NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010082-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: February 21, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

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Tuesday 21 February 1978 CC NIDC 78, 042C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 21 February 1978. 25X1
The NID Cable is for the purpose o informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
EGYPT: Aftermath and Reactions
CHAD: Situation Report
ARGENTINA-CHILE: Beagle Channel
ECUADOR: Bucaram Disqualified
IRAN: Anti-Government Rioting
BRITAIN: Economic Developments
USSR: Brezhnev Receives Award
EAST GERMANY: Stoph Reappears
USSR: Travel Restrictions
USSR: Political Infighting
BRIEFS
USSR-Cuba
USSR
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EGYPT: Aftermath and Reactions
//The failure of Egyptian troops to capture
the terrorists who assassinated Yusif aZ-Sibai, the editor of
A1-Ahram, and seized hostages on Cyprus has embarrassed Egypt's
President Sadat and other leaders and seems Likely to damage
the President's prestige. We believe, however, that the assas-
sination and bungled commando operation will ultimately have
little impact on Sadat's efforts to provide for Palestinian
self determination in anu settlement with Israel.
Egypt announced
yesterday that it is withdrawing itsdip omatic, technical,
and trade officials from Cyprus and demanding that the Cypriot
Government withdraw its diplomatic personnel from Cairo.//
I At this early stage, we believe that the assassina-
tion and mishandled commando operation will ultimately do little
to change Sadat's effort to resolve the Palestinian issue. Sadat
must consider a number of political imperatives, such as the
need to include other Arabs in peace negotiations, and is un-
likely to reverse his policies because of a single terrorist
attack. Once Sadat's anger subsides, he might even argue that
the assassination underscores the need for a solution to the
Palestinian problem.
//Sadat's initial reaction was to direct
his and Egypt's outrage and desire for revenge against the in-
dividual terrorists involved. The effect, if any, of Sadat's
anger on his view of the role Palestinians should play in peace
negotiations will depend on whether the Egyptians gain revenge
and on which Palestinian groups are involved.//
While spokesmen for the Palestine Liberation Organi-
nation have publicly denied complicity in the assassination,
the Egyptian Government has not yet received any official PLO
denial. Unless Sadat reacts in a totally emotional way, we
would expect him to maintain some contact with the moderate
wing of the PLO, although he might now argue more forcefully
that it break with the rejectionists. Any hint of involvement
in the murder of Sibai by Fatah or its leader Yasir Arafat,
however, would almost certainly cause Sadat to abandon even
the pretense of including the PLO in negotiations.
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The Egyptian press is blaming rejectionist Palestin-
ians for Sibai's murder and views it as an effort to derail
Sadat's peace initiatives. The US Embassy in Cairo believes
that most Egyptians, already tired of "carrying the burden of
the Palestinians," are sincerely outraged over the killing and
will now be less inclined to distinguish between Palestinian
moderates and extremists. As a result, the Egyptian public is
likely to redouble its support for Sadat's peace efforts and
to back a tough approach toward the PLO.
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Sadat apparently directed that an all-out effort be
made to capture Sibai's assassins; at different times prepara-
tions reportedly were underway for Egyptian aircraft to inter-
cept the Cyprus Airways plane commandeered by the terrorists
and for Egyptian commandos to attempt to rescue the terrorists'
hostages while the plane was at Djibouti.
//In an effort to save face, after the em-
barrassing failure of Egyptian troops at Larnaca, Cyprus, Sadat
sent Acting Foreign Minister Ghal.i to Nicosia yesterday to dis-
cuss with Cypriot officials the extradition of the terrorists
and the return of the Egyptian forces. Ghali was able to return
with only the Egyptian personnel, and Cairo shortly thereafter
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announced its decision concerning the Egyptian and Cypriot dip-
lomatic officials.// 25X1
CHAD: Situation Report
25X1 I A joint communique by Chad, Libya, and Sudan an-
nounce on Saturday caZZs for the holding of the previously
planned meeting between the Chadian and Libyan Foreign Minis-
ters in Niger, to be followed by a meeting between Chadian
President MaZZoum and Libyan President Qadhafi in Libya. Chad
agreed to withdraw its complaint against Libya in the UN Secu-
rity Council, and the two disputants agreed to resume diplomatic
relations, which were suspended on 6 February.
