NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030700010008-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 28, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 16, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday 16 May 1978 CG NIDC 78/114C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized (Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed Top Secret 25X1 0
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ITALY: Local Elections Report
Italy's governing Christian Democrats have made sub-
stantia gains, and the Communist Party has suffered its first
significant eZectoraZ setback in years, in scattered local
elections held Sunday and Monday. With about 80 percent of the
votes counted, the Communists have lost nearly 9 percent com-
pared to the 1976 parliamentary election. A loss of this magni-
tude is certain to spark intense debate among Italian political
leaders over the implications for national politics; eZectoraZ
patterns in recent years have shown a consistent trend toward
the Zeft. Italian politicians have generally drawn together
since the murder of Aldo Moro, but the election results--par-
ticularly if duplicated in local contests later this month and
in June--could make it more difficult for Christian Democratic
and Communist leaders to justify cooperation to their respec-
tive supporters.
I I Only 10 percent of the electorate was involved, but
e elections--mostly in small towns--were the first meaningful
test of voter sentiment since the Communists' sharp advance in
the 1976 parliamentary contest. It is not unusual for the Com-
munist vote in local elections to be about 1 to 2 percent below
the party's total in the same areas during the preceding na-
tional parliamentary contest. In this election, however, the
Communist vote dropped from 35.6 percent to about 27 percent,
suggesting the Communists were justified in fearing that they
might be lumped together with the violent left in many voters'
minds, despite the party's strong support for the governments'
antiterrorist policy.
The Communists attributed the result to a "profound
wave of emotion" favoring the Christian Democrats after Moro's
death. While it clearly is too soon to draw any firm conclu-
sions about whether the vote indicates any basic shifts in vot-
ing patterns, the result is nevertheless likely to intensify
debate in the Communist Party over the pros and cons of Berlin-
guer's cooperation with the government.
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With more than 42 percent of the vote, the Christian
Democrats'scored nearly a 4 percent gain over their 1976 tally
in the same areas. That performance, coupled with the Commu-
nists' losses, may embolden Christian Democrats who prefer con-
frontation with the Communists to Moro's policy of gradual ac-
commodation. With the Communists looking vulnerable, some Chris-
tian Democrats will at least raise the question of whether to
push for an early parliamentary election.
At this point, there appear to be considerable obsta-
cles to such an election, such as probable Communist opposition
and a full calendar of pressing parliamentary business. In addi-
tion, little time is left to arrange a new election because
President Leone cannot dissolve parliament after he enters the
last six months of his term on 24 June.
I I The Socialist vote of around 13 percent, up about 4
percent since 1976, will raise Socialist hopes that the party
is coming out of a period of electoral stagnation. Socialist
chief Craxi has been hinting at a desire for some kind of new
alliance with the Christian Democrats.
I Small contests due to be held soon--Sicilian local
elections on 28 and 29 May and two northern regional elections
in late June--will take on added importance as possible indica-
tors of the public mood. F77 I 25X1
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 16 May 1978.
The D Cab-Le is tor the purpose ot intorming
ZAIRE: Situation Report
USSR: Good Early Grain Prospects
EUROPE: Labor Rights in the USSR
COLOMBIA: Strikes Threatened
BRIEFS:
Dominican Republic
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ZAIRE: Situation Report
I IThe Katangan rebels' incursion into Zaire demonstrates
that t ey may have Learned some valuable Lessons from their
similar invasion Last year. Although the attacks pose a poten-
tially serious threat to President Mobutu's ability to maintain
Zaire's territorial integrity, the attacks are not an immediate
threat to his rule. The Katangans have halted a Zairian coun-
terattack and retain control of most of the key mining town of
Kolwezi. The ability of Zaire's Army to repulse the invaders
and the President's success in obtaining external assistance
may, in the Long run, determine whether Mobuto can continue to
ru"l.e.
The invasion appears to be a well-conceived, coordi-
nated attack on pre-selected objectives. In 1977 the rebels at-
tacked along the Dilolo-Kolwezi railroad and moved eastward
toward Kolwezi, but their drive petered out before it reached
their objective. Last year's attack began during the rainy
season--a factor that usually favors guerrilla forces.
