NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030300010012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 17, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Wednesday August 17, 1977 CG NIDC 77-191C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday, August 17, 1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior officials.
USSR - SOUTH AFRICA: Propaganda
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TURKEY: Greek Cypriot Political Uncertainty
MOROCCO: Polisario Guerrillas
NIGERIA: Foreign Exchange Scandal
UK: Fluidized-Bed Combustion System
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USSR - SOUTH AFRICA: Propaganda
I Official Soviet news media are continuing their
propagan a campaign on South African nuclear arms programs. In
addition, the Soviets have presented demarches to France and
West Germany. Whatever the degree of genuine Soviet concern
about South African nuclear developments, the timing of the
Soviet campaign--one month before the UN General Assembly
convenes--suggests that it is designed to gain political ad-
vantages for Moscow.
Last year Pravda ran a warning of South Africa's
nuclear potential about four weeks before the General Assembly
met, and the Soviets used the West's veto of a UN resolution
banning the supply of military technology and arms to South
Africa as evidence of Western duplicity. Both a Tass release
on Sunday and a Pravda commentary on Monday charged the West--
and the US, West Germany, and Israel in particular--with assist-
ing the South Africans.
I J These releases follow a week of Soviet news coverage on
this topic that began on August 8 when Tass warned that the
South Africans were preparing to test and manufacture nuclear
weapons with the aid of NATO nations and Israel. US sales of
enriched uranium were used as specific examples of Western
complicity. Tass argued that the US and its NATO allies are
aiding the South Africans to "consolidate the racist Pretoria
regime" and crush the struggle for liberation throughout
Africa.
On August 11, Izvestiya took up the issue when it
ran a cartoon alluding to US involvement in South Africa's
nuclear programs. The following day, Izvestiya returned to
this theme in an article which implied that the US was guilty
of hypocrisy for not forcing South Africa to live up to the
tenets of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.
I The most recent Tass release and Pravda commentary
repeated and expanded on many of the earlier Soviet claims.
The Tass piece was broadcast in English and quoted European
and African press reactions condemning South African nuclear
programs. Both Pravda and Tass accused the US, West Germany,
France, and Israel of aiding Pretoria since the late 1950s.
Tass again expressed high-level Soviet concern and called for
immediate UN action to prevent South Africa from going any
further.
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EGYPT: President Sadat's Decree
I I Egyptiarq President Sadat issued a decree on Sunday
e egattng all presidential powers to Vice President Mubarak
while he rests inAlexandria and his home village--probably
until the end of amadan in mid-September. For some time, Sa-
dat has seemed faiigued and very worried about domestic dif-
ficulties and the 'uneasy course of his peace initiative.; he
probably wants to take time off to consider his next moves.
Since the outbreak of hostilities with Libya in mid-
July, Sadat has been on the defensive in his public appearances,
lashing out at his enemies--Libya and the USSR--in an unusually
strident manner. In private, he has appeared tired and harassed.
Ambassador Eilts,'Iwho met with Sadat on Sunday, described the
President as looking tense and under stress. Sadat is especially
conscientious about his health and must have felt he could not
tolerate both the strain of fasting during Ramadan and the
pressures of his current difficulties.
Sadat mai also want a period of uninterrupted time
consider his nep~t step in the Arab-Israeli dispute, which in
turn will affect his other primary concerns--deteriorating re-
lations with the USSR and his feud with Libya. Although most
Egyptians still sh re Sadat's desire for a peace settlement
with Israel, many o longer share his seeming optimism and have
come to criticize he way he is handling the current peace ini-
tiative. There is mounting concern--of which Sadat almost cer-
tainly is aware--t at Egypt has allowed itself to be distracted
by Libya at the expense of its effort against Israel and has
gone too far in antagonizing the USSR, which will play a role
in either Middle East peace negotiations or war.
The genelal perception among Egyptians that Secretary
Vance 's recent visit to the region failed to break Israeli in- 25X1
transigence has
h
s
rpened domesti
c pressures on Sadat. Thus,
he may feel the need to develop ways of diffusing popular fru--
trati
I &a
-&u rr111V uuL =u-cure policy.)
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TURKEY: Greek Cypriot Political Uncertainty
I I Turkish leaders regard Archbishop Makarios' death
ana e ensuing political uncertainty in the Greek Cypriot
community as an opportunity to enhance the international sta-
ture of the fledgling, Turkish Cypriot state and to gain lever-
age over the Greek side in the event of a negotiated settle-
ment. Their efforts to exploit this opening have thus far come
to little. The Turks might, out of pique, take some precipi-
tious action, but the chances of such an act are very slim.
