NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029900010002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 1, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Tuesday March 1, 1977 CG NIDC 77-048C
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
MWEENA
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
(Securit Classification)
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, March 1, 1977.
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IThe NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior otticials.
CONTENTS
UGANDA: Situation Report
Page 1
CUBA-UGANDA: Cubans Allegedly in Uganda
Page 3
CHINA-USSR: Ilichev Goes Home
Page 4
INTERNATIONAL: Eurocommunism
Page 5
SOUTH KOREA: Anticipating Dissidence
Page 7
JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Relations
Page 9
EL SALVADOR: Post-Election Trouble
Page 10
ANGOLA-ZAIRE:
Relations
Page 11
MOROCCO-OAU:
Relations
Page 12
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UGANDA: Situation Report
I I According to Radio Uganda, President Amin asserted
to ay at the Americans are free to go anywhere they like,
inside or outside Uganda.
25X1 II The Ugandan charge in Washington, who has taken a
re axe position throughout the affair, also has asserted that
US citizens in Uganda were free to leave the country whenever
they wished.
Amin's second postponement of his meeting with the
Americans may be the result of problems in organizing the meet-
ing, a further effort by Amin to garner more international at-
tention for the session, or Amin's growing preoccupation with
his own internal troubles.
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Amin, who repeatedly inks the and Israel in his
bombastic speeches, has publicly drawn a connection between
the invasion he alleges the US is planning and the Israeli
rescue operation.
On the other hand, Amin, citing similar meetings he
has a with other expatriate communities, has publicly reiter-
ated assurances that the US citizens are in no danger and that
he only wants to express his gratitude for their service in
Uganda. Amin met with several US employees of Ugandan airlines
yesterday and praised them for their contribution to Uganda.
Amin has also acknowledged receipt of messages from several
African and Arab heads of state by assuring them of the safety
of the US citizens.
I A Tass broadcast criticizing the US naval presence
in the n ian ocean alleges that the US fleet is threatening
East African countries, including Uganda. This is the first
public Soviet comment on the current situation in Uganda, but
it appears to have been added to the article as an after-
thought. The brief comment stops short of defending ;min's
action against Americans in Uganda but it does imply that
they are not being detained.
More authoritative Soviet comment may not be forth-
coming until either the OA U or the African states being courted
by the USSR take a public stand. The Soviets themselves have
been the victim of Amin's erratic behavior and almost certainly
do not want to take the lead in defending Amin's latest adven-
ture.
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CUBA-UGANDA: Cubans Allegedly in Uganda
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//If Cuban military personnel are in Kampala, their
L
u?ies are likely to include flying and maintaining Soviet-sup-
plied fighter aircraft and setting up and manning an air defense
system. Setting up an air defense system was also one of the
first activities the Cubans undertook in Angola. The Ugandans
already have some antiaircraft artillery.//
Since opening an embassy in Kampala a little over a
year ago, Cuba has demonstrated mounting interest in Uganda.
The Cubans probably hope to establish a broad range of contacts
in the Ugandan military, which would leave them in a good posi-
tion regardless of Amin's tenure in office.
//The first sign of possible military coopera-
tion between the two countries came in late January--before the
current ferment in Uganda. The Cubans sent an unusually high-
ranking military officer--Deputy Armed Forces Minister Francisco 25X1
Cabrera--to head the delegation to the sixth anniversary of the
Uganda military government.
According to a press report, another Cuban military
e egation visited Uganda early last week. We cannot confirm
this visit, but a Cuban delegation led by Division General Ar-
naldo Ochoa--who heads Cuba's Western Army--arrived in Ethiopia
on February 23 and may have been proceeding from Uganda. Ochoa
has been used by the Cubans in the past to arrange military aid
to several African countries.
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I I The chief Soviet negotiator at the Sino-Soviet border
talks, Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev, left China for
home yesterday following three months of apparently fruitless
talks. He was seen off by his Chinese counterpart, Vice Foreign
Minister Yu Chan.
I I There had been speculation in Peking for several
weeks that Ilichev would leave soon because of the lack of pro-
gress in the talks. He is scheduled to accompany Soviet Pres-
ident Podgorny on a visit to Africa in mid-March.
I I Ilichev arrived in Peking last November after an ab-
sence o 18 months, the longest since the talks began in Octo-
ber 1969. The Soviets seemed pleased with widespread press
speculation that his return to Peking signaled imminent prog-
ress in the long-stalemated border issue. The speculation was
based largely on the fact that Ilichev's return came soon after
Mao Tse-tung's death and the purge of China's leadinq leftists.
I IThe Chinese, on the other hand, were quick to point
out that they expected little from Ilichev's return. They fre-
quently reiterated their major foreign policy objectives, one
of which is firm opposition to what they see as Soviet "expan-
sionism." Privately, the Chinese told foreign officials in Pe-
king that the Soviet negotiator brought no meaningful new pro-
posals to the table and that Chinese attitudes on the border
issue remained as firm as ever. China also asserted that the
USSR's positive characterizations of the talks were intended
for Washington's benefit.