This year however, the Katangans' initial attack
was aimed directly against Kolwezi--a target of strategic and
symbolic importance. In. addition, the Katangans apparently de-
cided to strike at the end of the rainy season. Their timing
may indicate they have the capability for more conventional
warfare.
The Katangans are probably aware that the Zairian
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Army has increased its strength in Shaba Province during the
past year, but they may also believe, with some justification,
istical
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that these forces lack the necessary materiel an
support to repulse a concerted, wel - anned invasion.
The residents of Shaba Province and the government
have a history of mutual antagonism and distrust. Local resi-
dents are reported to be sympathetic toward the invaders. The
Zairian Army, critically short of materiel and plagued by in-
efficiency, low morale, and deficient leadership, will probably
not be able to turn back the invaders without assistance from
other nations.
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I There are conflicting reports over whether Katangan
re e s ve finally captured the town of Mutshatsha. This at-
tack may be part of a Katangan plan to sever the road and rail
link between the hard-pressed Zairian Army units at Kolwezi
and Zairian garrisons near the Angolan border.
I Katangans
control most of Kolwezi, including the air ie and foreign
residential sectors. The Katangans halted a Zairian counterat-
tack that attempted to retake the town and apparently hope the
presence of a large number of foreign civilians there will pre-
vent the Zairians from launching air raids or a major ground
assault against the town. There are about 3,000 Europeans and
75 Americans in the Kolwezi area.
The loss of Kolwezi airfield significantly reduces
the Zairian Air Force's capability to support ground troops in
the area. The Zairians reportedly lost several Italian-made
fighter aircraft, two helicopters, one transport, and several
utility aircraft at the airfield. To offset this loss, the Air
Force has sent four additional Mirage-5 fighters to the Kamina
air base. The six Mirages now at Kamina may be the only fighter
aircraft available to the Zairians.
While the rebels initially posed no threat to whites
in the area, the US Embassy in Kinshasa reports that they are
becoming increasingly hostile. The insurgents have executed
at least two Europeans, and at least one other European casualty
has resulted from the rebels' random firing. The rebels are
also shooting from some Europeans' homes. The civilian popula-
tion of Kolwezi is reported to be very nervous.
If the rebels consolidate their hold on Kolwezi,
they may threaten Lubumbashi, which has a population of over
100,000 and is the largest city in Shaba. The Zairian Govern-
ment continues to deny that the rebels have captured Kolwezi,
and President Mobutu complained to Ambassador Cutler that
statements to the press by the US State Department concerning
Zaire's military situation aid the rebels. The insurgents have
not yet made any demands either for an independent Katanga or
for the overthrow of Mobutu.
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I We do not know whether the French and the Moroccans--
who ai e Zaire during last year's invasion--would be willing
to intervene again. The French are involved in several other
African hotspots. Moroccan forces are already stretched thin
by their fighting with Polisario guerrillas.
Although Zaire's backers may view that country as
an anti-Communist bulwark in central Africa, they may also be
unwilling to send annual expeditions to Zaire to prop up a
regime whose domestic support appears to be eroding.
While Mobutu"s rule is not threatened and he remains
the performance of his army over the next few
firmly in power
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days and his ability to gain external assistance may in the
long run determine his future. 25X1
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//Ethiopia may be attempting to signal the US
a z eszres improved relations. While the apparent over-
ture may represent nothing more than an effort by Chairman
Mengistu's regime to exploit superpower rivalry, it could over
time pave the way for at Least a partial restoration of the US
position in Addis Ababa.//
//Foreign Minister Feleke told the US charge
late last week that Ethiopia, after many months of considera-
tion, has officially agreed to the posting of a new US Ambas-
sador to Addis Ababa. Feleke also indicated Ethiopia's belief
that the US could play a positive role in the Eritrean situa-
tion "by counselling your Arab friends" to cease military sup-
port for Eritrean insurgents.//
//The charge described the meeting as the most
rien y since his arrival in Addis Ababa some six months ago.