Prior to the arrival iin Tripoli of a Chadian delega-
tion, a joint statement by the Libyans and the Sudanese, who
have been attempting to mediate the dispute, announced Qadhafi's
support of Malloum's appeal for a cease-fire between Muslim
rebels and government forces in northern Chad. The statement
also expressed Tripoli's desire to assist Ndjamena in its goal
of national reconciliation. Even if he is sincere, however,
Qadhafi may not be able to convince the insurgents to lay down
their arms.
25X1 Chad is disputing the Libyan occupation of territory
d
f
the government
has poor prospects for reversing the military situation and
that Chad's army could do little to stop a determined rebel
offensive toward Ndjamena.// It is questionable, however,
whether the rebels would attempt to advance on the capital.
Such a move would lengthen their supply lines and take them
far from sanctuaries in the mountainous north.
or an
on Chad's northern frontier and alleged Libyan support
even participation in the rebel military effort.
I In spite of the progress on the diplomatic front,
fighting apparently continues. Faya-Largeau, the government's
last remaining garrison in northern Chad, surrendered late
Friday to the Muslim rebels. The fall of Faya-Largeau, combined
with the government's loss of Fada and Ounianga-Kebir earlier
hands.
month, leaves almost all of northern Chad in rebel s.
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During the past two weeks of fighting, some 40 per-
cent of Chad's army--about 2,000 men--have been killed, wounded,
or captured by the rebels. Most of the remainder of the army
is spread among several small garrisions in the south.
A company of French commandos is still in the city
of Abeche to protect the French community and prepare for an
evacuation of French nationals if necessary. //A source of the
US defense attache in Ndjamena reports that guerrilla forces
have attacked two small towns near Abeche in the last few days.
If the fighting continues, Abeche itself may well become a ma-
jor target.//
ARGENTINA-CHILE: Beagle Channel
I he Presidents of Argentina and Chile met in southern
ChiZe yesterday for their second round of talks on the Beagle
Channel dispute. The two leaders signed an agreement that their
military representatives prepared after the presidents net Zast
month in Argentina.
According to the Chilean media, the Argentines and
Chileans have agreed to negotiate the complex problem in three
phases. A bilateral commission will explore all aspects of the
boundary differences and lay the groundwork for more substan-
tive discussions during an initial 45-day period. Over a sub-
sequent six-month period, a joint technical commission will
study specific issues including cooperation in the Antarctic
where the countries have overlapping territorial claims. The
final phase will entail finding means to implement the pro-
posals readied during the second phase.
Chilean Foreign Minister Carvajal told the US Ambas-
sador that the negotiations would establish "elements of de-
tente" and that some arrangement would be worked out on a bal-
ance of military forces in the south. While the diplomatic ob-
stacles to a long-term solution remain formidable, the decision
to negotiate the problem and to avoid provocative military ac-
tion should reduce substantially the chance of an armed en-
counter in the disputed area.
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ECUADOR: Bucaram Disqualified
Ecuador's military government has issued a new
election Law that disqualifies the favored presidential candi-
date, populist Leader Assad Bucaram. The country will probably
return to civilian rule, but the winner of the presidential
election on 16 July is more likely to be a front man for the
military and the oligarchy.
p
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Guayaquil, Bucaram
vented from becoming president in 1972, when the military in-
tervened and canceled the elections. The government had been
reported earlier to be considering Bucaram's disqualification
through a provision in the military code which stipulated that
an armed forces officer must have native Ecuadorean parents.
The President, as military commander in chief, would fall under
this provision.
Bucara
CAM
any candidate of non-Ecuadorean parentage. The former mayor of
arents were Lebanese--was also pre-
hose
--
MI, election law also prevents former presidents
from running; this provision disallows the candidacy of Carlos
Arosemena, who was head of state from 1961 to 1963. //Although
Arosemena was given little chance of winning, his candidacy,
like Bucaram's, was strongly opposed by most of the country's
top military leaders. Some officers apparently believed that
Arosemena's prospects might have been improved by a shift of
votes from Bucaram.//
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This arbitrary exclusion of civilian candidates tar-
nishes President Poveda's international commitment to return
Ecuador to civilian rule this year. Ecuador's performance in
carrying out an election has been viewed as a signpost for the
rest of the continent, where five other military regimes have
promised that similiar transitions will take place over the
next few years.
re is likely to be a strong protest and
h th
e
Althoug
perhaps even some violence by Bucaram's supporters--particularly
in the Guayaquil area--Bucaram's past statements indicate that
he is resigned that the military can do as it pleases because
"it has the guns."
