NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A030000010042-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 25, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Monday April 25, 1977 CG NIDC 77-95C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday April 25, 1977.
The NID Ca a is or the purpose o in orming
senior US off' als.
CONTENTS
ETHIOPIA: Situation Report
USSR-INDIA: Mission Reassurance
USSR: Grain Crop Status
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Page 2
Page 3
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ARAB STATES: New Monetary Fund
MOZAMBIQUE - SOUTH AFRICA: Ports
IRAN - SAUDI ARABIA: Oil Pricing Dispute
ALGERIA: Cabinet Shuffle
SENEGAL: Franco-African Summit
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PAKISTAN: Situation Report
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ETHIOPIA: Situation Report
Ethiopian military authorities in Asmara yesterday
took control of the operational site of the US Kagnew communi-
cations station after giving US personnel 10 minutes warning.
As of late yesterday all Kagnew personnel were safe
in eir residences or in the station's housing area. The acting
US consul and the Kagnew commander were scheduled to meet this
morning with an Ethiopian commission, comprised of top military
and civilian officials, appointed to oversee the US withdrawal
from facilities in Asmara. The consul has recommended that evac-
uation plans for consulate and Kagnew personnel be suspended
pending the outcome of the meeting.
I I The American affairs officer in the Ethiopian Foreign
finis ry had earlier told the US charge in Addis Ababa that
there would be no undue pressure on the US to meet the four-day
deadline originally set by the government for the evacuation of
US personnel from the facilities ordered closed on Saturday.
The Ethiopian official did not grant an extension of the dead-
line, but said the government had adopted a policy favoring an
orderly withdrawal without harassment of US citizens. He said
the government would provide security for US citizens and in-
stallations.
The official also stated that the US would be allowed
access to all affected installations. This remark indicates that
the denial yesterday of access to the USIS building in Addis
Ababa by Ethiopian army forces may have been carried out by an
overzealous commander. The authorities in Asmara are less likely
to have acted without instructions from Addis Ababa when they
occupied Kagnew.
The official's statement on the right of continued
access, however, would appear to indicate that the US may have
some leeway in negotiating the disposal of the remaining Kagnew
equipment. The final decision will be made by strongman Mengistu,
who may continue to deny the US access to Ka new despite the
Foreign Ministry official's assurances.
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Foreign Minister Gromyko will arrive in New Delhi to-
ay seeking reassurances that the new Indian government attaches
the same priority its predecessor did to maintaining close re-
lations with the USSR.
I IMoscow long has regarded Indian Prime Minister Desai
as one o the most pro-Western, right-leaning of India's polit-
ical leaders, however, and India's reassurances probably will
not be sufficient to dissuade the Soviets from their view that
the Desai government will not be as friendly toward the USSR as
the government of Prime Minister Gandhi had been. The Desai
government, for its part, wants continued Soviet political:,
economic, and military support but also is seeking to make
Indian foreign policy more genuinely nonaligned.
Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee has been sensitive to
Soviet concerns; he received the Soviet ambassador in New, Delhi
before any other foreign envoy there and renewed India's six-
month-old invitation to Gromyko to visit India. Gromyko accepted
with alacrity because the Soviet leadership wants to meet per-
sonally with India's new leaders and because the Indians appar-
ently said nothing about rescheduling President Podgorny's
trip, which had been canceled at India's request after the
death of its president in late February.
I I During the visit, Gromyko probably will focus on the
inconsis ency in statements made by Desai and other members of
his cabinet on relations with the USSR. Desai, for example, has
spoken publicly of the importance India attaches to maintaining
good relations with the USSR, but has also openly criticized
the Soviet-Indian friendship treaty; Desai said that India no
longer will have "special relations" with any one nation.,
Gromyko also will probe for signs of change in India's
attitude toward the US and China. The Soviet embassy in New
Delhi reportedly does not believe Gromyko will go into detail
on economic problems--such as the ruble/rupee exchange r to--
that had been troubling Moscow's relations with the Gand:i gov-
ernment. He probably will indicate a general Soviet readiness
to resolve all problems at issue between the two governments. In
their other dealings with the Indians since the elections, Mos-
cow has been behaving on a business-as-usual basis.
