NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030400010004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 15, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Saturday 15 October 1977 CG NIDC 77/240C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday, 15 October 1977.
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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
LEBANON:
Situation Report
Page 1
SYRIA:
Political Problems
Page 4
PAKISTAN: Internal Politics
Page 5
TURKEY:
Cabinet Resignation
Page 6
SPAIN:
New Amnesty Law
Page 6
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dissident Trials
Page 8
CAMBODIA-THAILAND: Border Clash
Page 8
NICARAGUA: Guerrilla Attacks Repulsed
Page 9
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LEBANON: Situation Report
//Recent information tends to confirm a
hardening of the Palestinian position on withdrawal from south
Lebanon.
BAs
a resu t, t e deployment of Lebanese forces to the south sche-
duled for this weekend may be delayed.//
tions of the Shaturah accords, but recent developments have
caused them to delay. They believe Israeli leaders and their
Christian allies in the south are deliberately impeding im-
plementation of the agreement. In their view, unilateral Pales-
tinian withdrawal at this time would be seen as bowing to
Israeli pressure and would give rightwing Christians an op-
portunity to expand their hold in south Lebanon.//
still intend eventually to abide by the withdrawal stipula-
//Moderate Palestinian leaders probably
//The apparent change in the Palestinian
position may also reflect a temporary tactical shift by Syria
to avoid the appearance of bending to Israeli pressure. It
seems unlikely that Palestine Liberation organization chief
Yasir Arafat would take such a stand if Syria opposed it.(--
i.an decision, it is clearly tactical. It could upset plans
//The reasoning behind the Palestin-
to move ahead this weekend with further deployments of Lebanese
army units to southern Lebanon. This in turn might lead to more
serious violations of the cease-fire, despite claims by Fatah
leaders that Palestinian "rejectionists" have agreed to a mili-
tary stand-down in h
BRAZIL: Geisel Strengthens His Position
gaged in political intrigue against Geisel's orders. Although
his political position at Least temporarily as the result
of his dismissal this week of Army Minister Frota, who had en-
Brazilian President GeiseZ has strengthened
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it is not Geisel's style to overreact or to conduct purges,
his concerns regarding the presidential succession could prompt
him to make other changes in key military assignments.
tician, probably acting in collaboration with Frota, publicly
announced that he was supporting Frota as Brazil's next presi-
dent. Geisel had repeatedly warned his military subordinates
not to campaign or to encourage political activities on their
behalf. Relations between Geisel and Frota, moreover, have
never been good.//
~/Geisel fired Frota after a right-wing poli-
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The swiftness and restraint of the President's ac-
tions will impress his military subordinates, including those'
who criticized many of his policies. This is the
second time Geisel has sacked a four-star general for failing
to follow orders; in January 1976 he summarily replaced the in-
fluential commander of the 2nd Army in Sao Paulo after a civilian
died in military custody. Although Frota reportedly is now under
house arrest, this may well be a precautionary move as there
are no indications that Geisel is contemplating further disci-
plinary action.
//Frota's fall from power removes one of the
two principal contenders to succeed Geisel, but the other lead-
ing candidate, intelligence chief General Figueiredo, may be
asked to resign--especially if he continues his political
maneuvering--in order to appease those in the military who had
supported Frota.//
give him the freedom to pick whomever he chooses as his suc-
cessor--a luxury that none of his military presidential pred-
over the army, his most important political constituency, could
In any case, Geisel's reassertion of his authority
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intensified a power struggle within his inner circle that he
may be trying to contain by ordering increased security measures
in Damascus. US officials in Syria do not believe a coup is
ZikeZy
Syrian President Asad's anti-corruption campaign has
the defense force
headed by Asad's brother Rifaat Asad--which is the main prop of
the regime--has been in a high state of alert for unexplained
reasons at least since the first few days of this month. The
US defense attache, moreover, has observed a buildup since late
last week around the Damascus military airfield by units be-
lieved to be part of Rifaat Asad's defense force. Some special
forces units attached to the airborne forces are also reported
to be on alert.
The US Embassy believes the alerts and troop movements
constitute nothing more than an anti-coup exercise ordered by
the President to demonstrate his control.
Asad probably did order the alert of the special forces--units
led by a key military commander loyal to Asad but in intense
competition with Rifaat Asad. It is not clear, however, that
the President is directing his brother's actions, and Rifaat
may in fact have deployed some of his troops on his own author-
ity.
President
tion campaign launched by President Asad in August to quiet
popular discontent over corruption at high levels. The President
probably has no intention of extending that campaign to his
brother, whose corruption has made him an object of general
opprobrium among virtually all other regime supporters.
