NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029700010010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 7, 1977
• Content Type: REPORT

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Access to this document will be restricted to
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Friday January 7, 1977 CG NIDC 77-005C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday January
The NID Ca le is tor the purpose o .in ormina
senior US officials.
USSR - UN - MIDDLE EAST: Peacekeeping Costs
SOUTH AFRICA: High School Boycott
ISRAEL: Suicide of Housing Minister
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CHINA-TANZANIA-RHODESIA: Variety of Issues Page 10
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Egyptian officials, worried about Palestinian and
other Arab reaction to President Sadat's Washington Post inter-
view last week suggesting that any future Palestinian state be
linked to Jordan, are making a strong bid to affirm Egypt's
support for future Palestinian independence.
Newspapers in Cairo studiously ignored Sadat's re-
marks for several days and have downplayed them in coverage
this week, taking the line that establishing a vaguely defined
"formula for coordination" between Jordan and a future Pales-
tinian state will ensure progress for the entire Arab cause.
By couching the issue of Jordanian-Palestinian link-
age in these terms, the newspapers are backing down from Sadat's
statement in the Post that some sort of confederal relationship
"must be agreed upon."
The Egyptians also are taking a sudden new interest
in the Palestinians since Sadat's interview. The leading daily
AZ-Ahram gave heavy coverage on Tuesday to a meeting between
Sadat and a delegation of Palestinian residents of the Gaza
Strip at which Sadat affirmed Egypt's determination to care for
the needs of the territory "until an independent Palestinian
state is formed."
Egypt's new concern for the Gaza Strip, which it has
long neglected, undoubtedly is intended to reassure the Pales-
tinians that Egypt itself and other Arab states would act as a
buffer against any Jordanian moves to absorb a Palestinian
state.
I I As a further affirmation of Egypt's support for the
concept of Palestinian independence, the AZ-Ahram article em-
phasized Egypt's insistence that the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization be invited to the Geneva peace conference, prefera-
bly as a separate delegation.,
The article made almost no mention of Jordan, refer-
ring repeatedly to the need for solidarity among Egypt, Syria,
and the Palestinians and to Egyptian-Syrian support for the
Palestinians.
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//In fact, the Egyptian position is somewhat
ambivalent. Sadat would undoubtedly like to press the PLO to
accept confederation with Jordan in order to make some accommo-
dation to Israel's objection to an independent Palestinian
state, and Fahmi acknowledged some concern that Sadat will pur-
sue the issue.//
//At the same time, however, Sadat is likely
to be cautious about pressing the matter too far. His credibil-
ity among the Arabs was damaged too badly by the second Sinai 25X1
agreement to allow him to press positions that are unpopular
with his Arab allies, and he is not likely actively to pursue
this one unless he can secure the cooperation of Syria.//I
USSR - UN - MIDDLE EAST: Peacekeeping Costs
The USSR announced on Tuesday that it was withholding
at least $4 million from its share of UN peacekeeping expenses
for the Middle East. The Soviet move is a protest against the
increased costs of peacekeeping caused by the last Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement agreement which introduced US equipment
and technicians into the peacekeeping area.
I Moscow is also signaling the new US administration
that the USSR must be a part of any future round of Middle
East negotiations.
Immediately after the signing of the Sinai agreement
_n 1975, the Soviets announced that they were opposed to the
introduction of an American presence into the UN emergency
-force buffer zone and to the increase of the size and cost of
the force. They threatened to oppose any attempt to have the
UN endorse the Sinai agreement, but ultimately did not block
the accord. Soviet objections did, however, force UN Secretary
General Waldheim to curtail plans for increased manpower for
the emergency force on the Sinai.
Moscow's latest move punctuates its efforts to revive
next round of negotiations. The USSR's failure to pay all of
its peacekeeping assessment may also presage a tougher Soviet
position when the Security Council considers renewal of Middle
East peacekeeping forces later this year.
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I I A series of terrorist incidents this week targeted
ris an interests have disrupted Lebanon's gradual return
to a semblance of order. A ban on movement between east and
west Beirut was imposed yesterday, and Christian militiamen--
not trusting the competence of the Arab security forces--have
been patrolling their own neighborhoods.
The first and most serious incident was a large ex-
plosion in front of the Phalangist militia headquarters in east
Beirut, which took place on Monday and killed over 50 people.
