NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010112-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 112
• Publication Date: July 18, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tuesday 18 July 1978 CG NIDC 78/166C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
v
State Dept. review completed
CIA-RDP79T00975A030700p j1&Cret 44
(Security Classification)
AMF
Top Secret 25X1
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 Approved For Rele
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 18 July 1978.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
CONTENTS
USSR: Kulakov Death Leaves Void
ZAMBIA-RHODESIA: Cuban Policy
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Relations
ECUADOR: First Round Elections
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
CHAD: Military Situation
Page 5
Page 6
Page 8
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The death yesterday of Fedor Kula";,ov leaves a void
in the Soviet leadership that could have an unsettling effect
on succession politics in the Soviet Union.
Kulakov, who was 60 last February, occupied a posi-
tion in the leadership that marked him as one of the possible
successors to General Secretary Brezhnev. He was certainly the
most advantageously placed among members of his generation.
He was one of the four Kremlin leaders who were both members
of the policymaking Politburo and the party secretariat that
executes that policy. The other three--Brezhnev, Suslov, and
Kirilenko--are all in their 70s and except for Kirilenko are
not in the best health.
For more than a decade Kulakov's principal responsi.-
bility was the supervision of agricultural affairs. His lack
of experience in other fields was a liability and during the
past year he had evidently attempted to create an image of
broader competence.
I IKulakov's obvious ambitions to play a prominent role
in the succession may have become a matter of increasing con-
troversy. In recent months he had received a number of protocol
slights, but he seemed to be participating at his normal level
during the Supreme Soviet session earlier this month.
Kulakov's death. creates a vacuum in the leadership
that will be more important than the role of agricultural moni-
tor he played in the secretariat. The question of whether to
name another secretary with Politburo rank, particularly one
from Kulakov's relatively young generation, is far more sensi-
tive and controversial because it inevitably bears on the suc-
cession question.
Kulakov was a prime contender in his generation for
the top party post largely by default. His credentials were
far less impressive than those of the other potential candi-
dates, but he was in much the best spot--in Moscow. Politburo
members Shcherbitskiy from the Ukraine and Romanov from Lenin-
grad, for example, are both strong contenders for Brezhnev's
mantle. Not having a job in Moscow has limited their chances,
but appointment to the secretariat would correct this deficiency
and also place them in the ruling circle on a day-to-day basis.
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I IThe seniors thus far have determinedly avoided such
steps. The question remains whether they can or will wish to
continue to delay moves that would work to the advantage of
one or another of the "next" generation. If delay on succession
is again in the cards, Kulakov's responsibilities could be
divided between a party elder and a fresh but nonthreatening 25X1
official from the provinces. Brezhnev could impose such a
solution without much difficulty, but in the lon er run it
could lead to resentment in the next generation.
ZAMBIA-RHODESIA: Cuban Policy
the Zambian
Government has ecz e to impose s rie er eon ro s on Cuban
military personnel entering or transiting the country. The ac-
tion was prompted by a number of incidents involving Cubans
and the Zambian-based Zimbabwe African People's Union over the
past several months.//
I //ZAPU, following Cuban advice, has not
respected the gui elines set down by the Zambian Government
almost a year ago to limit the number of Cubans training ZAPU
guerrillas in Zambia. Although the guidelines set no specific
quotas, Zambian President Kaunda directed that only Cubans
with special skills needed by ZAPU would be allowed to enter
Zambia, and then only on a temporary basis.//
I //In mid March a convoy carrying supplies,
trained guerrillas, and 240 Cubans from Angola entered Zambia
without prior approval from the Zambian Government. The convoy
was turned back by the Zambian Army. In late April or May,
Kaunda decided to prohibit flights carrying "large" numbers of
Cubans between Angola and Mozambique from flying over or land-
ing in Zambia.