The current tensions are a result of the anti-corrup-
i emma: how to give the corruption campaign credibility and
chasten rival factions within the regime without forcing some
As a result of his hands-off policy, Asad faces a
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military and the Baath Party within acceptable limits.
the power struggle among Rifaat and other factions within the
of them into a corner where they might combine and turn on him.
For the moment, he still appears in control of the situation,
but it is uncertain in the present confusion whether he can keep
Administrator Zia-ul-Haq to postpone the election in Pakistan
has created no serious problems so far for the military govern-
ment, despite unhappiness among politicians on both sides. The
move was directed primarily at former Prime Minister Bhutto,
whose party is divided on how to respond.//
//The recent decision by Chief Martial Law
this faction may have been behind recent demonstrations against
the election postponement and against a court decision to re
yoke bail for Bhutto, who is to be tried on several charges
including murder. Party conservatives, on the other hand, are
reluctant to confront the military at this time.
appears to favor putting as much pressure on Zia as possible;
One of the party's factions, headed by.Bhutto's wife,
to civilians as soon as possible, but his plans for doing so
are vague. The US Embassy in Islamabad believes that decisions
are being made with little forethought, with Zia relying on his
instincts and on the advice of a few senior military officers
and civil servants.
Zia continues to assert that he will hand over power
Pakistan is headed for a prolonged period of military rule.//
pects to defeat Bhutto in the next election, has generally
supported Zia's actions, but. demands by its leaders that Zia
set a definite date for the election reflect suspicions that
//The Pakistan National Alliance, which ex-
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TURKEY: Cabinet Resignation
resigned yesterday, and there is speculation in Ankara that the
Foreign Ministry and some lesser portfolios may also change
hands because of the domestic and foreign policy problems be-
setting Prime Minister Demirel's fragile three-party coalition.//
//Turkish Defense Minister Sadettin BiZgic
Bilgic is resigning to devote more time to his duties as deputy
chairman of Demirel's Justice Party. Other ministers may follow
suit if they are offered party leadership posts at a party meet-
ing this weekend. The difficulties facing the government ap-
parently have made the cabinet portfolios less attractive.//
//According to the Turkish news service,
p acne that he is worn out physically and emotionally by the
task of representing a weak coalition government. His departure,
however, is not at all certain. The US Embassy in Ankara reports
that there are indications the Turkish Government is contemplat-
ing some initiatives in the disputes with Greece. If such moves
are in the works, Demirel would probably want to retain Caglay-
angil, a moderate on Turkish-Greek relations.//
//Foreign minister Caglayangil has often com-
mirel's calculations.
gills successor is Energy and Natural Resources Minister Kamran
Ivan, who is a hard-liner on relations with Greece. Ivan is quite
popular in eastern Turkey, the stronghold of the Islamic-ori-
ented National Salvation Party, Demirel's troublesome coalition
partner. His appointment would suggest that domestic political
considerations still outweigh foreign policy questions in De-
//The man most frequently touted as Caglayan-
SPAIN: New Amnesty Law
Basque prisoners accused of terrorist crimes. The new Zaw--a
compromise between the government and the opposition parties--
is Likely to strengthen Prime Minister Suarez politically and
dorsed a broad amnesty Law that will particularly benefit
The Spanish parliament yesterday overwhelming en-
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could facilitate the current negotiations over autonomy for
the Basque regime. It will anger rightists, however, and in-
crease pressure on the government to enact harsh antiterrorist
laws.
a key demand of leftist and regional parties. Pro-amnesty demon-
strations in the Basque provinces in particular have repeatedly
led to violent clashes with the police, triggering rightist
charges that the new era of political toleration has resulted
in a breakdown of public order.
This widening of previous amnesty laws has long been
Basque leader as "the culmination of the aspirations of our
people"--is likely to ease the task of government and Basque
negotiators currently seeking an agreement along lines similar
to that worked out recently for Catalonia.
ress toward greater Basque autonomy. The new law--hailed by one
The strife in the Basque provinces has hindered prog-
e ore the parliamentary election of last June as long as the
goal of the perpetrators was the establishment of public free-
doms or regional autonomy. Political crimes committed before
6 October will be included if they did not involve serious vio-
lence against persons. The amnesty also applies to workers and
soldiers dismissed for political reasons, conscientious objec-
tors, press law offenders, and military men who fought for the
Republic during the civil war.