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Leaders of three "Eurocommunist" parties--Berlinguer
of Italy, Marchais of France, and Carrillo of Spain--are plan-
ning a two-day summit meeting in Madrid beginning Wednesday.
Their intention apparently is to meet privately and then hold
a press conference. They have not asked the Spanish government's
permission, and Madrid may still try to prevent the meeting.
The main purpose of the meeting is to highlight the
position of the Spanish party, which is waiting for the supreme
court to rule on its legal status before the legislative elec-
tion this spring. In addition, the three leaders almost cer-
tainly will discuss dissidence and political repression in the
USSR and Eastern Europe. They may not take a public stand on
this issue. If they do, none seems likely to diverge much from
the positions he has taken in the past.
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I /The Soviet and Czechoslovak regimes are already
annoye y persistent criticism from the West European communist
parties. The Soviets may fear that the summit will strengthen
the concept of Eurocommunism and that it will give dissidents
the idea that their struggle is backed by a regional center of
Western communists. the Soviets
are trying hard to prevent the Western parties from adopting
stronger positions against political repression by the Soviet
and East European regimes.//
Each of the three parties has some compelling domes-
tic reasons for repeating their past criticisms of the USSR.
The Spanish party wants to remind the supreme court both that
it has no formal ties to the USSR and that it has long been the
most outspoken Western party in criticizing the Soviets. The
French party, facing a crucial election next year, is trying
hard to erase its reputation as the most pro-Soviet party in
the West. The Italian party is under constant challenge from
Christian Democrats and Socialists to prove that it has also
broken its ties with Moscow.
//At the same time, the Italians have no intention
of courting trouble either with Moscow or with the minority of
Italian Communists who are still uncritically pro-Soviet. Top
party leaders draw a careful distinction between individual in-
stances of repression and the Eastern brand of communism, re-
fusing to admit that repression is a product of the system.
Gianni Cervetti, a Berlinguer lieutenant, recently promised So-
viet leaders that Italian party handling of the civil liberties
question would be restrained.//
I IAlthough Marchais has been making headlines by criti-
cizing rague's handling of the Charter 77 human rights advo-
cates, the French party leadership has also clearly underlined
the distinction between single cases of repression and the sys-
tem.
I I Both Italian and French communists admit that they
cannot give up the idea that the establishment of the Soviet
state and system was a landmark in history. They are likely to
hold to this line, whatever problems it may cause. Indeed, de-
spite their immediate problems with Soviet policy, they consider
that Soviet power is a long-range factor working in their favor.
It is not certain that Carrillo shares this view.
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Carrillo, in fact, is under intense domestic pressure
to demonstrate his party's independence from the Soviets with
a strong condemnation of Soviet and East European repression.
arrillo has admitted that he
cannot pre ict what Marchais and Berlinguer will agree to put
into the communique, but by making his own views clear in ad-
vance he probably hopes to gain credit even if the other
leaders soft-pedal the issue. Other Spanish communists have
also reportedly been making it a point to speak harshly of the
USSR and even to question whether the Soviet system can be de-
scribed as socialist.
Thus the Madrid summit can be expected to produce a
restatement of views already set down at bilateral meetings of
party leaders. It will exploit the symbolism of Eurocommunism,
an appelation that the Western parties evidently find useful
and that disturbs the Soviets. Beyond this, no challenge to
Moscow is likely.
For their part, the Soviets clearly would prefer not 25X1
to aggravate their quarrel with the Western parties and are
unlikely to pick a fight so long as the latter avoid direct
criticism of Moscow.
SOUTH KOREA: Anticipating Dissidence
//The South Korean government will probably
soon race the delicate problem of how to respond to a renewal.
of protest activity by political dissidents.//
//Today is the anniversary of the founding of
the Korean in ependence movement against the Japanese occupa-
tion and of the protest in Myongdong Cathedral last year. Early
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this month the university students return to the campuses after
a long winter vacation. In the past, the return of the students
has often meant political ferment in South Korea.//
//In an apparent effort to head off any sig-
nificant resumption of protest activity, the Pak government is
now backing off from the selective relaxation of political con-
trols it began late last year. Pak's tougher stance recently
appears to be a warning to dissidents that turmoil will not be
tolerated during the spring months.//
//Actions the government has taken to warn po-
tential demonstrators include a series of tough law-and-order
statements by top officials, some by Pak himself; several
fairly harsh court sentences for violators of Emergency Meas-
ure 9, the 1975 law that includes bans against the ;spreading
of "false" rumors and criticism of the present constitution;
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//In general, Pak's somewhat harder line now
does not preclude additional easing of controls if the situa-
remains fairly calm ove the next two months or so.
tion
JAPAN - SOUTH KOREA: Relations
I The South Korean government seems convinced that the
high officials it sent to Japan in February helped to shore up
Japanese support for South Korea.