I I In an opportunistic effort to capitalize on the poli-
tical disarray in the Greek Cypriot sector, the Turks have re-
cently pressed for international recognition of the Turkish
Cypriot administration as the equal of the Greek Cypriot - run
Cyprus government. The Turks have implied that continuing in-
ternational recognition of the Greek Cypriot government as the
legitimate representative of the entire island could have a ne-
gative impact on the chances for progress toward a Cyprus set-
tlement.
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The Turkish side argues that the Greek Cypriots have
continuously violated the 1960 constitution and that none of the
provisions concerning the Turkish Cypriots have been observed
since late 1963. Thus, the Turks conclude, it is no longer pos-
sible to talk of a republic based on the 1960 constitution, but
only of the existence of two autonomous communities. They claim
that any vestigial reason for arguing to the contrary has dis-
appeared with Makarios' death.
It is unknown how far the Turks intend to push this
ine; n ara's demarche to the US, however, was not made at the
highest levels and the Turks have been silent recently in the
face of a strongly negative international reaction. It seems
likely that having met little success, the Turks have backed
off. They are doubtless aware that, although uncertainties in
Greek Cyprus remove some of the pressure on Ankara, persistence
in their recent demands could offset any benefits from this
momentary advantage.
I ITurkish Cypriot leader Denktash has been even shriller
in his efforts to take advantage of the situation in the south.
He has even asserted that further talks cannot be held if he is
not recognized as the equal of the new Greek Cypriot leader
and hinted once again of a declaration of independence. His
hard line reflects to a large degree his own need to protect
his flank from extremist views.
The government in Ankara, which must also cater to
activist domestic sentiment, may not rein in Denktash, but he
is well aware that he is beholden to Ankara for crucial diploma-
tic and economic support and is unlikely to take any major steps
without mainland approval.
There are strong indications that when the dust clears
r_ne 01 nes of basic Turkish policy toward Cyprus will look very
much as they did before. If anything, progress toward a nego-
tiated settlement will now be slower than before the Archbishop's
death, as the Turks will want to test carefully their suspicions
that Athens will now have a greater say in Cypriot affairs.
One senior Turkish official recently asserted that An-
kara mig want to delay another round of formal talks until
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after the Greek Cypriot presidential election next February. In-
formal talks, however, between communal negotiators or senior
Greek and Turkish officials, could be held in the meantime.
In his approach to Cyprus, Turkish Prime Minister De-
mire continues to be limited by both the views of his coalition
partners and the fear that opposition leader Ecevit is waiting
to take advantage o any mis-step. Deputy Prime Minister Erbakan,
whose hard line con ributed to the government's virtual paralysis
on Cyprus for two aid a half years before the recent parliamentary
election, may now hive toned down his position somewhat in re-
cognition of the need for compromise in a coalition government.
I I Even if Demirel has a freer hand in this respect,
owever, a has been hemmed in by Ecevit's recent advocacy of
Turkish settlement in the Turkish-controlled, but unoccupied,
Greek portion of Fazagusta. Demirel may fear that Ecevit may
succeed in selling some Turks on the idea that the Prime Min-
ister is soft on Cy rus. No groundswell of public support for
Ecevit's position, 1owever, has developed.
I I There remains a small chance that the Turks--having
dug emselves in on the issue of international recognition of
Makarios' successor--will be tempted to do something rash, such
as permitting Denkt4sh to declare independence. We do not be-
lieve that this is likely, since the Turks are aware of the ne-
gative international reactions such a move would trigger. The
Turks may in fact soon be looking for a gesture by the inter-
national community that would enable them to ease their way
back from the diplomatic limb T n which they find themselves.
MOROCCO: Polisario Guerrillas
//The, Moroccan forces that began a sweep opera-
tion in the Western 'Sahara earlier this month have encountered
few PoZisar-lo guerriZlas. The Moroccans are claiming some
success in dispersithe uerriZZas n
Zo istics support,
e g
uerre Zas have avoided
contact wz the Moroccans and probably are waiting or the
end of the sweep to eir activitie
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/On August 4, some 20,000 Moroccan troops launched
a sweep in a Western Sahara to destroy Polisario logistic fa-
cilities and interdict routes to and from the guerrilla's Al-
gerian havens.
//The Moroccans hope these measures will restrict
the o isario's freedom of movement; until now the guerrillas
have been able to strike at will throughout the Western Sahara
and Mauritania. Similar sweeps in the past, however, have been
NIGERIA: Foreign Exchange Scandal
I I Police authorities in Nigeria on Monday announced
e az s of a major foreign exchange scandal involving the
Loss to Nigeria of an estimated $1.6 billion through illegal
currency transactions. The amount is equal to about one third
of Nigeria's official foreign assets. It is unknown how Lagos
will cover these obligations, but a combination of overseas
borrowing and a drawdown in reserves is probable.