The law provides amnesty for political crimes committed
The law will help Suarez--whose party falls just short
of a majority in the lower house--to win the support of Basque
and Catalan centrist deputies, and help free the Prime Minister
from the politically damaging necessity of seeking rightist sup-
port for key legislation. It will also help to dispel the grow-
ing popular impression that the government is drifting and un-
able to take decisive action.
add fue to rightist allegations that the Suarez government is
incapable of standing up to dangerous pressures from the left
and the regions, and may increase pressure by rightist military
leaders on Suarez and King Juan Carlos to restore public order.
t the same time, however, the amnesty will probably
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-- Has decided to discount a bad press and criticism at
the Belgrade conference, and may in fact believe it
can document improper contacts between the dissidents
and Western officials or intelligence agencies.
-- Waited for the opening of the Belgrade conference in
order to make it clear to the dissidents that they
cannot rely on outside pressure to protect them.
The government, in fact, has in hand a draft law that would grant
the police special powers of search and detention. The political
opposition is opposed to the bill, which it says is harsher than
the last antiterrorist measures passed by Franco.
prominent dissidents arrested in January will go on trial on
Monday. Similar stories during the summer proved false, but
the specificity of the present reports suggests that they may
be well-founded.
of the trial is surprising, given the recent opening of the
Belgrade conference on European security and cooperation. This
suggests that the regime:
the dissidents as a lesson to other malcontents, but the timing
The authorities presumably would like to sentence
-- May be trying to put psychological pressure on the
dissidents, and may further delay or postpone a trial.
own pressure on the regime by asking Presidents Tito and Giscard
to intervene with the Czechoslovak government on behalf of the
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e
Some dissidents, meanwhile, have tried to build their
CAMBODIA-THAILAND: Border Clash
the southern Thai-Cambodian border. Cambodian troops reportedly
crossed the frontier and attacked a Thai military unit and a
//Intense fighting broke out yesterday along
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village. This may be the largest Cambodian attack against Thai-
land since fighting began two years ago. It follows several re-
cent Thai attempts, including diplomatic demarches in Peking,
Vietiane and the UN, to establish a dialogue with Cambodia on
settling their border disputes.//
attacked a Thai marine company in the Ban Hat Lekt area near
the southern coastal border, the scene of minor skirmishing
last November. They apparently overran Ban Hat Lekt and captured
two police outposts. The Thai responded by sending in two naval
patrol boats to shell Cambodian positions; they also rushed a
marine battalion from Chanthaburi to reinforce their troops in
the Ban Hat Lekt area. The fighting apparently is still going
on, but the stronger, better-equipped Thai forces should be
able to drive the Cambodians back across the border.//
//Some 300 heavily armed Cambodians reportedly
//The Cambodians now have some 10 combat regi-
dean ships in the Gulf of Thailand.
ments along the entire border. The Thai have moved additional
combat troops and aircraft to bases in the area but still do
not have enough troops to patrol the frontier adequately. The
Thai navy is patrolling the coastal area and monitoring Cambo-
NICARAGUA: Guerrilla Attacks Repulsed
The guerrilla raids on Thursday in Nicaragua
were probably designed to goad the government into taking re-
pressive action and thus negate its recent efforts to improve
its image on human rights. An angry National Guard high com-
mand has already ordered more aggressive counterinsurgency
measures, and the government may publicly charge Cuba with
complicity in the attacks. President Somoza, however, will
probably try to resist reimposing martial Zaw.
Members of the Sandinist National Liberation Front
launched two widely separate attacks against the National Guard,
reportedly killing 10 military and three civilians and leaving
10 soldiers wounded. These were the first significant actions
by the guerrillas since an assault on the home of a cabinet
minister in December 1974.
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An elite guard company was airlifted to the area and is using
planes and helicopters to track down the guerrillas. A spokes-
man for the guard said troops will continue hot pursuit into
Costa Rican territory if necessary.//
//One attack occurred near the Costa Rican border.
der.
into
this
martial law, which had been imposed after the 1974 assault.
Somoza has also ordered the ward to stop torturing prisoners
and to respect their rights.
tation on human rights, the Somoza government recently lifted
The other encounter took place near the Honduran bor-
The Sandinist group there is reportedly trying to cross
Honduras, and the hot-pursuit policy may be followed in
area as well.
//As part of its efforts to improve its repu-
ister of Security Charpentier has already said publicly that
he has sent reinforcements to the border and that Costa Rica
will not allow its territory to be used for guerrilla strikes.
tween Nicaragua and the two neighboring countries; one incident
on the Costa Rican border has already received wide press cov-
erage. Costa Rica, however, may extend some measure of coopera-
tion. Although the Costa Ricans will probably not extradite
guerrillas who have made their way back across the border, Min-
I1/The hot-pursuit policy could cause problems be-
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