It would almost certainly have touched off acts of Christian
vengeance, except for the fact that the Christians have no
idea of who is responsible. Subsequent incidents--shots fired
from a car at passers-by in a Christian area of Beirut and two
smaller explosions that killed no one in the Christian city of
Byblos--have maintained the tension.
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including extremist Camille Shamun,
Christian leaders
,
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have appealed for calm, and President Sarkis has directed mili-
tary and police officials to discover who is responsible. Left-
ist and Palestinian leaders have so far refrained from public
statements which might inflame the atmosphere.
I I The tension and fear of reprisals may spur government
efforts to round up weapons, although they will also increase
the reluctance of the combatants to hand them over. The govern-
ment has announced that the quadrapartite committee overseeing
the cease-fire will meet today to make final decisions on how
to enforce the collection of arms.
relatively quiet, although Arab security forces have not yet
dared to patrol the area for fear of inciting the Israelis to
act.
//Lebanon's southern border has remained
SUDAN-ETHIOPIA: Tensions Between Countries
I I The Sudanese government is mounting a major diplomatic
and pubic relations campaign charging Ethiopia with aiding reb-
els preparing to attack the Sudan. In his National Day speech
on January 1, President Numayri threatened to retaliate by clos-
ing the border with Ethiopia, and to utilize Ethiopians living
in the Sudan to export unrest across the border.
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I I The Sudan subsequently withdrew its ambassador to
Ethiopia, and Numayri's foreign policy adviser Mansur Khalid
met this week with the US, British, French, and Soviet ambassa-
dors to repeat the accusation. The charge also has been high-
lighted in the Sudanese press.
I ISudanese concern apparently was not triggered by a
Ingle event. Sources in the Sudanese government state that
while Khartoum was aware that Ethiopia was implicated in last
July's coup attempt, the government chose not to attack the
Ethiopians publicly, hoping to gain assurances that the exiled
Ansar tribesmen involved in the attempt wculd no longer be al-
lowed to operate from bases in Ethiopia.
Recently, however, the Sudanese have become persuaded
that cooperation between Ethiopia, Libya, and the Soviets against
the Sudanese government has increased. The Sudanese cite Libyan
efforts to supply more sophisticated weapons, obtained from the
USSR, to Ethiopia for use by the Ansar tribesmen.
Local observers do not expect any rash military ac-
tion. Mansur Khalid told the US ambassador that there was no
reason for panic, and that the government 'was taking
tions.
SOUTH AFRICA: High School Boycott
High school students in the Cape Town black townships
continued to observe the six-month boycott when schools re-
opened on Wednesday after the summer recess. Many also stayed
home in Soweto, the black township near Johannesburg, but a
call by the Student Representative Council to go back to school
apparently persuaded numerous high-schoolers to show up at
schools there.
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Although the school boycott in Cape Town is more
successful, it apparently lacks the central organization that
exists in Soweto. The Cape Town students evidently are holding
out for government release of students in detention before re-
turning to their studies. The potential for further violence
in this area remains high.
The schools in the black townships are in special
session to allow students to prepare for examinations in March.
Black parents and newspapers in Soweto strongly support an end
to the boycott so that the students can go ahead with their
education.
If there are no provocative police actions, most stu-
dents could be back in school by the end of the month. A new
police chief has been assigned to Soweto, reportedly with. or-
ders to cool things down. He has promised to keep police off
the campuses, unless a crime is committed.
There is growing evidence that the Student Represen-
tative Council is divided. The council engineered a successful
strike in September in which violence was generally avoided--
a key council policy heretofore--in contrast to the outbreaks
in June and August. An attempt at a longer work stoppage in
November fizzled, however, and the leadership may well be split
over tactics.
//One result of the uneasy calm that has existed
in e acc. townships over the past month or so has been a
reduced flow of student refugees from South Africa. Massive
police sweeps through Soweto and other townships beginning in
August led to flight by hundreds of students--mostly from the
high schools--to Botswana and Swaziland.
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ISRAEL: Suicide of Housing Minister
The suicide of Israeli Housing Minister Abraham Ofer,
a close adviser to Prime Minister Rabin and the target of a
major corruption investigation, seems likely to strengthen
Defense Minister Peres' chances of wresting the Labor Party
nomination away from Rabin. Moreover, if other high officials
become tainted, the Labor Party would lose further ground to
the conservative Likud bloc and Yigael Yadin's Democratic Move-
ment.
