NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010022-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: June 13, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Access to this document will be restricted to
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Monday June 13, 1977 CG NIDC 77-136C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
State Dept. review completed
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, June 13, 1977
IThe NID Cable is for the pu
rp
ose of informing
senior US o
icials.
USSR-EGYPT:
Gromyko-F'ahmi Meeting
Page 1
OAS:
General Assembly Convenes
Page 3
ZAIRE: Katangan Harassment
CYPRUS: Settlement Unlikely
Page 4
Page 5
TUNISIA-LIBYA: Disputed Waters
Page 8
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USSR-EGYPT: Gromyko-Fahmi Meeting
//Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi does not ap-
pear o n ave made much progress toward repairing Egyptian re-
lations with the USSR during his visit to Moscow last week,
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//There is no indication Fahmi succeeded in re-
so ving a two issues most important to the Egyptians, a re-
sumption of Soviet arms deliveries and a rescheduling of the
massive Egyptian debt to the Soviet Union. The Egyptians were
able to extract a Soviet promise to consider "concrete mea-
sures" to improve relations, but there is no evidence of any
tangible Soviet commitment, other than one to expand export
quotas of coking coal--hardly an agreement of significance.//
There are other signs that the talks were difficult,
with the Soviets insisting that any improvement in relations
is up to the Egyptians. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was
particularly rough on his Egyptian guest at a luncheon on Fri-
day. According to a version of his remarks, published by the
Soviets, Gromyko pointedly noted that the "threads of trust,"
once broken by "thoughtless" actions, are difficult to mend.
The communique did note some minor achievements. It
indicated the Soviets and Egyptians agree that the Geneva con-
ference on the Middle East should be reconvened "not later"
than this fall. The Soviets, who have been working hard to place
themselves back in the mainstream of Middle Eastern diplomacy
via the Geneva conference, doubtless can take some satisfaction
in winning Egypt's public endorsement of their role.
I IThe Egyptians' primary interest probably was in making
sure a bitterness between Cairo and Moscow would not impede
the resumption of the Geneva peace talks. Thus the Egyptians
also appear to have achieved their objective concerning the
Geneva conference.
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//The communique also notes that Gromyko and
Fa mi. wi meet again at an unspecified time in Cairo. 25X1
1the meeting will be in August and
WI II _e _n__nw__ _y a ____ g between President Sadat and Gen-
eral Secretary Brezhnev. The communique and the Soviets, how- 25X1
ever, have not mentioned either of these points, suggesting
that the discussion of dates for a Gromyko visit and of a pos-
sible Brezhnev-Sadat meeting was highly tentative.//
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OAS: General Assembly Convenes
I IThe human rights issue is bound to be the major topic
of discussion when the seventh General Assembly of the organ-
ization of American States convenes in Grenada tomorrow. None
of the participants, however, seems anxious for divisive debate
on the issue.
Most delegates are interested in meeting Secretary of
State Vance and are looking to gain further insights into the
US administration's policy toward Latin America and its ideas
for restructuring the OAS. The majority of Latin American of-
ficials have had little contact with high-level US officials;
in general, the Latin Americans are confused by what they per-
ceive as conflicting signals from Washington.
The human rights issue is the core of the problem.
There have been reports that the southern cone countries--Ar-
gentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil--have been at-
tempting to form a common front in opposition to the US on this
issue. None of the countries is anxious to offend the US, how-
ever, and protestations against Washington's human rights policy
will probably be perfunctory but emotional.
Other topics on the agenda of the General Assembly in-
clude restructuring the OAS, charter reform, cooperation on
development, collective economic security, and educational and
cultural exchange programs. Bolivia's desire for an outlet to
the sea and the dispute between Guatemala and Belize may be
raised, but only statements for the record on these topics are
expected. Panama may bring up the question of the canal treaty
negotiations; no joint US-Panama report on the status of the
talks seems likely before the meeting.
As it shapes up now, the General Assembly could bog
down on human rights discussions, but none of the participants
seems anxious for a rankling debate. Most delegates, in fact,
want.to get the Grenada meeting over with as quickly as possi-
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ZAIRE: Katangan Harassment
Probably two types of Katangans remain in Shaba: those
still trying to make their way to sanctuary in Angola or Zambia,
and those who have decided to fight on as guerrillas for as long
as they can. Most of the Katangans are believed to have with-
drawn from Shaba after Mobutu succeeded in getting Moroccan
military support for his counteroffensive.
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A Katangan guerrilla campaign in Shaba would be aimed
at bringing down Mobutu. The Katangans would probably seek to
cut the rail lines and. stop the production or export of copper,
Zaire's chief source of revenue; discredit the government do-
mestically; and tie up Zairian armed forces and thus encourage
anti-government moves elsewhere in the country.
Although the Katangan leaders probably hope to continue
activity against Mobutu, they face a number of disadvantages
that have developed since their invasion began on March 8. Their
forces are now in disarray, with some possibly in Zambia, some
in Angola, and some being hunted by Mobutu's army within Shaba.
Many of the Katangans were demoralized by their failure to bring
down the Mobutu government quickly, Mobutu's success in obtain-
ing foreign support, and the lack of support from Angola when
their offensive faltered.
The Katangans face problems of food supply and disease.
Ango a, their exile home, appears preoccupied with increased
domestic problems.
