NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010043-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: June 25, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday June 25, 1977 CG NIDC 77-147C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Saturday June 25. 1977.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
ITALY: Political Accord Developments
EAST GERMANY: Consumer Unrest
IRAN: Human Rights Reforms
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Page 2
Page 3
FRANCE: Socialist Party Meeting
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ITALY: Political Accord Developments
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//Italy's major parties are cautiously op-
timst-bc as tney nead into the final phase of negotiations on
the content of Prime Minister Andreotti's government program.//
For two months, Andreotti's Christian Democrats have
been nolIng bilateral talks with the Communists and the four
other parties, which support the government indirectly by ab-
staining on key parliamentary votes. Party technical experts
believe that they have gone as far as possible and that the
time has come for the six party leaders to begin collegial ses-
sions aimed at ironing out remaining differences.
These roundtable meetings are likely to start today
or early next week. The convening of such meetings, which are
certain to receive extensive publicity in Italy, has been a ma-
jor Communist objective in its talks with the Christian Demo-
crats. The Communists believe that party chief Berlinguer's
participation around the same table with the other leaders will
vividly underline the political significance of an accord in
which the Communists are formally included.
Among the contentious issues up for consideration by
the party leaders are restraints on wages, police unionization,
and the organization and management of key state enterprises.
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the Socialists?who have been press-
ing tor a
more comprenensive
accord involving a change of gov-
ernment--now
seem inclined to accept a limited program agree-
ment. The
sharpest comments at this stage are coming from the
smaller parties,
such as the Republicans, who charge that the
agreement
will reflect a consensus by the Christian Democrats,
Communists,
and Socialists to treat economic problems in such
general terms
as to render the accord meaningless in substan-
tive terms.
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If the
six party leaders succeed in nailing down an
still have to be approved in separate meet-
agreement,
it will
ings of the
respective party directorates. The Christian Demo-
crats and
Communists at least are optimistic that the process
can be
completed
by the end of the month or the first week
in
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EAST GERMANY:
Consumer
Unrest
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East Germany's
debt service ratio has risen rapidly
and in 1976
was
35 percent of its exports to the developed
West. Its
hard-currency debt jumped from $2.8 billion at the
end of 1974
to $4.8 billion at the end of 1976; a rising debt
and debt
service is likely over the next few years if exports
are not expanded
more rapidly than in the past or if imports
are not curtailed.
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The West's lagging economic growth, meanwhile, has
ampeneci
demand for East German goods. The inability to divert
goods from
the domestic consumer to exports will only aggravate
this problem.
Meat, live animals, and other consumer goods are
important hard-currency earners and are among the more promising
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of East German exports. Attempts to expand exports of machinery
and equipment, on the other hand, are apt to meet with Western
resistance.
Because East German economic growth is heavily de-
pendent on imports, a curtailment of imports could impinge on
the ability to export and might eventually affect the avail-
ability of consumer goods if economic growth slows down.
25X1 The East Germans could continue to borrow heavily in
the West to finance increased imports. To do so, however, would
lead to a faster growth in debt than the planners apparently
feel is wise. Nonetheless, Honecker might well opt for this
alternative rather than chance a reduction in the personal con-
sumption plan.
25X1 I I Presumably, the East Germans could borrow what they
need at least in the short-run. Most Western lenders apparently
still consider East Germany a good credit risk. This picture
could change, however, if the East Germans fail to demonstrate
some intention of keeping the debt within manageable bounds.
25X1 The debt situation could force the East Germans to
seek Western assistance. The most likely source would be West
Germany, which holds one fourth of East Germany's debt to the
West. If approaches to West Germany fail, other sources of
Western financial assistance might have to be tapped.
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IRAN: Human Rights Reforms
25X1 //The Shah is moving steadily, if deliberately,
in his effort to improve Iran's poor international reputation
on the issue of human rights. At the same time, he is at pains
to dispel any impression that proposed judicial reforms are,
in fact, capitulation to pressure from Western critics of Iran's
handling of the detention and trial of terrorists.//
25X1 //Last week, the government submitted for es-
sentially pro forma parliamentary approval a bill that calls
for reform of penal codes under which civilians are charged
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and tried, usually in closed sessions, by military tribunals.