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The Soviet foreign minister probably will invite Prime
Minister Desai to visit the USSR at his earl' possible con-
venience.
USSR: Grain Crop Status
I I The outlook for 1977 Soviet winter grains continues
to be favorable, with winter losses still likely to be below
normal. Soil moisture reserves have been unusually high across
much of the Soviet grain belt since planting last fall, bright-
ening prospects for both winter grain production and in most
of the spring grain region. While this increases the probabil-
ity of a bumper crop this year, grains that begin the growing
season with abnormally high levels of soil moisture are es-
pecially vulnerable to mid-season droughts.
Moscow announced on April 18 that spring grain sowing,
excluding corn, had been completed on more than 16 million hec-
tares, about one sixth of the spring grain area, and slightly
ahead of the pace last year. A major shortfall in plowing last
year due to poor weather conditions, however, has sharply de-
layed spring sowing in areas just north of the Ukraine. Unless
the lag can be made up this month, spring crop yields could be
lower in the affected regions.
Despite the generally good wintering conditions over
most of European USSR, some parts of the Non-Chernozem Zone
and the North Caucasus have suffered serious winter damage.
According to Soviet officials, significant crop losses in both
regions were caused by a cold snap last October. At that early
stage of germination, and without protective snow cover, most
of the fall-sown grains were not yet sufficiently hardy to
withstand the low temperature.
Winter grain sowing was expanded in the fall of 1976
to cover 38.5 million hectares, the largest area since 1968
and 1 million hectares greater than last year. Most of the in-
creased acreage is reportedly in the Ukraine, which accounted
for about 11 million hectares of the total winter grain plant-
ings, primarily winter wheat. Because of this year's large
area of surviving winter grains, spring barley--the normal re-
placement crop for winterkilled grains--will not be planted as
extensively as in 1976.
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ARAB STATES: New Monetary Fund
Finance ministers and central bankers from 20 Arab
coup rtes and the PLO formally established an Arab Monetary
Fund early Last week. The fund, the first regional version of
the International Monetary Fund, will operate from Abu Dhabi.
The agreement on the creation of the fund was reached a year
ago, but only recently have a sufficient number of states
ratified it.
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I I The Arab fund is intended to complement the facili-
ties of the IMF. It will help member states with balance-of-
payments deficits, stabilize Arab exchange rates, facilitate
development of Arab financial markets, and work toward the
eventual unification of Arab currencies. The fund is initially
capitalized at $900 million mostly in convertible currencies
and, like the IMF, will offer short- and medium-term facilities
at nominal interest or service charges.
The heaviest claimants on the fund's resources are
likely to be non-OPEC members that have balance-of-payments
problems--Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco,
North Yemen, Oman, Somalia, South Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and
Tunisia. By adding the facilities of the Arab fund to those of
the IMF, short- and medium-term funds available will nearly
double. This excludes compensatory financing for export short-
falls of basic raw materials.
I I Credit offered to Arab countries by the Arab Monetary
Fund is ikely to be made available with much less stringent
domestic policy conditions than those demanded by the IMF'.
Many Arab and other debtor countries have found IMF terms
objectionable.
I The seven OPEC countries that are members of the
Arab un will, as a block, have voting control. Conservative
states such as Saudi Arabia and radical states such as Libya
may find it difficult to reach agreement on conditions for bor-
rowing.
I I The poorer Arab states have already received large
amounts o long-term support or project assistance from the
oil-rich Arab states. In 1976, Arab OPEC members transferred
more than $2.5 billion in bilateral economic aid to non-OPEC
Arab countries. Small amounts were administered by the Arab
Fund for Economic and Social Development, an Arab League multi-
lateral aid agency.
MOZAMBIQUE - SOUTH AFRICA: Ports
Conditions in the Mozambican port of Maputo are de-
erzora zng rapidly despite vigorous efforts to keep cargo
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moving by South Africa, which still depends on Maputo for hand-
Zing a portion of its foreign trade. Shipping lines are threaten-
ing to stop calling at the port, which provides a major source
of foreign exchange for Mozambique.
