NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010018-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
13
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 22, 2005
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 10, 1976
Content Type:
REPORT
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CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010018-4.pdf | 428.04 KB |
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INITIALS
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
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Friday December 10, 1976 CI NIDC 76-288C
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday December 10, 1976.
The NID Cable is for e purpose o
senior US uzrr; als.
SPAIN: Moderates Defeat Radicals
USSR-LIBYA: Qadhafi Visit Ends
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AUSTRALIA: Uranium Policy
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CIEC: Ministerial Postponed
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LEBANON: Eight-man Cabinet
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SPAIN: Moderates Defeat Radicals
D
Radicals have failed in their efforts to move the
Spanish Socialist Workers Party further to the left.
During the Socialist congress this week, the rela-
moderate party leadership defeated radical efforts to
tivel
y
reinstall the "dictatorship of the proletariat" as the princi-
pal plank in the party's platform. The concept was dropped by
the Socialists more than 40 years ago. The leadership also
turned back demands that the Socialists refuse to support Prime
Minister Suarez' political reforms unless the government meets
certain conditions.
The congress called for negotiations with the govern-
ment to ensure that the legislative election next spring is
not manipulated by rightists at the local level. The party as-
serted that it will back demands made by the opposition last
month--including legalization of the Communist Party. If these
conditions are not met, however, the party's national commit-
tee will have the authority to reach a compromise with the gov-
ernment on participation in the election.
As expected, the congress called for abstention in
the referendum to be held next Wednesday. This is largely a
symbolic gesture because the government will probably win a
comfortable majority on its reform proposals.
Congress pronouncements indicate that the Socialists
have not resolved their dilemma over whether or not to support
the government's moves toward democratization. If they are to
participate effectively in the legislative election, however,
they must make a decision.
The relatively moderate composition of the newly
elected executive committee and hints dropped by party leaders
make it seem more likely that the Socialists will work out some
form of compromise with the government. If so, the party stands
to lose part of its left wing and some of its worker support
to the Communists.
I The party's left wing will draw little comfort from
the congress' pronouncements on foreign policy, which largely
reiterated earlier party positions. The congress called for a
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US withdrawal from its bases in Spain, denounced US "imperial-
ism" in Latin America, condemned the Spanish retreat from West-
ern Sahara, and rejected both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
I Socialist leaders have shown more flexibility on
these issues in private, implying that the US bases and Spanish
membership in NATO could be acceptable if endorsed by a freely
elected government.
USSR-LIBYA: Qadhafi Visit Ends
The communique issed after Libyan President Qadhafi's
visit to the USSR this week reflects substantial strengthening
of bilateral ties over the past two years. Qadhafi, who was
making his first trip to Moscow, was warmly received by Soviet
leaders.
I J The four days of talks produced a shipping agreement
that could increase Soviet merchant marine use of Libyan fa-
cilities, and agreements on cultural, economic, and technical
cooperation.
I The communique included several references to the
importance of friendship and cooperation, which implied that
the two sides may be working toward a protocol on consultations
or principles to mark a new phase in Soviet-Libyan relations.
At this juncture, however, neither side is likely to be inter-
ested in a formal friendship treaty that would suggest a more
tangible relationship.
I The statement also disclosed the differences that
continue to separate the two countries:
--There was no mention of the Geneva conference on the
Middle East, which Oadhafi denigrated in his public re-
marks in Moscow.
--References to Israel were relatively soft, presumably
a concession to Soviet efforts to return the protagonists
in the Middle East to the Geneva forum.
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--The failure to refer to the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation as the sole representative of the Palestinian peo-
ple as well as the handling of the issue of Palestinian
statehood were certainly dictated by Libyan ties with the
more radical fedayeen groups.
I I Although the Libyan armed forces commander played a
prominent part in the talks, the communique carried no specific
reference to military ties. Libya has been able to absorb only
a fraction of the substantial amounts of military equipment it
has acquired from the USSR during the past two years. Most of
this material is in storage, and Qadhafi's plans to expand his
forces are limited by Libya's small pool of manpower with tech-
nical skills.