South Korea's major objective in sending the foreign
minister, the speaker of the National Assembly, and former
prime minister Kim Chong-pil to Japan apparently was to obtain
more forthright assurances from the Japanese that Tokyo is op-
posed to early US troop withdrawals from Korea. The South Kore-
ans were dissatisfied with diffident Japanese public statements
on the issue during Vice President Mondale's visit to Tokyo.
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I The South Koreans were also pleased with the gener-
ally supportive approach taken by Japanese members of the South
Korea - Japan Parliamentarians Association and by what they see
as an improvement in the tone of Tokyo's press coverage of Korea.
Neither South Korea nor Japan has illusions about the
prospects for smooth relations in the future. Many problems re-
main; they include Tokyo's slowness in ratif in the South
Korea - Ja an Continental Shelf Agreement,
nese gestu
and Seoul's wariness f Ja
a-
p
toward North Korea.
I F
EL SALVADOR: Post-Election Trouble
Violence broke out early yesterday when Salvadoran
army troops and police cleared demonstrators out of San Salva-
dor's main plaza. Three youths were killed and several persons
injured.
I IThe demonstrators, mostly youths, were protesting
e
t
ou
come of the presidential election of February 20. They
had occupied the plaza since Thursday, and at one time at-
tracted a crowd of 50,000 people.
Supporters of the defeated candidate
Colonel Ern
st
,
e
o
Claramount, charge that the government rigged the electi
b
on
y
padding the voter rolls and stuffing ballot boxes. The govern-
ment did in fact tamper with the election results, but probably
would have won anyway.
General Carlos Romero, the candidate of the rulin
g
conservative National Conciliation Party, was declared the
winner with some 68 percent of the vote. Claramount, who had
been leading the demonstrations--vowing at one point to con-
tinue until the government met his demand for a new election--
left the country for Costa Rica yesterday.
I The government declared a 30-day state of siege yes-
terday, which limits political meetings and rallies. The dec-
laration, and recent actions by the army and police, will
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probably put an end to further large demonstrations, but lin-
gering unrest aggravated by the three killings could spark
more trouble. There is virtually no chance that the government
will accede to demands for a new election. F7 I 25X1
ANGOLA-ZAIRE: Relations
President Neto of Angola appears to have no intention
of improving relations with Zaire as long as he is faced with
a serious insurgency.
I I Despite President Mobutu's announcement in early Jan-
uary a he was recognizing Neto's government, and despite
Zairian steps to reduce support. sharply for Angolan dissident
groups, both Neto and his foreign minister have in the past two
weeks criticized Zaire for permitting Angola's enemies to oper-
ate from bases inside Zaire. Neto recently accused the US of
sending soldiers to Zaire to prepare for a military attack on
Angola.
While Mobutu says he is not worried, Neto's strong
antipathy for him, stemming from the Angolan civil war, remains
a barrier to better relations. In addition, relations will be
strained by the insurgency in Angola, which will continue for
some time, no matter what Mobutu does to prevent help from
reaching the insurgents from Zaire.
All three insurgent groups, the Cabindan guerrillas,
Holden Roberto's National Front, and Jonas Savimbi's National
Union, could probably continue their present levels of activity.
Savimbi's group in particular has recently enhanced its effec-
tiveness at shutting down the Benguela railroad.
I Neto may believe he has to accuse-Zaire _ of backing
e guerrillas in order to
to put down the insurgency.
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Morocco's decision to suspend participation: in all
the activities of the Organization of African Unity will hamper
its efforts to prevent OAU consideration of the Western Sahara
problem.
Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki declared on Friday
that Rabat's action was a protest against the dissemination by
the OAU of a report charging Morocco and Gabon with complicity
in the abortive coup in Benin on January 16. Morocco was also
protesting the attendance at a recent OAU ministerial meeting
of representatives of the Polisario Front, the group that is
carrying on insurgency against Moroccan and Mauritanian control
in Western Sahara.
The Benin report was the principal reason for the Mo-
roccan--action. A senior Foreign Ministry official privately told
US diplomats that Morocco had been prepared to limit its protest
of Polisario presence at the meeting to boycotting the opening
session. He emphasized that the Moroccan action does not consti-
tute withdrawal from the OAU.
The Moroccans apparently believe that neither their
action nor the Benin report will have much effect on Algeria's
effort to win sympathy on the Western Sahara issue. The official
noted that Mauritania would defend Moroccan interests with re-
gard to Western Sahara in the OAU.
The Moroccans probably are over-optimistic. Algeria
will certainly exploit the Benin report in its efforts to press
its case on the Western Sahara and to portray Morocco as linked
to "imperialism." While Algeria has been unable to promote much
enthusiasm for the Polisario cause among the Black African
states, sensitivity to outside interference in African affairs
could lead some states to reassess their positions on the West-
ern Sahara.
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