He said the Foreign Minister emphasized that Ethiopia valued
its traditions of independence and sovereignty and would not
be a "stooge" of anyone--perhaps a reference to Addis Ababa's
Soviet and Cuban mentors.//
//Feleke's apparent bid for improved Ethiopian-
ies coincides with a decrease in anti-US rhetoric, the
US
cessation of the most violent aspects of the regime's "red
terror" campaign, and an upswing in pro-Somali guerrilla ac-
tivity in the Ogaden. It also comes close on the heels of Chair-
man Mengistu's apparent failure, during his visits to Moscow
and Havana, to persuade the Soviets and Cubans to support an
all-out military push against the Eritreans at this time.//
//Ethiopia's decision to accept a new US Am-
bassador and to solicit US assistance in dealing with the
Eritrean problem may simply be a ploy to press Moscow and Ha-
vana for greater support of Ethiopian policies in Eritrea. The
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US Embassy believes that Addis Ababa's apparent desire for a
thaw in relations is probably motivated in large measure by
tactical policy considerations and that, at this point, Ethiopia
would not reduce its heavy dependence on the Soviets and Cubans.//
//Ethiopian concern over continuing guerrilla
activity in the Ogaden may also help to explain Feleke's re-
marks. Mengistu last weekend warned Somalia that his patience
with its continued support and encouragement of the Ogadeni
insurgency is at an end and that, unless such support ceased
forthwith, Ethiopia would be compelled to take punitive mili-
tary action against the Siad government. This was the strongest
language Mengistu has used against Somalia since the Ethiopians
and Cubans defeated Somali forces in the Ogaden, in early March.//
I //The Ethiopians may hope that, by offering to
improve bilateral relations, they can persuade the US to counsel
Somali restraint in the Ogaden and not to supply arms to Somalia.
The continuing guerrilla threat in the Ogaden constitutes a
drain on Ethiopia's military resources--particularly at a time
when AdHiq a's Primary attention is focused on the Eritrean
front. F77 I
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LEBANON: Failure To Form Cabinet
Lebanese Prime Minister Huss has withdrawn the
resignation of his eight-man cabinet of technocrats that was
tendered Last month. The move dramatizes the failure of Huss
and President Sarkis to put together an expanded "national
unitu" cabinet containing supporters of the country's contend-
ing factions.
I I The failure was largely the result of the obstruc-
tionist tactics of National Liberal Party leader Camille Shamun,
who had insisted on a cabinet limited to members of parliament
because he wanted to exclude representatives of leftist parties
and candidates favored by Syria. Shamun and leftist leaders
exchanged public' slurs, and their polemics put an end to the
somewhat more optimistic atmosphere that had prevailed after
parliament adopted the generalized--and largely meaningless--
"statement of principles" that was supposed to guide the new
cabinet's approach to solving Lebanon's problems.
The failure of Huss and Sarkis leaves the government
but their experiment has undoubtedly
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worsened the situation. Their unsuccessful effort has dramatized.
the paralysis of the central government in an unmistakable way.
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Parties now are more likely to take their grievances
to the streets, and the relative calm that has prevailed in
Beirut since the fighting in April seems likely to end. The
Sarkis-Huss government had shown little initiative in dealing
with the country's problems; continued drift--and deterioration
in the direction of increasing violence--seem likely.
USSR: Good Early Grain 'Prospects
Conditions in most of the USSR's winter and
spring grain areas now appear good. A slightly Larger than
average harvest--of the winter crop--possibly as much as 60
million tons--is possible. Planting of the spring crop is be-
hind schedule in the north European USSR, but elsewhere field
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work is proceeding normally. It is too early to forecast total
grain production, but poor conditions in the next few weeks
could cut winter grain prospects, and about half of the spring
grain area remains to be sown.
//Although in some areas crop conditions con-
tinue to -Be poor, in most regions spring weather has been
generally favorable, and a somewhat larger than average winter
rain harvest now appears possible.
e crop is
however; a e eri ra i.on in ions in the
Ii cona-L
no ye assure=
next few weeks, especially in the important eastern Ukraine
and North Caucasus economic regions, could markedly reduce the
winter crop.//
The Soviets have completed sowing about half their
spring grain crop but are about 4 or 5 million hectares behind
the pace of the past few years. Late snows and a wet spring
s in parts of north European USSR and the southern
d dela
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cause
Urals region. The Soviets have completed seeding in the Ukraine,
and no delays are expected in the important spring grain areas
east of the Urals.
