveness among the nonaligned states. Several issues, including
the Middle East and Western Sahara, divide the movement's
regional groups. One issue--Cuban-Soviet intervention in Africa--
has raised serious questions about the movement's political
orientation and focused attention on sharp rivalries for lead-
ing positions in the movement.
The draft communique---prepared beforehand by Yugo-
slavia as host of the meeting---is, in nonaligned terms, moderate.
The draft contains reasonably balanced interpretations of
nonalignment--reiterating its standard tenets--and breaks new
ground with a section cautiously setting out nonaligned posi-
tions on respect for human rights.
The section dealing with the Middle East emphasizes
the need for an overall settlement and calls for reopening the
Geneva talks. It does not contain the heavy-handed, Syrian-in-
spired formulations that were contained in the communique pro-
duced by the meeting of the movement's Coordinating Bureau in
Havana in May. Those statements accused the US of plotting to
promote a settlement without the Palestinians.
The ministers at Belgrade may recommend the convening
of a special session of the UN General Assembly on the Pales-
tinian problem. The formulation equating Zionism and racism
that was first raised in 1975 is not included in the draft com-
munique, but Syria may try to include it.
J The section on Korea is somewhat blander than the
formulation adopted in Havana, although it still favors North
Korea. A North Korean success at Belgrade in marshalling sup-
port could influence Pyongyang"s decision on whether to intro-
duce a resolution in the UN General Assembly this year.
I I Southern African issues are not likely to go beyond
traditional nonaligned positions. In fact, the proposal by the
five Western powers for a settlement of the Namibia question is
likely to receive favorable comment, barring a breakdown in
the current Security Council deliberations.
I lIssues related to the mass media will receive atten-
tion as the group prepares for the UNESCO General Conference
in October and the World Administrative Radio Conference in
September 1979. The movement is responsible for coordinating
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the developing countries' positions for these meetings, at
which important US interests--including the free flow of infor-
mation and continued unrestricted access to radio frequencies--
will be involved.
The delegates to the Belgrade meeting will discuss
contingency planning in the event of a failure of the nego-
tiations on the common fund by the UN Conference on Trade and
Development. Other economic issues likely to be discussed are
the current multilateral trade negotiations, in which develop-
ing countries think their concerns are not being satisfactorily
addressed, and preparations for the next international develop-
ment decade.
Opposing interests within the movement will create
tension at Belgrade, but a split in the group is unlikely. The
outcome more likely will be a show of public unity, while the
struggle within continues. F7 I 25X1
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