NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010028-5
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• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2005
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 16, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday.
e Nil) Cable is tor the purpose o in orming
senior officials.
ISRAEL: Right-Wing Coalition
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PAKISTAN: Situation Report
NAMIBIA - SOUTH AFRICA: Negotiations
EL SALVADOR: Violence Continues
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ISRAEL: Right-Wing Coalition
I I The leader of Israel's Likud bloc, Menahem Begin,
wz pro ably announce the formation of a right-wing coalition
on Monday. Since Begin's talks with Democratic Movement for
Change leader YigaeZ Yadin have broken down, the new coalition
will have only a narrow parliamentary margin. Even so, the coa-
lition appears to have a good chance of holding together.
With the hawkish National Religious Party, Arik
Sharon's right-wing Shlom Zion, and the support of the Aguda
religious parties, Begin would control 62 seats in the 120-
member Knesset. Likud'. could also count on the support of expa-
triate Frenchman Flatto-Sharon, who holds one seat, and Begin's
nominee for foreign minister, Moshe Dayan, if Dayan decides
not to return his seat to the Labor Party.
Such a coalition would be more close-knit and less
L_ nera e to personal and ideological conflicts than the La-
bor government. On key negotiation issues, Likud and the Na-
tional Religious Party fully agree on the need to retain per-
manent control of the West Bank and to reject negotiations, in
any forum, with the Palestine Liberation Organization. The or-
thodox Aguda groups, as well as the National Religious Party,
moreover, see eye-to-eye on the interpretation of most reli-
gious questions and seem satisfied with Begin's assurances of
support on these issues.
Neither Begin nor Yadin has excluded the possibility
of resuming coalition talks, but this appears unlikely in the
near future. Indeed, Begin's steadfast defense of his hardline
position on the West Bank and his refusal to give the Demo-
cratic Movement a real voice in his cabinet on negotiation is-
sues seem to reflect his unwillingness to pay more than a token
price for the inclusion of the Democratic Movement in his gov-
ernment.
Begin probably hopes to attract some members of the
Democratic Movement and the Labor Alignment or at least to be
able to depend on their support in the event of a confronta-
tion with the US over concessions to the Arabs. This possibil-
ity has probably further reinforced Begin's disinclination to
compromise on key domestic and negotiation questions in his
talks with the Democratic Movement.
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I I In recent days, Begin has been more restrained in
discussing Arab-Israeli issues, but this appears to be mainly
a tactical change designed to accommodate Dayan and the Demo-
cratic Movement and to ease apprehensions in the US Congress
and among Jewish interest groups in the US. Begin's more mod-
erate tone is probably also intended to avoid antagonizing the
US administration before he travels to Washington for discus-
sions with President Carter.
I Begin seems fully confident that he will be able to
argue his views on negotiations with success in Washington. In-
deed, Likud leaders do not seem to believe the US will apply
heavy pressure on Israel, although they say they are ready to
weather such a storm if it comes. Begin and his followers ap-
pear to be counting on the US Congress to rally behind his
government, no matter what.
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PAKISTAN: Situation Report
Negotiations between Pakistan Prime Minister Bhutto
and opposition leaders ended yesterday without a definitive
agreement on the resolution of Pakistan's political crisis.
The opposition apparently believes there is still hope for a
compromise, however, and has agreed to continue discussions
with Finance Minister Pirzada, one of Bhutto's closest advisers.
Despite an announcement that an agreement was reached
on the basic issues, the two sides may be little closer to a
compromise on one important issue--a way to ensure that elec-
tions are honest--than they were when talks began almost two
weeks ago.
Although most. of the concessions announced during the
series of meetings were made by Bhutto, he may still have ben-
efited more than the opposition. There is no indication that
the opposition plans to resume its street campaign against him
soon.
I I Bhutto also was able to forestall, at least for now,
oppose ion attempts to prevent him from controlling elections.
The opposition dropped both of its key demands--that he resign,
and that he agree to an alternate plan for an interim govern-
ment in which the opposition would have considerable power.
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The opposition gained a public commitment from Bhutto
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to hold new elections. When talks began, however, Bhutto appar-
ently had already agreed to new elections, and his differences
with the opposition were over when elections would be held. No
date has been announced--possibly an indication, despite press
reports to the contrary, that this issue too has not been re-
solved.
Early in the talks, the opposition secured several
other concessions, including the release from jail of its leaders
and thousands of its followers and the end of martial law imposed
in April in Pakistan's three largest cities. These concessions
were preconditions for the talks, however, rather than a result
of them.
NAMIBIA - SOUTH AFRICA: Negotiations
I ISouth Africa has made its first clear concession in
the a cs with five Western powers that are attempting to nego-
tiate a transition to independence for Namibia. Instead of the
multiracial interim government for which white Namibians voted
last month, South Africa has agreed to appoint a politically
neutral administrator-general, responsible to the South African
president, to administer Namibia until free elections with UN
involvement can be held for a constituent assembly. South Africa
has also accepted in principle the appointment of a UN special
representative to work closely with the administrator-general.
here has been agreement at the talks on the nature
and scope of some of the other problems involved, but South
Africa made few commitments on such critical matters as the
timing of elections, the role of the UN in the political pro-
cess, the fate of political prisoners, the removal of dis-
criminatory legislation, the future of South Africa's Walvis
Bay enclave, and the withdrawal of South African military and
security forces. There are also many administrative and finan-
cial ties between South Africa and Namibia that must be dealt
with before any turnover of power to an independent government.
