NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010052-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: April 30, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Saturday April 30, 1977 CG NIDC 77-1000
State Dept. review completed
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Natinn;al 'gence Daily Cable for Saturday. April
ITne NiD a e is or the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
ZAIRE: Situation Report
Page 1
PANAMA: Next Negotiating Round
JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Shelf Issue
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Page 6
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YUGOSLAVIA: May Day Amnesty
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ZAIRE: Situation Report
Lead units of the Zairian-Moroccan task force were
reported to have reached Masoji on Thursday. According to the
US embassy in Kinshasa, government troops are still meeting
almost no Katangan resistance. The Katangans apparently are
even neglecting to destroy bridges.
Press reports indicated yesterday that the government
o ensive on Kapanga had been repulsed by the Katangans. Some
1,300 Zairian troops were reported advancing on Kapanga earlier
this week.
I I The American consulate in Lubumbashi is skeptical of
Mobutu' s public statement on Thursday that there will he no
suppression of Lunda tribesmen, who are relatives of many of
the Katangans, in the government's campaign to reoccupy in-
vaded areas of Shaba. Reports of army harassment and brutality
directed against civilians are common and are thought to be
the reason the reoccupied villages have been abandoned before
the army arrives. The consulate doubts that Zairian officers
have enough control over their troops to prevent brutalities
in western Shaba.
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I I A Katangan leader said in an interview yesterday that
his organization will request aid from Angola, Tanzania, Zambia,
Botswana, and Mozambique "because we are all embarked upon the
same struggle for the liberation of our peoples." He said the
Katangans were preparing for a lengthy struggle against the
Mobutu regime. We doubt that any of the countries mentioned
would provide aid directly to the Katangans inside Shaba under
present circumstances.
The US embassy in Kinshasa has sounded a note of cau-
tion over reports that Iran and other conservative Arab states
plan to grant Mobutu substantial financial aid. Such aid could
be a useful supplement to possible financial relief to Zaire
through official debt rescheduling, private bank credits, and
the aid programs of established donors. If such assistance is
not linked to formal stabilization commitments, however, it
may lessen Mobutu's need and inclination to make the domestic
spending reforms necessary for -run economic recovery.
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PANAMA: Next Negotiating Round
//Panama appears to be approaching the next round
of cana reaty talks hoping for US movement toward Panamanian
positions but not banking on much progress from the session,
which begins in Washington on May 9.//
The evidence on Panamanian expectations includes:
--A recent well-publicized interview with Chief of Govern-
ment Torrijos in which he spoke of "skepticism" regarding
the talks. Torrijos emphasized that US acceptance of Pan-
ama's timetable for dismantling the Canal Zone is the
price for Panamanian satisfaction of US concerns about
the canal's defense and neutrality.
--Chief Panamanian negotiator Escobar's reiteration in
Costa Rica this week that the US must now respond to Pan-
ama's established negotiating position.
//Holding the negotiating round in Washington also
argues against much movement from the Panamanian side. Panama-
nian positions have to be cleared in detail by General Torri-
jos--perhaps more so now than at any previous point in the
talks.//
//The Panamanians expect the US to be more willing
now to expedite the turning over of operational control of the
canal and to resolve questions regarding which side will con-
trol various lands and waters in the zone. Panamanian spokesmen
recently have repeatedly criticized the US for an unyielding
stance on "trivialities," such as a road or piece of land.//
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General Torrijos is planning a trip to Mexico before the next
negotiating round to firm up Mexican support prior to a visit
there by US negotiators to explain the US position.//
JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Shelf Issue
I IJapan's failure this week to ratify its continental
shelf agreement with South Korea has already prompted angry
protests in Seoul. The Japanese government reportedly has in-
formed the South Koreans that the pact is not dead and that
it will again seek Diet ratification early next month, but
South Korea is skeptical. If the Japanese do not act, the is-
sue will strain ties between the two countries.
South Korea has strong economic motives for seeking
rata ication of the pact; it badly needs any energy resources
that may be discovered on the continental shelf. The issue
also has become a question of national prestige in Seoul. The
South Koreans ratified the shelf agreement in 1974 and subse-
quently have become increasingly frustrated over repeated
Japanese delays.
In Japan, the treaty is a sensitive political issue
tor ime Minister Fukuda's government. Basically sympathetic
toward South Korea, Fukuda also is interested in exploiting
any new energy sources. Most Japanese opposition parties, how-
ever, have resisted increased cooperation with South Korea and
see the issue as an opportunity to embarrass the government.
Japanese concern over Chinese objections to the treaty is also
a factor, although Peking has registered its protests in a low-
key fashion.
I Fukuda has the votes to push ratification through
r-ne 131 but is moving cautiously, clearly hoping to avoid
opposition charges of "high-handedness" and possible efforts
to stall other key legislation.
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Both progovernment and opposition parties in South
Korea are denouncing Japan for not acting this week, and the
government is discussing the possibility of "countermeasures."
Seoul's real options are limited, and it is likely in any
event to await the outcome of the Diet deliberations next month
before deciding on a course of action.
In another development, Tokyo was warned by Moscow
yesterday that it was ending the Soviet-Japanese bilateral
fishing treaty concluded in 1956. Under the terms of the treaty,
the decision to terminate it would take effect in one year.
Moscow's action is the latest in an escalating series of moves
designed to press Tokyo to accede to Soviet demands in the cur-
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rent round of fisheries negotiations following the USSR
declaration of a 200-mile fishing zone.
