NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030600010102-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 102
• Publication Date: April 28, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Friday 28 April 1978 CG NIDC 78/099C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 28 April
Ca Die is tor the purpose of informing
senior US o ficials.
CONTENTS
AFGHANISTAN: Coup Attempt
Page 1
UN: Session on Disarmament
INTERNATIONAL: Nuclear Energy
BRIEFS:
North Yemen
Upper Volta
Page 8
Page 9
Page 10
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AFGHANISTAN: Coup Attempt
Afghan President Daoud may have been overthrown and
replaced by a Leftist military government, although the situa-
tion remains highly fluid and confused. The Soviets may have
mixed views on a leftist coup in Afghanistan because it could
complicate their relations with other countries of the area.
Afghanistan's other two immediate neighbors, Pakistan and Iran,
would see the installation of a leftist government as a threat
to their security.
The rebellion against Daoud may have been sparked by
the arrest late Wednesday of the leaders of the pro-Soviet
Communist Party. The government had moved against the Communist
leaders in an apparent attempt to preclude further demonstra-
tions of Communist strength. On 19 April the supposedly weak
Communist Party mobilized a well-disciplined procession of
about 15,000 for the funeral of a party leader killed two days
earlier.
Fighting broke out about midday yesterday when a
small force of tanks attacked government buildings, including
the presidential palace and the Defense and Interior Ministries.
A much larger, apparently pro-government, force arrived in
Kabul about an hour later, and it soon appeared that the govern-
ment would restore order. Air Force planes then intervened on
the side of the rebels and tipped the balance in the rebels'
favor. The US Embassy believes pro-Daoud forces may be moving
on Kabul and that there could be further fighting today.
As firing died down last night, the extent of the
rebels' success was unclear, although they did control the
radio station. Their broadcasts have given only the vaguest
picture of their policies or who is leading their movement.
What few indications they have given tend to place them con-
siderably to the left of Daoud.
While the Soviets are no doubt watching events in
Kabul with great interest, we have had no indication that they
were directly involved in or aware in advance of the coup at-
tempt. Moscow has maintained contacts with the Afghan left
since the 1920s, but it has always attempted to deal with what-
ever government was in power and to avoid any hint of inter-
ference in internal Afghan affairs.
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For at least the last decade the Soviets have metic-
ulously favored state-to-state relations throughout South Asia.
Although they may have been concerned about the future of their
relations with Kabul when Daoud first came to power in 1973,
over the past five years the Soviets have established a good
working relationship with Daoud and the USSR has remained the
predominant foreign power in Afghanistan.
A leftwing coup in Afghanistan would raise suspicions
about the Soviets in India, Iran, and Pakistan, and complicate
Moscow's dealings with all three. It would undermine the long-
standing Soviet claim that Afghanistan was an example of a
small, poor state existing on the USSR's border without fear of
Soviet meddling in its affairs.
Whatever the outcome, the Soviets will count on Kabul's
dependence on Soviet military and economic aid to ensure that
the USSR remains the pervasive foreign influence in Afghanistan.
I The Shah of Iran's reactions will be determined by
the orientation of the government that finally emerges in
Afghanistan. He would view a leftist government there as adding
to the danger facing Iran on its eastern flank. Iran's relations
with its neighbors are already complicated by continuing politi-
cal uncertainty in Pakistan.
//If the new government is in full control, the
Shah probably can do little about it, but he will see himself
as increasingly threatened by the Soviets and as requiring even
larger supplies of Western arms. If a substantial portion of
the country remains in the control of anti-leftist forces, the
Shah might be tempted to intervene in-some fashion.//
Pakistan shares Iran's concerns and would also be
worried about the revival of a longstanding border dispute
that Daoud had played down over the past two years.