I Ofer had recently been working on Rabin's behalf to
reac an understanding with Peres that would have guaranteed
Rabin the party's top spot and avoided a leadership fight. With
Ofer's death, Rabin has lost a mainstay of support within the
party and may become more vulnerable to attacks from Labor con-
servatives led by Peres.
Rabin is now likely to be criticized by party con-
servatives for his failure to dismiss Ofer or to suspend him
until the conclusion of the investigation into his management
of a government-operated housing company. Peres' supporters
may argue that his calls for sweeping changes in party leader-
ship and government reform put him in a better position to lead
the party's election campaign.
Labor moderates sympathetic to Ofer, on the other
hand, may fault Rabin for his unwillingness to back Ofer pub-
licly. Dissatisfaction with Rabin's inaction could lead Labor-
ites unsure of their choice for the party nomination, as well
as some disgruntled moderates, to support Peres.
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Since Rabin's resignation, Peres has not indicated
whether he will seek the nomination. He has, however, continued
to hold discussions with Labor leaders to gauge his prospects.
Should he detect a drop in support for Rabin, he would throw
his hat into the ring.
In a related matter, Rabin's original nominee to head
the Bank of Israel, Asher Yadlin, is scheduled to go on trial
next month on charges of fraud and bribery allegedly committed
when he headed Israel's major health insurance company. The
trial is likely to be a further embarrassment to Rabin and the
party and could deepen dissatisfaction among some party leaders
with Rabin's judgment.
I I Both Lukid and the Democratic Movement stand to gain
signiticantly from the revelations of corruption. A recent pub-
lic opinion poll indicates a sharp erosion in support for the
ruling Labor alignment and gains by Likud and Yadin's party.
The polls also showed, however, that a large percentage
of th
electorate remain undecided.
CHINA-TANZANIA-RHODESIA: Variety of Issues
I lTanzanian First Vice President Jumbe's visit to China.
last month enabled Peking to reaffirm its close relations with
its major African ally. The visit also gave the Chinese a chance
to sort out their relationship with Tanzania and the badly frac-
tured Rhodesian liberation movement at a time when they face in-
creasingly stiff competition from the USSR.
//For their part, the Tanzanians no doubt saw the
visit as an occasion to sound out the new Chinese leadership on a
variety of bilateral and southern African issues, to seek more
aid, and to discuss military coordination.//
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Jumbe carried a personal message from Tanzanian Presi-
dent Nyerere asking that all future Chinese aid be funneled
through the ALC. The Chinese probably attempted to please their
guests by agreeing to this request in principle, while holding
open the possibility of continued direct aid.
The Chinese position on this question is weak, however,
because all aid going to Tanzania must come under the scrutiny
of the Tanzanian government. The Tanzanians probably hope that
by emphasizing the role of the ALC, they can avoid a repetition
of a situation like that in Angola--where competing powers fur-
nished assistance directly to the factions they favored.
The Chinese and Tanzanians appeared in agreement on
the desirability of a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia. By pre-
scribing the use of revolutionary dual tactics," Vice Premier
Li Hsien-nien implicitly endorsed the concept of the Geneva nego-
tiations so lonq as military pressure is maintained on the Rho-
desian government.
i publicly described the results of Jumbe's visit as
"satisfactory," but it is unlikely that the Tanzanians got all
they wanted in bilateral matters. There was no announcement of a
new economic aid agreement.
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For China, nevertheless, the relationship with Tan-
zania is the prime achievement of a decade of diplomatic effort
in eastern and southern Africa. Good relations with Tanzania have
been necessary for the shipment of Chinese military assistance
to the southern African liberation movements.
Having experienced a fiasco in its insurgency support
effort in Angola, Peking is eager to avoid another loss to the
Soviets in Rhodesia. This goal, of itself, ensures continued
Chinese interest in maintaining close ties with Tanzania.
Li's warning about Soviet intentions in southern Af-
rica, however, points up Peking's dilemma. A protracted guer-
rilla war in Rhodesia--the type China can best supply--might
enhance Peking's prestige and influence in southern Africa. But
the present pattern of conventional cross-border raids might
prompt Mozambique at some point to seek the kind of Soviet and
Cuban involvement that could win the struggle quickly. The Chi-
nese ma_y hope that the Geneva negotiations prove fruitful fore
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