The amendments would go a long way to meet the demands of those
in Iran and abroad who have criticized the lack of due process
in the trials of terrorists by military tribunals. The new re-
gulations would grant defendants charged with violations of
national security most of the rights now available in civil
courts and would provide for:
--The charging or release of detainees within 24 hours.
--Selection of a civilian defense lawyer from qualified
members of the bar.
--Open trial, presumably including permission for foreign
observers to attend.//
25X1 //A final assessment of the reforms, which should
come into effect this summer, will have to await their actual
implementation. The new trial practices do give the government
flexibility by allowing special handling of particularly violent
terrorist acts. The provision for open trial, for example, can
be waived if the tribunal rules that it would damage "the best
interests of state or moral standards."//
25X1 //The Shah has been chafing under foreign criticism
of the government's handling of security-related cases. He real-
izes that Iran cannot afford to be indifferent to the commentary
of foreign news media on Iran's human rights performance, if
only because of media influence on Western governments.//
25X1 //In the past few months, the Shah has launched
a counterattack against his human rights critics by conducting
a public trial of terrorists in April, opening prisons to out-
side observers, and responding personally to requests from media
representatives for information on Iran's posture on human rights.
Empress Farah Diba and the Shah's sister, Princess Ashraf, have
joined him in making public statements aimed at discrediting
foreign critics and defending Iran's overall record in human
rights.//
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FRANCE: Socialist Party Meeting
The French Socialist Party congress last weekend
confirmed and strengthened party leader Francois Mitterrand's
complete control of his party. His authority is now overtly
unchallenged, even by the party's recalcitrant left wing,
which has made the symbolic gesture of renouncing its role as
an "organized faction." By demonstrating his dominance of the
party, Mitterrand has disarmed some of his right-wing critics
who are wary of left-wing extremism. He has also warned his
Communist allies that they cannot count on the left wing to
exert pressure on their behalf from within the party.
The congress was billed as the final pre-election
test of strength between Mitterrand's majority faction and
the dissident Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Edu-
cation; the CERES faction has been critical of party policies
and of what it describes as Mitterrand's "monarchic" style of
leadership. Mitterrand arrived at the congress with a key ad-
vantage; his faction had increased in strength from 68 to 75
percent of the party in the past two years, whereas CERES had
stagnated at around 24 percent. Mitterrand thus had a compara-
tively free hand and events apparently played themselves out
as he wished.
CERES capitulated to party discipline fairly quickly,
agreeing to disband its formal organization, end its independ-
ent financing, and refrain from criticism of the party. Mitter-
rand offered nothing in return. He rejected a compromise "syn-
thesis" motion that would have integrated CERES' differing
policy views into the party platform, and--more important--
would have brought CERES back into the party's secretariat,
from which it has been banished since 1975. Mitterrand did
this, despite his realization that there was extensive support
among the party rank and file for a "synthesis" compromise and
a show of party unanimity.
Mitterrand was undoubtedly aware that CERES had grown
when it was in the party leadership from 1971 to 1975 and stag-
nated when it was not.
Mitterrand's major objectives are for the Socialists
to win, the next election and enter the government with a
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fairly homogeneous team. Too many CERES militants in the party
leadership or in parliament, where they could be expected to
side with the Communists, could kill his chances for success.
Mitterrand has believed for some time that the period of pro-
tracted philosophical and theoretical debate dear to the heart
of CERES is over and that energies should be turned toward the
real problems of governing.
It is likely that Mitterrand went out of his way to
make it difficult for CERES to agree to a compromise on the
political options, such as European relations and a market
economy, on which it disagrees with the majority. The presence
in the party of both a majority and an opposition is probably
acceptable to him, as long as the opposition confines itself
to debates and the majority make the decisions.
CERES, for its part, agreed to an at least temporarily
bad bargain because it is committed ideologically to socialism.
The CERES leaders, among the most dynamic and dedicated in the
party, were convinced socialists long before Mitterrand took
up the cause. CERES also pragmatically had little choice; much
as it decries the "cult of personality", it realizes than with-
out Mitterrand and his party CERES would count for little.
During the congress, Mitterrand gave short shrift
to his Communist allies. Although stoutly defending his inten-
tion to share power with them, he noted that if the mid-July
deadline he has set for updating the common program of the
left is not met, the Socialists would simply consider them-
selves bound by the common program as it now exists.
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