In theory, the entry of Cuban--and Soviet personnel
to assist ZAPU is determined on a case-by-case basis following
a formal request from ZAPU. Although. Kaunda does not want to
prevent ZAPU from getting the assistance it needs, he remains
determined to prevent a major influx of Cubans into his country.
Some 50 to 70 Cubans are now working with ZAPU in Zambia.
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ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Relations
//Delegations from Zaire and Angola that
met in Brazzaville Last weekend to normalize relations and
lessen tensions apparently reached initial agreement on several
issues.//
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the delegations--meeting under Congolese auspices--agreed:
-- To repatriate refugees who wish to return to their
respective countries.
-- To institute-~ controls to ensure that refugees are dis-
armed.
-- To establish a demilitarized zone on both sides of
the Zairian-Angolan border.
-- To create a multilateral African observer team, ap-
proved by the OAU, to monitor the demilitarized zone.//
(S NF NC OC) //The delegations also agreed to reopen
the Benguela Railroad, but because of the unstable security
situation along major parts of the railroad, the Zairians are
unlikely to export large quantities of goods over this route
for some time F_ I
JIn the meantime, the Angolans
have asked the Zairian military to identify the locations of
Angolan insurgent military camps alleged to exist in Zaire.//
//The Zairian Ambassador in Brazzaville told
the US Charge that Zaire would be looking to the US for logis-
tic support--including aircraft--to assist the multilateral
African observer team.//
//There are a number of contentious issues,
such as the aid both countries provide to the other's dissi- 25X1
dents, that remain to be resolved before relations can be
normalized; the establishment of diplomatic relations apparently
was not discussed.
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An impressive plurality won by populist candidate
Jaime Roldos in the first round of Ecuador's presidential
election on Sunday poses a major dilemma for the country's
military rulers. Government leaders gave repeated assurances
before the election that they would respect the results. Some
of them are worried, however, that a Roldos administration
might be unduly influenced by their major political antagonist,
disqualified presidential candidate Assad Bucaram, who heads
the party that nominated Roldos. This fear could lead to fur-
ther government manipulation of the election, or, if Roldos
wins the presidency in the runoff in September, another coup
d'etat.
According to unofficial returns, Roldos received
over 30 percent of the 1.8 million votes cast, compared to
23 percent for his nearest rival, Sixto Duran-Ballen, the
candidate of a center-right coalition. Roldos' upset victory
came despite a series of surreptitious moves by the government
to scuttle the campaign waged by his party, the Concentration
of Popular Forces.
In addition to its disqualification last February
of Bucaram, who was the party's original nominee and the elec-
tion frontrunner, the government attempted to disqualify Roldos'
running mate, Osvaldo Hurtado. It also secured the removal of
Bucaram and his wife from the mayorality slate in Guayaquil in
a transparent effort to weaken the party's powerful electoral
base in Ecuador's coastal region.
Military leaders opposed to Roldos are apprehensive
that under the influence of Bucaram--who is also Roldos'
father-in-law--he might take punitive action against officers
who have enriched themselves at public expense during the past
six years of military rule. During the closing days of the
campaign Roldos tried to convince the military that they have
nothing to fear if he is elected. Yesterday, however, he made
a victory statement that promised "social changes and funda-
mental reforms."
I I In his statement Roldos also said that if successful
in the runoff he would "forge the moral restoration of the
country." This is the kind of populist rhetoric that drove the
military to cancel the last presidential election in 1972, when
it appeared that Bucaram would be victorious.
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CHAD: Military Situation
//French officials in Chad consider the military
situation stable for the time being. Rebel activity is tow and
the initiative has passed to French and Chadian forces. The
Chadian Government still faces serious economic and political
problems that threaten its survival.//
//The French believe the Libyan-backed Toubou reb-
els are reorganizing and refitting after having suffered about
1,000 casualties during the past year. The insurgents are also
having problems finding qualified technicians and staff person-
nel to help build a force that could stand up to the French.//
According to the French Ambassador in Ndjamena,
French reconnaissance aircraft have detected no recent enemy
troop movements of any significance, and ground patrols are
now operating freely as far as 200 kilometers north of the
Abeche-Ati-Moussoro defensive line.
