NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010032-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: January 20, 1978
• Content Type: REPORT

AMW Adw AW 'AW 'AW 'AW 149
0
0
RhIIQase 2007/02/08: CIA
TO. NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS
1 1
RDP79T00975AO30500011o32-7
p Secret ~ 3 8
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO.
RECDMMENDATIDN
RETURN
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Friday 20 January 1978 CG NIDC 78/016C
DIA review(s) completed.
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Top Secret 25X1
(Security Classifiratinn)
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO3050001003 -7 --J"AJ
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday, 20 January 1
The NID Cable is tor the purpose o in orming
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Rapprochement
IRAN: Violence from the Right
PORTUGAL: Soares Appointed
ITALY: Formal Negotiations
INDONESIA: Political Situation
FRANCE: Election Campaign Issue
BRIEFS
Rhodesia
New Zealand
Bolivia
Argentina-Chile
Spain - North Africa
Page 1
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
Page 6
Page 8
Page 8
Page 9
Approved For Releas+ 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500010032-7
 Approved For Relo
LEBANON: Shaturah Accords
The failure of Palestinian forces to with-
draw from areas near Lebanon's southern border, as stipulated
in the Shaturah accords of Last summer, is contributing to
concern in Lebanon that fighting' between the various factions
may resume. Almost daily shooting incidents in the south are
feeding this concern, as are rumors that Christian militants
are planning renewed fighting.
Prospects for a full implementation of the Shaturah
accords were never bright. Only Syrian pressure on the Pal-
estinians could have overcome a deadlock that developed late
last year over mutually unacceptable conditions attached by
the Palestinians and the Israelis.
In the aftermath of Egyptian President Sadat's trip
to Jerusalem, however, the Syrians have not been pressing the
matter. They are unwilling to jeopardize support by the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization for President Asad's stand
against the Sadat initiative.
I Exchanges of artillery and small arms fire between
Christian and Palestinian positions in the south diminished
somewhat earlier this month, but sporadic firing is again oc-
curring on virtually a daily basis.
The
Palestinians are already well equipped an nave I17f immedi-
ate need for large amounts of new supplies. According to sources
of the US defense attache in Beirut, however, the Palestinians
are worried about a possible Israeli attack, and they want to
stock up now because the Israelis could easily shut off the
flow.
/We do not believe the Israelis are preparing to
go into sou Lebanon in force, nor that they would want to
stir up more trouble there at this delicate point in their ne-
gotiations with the Egyptians. They do not seem unusually con-
cerned about the situation, although they are monitoring it
Approved For Rele*se 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030590010032-7
 Approved For -
75AO30500010032-7
7.
closely and are prepared to deal with any cross-border inci-
dents by Palestinian terrorists. An Israeli officer recently
told a US Army attache that the Israelis have sent a paratroop
unit from the Golan Heights to the Lebanese border because of
its special capabilities for operating in the area.//
Developments in south Lebanon have contributed to
the edginess already evident in Beirut over the lack of sus-
tained progress toward national reconciliation. President Sarkis
has taken the position that such a reconciliation is not feasi-
ble until the problem of the Palestinians in the south is re-
solved.
//Several sources have told the US defense
attacne in ecru that they expect serious trouble within the
next few months between the Christian militias and the Pales-
tinians or the Syrian peacekeeping force.
The US attache has heard that the Christians
wou attack small, dispersed Syrian units and provoke an up-
surge of incidents throughout Lebanon.//
The bravado evident in such rumors is badly out of
proportion to actual Christian strength. The 30,000 men of the
Syrian-dominated peacekeeping force are more than adequate to
put down any force the Christians could muster--barring major
Israeli intervention. Most Christian leaders probably recognize
this, and would be loath to provoke a confrontation.
The Christians, who initially welcomed the Syrian
intervention, are increasingly restive at the continued Syrian
presence. Some Christian militants would welcome renewed fight-
ing if it would draw in the Israelis and lead ultimately to the
partitioning of Lebanon. The S rians aware of the rumors of
Christian plotting, are edgy
Approved F
 Approved For Release
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Rapprochement
Talks between Zairian and Angolan delegations on the
possibility of easing strained relations are scheduled to start
today in Brazzaville Congo. There are major obstacles to a real
reconciliation.