//If either the Iranians or the Pakistanis were
to intervene militarily, they would run a substantial risk of
a confrontation with the Soviets. This might well be a deci-
sive deterrent.//
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UN: Session on Disarmament
//The nonaligned Mates, already impatient with
the Lack o ]progress in disarmament negotiations, were further
frustrated by the outcome of the recently concluded fifth and
final session of the preparatory committee for the UN General
Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. The nonaligned want
the special session, scheduled to open on 23 May, to mark a
fresh departure in arms control and disarmament efforts and
to create greater opportunities for their participation and
involvement. They increasingly feel that the US and USSR have
adopted an approach designed to minimize the role of the UN
and the special session in the disarmament process.//
//Deep differences persist among regional groups
and members, as indicated by the disagreements over the draft
documents prepared by the committee. The documents--a declara-
tion on disarmament, a program of action, and a document on
disarmament machinery--were to be adopted by consensus at the
special session. The results of the Preparatory Committee have
prompted some Third World delegates, however, to suggest that
voting will be necessary if negotiating efforts fail to resolve
the differences.//
//Although there are still significant difference
concerning references to nuclear disarmament, conventional
weapons, and non-use of force in the declaration on disarmament,
the Preparatory Committee chairman, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas of
Argentina, believes these can be worked out by consultation at
the special session.//
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//The differing perceptions of what should be in-
cluded in the program of action present the major obstacle,
however. The program is considered the most important document
because it may shape the UN disarmament agenda for the next
several years. Nuclear disarmament and security assurances are
the two major issues.//
agree to negotiate nuclear disarmament measures going beyond
SALT II and the comprehensive test ban, including a halt to
nuclear weapons production and a "time-bound program" for re-
ducing and eventually eliminating stockpiles. Efforts to produce
a joint US-Soviet text on nuclear disarmament collapsed when
Moscow insisted on the text Soviet delegates had introduced
in the previous session of the Preparatory Committee. The West-
ern texts, which are brief and very general, are unacceptable
to the nonaligned.//
//Another issue of particular interest to the non-
aligned will be binding security assurances for non-nuclear-
weapon states, along with the related topics of nuclear-weapon-
free zones and zones of peace.//
pal remaining issues will be the organization and procedures
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, notably its
chairmanship and its relationship to the UN; revival of the UN
Disarmament Commission; and the follow-on to the special ses-
sion--either a second special session or a World Disarmament
Conference.//
I //Expectations that either a SALT II treaty or a
comprehensive test ban agreement would be concluded before the
special session meets have been replaced by uncertainty and
increased frustration at the slowness of those negotiations.
Although it is not yet clear whether the nonaligned will vent
this frustration at the special session, they could resort to
disruptive tactics, such as rhetorical posturing and forcing
votes on key issues.
//The nonaligned states want the US and USSR to
//In the area of disarmament machinery, the princi-
INTERNATIONAL: Nuclear Energy
Non-Communist countries are scheduled to bring 28
nuclear power reactors, representing an electric generating
capacity of 24,380 megawatts, into commercial service this
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year--the largest annual gain in nuclear power capacity to
date. Two of the reactors began commercial operation earlier
this year and several others are currently being brought up
to full power. Operating at a typical capacity rate of 60
percent, the new plants would provide the energy equivalent
of nearly 650,000 barrels per day of oil.
The 1978 gains would raise the total nuclear capacity
o Non- ommunist countries by 29 percent to almost 109,000
megawatts. The largest increase is projected for the US--eight
reactors totaling 7,229 megawatts. New plants in West European
countries will add 10,716 megawatts this year, and Japan is
scheduled to bring 4,522 megawatts of new capacity on line.
This year will also mark the entry into service of
US-designed light water reactors in South Korea and Taiwan.
These countries will join Argentina, India, and Pakistan as
the only developing countries currently using nuclear energy
to generate electricity.
I If most of the new plants remain on schedule, 1978
should be a boom year for electric utilities. Plants now reach-
ing operational status are expected to provide electricity at
much lower costs than competing power plants operating on
fossil fuels. Court orders or government regulations--largely
stemming from controversy over the ultimate disposal of radio-
active wastes--may, however, prevent several of the plants
from going into operation this year.
The longer term market for nuclear power continues
to be clouded by a variety of financial, technical, political,
and environmental obstacles. Lead times continue to be long
and uncertain; 13 of the 28 reactors scheduled for operation
in 1978 have been on the drawing boards since 1969 or earlier.
Orders for future nuclear units remain stagnant.
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Lt. Col. Ahmad al-Ghashmi, North Yemen's strongman
since last October when he succeeded an assassinated fellow of-
ficer as chairman of the now-defunct Command Council, was sworn
in as president last Sunday. He was elected for a five-year
term by the new People's Assembly, whose members he recently
appointed.
Ghashmi has the difficult task of governing a country
split by north-south, religious, and left-right differences.
The country's strong tribal system and a contentious officer
corps add to his problems. He has already moved to curb the
power of a potential rival in the army by dispersing paratroop
commander Alim's forces throughout the country. Further re-
structuring of the government and high-level personnel shifts
are likely soon.
Upper Volta
Upper Volta, under military control the past 12 years,
is about to begin the process of returning to civilian rule.
Deputies to the National Assembly will be elected Sunday and a
presidential election will follow on 14 May. President Sangoule
Lamizana, a moderate, pro-Western Army general who has ruled
Upper Volta since 1966, is expected to win the presidential
election over several other candidates.
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