The Zairian army, although lacking the drive and ef-
ectiveness of the Moroccan troops, has some 8,700 men in Shaba
as well as equipment left by the Moroccans or provided by West-
ern governments since March 8.
Mobutu is in Belgium, continuing the victory tour he
started in France last week of some West European and African
countries that supported him against the Katangans.
CYPRUS: Settlement Unlikely
Three rounds of informal talks in Nicosia have not
broken the impasse between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots.
Although negotiations have not broken down entirely, prospects
for substantial progress either in Nicosia or at the still
unscheduled seventh round of talks in Vienna are not good.
Neither Turkish Cypriots nor mainland Turks are likely to budge
from their stated positions until the political situation in
Turkey becomes clearer. If the National Salvation Party is part
of a coalition government in Ankara, there may be no movement
for quite some time.
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I IThe two main issues for both coiiuuunities have been the
division of territory on the island and a new federal constitu-
tion. Since mid-May, however, the Turkish Cypriots have charged
that the Greek Cypriots are waging economic warfare against the
so-called Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.
I The charges stem from recent efforts by the Greek Cy-
priots o reduce the availability of foreign currency in north-
ern Cyprus and to harass foreign companies that deal with the
Turkish sector. The Greek action is unlikely to be economically
effective; it has, however, provided the Turkish side with an-
other propaganda club to use against the Greek Cypriots.
At the most recent round of negotiations in Vienna,
the Greek Cypriots offered what they considered a substantial
concession by signaling their willingness to accept a bicommunal
Cypriot republic. The Turkish Cypriots, however, were far from
pleased by the Greek proposal for dividing Cyprus since it left
the Turkish Cypriots with only 20 percent of the island and that
area would be sandwiched between two Greek Cypriot regions.
I At these same talks, the Turkish Cypriots presented
their views on the constitutional makeup of a new Cypriot re-
public that would be based on a bizonal federation. The Turkish
Cypriots proposed that the federation have an extremely weak
central authority and that virtually all meaningful powers be
vested in the separate communities.
Assurances by the Turkish Cypriots that they envisaged
an "evolutionary federalism," with the two communities giving
more power to federal agencies in the future as mutual trust
developed, were greeted skeptically by the Greek Cypriots. The
Greek Cypriot proposal called for a strong federal government,
a concept that is anathema to the Turkish Cypriots.
To settle the Cyprus issue, the Turks will have to make
concessions. No Turkish leader, mainland or Cypriot, wishes to
bear the responsibility of "surrendering" Turkish-occupied
territory to the Greek Cypriots, especially if it appears to
be in response to foreign pressure.
State o Cyprus, prefers to preserve the territorial status
Rauf Denktash, "president" of the Turkish Federated
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quo and will relinquish land only if Ankara exerts considerable
pressure on him--a highly unlikely event until the mainland
Turks sort out their domestic situation.
I uIn Turkey, both Prime Minister Demirel and Bulent Ece-
vit, w ose Republican Peoples Party won a plurality in the par-
liamentary election on June 5, recognize that a solution to the
Cyprus situation is essential for domestic as well as foreign
policy reasons.
Turkey is beset with serious economic problems, and
supporting military forces on Cyprus as well as providing di-
rect aid is a drain on its limited financial resources. Most
Turkish leaders recognize that their public rejection of any
linkage between the Cyprus issue and the resumption of US mili-
tary aid is unrealistic; they also know that solving the Cyprus
problem would not only reopen the door to US military aid but
would also enhance Turkey's international reputation.
Even in the best of circumstances, however, either
Demirel or Ecevit would find it difficult to propose the con-
cessions that would almost certainly be required for a realis-
tic settlement. They would find it doubly difficult if, as
seems likely, any coalition includes Necmettin Erbakan's Na-
tional Salvation Party. Staunchly opposed to returning an inch
of northern Cypriot territory, Erbakan would be able to make
it very difficult for Ankara to exert enough pressure on Denk-
tash to get him to negotiate seriously.
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TUNISIA-LIBYA: Disputed Waters
I I The Tunisian-Libyan agreement to seek arbitration of
their continental shelf dispute may have defused the situation
only temporarily. According to the US embassy in Tunis, a sen-
ior Tunisian Foreign Ministry official said that the Libyans
have insisted that the agreement to arbitrate be ratified by
the legislatures of both countries before the dispute is turned
over to the International Court of Justice. The Libyans may
use this tactic to avoid any binding arbitration.
L__~ This is the second time the two countries have agreed
to take he problem to the International Court. The Libyans
backed off from the arrangement last August because they were
unwilling to accept Tunisia's insistence that the arbitration
be binding.
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I ITunisia has made a significant concession in allowing
Libya o continue drilling in the disputed area for the time
being. Since the dispute flared again late last month with the
appearance of the privately owned US rig hired by the Libyans,
Tunisia had been insisting on its withdrawal as a precondition
to a settlement. Each government and the oil companies are
confident that the shelf holds commercially exploitable oil
deposits.
Libyan President Qadhafi has succeeded in denying Tu-
nisia access to offshore oil in at least part of the zone. Qad-
hafi hopes that Tunisia's desire to obtain access eventually
will lead it to join in a "union" with Libya. By papering over
the quarrel concerning the continental shelf, Qadhafi has pro-
tected his ability to employ Tunisian workers, a significant
factor in Libyan development plans.
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