I IThe talks grew out of a recent exchange of public sig-
na-Es y airian President Mobutu and Angolan President Neto of
a willingness to consider a rapprochement. Relations between
the two Presidents, never good, reached a nadir last year as a
result of the invasion of southern Zaire by anti-Mobutu exiles
from Angola.
The exploratory talks in Brazzaville, encouraged by
Congolese President Yhombi Opango and other leaders, will review
the numerous problems in bilateral relations and determine whether
there is a basis for a more detailed dialogue, perhaps including
a meeting between Mobuto and Neto. Both Presidents face severe
domestic problems--such as Zaire's nearly bankrupt economy and
Angola's inability to suppress insurgents--that might stand more
chance of solution if their bilateral strains were eased.
Approved For ReleaseI2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500910032-7
 Approved Fc
I I In authorizing talks, each President probably hopes to
persuade the other to stop supporting his insurgent enemies. In
view of the longstanding acrimony and ideological differences
between the two Presidents, however, any real reconciliation be-
tween them will have to overcome serious obstacles and is not
likely to be reached anytime soon.
IRAN: Violence from the Right
I /New information indicates that disturbances
staged by fundamentalist Muslim protesters in Iran Last week
resulted in heavier Loss of Life than the government has been
willing to admit pubZiclj.
//The incident, the most serious of its kind in
years, is a pointed reminder to the Shah that conservative re-
ligious opposition to his modernization program is still. an
important force. The attempt to storm the police station capped
a three-day protest by Muslims on the occasion of the anniver-
saries of the Shah's land reform program of 1963 and the out-
lawing of the veil for women in 1936. Last October, fanatically
religious rightwing students at Tehran University went on a
rampage in protest against co-education, which is proscribed
by traditional Islamic doctrine.//
//The Shah, always sensitive to a possible resur-
gence of opposition to his views on Iranian modernization, no
doubt is closely watching the violent demonstrations of sympathy
with the Qom demonstrators that have been mounted in several
other Iranian cities. Proponents within the regime of a tough
policy toward dissidents may well argue that the recent events
call for a reversal of the Shah's program of political liberal-
ization, which has been aimed in part at refurbishing Iran's
image on human rights.//
I //Religious dissidents would be considered a more
serious threat if they were known to be allied with the leftist
political opposition and terrorists. The task of the security
forces, who now have the situation under control, could be com-
plicated if the various dissident groups mounted a coordinated
effort on a national scale.
4
Approved For a ease -
 Approved For Release
PORTUGAL: Soares Appointed
//Portuguese President Eanes yesterday formally
named Mario Soares Prime Minister, an office Soares has held
as a caretaker since his minority Socialist government fell
six weeks ago. The new cabinet, which the President is expected
to name shortly, will probably include at least three Center
Democrats, whose participation in the government will assure
Soares majority support in the legislature. Socialists and
Center Democrats are already agreed on a government program
and will probably not need the 10 days the constitution gives
them to present their program to the national assembly. Soares
may, however, use this time to continue talks with the Commu-
nists and Social Democrats in hopes of bringing them out of op-
position and winning broader support for economic measures he
plans to implement.//
//Soares, following party orders, insists that the
new government will not be a coalition. Center Democrats are
participating as "personalities" rather than as party leaders.
While the arrangement may technically satisfy
the Socialists'
"no alliances" policy, it in fact reverses a
stance
adopted
by
them since the national election campaign in
April
1976.//
//Leaders from both parties say the government will
last until 1980, when a new election must be held. Most members
of the military Revolutionary Council, however, do not feel that
the government can weather opposition from both the left and
right, and some say it will fall within a month. The Social Dem-
ocrats, who count northern financial and business interests among
their supporters, give the alliance six months, and the Communists,
who control 80 percent of organized labor, think it has "no fu-
ture at all."//
//Such negative evaluations are probably pessimistic.