The police have arrested over 200 prominent Nigerians
and oreigners; no US citizens have been detained. Nigerian and
foreign businessmen, and accomplices in the central bank, ports
authority, customs, and probably the Ministry of Finance are
involved in the scandal.
I J The US embassy reports that the ruling Supreme Mili-
tary Council is in a vehement mood and that observers expect an
intensive witchhunt to continue for months. No military council
member is known to have been involved. The highest ranking of-
ficial reportedly detained so far is the assistant inspector
general of police.
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I Nonetheless, the scandal will further tarnish the re-
gimelp ich has stressed its anti-corruption image. It will also
provide new fuel for civilian and military critics of the gov-
ernment.
I The council may face intensified pressure from civilian
groups o return power to civilians before the present target
date of 1979. Another problem for the government will be to
keep its witchhunt within manageable bounds and to deal with
inevitable charges of high-level complicity which could exacer-
bate already existing strains and mutual suspicions among council
members.
Arrests of suspected bureaucrats will disrupt govern-
ment functions and could also slow the flow of imports--and
thereby aggravate existing shortages of consumer goods. In ad-
dition, some potential investors--because of the storm of con-
troversy raised by the scandal and the prospect of new correc-
tive regulations--may forgo plans to invest in Nigeria. Lagos
is counting on substantial amounts of private investment to
carry out its ongoing industrialization program.
UK: Fluidized-Bed Combustion System
The UK has a clear lead over other industrial nations
Zn e z.eZd of fluidized-bed combustion, a more efficient
technique for burning powdered coal, and can be expected to
achieve a number of significant new developments in the next
several years. It has expanded its capability to use Zow-grade,
high-sulfur coal as an industrial fuel with the first commer-
cial installation of a fluidized-bed combustion unit on an
existing industrial boiler system. This technique permits
greatly increased combustion efficiency and lowered air poZZu-
tion while affording moderate savings in capital and operating
costs for industrial heating systems.
J Fluidized-bed processing has been used for some time
in the chemical and metallurgical fields, for example for cata-
lytic cracking of petroleum. The recently installed British
unit has a compact vertical combustion chamber containing a
heat transfer medium of sand kept in turbulent suspension
around embedded water tubes by the action of powerful upward-
directed jets of air. Granulated coal fed into this fluidized
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bed burns completely as it circulates, releasing a far greater
proportion of its energy as useful heat than would be the case
under normal combustion conditions.
The burner operates at atmospheric pressure and the
flue gases heat a conventional water-tube boiler. The heat re-
lease is sufficient to raise about 24 metric tons of steam per
hour, corresponding to about 16 megawatts thermal. Undesirable
pollutants in the stack gas are controlled by adding pulverized
limestone to the bed. Ash and spent limestone fall out of the
fluidized bed and are removed at the bottom of the unit.
Such burners could use a wide range of solid or liq-
ui tue s--coal mine tailings, municipal refuse or residual oil.
The process is particularly attractive for such countries as
the US that have low-grade, high-sulfur coal but wish to main-
tain strict anti-pollution standards.
At least three British firms are designing and test-
ing commercial fluidized-bed combustion units for industrial
boiler applications. A smaller British model designed for do-
mestic heating has been tested in the Netherlands for two years.
Large pressurized units for power plant use are still in the
developmental stages.
The UK's present lead in fluidized-bed combustion
technology is probably only temporary. Other countries are now
devoting a great deal of attention to this technique, and the
UK is an active partner in many of their ventures, such as at-
mospheric-pressure boiler systems in Australia and South Africa,
land and ship-based power plant systems in Sweden, and pressur-
ized gas. turbine power plant systems in Canada and the US.
I I The International Energy Agency has chosen the UK to
head its large pressurized fluidized-bed combustion test pro-
gram. This program, funded jointly by West Germany, the UK and
the US, includes construction at a UK coal mine of an experi-
mental facility that will have a steam-raising capacity of
nearly 150 tons per hour, corresponding to about 88 me awatts
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of involvement in the 1965 coup attempt. The last major release
was in December 1976; at that time the government said it would
I President Suharto has publicly reaffirmed his govern-
ment's intention to release political detainees, according to
press reports. In a speech to parliament on the eve of independ-
ence day, Suharto promised to free 20,000 of nearly 28,000 pris-
oners within the next two years. Those to be released have been
designated ineligible for trial because of insufficient evidence
free all those linked to the abortive coup.
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