NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010088-7
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T
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17
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 11, 2006
Sequence Number:
88
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 6, 1977
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP79T00975AO3040(Tt''~Qj~89bcret `' I U
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Access to this document will be restricted to
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Tuesday 6 December 1977 CG NIDC 77/282C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
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(Security Classification)
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 6 December 1977.
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f orminq
IT he NID Cable is tor the purpose o I
senior US officials.
ARAB STATES: Egyptian Reaction
RHODESIA: Zambia Plans Meeting.
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Page 2
GREECE-US-NATO: Attitude Toward Cooperation
Page 4
MAURITANIA-ARGENTINA:
Aircraft Purchases
Page 7
Page 10
BRIEFS
Berlin
China-USSR
Nigeria
USSR-Jamaica
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ARAB STATES: Egyptian Reaction
//Egypt reacted sharply to the Tripoli communique
by announcing yesterday that it will sever diplomatic relations
with Syria, Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and South Yemen. The move
could have the effect of forcing the summit participants to ad-
here to anti-Egyptian measures that they might otherwise have
circumvented. //
Egypt had earlier ordered the return of its top dip-
lomatic representatives from these Arab capitals and the USSR,
but--piqued by the resolutions issued by its Arab opponents--
decided to take more dramatic action against them.
L Egypt's apparent decision not to break completely
with the USSR indicates that, at least in this case, it con-
sidered the broader implications of its actions. By stopping
short of a break with Moscow, the Egyptians have preserved the
basic framework for a Geneva peace conference. Their rejoinder
to Syria, however, will make it more difficult for either side
to join the other at the negotiating table.
The Egyptians have seriously complicated the efforts
of Saudi Arabia and other Arab moderates to restore an Arab ne-
gotiating front. More important, they have probably risked
again annoying Saudi leaders,. whose anger over Sadat's penchant
for independent action had just begun to abate. Egypt's actions
will also feed the fears of Egyptian intellectuals and other
sophisticated Arabs that Sadat is playing into the Israelis'
hands by making concessions without gaining anything in return
and by further dividing the Arab world.
I adat's decision to break relations was a reaction
to the declaration at the Tripoli summit of a "freeze" in dip-
lomatic ties with Egypt. The participants at Tripoli did not
define their "freeze," but there is some evidence that, at
least until Sadat responded with a clear break in diplomatic
ties, the radicals intended that their move would have little
practical effect.
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h th final summit declaration denounced Sa-
I IAlthoug
dat's latest peace initiatives and affirmed a determination to
frustrate similar attempts at "capitulation," the document did
not reject peace negotiations altogether, and as such consti-
tutes a victory for Syria's efforts to keep its options open.
Iraq's walkout came following the conference's adop-
tion of w at Baghdad described as a "servile" document, made
necessary by Syria's refusal to accept the full rejectionist
program of no peace, no negotiations, no recognition of Israel.
Iraq had hoped to use the summit to force Syria to reconsider
its previous support for a negotiated settlement.
I Iraq wanted Asad and the other participants at Trip-
oli to denounce UN resolutions 242 and 338 and disavow any in-
tentions to attend a reconvened Geneva peace conference, to re-
quest that Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon and open its
borders to the Palestinian movement, and to join in a military
as well as an economic and political front for the total libera-
tion of Palestine.
Iraq's proposals add up more to a condemnation of
Asad an of Sadat. Baghdad still seems intent on holding its
own summit, although a date has not yet been set and neither
the Arab rejectionist states nor the Palestinians have indi-
cated they will participate.
RHODESIA: Zambia Plans Meeting
I //Zambian President Kaunda plans to send
his principal political adviser, Mark Chona, to Rhodesia to
talk with Prime Minister Smith, possibly as early as next week.
With this meeting, Kaunda hopes to maintain the dialogue with
the Rhodesians that began with Smith's surprise visit to Lusaka
in late September.//
//The talks will be the first contact be-
ian Prime Minis-
d
h
es
o
tween the Zambians and Smith since the R
ter's announcement on 24 November that he will move ahead in
an attempt to reach an independent settlement. Kaunda's osten-
sible reason for sending his adviser is to assess Smith's sin-
cerity about an internal settlement and to determine what Smith
meant by his conditional acceptance of the principle of one-man,
one-vote.//
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/Kaunda probably wants to raise again his own
ideas on a settlement, which have put him at odds with Tanza-
nian President Nyerere. As an alternative to the frontline
presidents' support of only the Patriotic Front, Kaunda has
advocated some kind of government of national unity in which
the major nationalist leaders would participate and to which
power would be transferred. He also wants national elections
in Rhodesia temporarily postponed once a national union govern-
ment is installed.//
//More important, Kaunda probably wants to seek
Smith's views of Joshua Nkomo, coleader of the Patriotic Front,
now that the Rhodesian Prime Minister has begun talks with rep-
resentatives of the other nationalist groups inside Rhodesia.
In previous contacts between Kaunda and the Rhodesians, both
sides have explored ways of finding a place for Nkomo in a set-
tlement. The Rhodesians would like to detach Nkomo from the Pa-
triotic Front and bring him into a settlement without Mugabe.//
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GREECE-US-NATO: Attitude Toward Cooperation
defense cooperation with the US is beginning to take shape.
//Prime Minister CaramanZis' attitude toward
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I //Negotiations between Greece and NATO have
in fact moved rather slowly since the Greeks withdrew from the
military side of the alliance during the Cyprus crisis in 1974.
