NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010090-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 11, 2006
Sequence Number:
90
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 7, 1977
Content Type:
REPORT
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N 7;
Wednesday 7 December 1977 CG NIDC 77/283C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, 7 December 1977.
The NID a e is or the purpose o informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
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Iran - Oman - South Yemen
Indonesia-Vietnam
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EGYPT-USSR: Further Action
Egyptian President Sadat told US officials yesterday
that he intends to take "further action," which will be an-
nounced today, against the USSR. Sadat did not indicate what
he had in mind. In his current mood he may announce a full
diplomatic break with Moscow. It seems more likely, however,
that Sadat's recent public commitment to work toward reconven-
ing the Geneva conference will constrain him from further com-
promising the Soviets' role as cochairman of the conference.
Sadat told the US officials that he decided to break
with Syria and other participants in the Tripoli summit after
learning of their resolution to "freeze" relations with Egypt.
In a diatribe against Syrian President Asad, Sadat remarked
that he had wanted to shock Asad and "cut him down to size."
Sadat primarily blamed Moscow, however, for the affront to
Cairo and called the offending Arab governments "a block of
Soviet agents."
The Egyptian President--who until the Tripoli con-
ference had tried to minimize or ignore Arab criticism--now
may be reacting without a clearcut idea of where his actions
will lead. Sadat is obviously fed up with what he considers
the abuse of Egypt by those who ultimately stand to gain from
the risks the Egyptians have taken.
I In reacting to Arab criticism, Sadat usually thinks
that his erstwhile allies are taking the easy way out at Egypt's
expense and fails to see that they are attempting at least in
part to curb Egypt's independent actions and to salvage at
least the appearance of having options of their own.
It is possible that Sadat is simply trying to force
Syria, the Soviets, and even Arab moderates--such as Jordan and
Saudi Arabia--to make the hard choices he has made and commit
themselves to a concerted peace effort. His actions are more
likely, however, to deepen suspicions that Egypt has been plan-
ning all along to negotiate a separate settlement with Israel.
The USSR's attitude since Sadat's decision to visit Israel and
the scathing Soviet press attacks in the.past several days
suggest that this is, indeed, Moscow's interpretation.
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I ver the past several days the Soviets have dished
out some of the strongest personal abuse aimed at the Egyptian
President in nearly a year. On Sunday Pravda ran a TASS commen-
tary that indirectly accused Sadat of pro-Nazi sympathies. TASS
carried additional commentaries in this vein yesterday. The
Soviets are usually circumspect and low key in treating heads
of state, even those from countries with poor relations with
the USSR.
The Soviets wrote off Sadat as a possible ally long
before his trip to Israel, but their actions in the wake of
his trip suggest that they are also giving up on any possibility
of a return to a Geneva Conference. Moscow presumably realizes
that any further deterioration in its ties with Cairo only
further places in doubt the USSR's role as cochairman at Geneva.
If the Soviets are anticipating a separate agreement between
Egypt and Israel, they will try to strengthen their ties with
Syria, Iraq, and Libya in order to isolate Sadat even further.
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/Andreas von Agt,, the leader of the Netherlands'
Christian. Democratic Party, has formed a center-right cabinet
with the Liberals. The new government will formally assume re-
sponsibiZ'ty later this week. A. staunch, moralistic Catholic,
not noted for his flexibility, Agt nonetheless is to the left
of most West European Christian Democrats, notably those in
West Germany. Although it lacks a clear majority in the Second
Chamber, the Christian Democratic - Liberal combination was
the only feasible one after talks between the Socialists and
the Christian Democrats collapsed.//
/Ten of the portfolios will be held by the Chris-
tian Democrats and six by the Liberals. Liberal Party leader
Hans Wiegel will be Deputy Premier and Interior Minister.//
//The 25-week effort to re-form a center-left
coa i ion, s ch as governed the Netherlands from 1973 until
early this year, foundered on the inability of the Socialists
and Christian Democrats to come up with a mutually acceptable
allccation of portfolios and blend of policies.//
//The Socialists emerged from the general election
in May as e strongest single party, with an increase in re-
presentation from 43 to 53 seats. But this increase disrupted
the previous delicate equilibrium with the Christian Democrats
and made renewed accommodation impassible.
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I 1//The Christian Democrats and Liberals have 77 seat
in the -seat chamber, but six left-wing Christian Democrats
have already declared their benign opposition to the new al-
liance. While they probably would not join in a censure motion
against their colleagues, there is much in a center-right. pro-
gram they would not support.//
,'/The new government hopes, in a pinch, to receive
the six votes of the four splinter right parties. These parties'
deputies have said that they would judge the new government's
projected legislation on a case-by-case basis and would refrain
from supporting any immediate vote of no confidence against it.//
//Given the fragility of the government, mounting
economic problems, and growing disaffection of the labor unions,
the Netherlands seems in for a difficult period. 25X1
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The release on bail yesterday of Khan
Abdul Wali Khan may be intended to strengthen the political
forces opposed to former Prime Minister Bhutto but it could
lead to further disunity in their ranks.
//At the time of his arrest by Bhutto in
1975, Wali was the most prominent figure in the opposition;
Bhutto alleged that he was plotting the secession of Pakistan'
two westernmost provinces.
he insertion of one more ambitious leader in the
political mix is bound to increase tensions in the alliance
opposing Bhutto, and Wali's close identification with demands
for greater provincial autonomy could bring differences on this
issue to the surface. One of the most prominent of the alliance
leaders, former Air Force commander Asghar Khan, broke with his
colleagues last month, and Wali might also choose to go his
separate way.
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Today's talks between the Shah of Iran
and Oman's Sultan Qabus in Muscat are likely to focus on South
Yemen's refusal to end its support for the Omani rebel group
that attempted to overthrow the Sultan two years ago.
Qabus is reluctant to request the withdrawal of
the 1,000-man Iranian force in his country until convinced
of South Yemen's good faith.
25X1 /Saudi Arabia recently all but abandoned
efforts to bring South Yemen back into the Arab mainstream
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Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh plans a
trip to Indonesia later this month. A trade mission recently re-
turned to Hanoi after spending two weeks in Indonesia discussing
the possibility of expanding bilateral trade. The trade mission
also showed interest in learning about Indonesia's experience
with production-sharing arrangements with foreign oil companies.
I he prospects for a significant expansion in bilat-
eral trade are remote at best, but Vietnam does need to know
more about dealing with foreign oil companies. The lack of such
knowledge has been a major obstacle.to discussing contracts
with Western oil companies. Vietnam needs Western technology
to develop its potentially rich offshore oil deposits. 25X1
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Top Secret
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