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LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT: UK
25X1 //This is the fifth in a series of articles exam-
ining tie- points of view of the major developed countries par-
ticipating in the London Economic Summit on May 7 and 8.//
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//The British view the summit as an opportunity
for major eveloped-country leaders to gain a better understand-
ing of each other and to air problems of common concern. Their
primary objective is to provide a strong psychological boost
to consumer and investor confidence throughout the world, which
they hope will lead to increased demand for British products.//
//The Labor government still finds itself in a pre-
carious position despite its political deal with the Liberal
Party. Public opinion polls and parliamentary by-election re-
sults have indicated that Labor's fortunes are sagging and are
unlikely to be improved by the local elections scheduled for
next week.//
//Prime minister Callaghan is not without hope,
owever. the deal he negotiated last month for Liberal support
on key parliamentary votes will keep the government afloat un-
til autumn and perhaps beyond. Callaghan is hoping the time he
bought will bring some evidence that Labor's economic policies
are working. Some sign of success would both reduce the Labor
left's influence in the party and boost the government's pros-
pects in an early election.//
//Callaghan continues to struggle with the twin de-
mons or in lation and unemployment, with even the most favora-
ble forecasts offering little hope of substantial improvement
in either area this year. The government intends to keep a rein
on public spending and has made a third year of wage restraint
the linchpin of its economic program, even though it knows a
new package will be much more difficult to negotiate than the
previous settlements.//
//The recent surge of wildcat strikes has made Cal-
Iagnan aware of the inequities in earlier agreements,
and he has acknowledged that a new accord must be more flexible.
Although such a loose agreement is likely to slow the process
of reducing inflation, the absence of a wage accord would prob-
ably create political problems that would jeopardize the govern-
ment's continuation in office.//
//Because London is constrained in its own effort
to re uce unemployment and inflation, it has repeatedly stressed
the need for a worldwide attack on the problem. London believes
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strongly that the GNP growth forecasts of the economically
stronger developed nations should be viewed as targets and that
the "Big Three" countries--the US, Japan, and West Germany--
should publicly commit themselves to achieving the targets.//
//The British hope that such actions would generate
demand for their products. British officials thus appear disap-
pointed with the announced cuts in the US reflationary program,
particularly since such cuts may end hopes of greater refla-
tionary measures on the part of West Germany.//
//The British have expressed some concern over
balance-of-payments financing arrangements. They believe that
private banks are rapidly reaching the limits of their ability
to finance deficit countries and that official financing is too
limited, too short term, and too conditional to meet interna-
tional needs.//
//In line with the US position, London sees advan-
tages to some additional financing facilities linked either to
the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. The UK favors
a substantial increase in IMF quotas as well as a proposal for
a new special IMF lending facility.//
//The British are deeply concerned over what they
perceive as a growing trend toward protectionism and would
endorse a general statement eschewing trade controls. London
nevertheless wants to retain freedom to impose selective meas-
ures when an industry is threatened and jobs are at stake. It
also believes that the more advanced Asian countries merit
somewhat harsher treatment in trade matters than the West.//
//The UK has dragged its heels on the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, fearing that broad tariff cuts would fur-
ther impair the country's competitiveness. The British are con-
vinced that any agreement on tariff reductions ought to cut
less deeply and be subject to more exceptions than the Kennedy
Round formula.//
//The UK's position to North-South issues is gener-
ally in line with that of the US. Given the current financial
constraints on the UK, it is unwilling to commit itself to po-
tentially costly aid proposals. Britain opposes the common fund
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demanded by the developing countries but is willing to nego-
tiate a limited common funding arrangement for individual com-
modity agreements.//
//London would prefer to help the developing coun-
tries, particularly those with per capita income of less than
$200, through increased multilateral assistance. To help quiet
developing-country demands for debt relief, for example, the
UK recently proposed that the developed countries make a special
contribution of $1 billion to the International Development
Association.//
//British and US views on energy issues are very
close, re ecting in part the UK's wealth of domestic energy.
Although the British currently are focusing on the exploitation
of North Sea oil and gas, which will soon alleviate their bal-
ance-of-payments problems, their longer term strategy calls
for more conservation and increased use of coal and nuclear
power. Britain would have no trouble setting oil import ceil-
ings but probably would not want to involve itself in any pledge
to help other countries reach theirs.//
//London has not yet decided whether to proceed
wi construction of a commercial fast-breeder nuclear reactor.
A royal commission has urged delay, but the weight of technical
opinion is that Britain should use its fast-breeder technology
to capture a share of what is expected to be a large world
market. The British agree with the intent of US efforts to halt
nuclear proliferation and will probably cooperate in devising
international restrictions on the transfer of sensitive tech-
nology and the availability of plutonium.
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YUGOSLAVIA: May Day Amnesty
The Tito regime in Yugoslavia appears ready to
announce an amnesty for some political prisoners on May Day.
The handling of the event suggests the amnesty might be more
restricted in scope than earlier information had implied.
The authorities in Belgrade have told foreign corre-
spondents to be available on Sunday for an unspecified announce-
ment. The announcement will almost certainly deal with the am-
nesty program. During the past week, amnesty arrangements were
completed in the republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina,
where the program has met political opposition.
I I The proposed release of political offenders has
cause problems in the Yugoslav leadership. Some hardliner--
mainly those who run disciplined fiefdoms in Bosnia-Hercegovina
and a few other republics--have objected to releasing political
foes because they fear this might encourage the liberal opposi-
tion. Some convictions, moreover, were based on trumped-up
charges, and the local authorities probably are uneasy about
the possibility of scandal.
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(These differences may have already caused the regime
to alter its plans for amnesty. Earlier rumors said the amnesty
would be announced at the end of may during the massive cele-
brations of Tito's 85th birthday and 40th anniversary as party
leader. The rescheduling of the announcement over a three-day
holiday--when the capital is largely empty--suggests the regime
is seeking to play down the public relations aspects.
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