The programmatic accord worked out by the Socialists and Center
Democrats will promote government stability in the early going,
and the two parties apparently have resolved many differences
on economic policy that might have created problems later. In
the loosely formed coalition, the Center Democrats are likely
to find occasion to oppose Soares, but they are pledged to sup-
port essential legislation.//
//The government's long-term prospects are more
ou u ; i s staying power will depend in large measure on the
impact of its economic policies. Many Portuguese fear that the
Approved For ReleaseI2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030500p10032-7
 Approved Fo4 Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T0097514030500010032-7
austerity measures Soares has promised--and to which he will be
committed if negotiations with the International Monetary Fund
are concluded--will prompt labor unrest and bring on a recession
that will alienate business concerns.//
//Soares feels that side agreements with the Commu-
nists and Social Democrats could help him win labor-management
cooperation. At the same time such agreements would help him
preserve unity in his own party, which was divided on the is-
sue of a Socialist-Center Democratic alliance.//
//The Prime Minister's efforts to negotiate the
additional agreements may strain relations with his alliance
partner. The Center Democrats say they will allow the Socialists
to reach a separate understanding with the Communists so long as
the governmental accord is not affected. They will not, however,
allow the government itself to be linked with a Socialist-Commu-
nist pact.//
//Talks with both the Communists and Social Demo-
crats have bogged down in recent weeks. Social Democratic insist-
ence on participating in the government on an equal footing with
the Socialists continues to be an insurmountable barrier. The
Communists, who see the center-right alliance as a sinister omen,
want some kind of guarantee that leftist interests will not
suffer if conservatives in government become too ambitious.
ITALY: Formal Negotiations
Giulio Andreotti, chosen yesterday by Italian
President Leone to try to form another government, will begin
formal negotiations with major parties, including the Commu-
nists, next week. The bargaining promises to be protracted and
complex as Andreotti searches for a formula that can satisfy
Communist demands for a Larger role but still permit his Chris-
tian Democrats to deny having violated their electoral mandate
to keep the Communists out of government.
I the Christian
Democrats want Andreotti to tocus is initiai talks on govern-
ment policies rather than formulas and to emphasize economic
Approved Fair Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975Ap30500010032-7
 Approved For Release 4
and public order issues in particular. This presumably will
help him to gauge the flexibility of the Communists and others
and to exploit the Communists' desire for agreement on certain
government actions.//
The Communists, for example, are probably even more
eager than the Christian Democrats to find a way to cancel a
series of national referendums slated for the spring. The par-
ties would then have to take clear public positions on several
difficult issues, such as whether to abolish recent law-and-
order legislation characterized as repressive by leftist groups
critical of the Communists.
//If-and when the parties get down to discussing
government formulas, the bargaining will become particularly
delicate and complicated. Communist leaders continue to signal
their willingness to settle for less than cabinet status, but
their minimum condition for renewed cooperation with Andreotti
appears to be formal membership in a new government's parlia-
mentary majority--a role that has traditionally signaled a
party's eligibility for full participation.//
Andreotti plans to hold a strategy session with the
Christi an Democratic directorate tomorrow and to spend the
weekend drawing up an agenda for negotiations likely to begin
on Monday. 17 1 25X1
Approved For Release12007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO30509010032-7
 Approved
removal. The generals apparently are divided over whether the
government should continue its moderate approach or order a
crackdown. Harsher measures run the risk of sparking large-
scale demonstrations and violence. This would probably not
threaten Suharto's reelection in March, but heightened insta-
bility might eventually create fissures within the military
sufficient to undermine his power.
Top Indonesian military officials reportedly held an
emergency meeting Wednesday to discuss the increasing political
tension between the government and student activists, who for
the first time are publicly calling for President Suharto's
Although students thus far have heeded the military's
warning not to take to the streets, their sharper and more
personal attacks on Suharto have been well publicized. Students
have criticized Suharto for his inaccessibility, refusal to
share power with civilians, and tolerance of corruption. Stu-
dents in Bandung recently made an unprecedented public call for
Suharto's ouster, a demand that others in Jakarta are expected
to repeat.
moderate approach probably stems from a desire to obtain even-
tual consensus for his reelection and his belief that severe
measures will only stiffen opposition. Prolonged student demon- 25X1
strations in the streets could undercut the President's already
declining prestige and encourage the beginning of a uiet but
active search within the military for a successor.
Suharto has allowed the opposition a degree of free-
dom against the advice of some senior military officials.. His
FRANCE: Election Campaign Issue
25X1 The recent warning by the US against the growth of
Communist influence in Western Europe has quickly become an
important election campaign issue in France. The Communist
Party has denounced both President Giscard and Socialist leader
Mitterrand and accused them of having sought President Carter's
endorsement during his recent trip to Paris.
