NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029700010020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2005
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 13, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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CIA-RDP79T00975A029700010020-0
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO.
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Thursday January 13, 1977 CG NIDC 77-O10C
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
State Department review completed
w
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Top Secret 0
r1tv Class if iration)
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday, January
I The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US officials.
CONTENTS
USSR: More Explosions in Moscow
Page 1
Page 3
USSR-SYRIA: Tartus Facilities Dispute
ISRAEL: Peres' Candidacy
CHINA-JAPAN: Upcoming Trade Bargaining
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Dissidence Continues
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the authorities in Moscow as well as to the overwhelmingly :non-
violent Soviet dissident movement.
USSR: More Explosions in Moscow
The US embass in Moscow has learned 25X1
hat, apart from the publicized explo-
sion in the Moscow subway on Saturday, there were at least two
other blasts in the city the same day. One was said to have oc-
curred near the KGB headquarters.
I I This information generally coincides with rumors re-
ported By the Western press last weekend.
that the three explosions, which they say were "definitely"
caused by bombs, represent a potentially serious challenge to
I the article re-
porting the first explosion, written by well-connected Soviet
journalist Victor Louis and published in a London newspaper,
was reminiscent of the kind of officially inspired reporting
that appeared during the spy-hysteria of the 1930s.
Iwould be used by the authorities tor seri-
ous new moves against dissidence of all kinds.
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I Iconvinced that the explosions were not set o by
the authorities themselves to serve as pretexts for repression.
I Domestic Soviet media have not reprinted the Victor
Louis article, and Tass has carried only a sparse announcement
of the first blast without speculating on its cause. The author-
ities may be still undecided on how publicly to interpret or
exploit the Moscow events.
Louis' article implied that dissidents were to blame
for the 'subway explosion and that they may have been incited by
the adverse impact on Soviet society of the freedom of informa-
tion provisions of the Helsinki accords. This may be the direc-
tion that both Soviet propaganda and possible antidissident ac-
tion may take.
I I The apparent nationwide crackdown on dissident activ-
ity, which was gathering momentum even before the explosions in
Moscow, could be part of a Soviet effort to bring overt dissi-
dence in the USSR under control well in advance of the European
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security follow-on conference in Belgrade in June.
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//In a lengthy paean to the late Chou En-lai in
the Peop e s Daily on Tuesday, a group of writers from the
Chinese Foreign Ministry referred to a desire for talks between
China and the US on the Taiwan issue, a reflection of China's
concern that the incoming administration is paying inadequate
attention to China.//
//The article follows earlier private Chinese
re erences beginning last November to fears that the incoming
administration in Washington will be so preoccupied with domes-
tic affairs and with US-Soviet relations that it will devote
little attention to resolving the Taiwan matter, which remains
the chief obstacle to improved Sino-US relations. Some of these
private remarks have included hints of Chinese flexibility on
the Taiwan issue.//
I IThe statement on Tuesday said the dispute between
ina an the US should be resolved "through negotiations with-
out the use of force"--language that dates to the 1950s when
the two sides were negotiating a non-use-of-force agreement for
the Taiwan area.
//The original reference to non-use-of-force was
in the con ext of a possible Sino-US clash over Taiwan in the
1950s and was not intended by the Chinese to rule out the
possibility that they might eventually resort to military means
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to "liberate" Taiwan. Nonetheless, the references that China's
historical position on this issue in the best light could be
part of a larger effort to create a positive atmosphere for
negotiations that China hopes will induce movement from the new
administration on the Taiwan issue.//
//The article implied no change in China's basic
demands on aiwan--that the US will break relations with Taipei
and terminate its security arrangements with the Chinese Nation-
alists. It asserted the familiar claim that Taiwan is "China's
internal affair" and that no "foreign interference" will be
allowed, a reference to past US requests for a Chinese commit-
ment not to use force 25XI-
//Peking has emphasized in recent weeks its view
a on y a herence to the principles of the Shanghai communi-
que will assure improvement in Sino-US relations. In an unusual
report on the meeting last week of Chinese liaison office chief
Huang Chen with Secretary Kissinger and his successor-designate,
Chinese media pointed approvingly to Cyrus Vance's statement--
that US relations with China would be "guided" by the Shanghai 25X1
communique. The Chinese report also noted with obvious satis-
faction that Kissinger had referred to the "enormous importance"
the US attaches to normalizing relations with China.//
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USSR-SYRIA: Tartus Facilities Dispute
The Syrian threat to deny facilities at Tartus to
Soviet naval ships may have been a demonstration of President
Asad's unhappiness over Moscow's heavy-handed tactics during
the fighting in Lebanon. He may have wanted to remind the So-
viets that Syria is Moscow's only client among the respectable
Arab states, and that good relations are important to both
sides.
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Asad, who has cautiously but steadily reduced the
Soviet economic presence in Syria over the past year, may have
decided that now was an appropriate time to signal a move
against the Soviet military presence as well. Since the Leb-
anese cease-fire, he has been seeking better relations with
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and these countries have been advising
a reduction in the Soviet presence.