Before another round of talks with the South Africans,
the contact group that represents the five Western nations will
discuss the talks with their own governments as well as with
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the front-line African states and the South West African Peo-?
pies Organization. SWAPO is the only Namibian nationalist or-
ganization recognized by the UN and the Organization of African
Unity.
I The South African government has hailed progress in
e talks as evidence of its good faith in negotiating Nami-
bia's future. The contact group agrees that South Africa seems
sincere in wanting a peaceful transition to independence for
the former German colony and League of Nations mandate that
South Africa has continued to administer in definance of the
UN.
This first round of talks puts Prime Minister Vorstr?r
in an excellent bargaining position in what will doubtless be
a long negotiating process. By avoiding a breakdown in the
talks, he hopes to gain Western support in the UN; he believes
he has shown the world he is committed to an independent Nami-
bia. He has also shunted to the West and the UN some of the
responsibility for establishing an interim administration
without losing any legal control over Namibia.
I Vorster wants and needs a friendly country on South
Africa's northwest border, and his purposes would be best
suited by having an ethnically and racially divided government
there that would be dependent on South Africa both economically
and militarily. It is unlikely that he will willingly make any
substantial concessions to the five Western nations that do
not preserve South Africa's basic interests in the territory.
The contact group asked South Africa to plan a phased
military and police withdrawal during the transition period,
but the government made it clear that it intends to retain its
security forces in the territory as long as it sees an external
threat. Foreign Minister Botha commented after the talks that
pre-independence withdrawal of South African troops was not
at issue. The South Africans did, however, agree that their
troops would not interfere in any elections.
South Africa's goal. in setting up the multiracial
constitutional conference--the Turnhalle conference--in late
1975 was to establish a conservative ethnic coalition in Nami-
bia which would permit South African counterinsurgency forces
to continue operating in its territory. By scrapping both
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the plan for an interim government and then the idea of a sub-
sequent central administrative authority that would replace
it, the South Africans are cutting the Turnhalle groups out
of any special role in a transition government.
When they learned of the demise of the Turnhalle plan
last mont , several of the delegates who had participated in
the conference announced that they would work toward forming a
multiracial party in order to defeat SWAPO in any future elec-
tions, but it is not known if they have made any progress.
Vorster is continuing to set up ethnically based re-
giona governments in Namibia under his separate development
plan. The system could influence the outcome of future elections,
and Vorster doubtless hopes it will facilitate SWAPO's election
defeat and preserve white South African interests. Vorster has
indicated his desire that the elections take place before the
end of this year.
I IA major facet of the Western initiative is an effort
to get O involved in the negotiations. SWAPO president Sam
Nujoma, however, has been out of contact since last week. In
the past, Nujoma has insisted that any settlement must be de-
cided by direct negotiation between the South African govern-
ment and the SWAPO leadership.
I I Nujoma has also maintained that SWAPO will not stop
guerrilla activities and enter into negotiations unless South
Africa meets its demands, which include the release of all polit-
ical prisoners and the pledge of an early withdrawal of South
African armed forces from Namibia. Nujoma and other SWAPO
spokesmen have occasionally intimated that, with these condi-
tions met, they might accept a UN conducted election. They say
they would make a strong showing in such an election.
Several SWAPO officials in the UK and Zambia, how-
ever, have been briefed on the contact group's meetings with
the South Africans. They appreciated the efforts being made by
the group and expressed a willingness to be flexible, but they
were suspicious of South African motives, arguing that anything
to which South Africa agreed would be contrary to SWAPO's in-
terests.
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//Violence in EZ Salvador--by both guerrillas
an secure g orces--has continued unabated since the murder of
the foreign minister Zast month. President-elect Romero, a Zaw-
and-order hardZiner, is likely to continue harsh repressive
measures after he takes office on July 1.//
In two separate incidents last week, terrorists from
the Popular Liberation Forces killed two national guardsmen
and a policeman; in retaliation, security forces killed eight
alleged members of the guerrilla group.
I I The abduction and murder of the foreign min-
ister as mon may have marked the be innin of a more intense
campaign by the guerrilla group.
I The government has responded strongly to the increased
guerrilla actions. Late last month, the armed forces mounted a
sweep by airborne and ground forces against several thousand
peasant squatters who had occupied three haciendas to back up
demands for long-promised agrarian reform. The peasants' action
had been organized by three leftist groups suspected of collab-
orating with the Popular Liberation Forces. In an ensuing clash,
six alleged members of the guerrilla group were killed by secu-
rity forces.
I The actions by the government have apparently done
little to intimidate the guerrillas, but they have aggravated
its already strained relations with the Catholic Church. The
recent arrest and roughing-up of a priest suspected of cooperat-
ing with the guerrillas will cause further strains in relations.
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