I IConditions at Maputo, one of Africa's largest ports,
are so a that shipping agents predict that no shipping com-
panies will use the port by the end of 1977. The port still
earns an estimated $40 million annually in foreign exchange for
Mozambique; loss of these revenues would be a severe setback
to the already deteriorating economy.
Equipment in the port works only sporadically, par-
ticularly in the important ore-handling area. Rail facilities
are broken down and, as a result, ore-loading operations are
haphazard. Ships scheduled to carry chrome ore are leaving the
port empty; others are loading at general cargo docks. Harass-
ment has made foreigners reluctant to work in Maputo and some
freight forwarders have closed their offices there.
South African authorities are disturbed. Although
South African goods transiting the port are now less than half
the level in 1975, it is the closest and best port to serve
South Africa's industrial heartland. It is particularly impor-
tant for the export of chrome ore from the nearby mines of the
Eastern Transvaal. South African ports, now the main gateway
for Rhodesian traffic and an important outlet for exports of
Zairian copper, would be hard pressed to handle the additional
volume that would result from a closure of Maputo.
South African Railways, in attempting to keep the
port operational, has supplied technicians and engineers for
maintaining the traffic flow between Maputo and the South
African border. South Africa has agreed to repair 19 damaged
locomotives, virtually Mozambique's entire locomotive park,
and provide four additional ones.
I I The rapid improvement and growth of South Africa's
own aci ities ensure a gradual reduction in its dependence on
Maputo. Ore-loading equipment rivaling that in Maputo has been
installed in Durban, and some 400,000 tons of chrome ore re-
portedly is being diverted to the South African port.
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m-- container facilities will begin operation after
July at Durban, Port Elizabeth, and Cape Town. Richards Bay,
the area's biggest p development project, will provide
another alternative.
IRAN - SAUDI ARABIA: Oil Pricing Dispute
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crude, a benchmark for the oil produced by the members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is $12.09 per
barrel, f.o.b.--5 percent above the government sales price last
year. The official price of Arabian medium crude is $11.69--3.6
percent higher than in 1976. Most of these crudes are lifted by
Aramco and are utilized within the parent company systems.
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ALGERIA: Cabinet Shuffle
Algerian President Boumediene's cabinet shakeup last
week, the first major reshuffle since 1970, broke up key
economic responsibilities and further limited the powers of
some of his immediate subordinates. Boumediene will continue
to exercise strong control and to serve as defense minister.
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Ahmed Ghozali, president of Algeria's state oil com-
I I most significant change was the demotion of
Be ai desselam, who as minister of industry and energy had
dominated Algeria's economic development effort. He reportedly
opposed Boumediene's uncompromising stance on Western Sahara.
This opposition, and Belaid Abdesselam's poor health, probably
accounts for his assignment to the less important post of head
of light industry.
pany, wad appointed minister of energy and petrochemicals.
Ghozali has had good working relations with officers of US
companies.
Two senior members of the council of the revolution
were also demoted in an apparent effort to deprive them of
their power base. Ahmed Draia, former chief of national police,
was given the transport portfolio and Ahmed Bencherif, former
gendarmerie commander, was put into the unlikely post of min-
ister of environment and water resources. Draia's loyalty has
seldom been questioned, but Bencherif had become one of
Boumediene's sharpest critics during the past year.
I I More cabinet changes seem likely. The present min-
ister o tourism has been nominated to be ambassador to Wash-
ington; his replacement was not announced. The head of
Agriculture Ministry is another candidate for removal.
SENEGAL: Franco-African Summit
The conflict in Zaire overshadowed the proceedings
at 2s week's 20-nation Franco-African summit in Senegal,
scheduled months ago to address nonpolitical matters. Repre-
sentatives of moderate African states, fearful of growing So-
viet influence on the continent, apparently emerged from the
summit hopeful that France and other European states would help
protect them.