Approved
 Approved For Releas4
French Foreign Minister Guiringaud's statement that
"it is normal for Washington to have an opinion on the ques-
tion" has also come under sharp attack from the Communists,
who assert that such comments invite US interference in France's
internal affairs. This line is consistent with the Communists'
longstanding effort to portray themselves as the most important
defender of French independence--an issue on which they have
heavy competition from the Gaullists.
I I In the wake of the US warning, the Socialist Party
has at y affirmed that it has no intention of governing with-
out the Communist Party if the Left wins the election in March.
Given the acrimonious public debate between the two former al-
lies over economic policy, defense, and now the proper attitude
toward the US, the prospect of their governing together becomes
increasingly dim. Against this background, the fact that a
majority of the French still say they intend to vote for the
Left is viewed by the conservative daily Le Figaro as a de-
cision "made solely out of spite."
//Rhodesian Patriotic Front co-Zeaders Joshua
Nkomo an Robert Mugabe have agreed to meet with British For-
eign Secretary David Owen on Malta on 26 January to discuss
the UK-US proposals for a Rhodesian settlement. The two Zeaders
rejected an invitation from Owen for such a meeting Zast month
on the grounds that the British Government was not prepared to
turn over political power in Rhodesia to the Front. Both Zeaders
oppose the national elections that are a key aspect of the
plan.//
//Since then they have come under heavy pressure
from the frontline states and from Nigeria, which are concerned
that Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith may reach an independent 25X1
settlement with black nationalist leaders inside Rhodesia. De-
spite that pressure, Nkomo and Mugabe do not appear to have
softened their stand against elections. F7 I
//The hospitality accorded the crew of the US nu-
clear submarine visiting Auckland this week reflects the less-
ening of nuclear fears among the New Zealand public. Except
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A039500010032-7
 Approved F4
for efforts by a flotilla of private pleasure boats to impede
the submarine's entry into the harbor, incidents have been min-
imal. Trade union opposition has been limited to a refusal to
work at the wharf where the submarine is berthed, despite agi-
tation by the local union boss, an avowed Communist. Two visits
by US nuclear-powered vessels in 1976 triggered port shutdowns.//
//The opposition Labor Party's attempt to stage
protests lects its lack of issues on which to attack the
government. Labor has been unable to offer solutions to New
Zealand's economic problems, and its baiting of the US may
further erode its prospects in the national election late this
year.
A three-week hunger strike in Bolivia by more than
1,200 persons has ended following some political concessions
by the government. These reportedly include a general amnesty
for political exiles and those involved in the strike.
The strikers received widespread support from church,
tabor, an student groups. Even though their demands apparently
were not completely met, strike leaders believe they have won a
majority victory. Government leaders have thus far refrained
from comment although an official in the President's office
said the strike settlement has paved the way for holding the
presidential election in July as scheduled.
Approved F4
 Approved Fort
Argentina-Chile
President Videla of Argentina and Chilean President
Pinoc e met in Mendoza, Argentina, yesterday to explore ways
to settle the dispute over the Beagle Channel. Both leaders
plan to meet again in Chile next week, presumably to seek a
basis for continued bilateral talks or to agree on further
arbitration. The announcement of a second round of presidential
discussions suggests that both are interested in reaching some
sort of agreement before the Argentines formally reject a de-
cision by the International Court of Justice favoring Chile.
Spain - North Africa
King Juan Carlos of Spain has asked his father, Don
Juan e orbon, to go to Libya today in an effort to persuade
President Qadhafi to help ease growing tension between Spain
and Algeria.
I IRelations between Madrid and Algiers have been'
strained since 1975, when Spain ignored Algeria's interest in
the Spanish Sahara and signed the territory over to Morocco
and Mauritania. In hopes of forcing Spain to renounce the 1975
agreement, Algeria has sought to apply pressure through indirect
aid to the tiny, violence-prone Canary Islands Independence
Movement. Algeria has also supported a proposed inquiry by the
Organization of African Unity into the "colonial" status of
the Canary Islands. Madrid rejects the inquiry out of hand,
arguing that the Canaries are an integral part of Spain in-
habited by people of Spanish descent.
Approved For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0310500010032-7
 ..A razed For Release 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7
(Security Classification) 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0
Top Secret
(SecurjtpOI ,sft0 elease 2007/02/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO30500010032-7
0 Aiw Aiw Aiw Agw Aw Aw Aw Aw Aw
1