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was eliminated by a provision that disallows
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The mayor of Quito, Sixto Duran-Ballen, now appears
to have the inside track for the presidency. The Conservative
Party candidate not only has the backing of a strong coalition,
but also enjoys the surreptitious political and financial sup-
port of the government.
IRAN: Anti-Government Rioting
The demonstration on Saturday in the north Iranian
city of Tabriz was more serious than official Iranian news
stories would indicate. The US consul in Tabriz reports exten-
sive damage to the city; the demonstrators' principal targets
were banks, hotels, police stations, and municipal buildings.
Less violent demonstrations apparently occurred in other cities
the same day.
The army, which took over from the police on Satur-
day, continues to patrol the streets, and a curfew remains in
effect. There probably were more casualties than the six killed
and 125 injured admitted by the government. All windows were
broken at the Iranian-American Society binational center.
I The demonstration was triggered by an order from lo-
cal religious leaders to close the bazaar in commemoration of
the deaths of demonstrators in rioting against the Shah's mod-
ernization program in the city of Qom on 9 January. Once the
bazaar was closed, mobs roamed through the streets and clashed
with security forces. The crowds appeared to have been rela-
tively well-organized, and their targets were carefully se-
lected.
Some demonstrators may have carried firearms. Anti-
government demonstrators in Iran normally are armed only with
sticks, rocks, and other makeshift weapons.
The government has blamed the rioting on Islamic
Marxis terrorist groups, assisted by "foreign elements." The
US Embassy in Tehran, however, concludes that evidence so far
points to fanaticial Muslims as being primarily responsible.
Leftist terrorist organizations possibly took over what had
originated as a demonstration by religious dissidents.
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The Iranian Government has thus far been generally
uninformative on the demonstration in Tabriz. The size and
violence of the demonstration, however, presumably have caused
serious concern in Tehran and could tip the balance against
those who have previously advocated a more relaxed government
policy in dealing with the Shah's opponents. 25X1
BRITAIN: Economic Developments
//Britain's annual inflation rate fell below 10
percent last month after more than four years in double digits.
Recent earnings and money supply statistics, however, point to
a reacceZeration of consumer price increases later this year.//
//In August 1975, when Prime Minister Callaghan's
government introduced formal pay guidelines, prices showed a
year-to-year rise of 26.9 percent. In addition to applying wage
controls, the government also moved toward fiscal and monetary
restraint to slow inflation. A nine-month decline in the prices
of imported raw materials has reinforced the government's anti-
inflation efforts. In recent months, the appreciation of the
pound has helped hold down the cost of imports.//
I //The present euphoria may be short-lived. Despite
the publicized success of the government in holding major wage
settlements to its 10-percent target, earnings have risen at
an annual rate of nearly 17 percent since August, the start of
the current pay round. Press reports suggest that recently ap-
proved productivity bonuses to coal miners may provide a sub-
stantial hidden wage increase, a bad precedent for future pay
settlements.//
1
//The government also is overshooting its 9- to
11
13-percent target for money supply growth for the year ending
mid-April. In January, the broadly defined money supply rose
2.2 percent and brought the projected increase for the fiscal
year to about 15 percent. These developments suggest an accel-
ar
hi
.
s ye
eration of consumer price inflation later t
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USSR: Brezhnev Receives Award
The Soviet Leadership has conferred yet another award
on President Brezhnev. Yesterday he received the "Order of Vic-
tory," the nation's highest military order, during a Kremlin
ceremony. The award is another step in the embeZZishmeni; of
Brezhnev's military record and serves to keep him in the Lime-
Light.
Central Committee secretary Suslov, in presenting the
order, emphasized Brezhnev's contributions to the struggle for
peace, the development of Soviet military capabilities, and
the defeat of the Germans in World War II. Brezhnev discussed
the same topics in his remarks. He reiterated a recent common
theme that the Soviets, in developing their armed forces, had
not exceeded "the actual requirements of our security and the
security of our socialist friends."