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AUSTRALIA: Uranium Policy
//In contrast to the restrictive policies of its
predecessor, the year-old Fraser government favors early devel-
opment of Australia's vast uranium resources. The government is
moving cautiously because the issue is highly controversial,
but has already allowed resumption of some uranium mining.//
25X1 //If existing curbs on exports and on mining in
the Northern Territory are lifted, Australia will become a
major supplier of uranium within the next decade. Consumer
countries are relying on these supplies.//
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//Australia has about one fifth of the uranium re-
serves outside Communist countries. With no plans for a nuclear
power industry within the next 10 years, the Australians could
export nearly all their uranium output. If the government allows
producers to carry out their present plans, Australia could be
exporting several thousand tons of uranium oxide annually by
the end of the decade. Uranium then would become Australia's
number-one export, bringing in over $1 billion annually.//
//The uranium industry foundered between 1972 and
1975 under the energy policies of the Labor government. Uranium
exports were banned, exploration activity fell off, and no
mining occurred. In late 1974, the government established
federal ownership of all deposits in the Northern Territory--
where 80 percent of the country's reserves are located--and
banned additional foreign equity in uranium exploration and
development. //
//Shortly after taking office in December 1975,
the Liberal-Country government began lifting some of these re-
strictions. Discarding the Labor government's aim of eventual
100 percent government ownership of the uranium industry, the
new government instructed the Australian Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to sell the shares in uranium companies it had acquired in
1974.//
//Last January, the government withdrew from all
uranium exp oration and turned the job over to private compa-
nies. Uranium mining outside the Northern Territory resumed in
March, and the ban on foreign investment in new uranium projects
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was lifted the following month. Foreign ownership still is
limited to a maximum of 25 percent. The government also retains
strict control over safeguards and marketing regulations.//
//Uranium development has become one of Australia's
hottest public issues. Some public opinion polls indicate that
a majority of the population favors uranium development for use
in nuclear power; others show that Australians think nuclear
development would have harmful effects on future generations.//
//Many unions are vehemently opposed to all uranium
mining. This past summer, unions prevented the Mary Kathleen
Uranium Company from shipping 45.4 tons of uranium oxide that
had been contracted by the US in 1970. Rather than forcing a
showdown with the unions, the government arranged to borrow
uranium oxide from a British stockpile to meet the company's
commitment. //
//The government has put off two politically sensi-
tive policy decisions--whether to allow mining in the Northern
Territory and whether to permit uranium exports--pending the
outcome of a special environmental inquiry by a commission
charged with forming guidelines for Australian uranium policy.
The commission recently gave tacit approval for changing export
policy and for mining outside the Northern Territory, but also
recommended stringent safeguards, government controls, and further
public debate. A second report, dealing specifically with the
Northern Territory, will not be ready until after the first of
the year.//
//The government, meanwhile, will continue removing
impe iments to uranium development. Since the commission's first
report, Canberra has announced that existing export sales
commitments will be met, subject to the guidelines of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, and that projects outside the Northern
Territory may proceed with environmen~al act studies a
necessary prelude to mining approval.
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CIEC: Ministerial Postponed
//The participants in the Conference on Interna-
iona conomic Cooperation have decided to postpone the min-
isterial review scheduled for December 15. The conference was
organized last year to discuss energy issues and development
problems.//
//The conference chairmen, Allan Maceachen of Can-
ada and Manuel Perez Guerrero of Venezuela, agreed last week
to a compromise formula for delaying the meeting--a course fa-
vored by almost all of the participants--that circumvented at-
tribution of responsibility for the delay.//
//The Europeans expected that the OPEC states
would cite an acrimonious ministerial meeting to help ration-
alize the oil price increase expected later this month. Many
of the developing states, although disappointed with the lack
of progress in the conference, think they may still obtain
some of their demands in later negotiations and were thus not
willing to jeopardize the scheduling of future talks.//
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//The change in us administrations and the lack
o progress among the EC states on reaching an agreed position
have been cited by industrialized and developing states as jus-
tification for the delay. Most participants, however, recog-
nized that little substantive progress has in fact been made in
the talks and that a ministerial conference would have almost
inevitably degenerated into an acrimonious confrontation.//
//The principal differences between developed and
developing countries in the CIEC discussions include:
--The OPEC countries, faced with objections from all of
the industrialized and some of the developing states,
seek formal recognition of their right unilaterally to
set oil prices. OPEC states also want their purchasing
power to be guaranteed by the developed countries.
--The industrialized and developing countries still dis-
agree on maintaining the prices of raw materials in rela-
tion to inflation.
--The industrialized countries have refused to meet the
developing countries' demands for automatic debt relief.
The industrialized countries and those developing coun-
tries that depend on private credit advocate a case-by-
case consideration of debt problems.
--The developing countries seek firm assurance that each
industrialized country will allocate seven tenths of 1
percent of its gross national product to development as-
sistance by 1980.
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LEBANON: Eight-man Cabinet
Lebanon's newly appointed Prime Minister al-Huss an-
nounced formation of an eight-man cabinet of technocrats yes-
terday. Fuad Butrus will head the foreign and defense minis-
tries and Salah Salman will be in charge of the ministries of
interior and housing. Al-Huss himself will be responsible for
the ministries dealing with economic reconstruction--economy,
trade, industry, and oil.
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The appointment of non-political figures underscores
President Sarkis' determination to retain as free a hand as
possible in putting together programs for economic recovery
and social welfare. The appointment of ministers from various
religious affiliations conforms with Lebanon's tradition of
distributing government posts on a sectarian basis.
D
lated to post-war reconstruction.
Tn the cabinet's first meeting yesterday, the minis-
ters reportedly began preliminary discussions on issues re-
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