//Unlike the Egyptians, however, the Syrians 25X1
have never been interested in an open break with Moscow and
do not want to jeopardize their military relations with the
Soviets. F_ I
The Syrians, however, have now let Moscow know that
they cannot be taken for granted. The Soviets, who have pri-
vately expressed concern about the rapprochement between Egypt
and Syria, may now have to make additional offers of assistance
to counter residual Syrian bitterness.
ISRAEL: Peres' Candidacy
Israeli Defense Minister Peres' decision to seek the
Labor party's nomination for prime minister makes it likely
that there will be a divisive leadership struggle at the Labor
party convention next month.
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I Former prime minister Golda Meir and other old-guard
party leaders, who favor Prime Minister Rabin, had hoped to
dissuade Peres from running. The suicide of housing minister
Ofer, a close political ally of Rabin's, and the Labor Party's
poor showing in recent public opinion polls apparently prompted
Peres to run.
I IPeres was defeated by Rabin for the prime minister-
snip in a party election in 1974 by a relatively narrow margin,
and he doubtless believes that his chances of overhauling Rabin
this time are good. His most effective appeal may be that Labor
cannot win with Rabin and that only his candidacy, at the head
of a new team, offers the party a chance to refurbish its image
and avoid a calamitous setback at the polls in May--an argument
he has already begun to use.
I IPeres, however, will have to overcome the opposition
of Foreign Minister Allon's faction and of Meir and Labor Party
bosses, who still hold it against him that he bolted the party
in 1965 with former Labor prime minister Ben-Gurion. Mapam,
Labor's left-wing coalition partner, also opposes Peres and
has threatened to break up its alliance with Labor unless the
Labor Party adopts a more explicitly dovish party platform on
peace negotiations than Peres favors.
I The collapse of the alignment with Mapam could sharply
reduce La or's plurality in the next election, or throw the
election to the conservative hard-line Likud bloc, although this
is less likely.
To complicate matters further, former foreign minister
Abba Eban has also declared his candidacy in an effort to woo
Labor Party doves away from Rabin and, paradoxically, lock up
the nomination for the more hawkish Peres. Eban, who holds a
long-standing grudge against Rabin, has already indicated he
would be willing to serve in a Peres cabinet.
Despite his reputation for opportunism and pragmatism,
any government headed by Peres would adopt a tougher, more in-
dependent line on Middle East peace negotiations than one led
by Rabin. A protege of former defense minister Dayan, Peres'
main base of support is within the right-wing of the Labor
Party. In the past, moreover, he has been more favorably dis-
posed than Rabin to the re-establishment of a national unity
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coalition government with Likud, which takes a much harder line
on territorial concessions and favors the annexation of the
West Bank.
In recent interviews, Peres has indicated that he
favors a resumption of the step-by-step approach instead of
reconvening the Geneva peace talks, which he probably believes
would only end in stalemate over the issues of Palestinian par-
ticipation in the negotiating process and Israeli withdrawals
from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
I I Peres has said he prefers a "functional" rather than
a terra orial agreement with Jordan over the West Bank. By this
he means an arrangement that would allow Jordan to reassert its
civil authority over most of the area but permit the Israelis
to keep their armed forces there and to continue to establish
settlements.
As a possible gesture to party doves and Mapam, how-
ever, Peres has hinted at a readiness to make territorial con-
cessions as well but only when the Arabs are ready in his view
to make "genuine peace" with Israel--a position very similiar
to Rabin's which envisions full diplomatic and commercial re-
lations as part of a final peace settlement.
CHINA-JAPAN: Upcoming Trade Bargaining
//Differences between China and Japan on oil
and other trade issues could lead to hard bargaining in upcom-
ing negotiations. China is likely to take a strong position,
but its options and leverage are limited.//
Sino-Japanese trade is much more important to China
than Japan, and accounts for more than one fourth of China's
trade. Last year both imports and exports fell off, with the
result that China's deficit with Japan was cut to about half
the $900-million level of 1975.
I //Peking hopes to narrow the trade deficit
even more by increasing oil exports but is likely to be frus-
trated by Tokyo's reluctance to step up imports. China also
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wants to increase exports of silk and cotton textiles, but its
plans are running against Japanese protectionist policies for
these goods. Japan, on the other hand, wants to import more
coal than China appears willing or able to supply.//
//Meanwhile, Japan remains China's major sup-
plier o stee , chemical fertilizers, and machinery. Competi-
tion for a possibly smaller Chinese market for machinery and
equipment in 1977 could, however, strengthen Peking's hand.
China might try linking increased purchases of Japanese machin-
ery to a boost'in Japanese oil imports during 1977-78, although
a similar effort collapsed last year.//
Security police are continuing to harass Czech dissi-
dents who apparently wrote a human rights declaration that was
first published in West Germany and France. The authorities
seem to be following a deliberate policy of repeated detention,
questioning and release of the more prominent dissidents.
In addition, the police have evidently attempted to
enlist one widely known dissident as a "witness," implying that
the government may be considering some form of legal action
against those arrested. The government, however, would obviously
prefer to avoid formal trials in view of the international reper-
cussions that would inevitably ensue.
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