Although the formal sessions at Dakar hewed to a non-
controversial agenda of economic and developmental topics, Af-
rican leaders' concerns over events in Zaire--and to a lesser
extent the Horn and southern Africa--permeated corridor dis-
cussions.
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I I Pro-Western leaders such as Ivory Coast President
Houphouet-Boigny and Senegalese President Senghor went to the
summit concerned over what they see as Soviet expansionism in
Africa, with the Katangan thrust into Zaire as the latest ex-
ample. Their worry about their inability to resist Soviet in-
roads has been mounting since the Angolan war, which they saw
as a Soviet victory over the West.
The pro-Western states were heartened by the French
decision to provide direct assistance to Zaire, seeing it as
welcome evidence that they, too, could count on France if di-
rectly threatened. The moderate Africans were probably further
heartened by French President Giscard's statements in Dakar
that:
--Every African country has a right to security within its
frontiers, no matter what its political choice.
--Defense agreements between France and certain moderate
African countries would apply fully if the security of
the African states were threatened.
--France would back any African initiative aimed at con-
tinental arms limitation, an apparent reference to French
concern over an arms race between moderate and radical
francophone states.
Giscard also indicated that he will raise the ques-
tion of African security and development at international meet-
ings, beginning with the May economic summit of seven indus-
trial powers in London.
After the summit ended on Thursday, there appeared
to be an increased feeling among the moderates who attended
that France, and to a lesser extent other European countries,
could be counted on to shield them from external domination.
I I The moderates did not openly discuss their perception
of a Soviet threat at the general sessions because of the pres-
ence of such "progressives" as Benin, which have ties to the
Soviets and which view the Zairian conflict as an internal prob-
lem.
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Senghor publicly mentioned an old proposal for a de-
tense agreement among members of the francophone economic group-
ing in West Africa--Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mauritania, Upper
Volta, Niger, and Mali. The idea will be discussed at a meeting
of the six countries in June but is unlikely to result in an ef-
fective security pact. Mali is heavily obligated to the Soviets
and is therefore suspect by the others; pro-West nations such
as Togo are not members of the economic group.
I uIn the end, the moderate states may be able to rely
only on their own security agreements with France--and perhaps
some assistance from like-minded African neighbors--in case of
a direct military threat.
I I France is still hopeful that the Africans themselves
will evo re more effective coordination in the security field,
leaving Paris free to maintain fruitful relations with both
the moderate and radical francophone states.
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N PAKISTAN: Situation Report
Prime Minister Bhutto has imposed censorship, arrested
more opposition leaders, and extended the curfew--but not mar-
tial law--to a few more cities. Earlier government restrictions
and arrests have had little effect on the opposition's campaign
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to bring Bhutto down. The Prime Minister stiZZ depends on the
continued willingness of the military to obey his orders; there
has not yet been a significant test of the army's loyalty.
Over the weekend, the government arrested most of the
oppose ion leaders who were still free. Similar arrests in the
past have only meant the emergence of new leaders who are just
as determined to oust Bhutto. The new leaders selected after
the arrests this weekend have called for a major demonstration
on April 30 that will end at the Prime Minister's residence.
The opposition also intends to continue the general strike in-
definitely, despite orders from the military to return to work.
I I The censorship of any news dealing even indirectly
wi a opposition could be more damaging than the arrests.
The opposition has used press coverage to keep its supporters
informed of its plans.
Senior military officers may be supporting martial
law in part because it has prevented serious violence--espe-
cially in Lahore--and consequently delayed the need for polit-
ical decisions that the generals are reluctant to make. Their
view could change, however, if there were a serious attempt to
test the army's resolve in Lahore, or if martial law were ex-
tended to other parts of the Punjab, thereby greatly increasing
the chance of a confrontation between the army and the populace.
Opposition leaders in the Sind reportedly believe they
MUSE 'C the army's willingness to enforce martial law. There
have already been several incidents, but the troops are still
obeying orders, including those to shoot demonstrators and cur-
few violators.
There have been a few minor incidents in Lahore, which
is politically far more important than the Sind cities under
martial law, but so far there has been no significant test of
the predominately Punjabi army's willingness to act against
fellow Punjabis.
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