At that time, the view was widely held in the alliance that
US-Greek defense relations must first be sorted out, and that
the passage of time might permit some progress on Cyprus and
increase Caramanlis' ability to recommit Greece fully to the
alliance.//
]//Since negotiations began in earnest last
fall, however, the Turks have posed a series of objections;
they oppose the special status for Greece envisaged by the ne-
gotiators, and are also pressuring the Greeks to stop lobbying
against the US-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement signed in
March 1976.//
//The Greeks have long urged that the US
use approval of the Turkish agreement to press for Turkish con-
cessions on Cyprus and a less rigid Turkish attitude in the Ae-
gean. They also fear that its passage, by again making a large
amount of military supplies available to the Turks, would tip
the balance of power against them. Indeed, they have made no
secret of the fact that they would not be unhappy if neither
agreement comes into force, especially since they are in a
better economic position than Turkey to meet their defense
needs.//
//Caramanlis resisted signing the US-Greek
agreement before the parliamentary election partly because of
domestic political considerations--particularly the strong
showing of leftist Andreas Papandreou in the election--but
also because he wanted to avoid facilitating US congressional
approval of the Turkish agreement.//
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MAURITANIA-ARGENTINA: Aircraft Purchases
//Mauritania reportedly plans to purchase at least
eight Argentine counterinsurgency aircraft to increase its ca-
pabilities to conduct aerial strikes against the PoZisario
Front guerrillas. This would be the first sale abroad of the
Pucara, an aircraft Argentina has been actively promoting for
export. Morocco, Mauritania's ally in the war against the Po-
Zisario Front, may also be interested in the Pucara.//
I /The Mauritanians have been looking for a suit-
able counterinsurgency aircraft for some time. For the past
two years they have relied upon their small force of Britten-
Norman Defenders, a modified version of a light transport air-
craft, for attacks and reconnaissance against the guerrillas.//
//France, who is Mauritania's largest arms sup-
plier, does not produce an aircraft comparable to the Pucara.
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/Argentina exhibited the IA-58 Pucara at the
Paris Air Show this year, the first time this plane has been
outside South America. Although Argentina reportedly has dem-
onstrated the Pucara in several countries, no contracts have
yet been signed.//
//The Pucara is Argentina's only military plane
of national design in production. It is a two-seat turboprop
plane best suited for close air support missions. Similar in
capabilities and role to the US Bronco, the Pucara carries
1,500 kilograms of bombs and ammunition, has two 20-mm cannons
and four 7.62-mm machine guns, and can land and take off from
400-meter long unimproved runways.//
I //The Pucara is ideal for many Third World coun-
tries. is cheaper than high-performance jets, and its slow
speed and loiter capability make it well-suited for use against
both guerrilla bands and conventional ground units.//
I//The Argentine Air Force received its first Pucaras
in mid-1976. Production has continued at a moderate pace; some
15 have been built to date. The Air Force has ordered 45, but
the total production run--largely dependent on sales abroad--
could be as high as 100 before the end of 1979.
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I East German border guards have apparently stopped
demanding that holders of US diplomatic passports show an East
German visa when traveling between East and West Berlin.
Since 1965, these travellers have used a "flash pro-
cedure" to pass through East German checkpoints, showing only
the cover and picture pages of their passports from inside
their vehicles. In early September, however, East German guards
began randomly to challenge this practice, presumably with So-
viet approval. Although there were numerous minor delays no
one was ever denied the right to pass.
The latest change almost certainly results from a US
emarcze to the Soviets on 10 November. The Soviet official
who received the demarche professed surprise at the East Ger-
man actions, maintained that crossing procedures had not
changed "so far as we know," and said he would check with the
East German authorities.
The Soviet attitude could, however, easily change if
overa relations with the West should turn downward. The East
Germans, for their part, remain eager to assert their "sover-
eignty" over the city's eastern sector.
I Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko met yesterday with
the new C inese Ambassador to Moscow, Wang Yu-ping. A brief So-
viet announcement said that the meeting was held at the request
of the Chinese Ambassador and that the two diplomats "had a
conversation."
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Since his arrival in Moscow in August, Wang Yu-ping
has met with several Soviet officials, including Prime Minister
Kosygin. Although Peking's handling of other recent diplomatic
contacts with Moscow appears to reflect an effort to put Sino-
Soviet state-to-state relations on a more correct footing, the
pattern of Wang's courtesy calls has so far paralleled that
followed by the previous Chinese Ambassador after his arrival
in Moscow in late 1970.
Nigeria
The government's program to register all voters within
seven weeks--scheduled to have begun last week--has been post-
poned until mid-January. The federal electoral commission an-
nounced that the postponement was necessary to give Nigeria's
19 states time to launch publicity campaigns to register voters
for the five state and federal elections required to install a
civilian government by October 1979. The commission faces mas-
sive problems in trying to register an estimated 35 million to
45 million voters and further slippage in the registration pe-
riod is likely.
Even after registrations have been completed, admin-
istrative problems will make it difficult for the military to
honor its commitment to hand over power by the target date.
Only one year--beginning next October--has been allotted for
formally organizing political parties and holding the elections
called for under the draft constitution.
//The USSR and Jamaica signed an economic and
techn.ica cooperation agreement last week in Kingston. The ac-
cord calls for construction of a large cement plant--the USSR's
first project assistance to Jamaica--and possibly for several
geological surveys. Moscow also offered to set up centers to
train workers on agricultural and industrial machinery and motor
vehicle repair and maintenance. The USSR also will furnish So-
viet teachers to educational institutions in Jamaica and will
receive Jamaicans in the USSR for industrial training.//
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//The value of the agreement was not disclosed.
Moscow probably will extend credits for equipment and technical
assistance for the cement plant and possibly for the surveys as
well.//
//Under the leadership of Prime Minister Michael
Manley, Jamaica's political and economic contacts with the
USSR have expanded. Jamaica failed, however, in previous at-
tempts to gain Soviet balance-of-payments support and has not
received any substantial Soviet aid, F_ I 25X1
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