NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
17
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 10, 2005
Sequence Number: 
28
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 16, 1976
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3.pdf548.93 KB
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T0: NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS 1 ~~ 2 3 4 ACTIDN DIRECT REPLY PREPAR E REPLY APPRDUAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION COMMENT FILE RETURN CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGNATURE REMARKS: FROM; NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE N0. DATE CIA-RDP79T00975A0296000 028- 2 ~ 3 ~op ~ecret (Security Classification) 25X1 CONTROL NO..~ Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities: Thursday December 16, 1976 CI NIDC 76-293C DIA review(s) completed. w NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions i Top Secret (Security I ~ 'f' i n 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 25X1 gpproved For Release 2006/03/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved For F~elease 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T0097~5A029600010028-3 National Intelli ence Daily Cable for Thursday, December 16, 1976. 25X1 T e NID a e is or t o purpose o in orming senior US o icials. CONTENTS ZAIRE: Watching Rhodesia Page 1 ISRAEL-UK: Submarine Delivery Page 3 YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Brezhnev Visit Page 5 ECUADOR-PERU-CHILE: Strained Relations Page 5 25X1 EC: Fishing Zone Page 8 PORTUGAL: Election Page 10 CANADA: Foreign Borrowing Page 11 FINLAND: Coalition Survives Page 12 JAMAICA: Election Page 13 Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved For R~ ZAIRE: Watching Rhodesia Zaire's President Mobutu is watching Rhodesian devel- opments with growing concern. A civil war or a radical regime there would have grave economic and political consequences for Zaire. Mobutu can do little to influence the course of events in Rhodesia, however, because his open opposition to the win- ning side--the Popular Movement--during the Angolan civil war has cast him in the role of odd man out in southern Africa. Mobutu's major concern is for safe and economical transpor ation routes. Zaire has always had to rely on exter- nal transportation to carry a large share of its imparts and exports, as its own meager rail and port facilities are unable to handle the country's needs. The disruption of Angolan facilities--the Benguela railroad and the port of Lobito--has forced the Zairian govern= meat to divert a large share of its traffic to South African parts via Zambian and Rhodesian rail lines. In addition, Zair- ian copper producers purchase some $37-million worth of coke, coal, and corn from Rhodesia annually. These supplies would probably be jeopardized by instability in Rhodesia. Mobutu has had to concentrate primarily on improving his political standing with former antagonists in order to open up his options. Mobutu would like to re- gain use of the Bengue a rai roa , ut wants assurances from Luanda that Zaire's access will not be subject to political 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved Ford Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T009751p029600010028-3 Mobutu is also seeking better relations with Lagos--Nigerian Foreign Minister Garba is tentatively scheduled to visit Kinshasa this month--and is attempting to strengthen his contacts with Moscow. His effort apparently coincides with a Soviet interest in improving relations. The Zairian commerce minister is currently in Moscow to initial several commercial and cultural accords.// Approved For Release 200 / 1 - 9T00975A02 - Approved For Mobutu's prospects for success in mending fences and pro ec ing Zaire's interests are not promising. His past ac- tions will limit his ability to maneuver in southern Africa. For some time to come, he is likely to find himsel the eri her in affectin develo ments in the re ion. ISRAEL-UK: Submarine Delivery //Israel recently took delivery of the first of three 500-ton small attack submarines from the UK, according to the US defense attache in London. The submarine reportedly sailed for Israel in late November.// //The other two submarines apparently are sched- ulec or e ivery in 1977. Israel is considering the purchase of additional submarines, pending close evaluation of the per-. formance of the first three.// //The Israelis have had only one submarine--a World War I vintage, British-built submarine. It has been used primarily for training, and we expect it to be phased out before 1980.// //The new submarines probably will be based at u? a an 11GPC~ in the Mediterranean for coastal defense 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 25X1 gpproved For Release 2006/03/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved For Release 2006/03/17 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved For YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: Brezhnev Visit After meeting in special session last week, the Yu- gos av party leadership has issued its own report on Soviet leader Brezhnev's visit from November 15 to 17. The statement reaffirms Yugoslavia's desire for good relations with the USSR but leaves little doubt that significant differences persist, particularly where Soviet emphasis on "international solidar- ity" is concerned. The report stresses Yugoslavia's ri ht t pursue an in ependent road to socialism." Wh tever tactics were pursued, Moscow and Belgrade a have now each gone on record with an official account of the Brezhnev visit, illustrating the continuing disparity in view- points. The USSR earlier had issued a statement on the visit in which it redictabl stressed the socialist dut of inter- nationalism. ECUADOR-PERU-CHILE: Strained Relations //Relations between Peru and Chile and between Peru an Ecuador are under new strain.// //Ecuador's cancellation of a stopover by Peruvian Press en orales Bermudez last week while he was en route home Approved For Release 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010028-3 Approved For from a visit to Colombia and Venezuela, a stalemate in Chilean- Peruvian talks on a proposed Bolivian outlet to the sea, and Peru's continuing arms buildup are the major causes of the in- creased uneasiness.// //Since Chile early this month bluntly rebuffed eru s proposal to establish a ~~orridor to the sea for Bolivia with a jointly administered coastal enclave, there has been a hardening of positions by the two countries. The foreign minis- tries seem prepared to explore ways to resume talks, but mili- tary leaders in both Peru and Chile may be demanding a tougher stand.// //Tension between Ecuador and Peru appears to e tied mainly to the Ecuadorean internal situation. Ecuador's always-shaky Supreme Council of Government has weakened percep- tibly in recent weeks. It appears to have seized on rumors of a Peruvian mobilization near its border and the recall of the Peruvian ambassador following the cancellation of the presiden- i- i ~ l