//The Chadian Army is recovering from its own set-
backs; it lost about half its strength during the fighting of
the past year. The government is having greater success in re-
cruiting new personnel and the fighting spirit of the troops
has been bolstered by French. support and by recent victories,
according to the French Ambassador.//
//Chadian President Malloum apparently is continuing
to make public appearances in government-controlled regions of
the country. The French report that the local populace has be-
come more cooperative and that the morale of local officials is
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improving. France still intends to maintain pressure on Malloum
to replace Chad's ruling Supreme Military Council with a govern-
ment of national reconciliation, including at least some minor
rebel groups.//
//The Malloum regime is widely discredited as a re-
sult of its inability to deal with military and economic prob-
lems. The US Embassy reports that it is doubtful any new govern-
ment will be able to resolve the country's underlying problems,
which will continue to be manifested through protest or rebel-
lion.//
//Libyan Prime Minister Jallud discussed the Chad
issue with French-President Giscard in Paris last week, but
apparently there was no forward movement. French African affairs
adviser Rene Journiac observed that Libya does not seem serious
about reaching an agreement. For its part, France plans to con-
tinue supporting the Chadian Government position that withdrawal
of French troops from Chad should not be the first step of any
compromise with the rebels.//
//The recent Rhodesian operations against
guerrilla bases of the Zimbabwe African People's Union in the
Choma area of Zambia have ended, 25X1
Zambia's refusal to help ZAPU counter the o eszan attacks i's
reported to have aggravated Longstanding differences between
them. Soviet and Cuban advisers may have suggested that ZAPU
try to circumvent the Zambians.//
//Fighting in southern Zambia ended last
Tuesday, and all Rhodesian forces--except possibly a few small
reconnaissance teams--apparently have returned to Rhodesia.
Zambian forces put up little resistance while retreating to
Choma and left ZAPU to face the Rhodesians alone.//
//Zambia's reluctance to fight and its un-
willingness last week to supply trucks to move guerrilla rein-
forcements to the Rhodesian border have aggravated frictions
with ZAPU. After Lusaka refused to supply the trucks, the So-
viets and Cubans arranged for Angolan aircraft to transport
ZAPU personnel from Angola to Lusaka without Zambia's permis-
sion.//
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//Zambia's reluctance to fight and its un-
willingness last week to supply trucks to move guerrilla.rein-
forcements to the Rhodesian border have aggravated frictions
with.ZAPU. After Lusaka refused to supply the trucks, the So-
viets and Cubans arranged for Angolan aircraft to transport
ZAPU personnel from Angola to Lusaka without Zambia's permis-
sion.//
//ZAPU's Soviet and Cuban advisers are re-
ported to have recommended that the guerrillas circumvent the
Zambians whenever possible. They have suggested that ZAPU in-
form the government about guerrilla activities only after they 25X1
have begun, and that it tell the Zambians that weapons drawn
from Zambian-controlled stockpiles would be used for training,
when actually they would be sent to the border cam s.
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//Yesterday's surprise agreement by the seven
world leaders at the Bonn summit to a strong antihijacking
measure could mark a turning point in multilateral cooperation
against terrorism. The seven, at least in principle, agreed to
cut off airline services to and from countries that refuse to
extradite or prosecute hijackers or fail to return hijacked
airplanes. Other states have been invited to join in this
"common undertaking against international terrorism."//
//Numerous practical and legal problems remain.
in addition, some radical Third World regimes are likely to
withhold cooperation in view of their sympathy for "national
liberation movements." While Soviet and East European nations
have signaled some willingness to cooperate with the West Euro-
peans in dealing with terrorists, as witnessed by Bulgaria's
aid to the West Germans last month in apprehending four West
German anarchists on Bulgarian soil, it is not clear that the
would subscribe to this specific agreement. 25X1
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