Unlike previous occasions when Brezhnev was honored,
the entire leadership was not present. Ukrainian party boss
Shcherbitskiy in particular was unaccountably absent.
The award timed to coincide with the Soviet Army's
60th anniversary celebration, represents a further enhancement
of Brezhnev's already exaggerated reputation as a military
leader. The Order of Victory has been given only 16 times since
it was established in 1943 and, until now, only to World War II
commanders who directed large-scale military operations that
"radically changed the situation to the advantage of the Soviet
Union." Brezhnev's wartime exploits hardly fit this requirement.
Brezhnev is the only political leader to receive this
award other than Stalin and joins a select company of Soviet
and foreign military leaders--including Marshals Zhukov and
Konev and General Eisenhower.
I I The award demonstrates the lengths to which Brezhnev
and of er Soviet leaders are willing to go in expanding his
"personality cult." Brezhnev's military record has been extolled
in even more effusive terms for several years, most recently
in his memoirs of his wartime experiences, published in January.
His military responsibilities have also been steadily
expanded. Since 1975 Brezhnev has received two military promo-
tions and several awards and has been recognized as Chairman
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of the USSR Defense Council. In addition, last October he was
described as "Supreme Commander in Chief" of the Soviet Armed
Forces. This formulation, however, has not been used subse-
quently, and it may remain controversial within the leadership.
Suslov did not mention it in his remarks.
The latest award serves Brezhnev in more important
ways. It places him in the spotlight only weeks after he re-
turned to activity after his latest bout with the flu and as-
sorted other medical problems. It also comes at a time when
other Soviet leaders have received awards on their 60th birth-
days. Brezhnev will not have any greater political power be-
cause he has received the "Order of Victory," but the award
gives him further prominence within the leadership and reminds
ndiminished
i
i
.
s u
ty
his colleagues that his political author
EAST GERMANY: Stoph Reappears
East German Premier WiZZi Stoph reappeared Saturday
after five weeks' absence from public view. Stoph, party leader
Honecker, Central Committee Secretary for Economics Mittag,
and Central Committee International Relations Department head
Markowski arrived Saturday in Poland for a previously unan-
nounced weekend official friendship visit at the invitation
of Polish party leader Gierek.
The East Germans and Poles met in Krosno Province,
an unusual spot for high-level visits, and discussed bilateral
and some international problems. East German radio reported
that the talks took place in "the traditional atmosphere of
cordiality and mutual understanding," an indication that there
may not have been complete agreement.
Sto h's absence fueled renewed rumors of a split be-
Z,
tween Honecker and Stoph, as most recently stated in early De-
cember by the West German newsmagazine Der Spiegel. The East
German Foreign Ministry on Friday reportedly informed a news
service that Stoph was "taking a cure," but did not state where
he was or when he would return to work.
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Some West Germans have reported that Stoph was in
Moscow for at least part of the time he was out of sight. The
weekly newspaper Die Zeit of 27 January stated that Stoph had
been in Moscow "at the beginning of the week."
USSR: Travel Restrictions
The USSR in early January made the first substantial
changes since 1966 in its List of areas closed to foreign trav-
elers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs says the new list eases
restrictions, but the net gains for the US Embassy's travel
program will be minimal. Soviet authorities continue to use a
variety of highly effective tactics that deny to most diplo-
matic travelers much of the "open" area of the USSR.
The initiative may have been prompted by an easing
of US re--s restrictions on Soviet diplomatic travelers in 1976. The
Soviets doubtless expect the US to respond by further easing
travel restrictions on their diplomatic personnel.
More than 25 cities and towns, as well as large areas
in Siberia, Soviet Central Asia, and the Soviet Arctic, have
been newly opened to travel. Magnitogorsk, the southern Urals
metallurgical center, is by far the most interesting of these.
The opening of Karagandinskaya Oblast may permit trips to
Karaganda--a major industrial center in Kazakhstan--and to the
surrounding coal mining region.
Cities and towns in the Baltic and western Ukraine
areas should prove particularly attractive to US Embassy per-
sonnel, although the Soviets have hedged these openings by pro-
viding detailed guidance for traveling through the countryside,
which remains closed.