It is too early in the crop season to forecast final
production. The Soviet plan calls for a harvest of 220 million
tons. Should the Soviets be able to harvest 60 million tons of
winter grain, they would still have to achieve a near-record
spring grain harvest in the fall to meet their goal.
I I The Soviets have neared or exceeded a 160-million
ton crop only twice before--159 million tons in 1973 and 163
million tons in 1976. Although conditions thus far do not pre-
clude a harvest of this size, weather conditions from now until
harvest in late summer and early fall would have to be much
better than normal if the Soviets are to achieve their goal.
EUROPE: Labor Rights in the USSR
//West European labor organizations appear pre-
pared to make an issue of workers' rights in the USSR. They
may generate a campaign with considerable momentum and poten-
tiaZ for embarrassing the Soviets.//
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//The World Confederation of Labor, composed pri-
mari y o ristian trade unions, last week filed a formal
complaint against the Soviets with the International Labor
Organization in Geneva. It charges that the USSR, in its al-
leged crackdown on workers who attempt to form trade unions
not under regime control, has violated the ILO's conventions
on workers' freedom of association and right to organize. The
Soviets have ratified both conventions, adopted in 1948 and
1949.//
//The executive board of the International Con-
e era ion o Free Trade Unions convenes tomorrow in Hamburg
to consider filing complaints against the USSR and Poland. Its
chief spokesman has already expressed concern that the Soviets
have imprisoned labor dissidents or placed them in psychiatric
hospitals. The complaint against Poland cites the Poles' deten-
tion of three leaders of an "action committee" seeking to form
an independent trade union.//
//The British and French affiliates of the ICFTU
are certain to push for action by the executive board. The
London-based Amnesty International--which has published much
of the material the labor dissidents have smuggled out--has
pressed the British Trades Union Congress to take up the dissi-
dents' case. In France, the issue has spurred all the principal
trade union confederations, including the Communist-dominated
labor organization, to attack the labor policies of the Soviet
bloc states.//
//ILO Director General Blanchard, a French citizen,
as weer ma e an official visit to the USSR; he informed the
Soviets in advance that he would raise the allegations that the
USSR has stifled workers' freedom to organize. The complaints
by the Western trade union organizations and the wide publicity
the issue is certain to continue to garner in France and else-
where will probably have a substantial negative effect on the
once promising Soviet bid for broader, higher level East-West
labor contacts.
//A government-authorized fare increase for
Colombia's heavily subsidized public transportation system has
sparked widespread protests that have resulted in a score of
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injuries and arrests. President Lopez has voiced his concern
over the breakdown in public order--which may become more
serious. Transportation and government workers and other labor
unions are threatening strikes; the national election is sched-
uled for 4 June.//
//The government's decision to implement a
12-percent fare increase on 4 May provoked students and other
low-income riders into burning a number of buses. The fare hike
also alienated the bus drivers union, which believes that it
is inadequate to offset the cost of living increase. The union
has threatened to strike unless its demands are met.//
I /The labor confederations, which are dis-
gruntled with official negotiations on labor reforms and wage
increases, apparently have broken off talks with the government
and may be inclined to join the other strikers.//
//Efforts to control inflation and related
wage-price negotiations have predominated throughout much of
the Lopez administration. The current demonstrations and strike
planning undoubtedly stem more from economic factors than
purely political ones. Extensive breakdowns in public order,
however, would create serious political tensions during the
period leading up to the presidential election on 4 June.
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Dominican Republic
Dominican President Joaquin Balaguer, who has waged
a vigorous campaign for a fourth term, faces an extremely close
race in today's election. Balaguer fully utilized extensive
government and party resources in the final week of the cam-
paign, and he will probably have the edge over Dominican Revolu-
tionary Party candidate Antonio Guzman. The election campaign
was relatively free of the violence and government coercion
that characterized previous Dominican elections, but there is
still a slight chance of government-sponsored fraud at the
polls.
The election outcome should not affect close US-
Dominican relations, but tensions are high among conservative,
pro-Balaguer military officers who have privately threatened
a coup if the left-of-center opposition party wins. The power-
ful officers, however, would probably try first to work out a
modus vivendi with what: would like1 be a cautious and re-
strained Guzman administration, 25X1
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