Sleight-of-hand is apparent in the selection of newly
opened rural areas in Soviet Central Asia, the Arctic, and the
Far East. The opening of the southern half of Kzyl-Ordinskaya
Oblast illustrates the technique. This desert region south of
the Syrdarya River remains completely inaccessible to travelers
because all towns, roads, and railroads lie on the still-closed
right bank of the river. This area and similar ones in Turk-
menistan and in the Far East would, in any case, be of little
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interest to Embassy travelers. The Foreign Ministry probably
offered them as barter items in the hope of getting something
better in return in the US.
Arctic might be expected.to draw US interest, if only because
of the notoriety of the forced labor camps at Norilsk. Two such
camps remain, one of which is undergoing expansion. Visits to
? this Okrug will, however, be very difficult to arrange because
all major settlements, and presumably their airports, are barred
to foreigners and there is no other way to get there.
access to the Pacific Ocean.
In contrast, the Taymyrskiy Autonomous Okrug in the
The openings are offset by the closing of Chitinskaya
and Amurskaya Oblasts and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, which
together form the USSR's Far Eastern border with China. Travel
by Westerners on the eastern part of Trans-Siberian Railroad,
a vantage point for observing Soviet defenses against the Chi-
nese, is barred by these closures. In recent years, US and
other diplomatic travelers have been "temporarily" required to
detrain at Irkutsk and continue by air to Khabarovsk and from
there by boat train to Nakhodka, the only open Soviet port with
USSR: Political Infighting
Soviet Politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, who
is head o the Ukrainian Communist Party and a long-time pro-
tege of President Brezhnev, received a relatively modest award
in honor of his 60th birthday on Friday. On 9 February one of
Shcherbitskiy's putative rivals, Politburo member KuZakov, re-
ceived a major award; it appears that the granting of such
awards has become part of the political infighting involved
in the question of who will succeed Brezhnev.
The award Shcherbitskiy received--the Order of the
October Revolution--was the minimum required by the occasion.
This slight could be somewhat softened by the laudatory speech
that Brezhnev can be expected to deliver at a Kremlin awards
ceremony sometime soon.
birthday--may be explained by the fact that he already had
Shcherbitskiy's failure to receive a Hero of Social-
ist Labor award--the standard for a Politburo member's 60th
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twice received Hero awards--most recently just last September.
A third Hero award would have been a conspicuous tribute, giving
him more such awards than any Politburo member but Brezhnev.
Shcherbitskiy, however, did not even receive the next
highest award, an Order of Lenin, which would have been appro-
priate under the circumstances. This treatment of Shcherbitskiy
casts an even more favorable light on the award of a Hero medal
to Kulakov, who was singled out for special prominence at a
separate awards ceremony. The ceremony surrounding the awarding
of the Hero medal to Kulakov was perhaps more than the occasion
called for, although Brezhnev's congratulatory speech was some-
what cool.
Shcherbitskiy becomes the fourth Politburo member in
recent months to receive an award in circumstances that break
with precendent. In contrast to Kulakov, Politburo member Sus-
lov, candidate Politburo member Demichev, and now Shcherbitskiy-
in different ways and for different reasons--received less on
their birthdays than had previous recipients. This suggests
that such awards, which for many years followed an almost
stereotyped protocol, have become increasingly politicized and
that political infighting in the Kremlin is becoming sharper as
the issue of who will succeed Brezhnev begins to loom larger.
BRIEFS
Air Marshal Aleksandr Yefimov, first deputy commander
in chief of the Soviet Air Forces, is in Cuba this week to par-
ticipate in ceremonies observing the 60th anniversary of the
establishment of the Soviet Army. This is the first time a So-
viet delegation has been invited to Havana for the occasion.
President Fidel Castro, Armed Forces Minister Raul
and other high-ranking Cuban military officers met
Castro
,
with Yefimov on Saturday. The visit underscores the close re-
lationship between the Cuban and Soviet armed forces and could
be used for discussions of Soviet-Cuban military cooperation
in Africa.
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Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister Sokolov has
been promoted one grade to Marshal of the Soviet Union, Radio
Moscow announced on Friday. Sokolov has been a first deputy
defense minister since 1967; he has general management respon-
sibilities within the Ministry of Defense. His promotion places
him on a par with the other two first deputy defense ministers,
Chief of the Soviet General Staff Ogarkov and Warsaw Pact Com-
mander Kulikov.
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