NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 2, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

1
0
1
1
plj~gr Release 2005/06/09
NAAAE AB~`D~AD?DR~ ESS
__-~ tom! ~~r
ACTION
APPROVAL
COMMENT
CONCURRENCE
R~fUlA62@tS:
DIRECT REPLY
DISPATCH
FILE
INFDRMATfON
RECOMMENOATION~
RETURN
CIA-RDP79T00975A02960~Oap ~~cret
(SecurOity Classification)
1
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Thursday December 2, 1976 CI NIDC 76-281C
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
25X1
Top Secret 25x1
(Security Cla sification
1
1
1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 25X1 gpproved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 25X1
Approved For Rel
25X1
25X1
National Intelli ence Dail Cable T
e a e is or e purpose o in orming
senior US o icials.
MEXICO: Presidential Inaugural Speech
RHODESIA: Guerrilla Delegation
USSR: Yakubovsky Posts Vacant
LIBYA-USSR: Qadhafi to Soviet Union
Page 1
Page 2
Page 2
Page 5
25X1
25X6
Page 8
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 Approved Four Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T009~5A029600010004-9
MEXICO: Presidential Inaugural Speech
Mexican President Lopez Portillo, sworn into office
yester ay, devoted most of his inaugural address to economic
policy, outlining measures needed to restore confidence in the
government. In a moderate and businesslike way he indicated
that he plans an orderly shift away from the expansionary fis-
cal policies of his predecessor.
On Tuesday, outgoing president Echeverria used his
last full day in office to polish his populist image. He gave
peasants titles to 445,000 hectares of land that had been ex-
propriated in past years, and ordered a new expropriation of
some 3,500 hectares to be split up into small plots for peas-
ants' homes.
In his inaugural speech, Lopez Portillo said that the
~
crisis in confidence was a danger to the economic and political
future of the country. He warned that continued economic dis-
order could cause domestic strife that would have to be dealt
with by force. He said a period of austerity will be necessary,
including import controls and cuts in government spending.
The new President made clear that he viewed land dis-
tribution as the wrong way to solve the urgent rural problem
because peasants cannot produce efficiently on small parcels
of land. These sentiments, in direct conflict with the expro-
priations carried out by Echeverria, will be received well by
conservatives, but will not assuage those landowners already
affected by Echeverria's actions.
Lopez Portillo will be under pressure to revoke the
~
expropriations, although any effort to reverse Echeverria's
actions would risk a peasant uprising.
Lopez Portillo's cabinet is composed of close asso-
cia es with strong administrative records rather than well-
known political figures, indicating that he will emphasize ad-
ministrative efficiency rather than the olitical rhetoric that
characterized Echeverria's years. 25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 Approved For Re
RHODESIA: Guerrilla Delegation
A black Rhodesian nationalist delegation from the
i a we Peoples' Army will join the talks at Geneva today.
Despite the organization'~~ initial assertion that its delega-
tion would be an independent group at the conference, the dele-
gates have now indicated ghat they will "strengthen" Robert
Mugabe's group, the militant faction of the Zimbabwe African
National Union.
he delegation includes senior military
commander Josiah Tongogara. and other representatives of the
guerrillas who were part of Mugabe's dele ation durin
first week of the talks.
The Peoples' Army has been harshly critical of
t e Geneva conference, and its leaders have taken a hard line
on settlement terms. The presence of the military leaders at
the conference, therefore, seems likel to cam licate
to reach an agreement.
25X1
25X1
25X1
USSR: Yakubovsky Posts Vacant
//The Soviet leadership will probably not allow
e posts of first deputy minister of defense and commander in
chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces to remain vacant for very
long.//
//Marshal Yakubovsky, holder of those posts, whose
ea- was announced yesterday, had been ill for some time. The
Soviet leadership may have already decided on his successor at
the time they appointed General Gribkov as chief of staff and
first deputy commander of the Warsaw Pact forces. No announce-
ment is likely until after Yakubovsky's funeral; one may be
made when the Warsaw Pact defense ministers meet in Bulgaria
next week.//
Approved For Re ease - -
 25X1
Approved For
25X1 //The new Warsaw Pact commander in chief will al-
most cer ain y be a Soviet military officer, despite occasional
Romania complaints about Soviet domination of the Warsaw Pact
command structure. Like Yakubovsky, the new commander will also
become one of three first deputies under Soviet Minister of De-
fense Ustinov. The others are Chief of the Soviet General Staff
Kulikov, and General Sokolov, who appearslfo~/ave broad manager-
t
25X1
se
ial responsibilities at the ministry i
//In the event of war, the Warsaw Pact commander
would hold t e highest field command position in the Soviet
armed forces and would receive his orders from the Supreme
High Command through the General Staff.//
25X1 //In peacetime, th.e Warsaw Pact commander, in his
role as first deputy, usually fills in for the Soviet minister
of defense when the latter is absent. On a day-to-day basis,
however, the chief of the General Staff may play a more impor-
tant role in deciding policy matters or advising Minister of
Defense Ustinov on various issues.//
25X1 //The Warsaw Pact commander is away from Moscow
much of t e time, visiting the forces under his command in
Eastern Europe or engaging in public relations activities that
keep him in the limelight but away from meetings on important
defense questions.//
25X1 //Any one of several high-ranking Soviet military
leaders cou d be in the runnin for Yakubavsk 's ost but the 25X1
name mentioned most frequently
is General Ogarkov. He is a deputy minis er o e ense, an we
believe he may be working on systems analysis of Soviet defense
needs.//
25X1 //Ogarkov has recently been seen with Minister of
Defense Ustinov on several occasions, and we assume he advises
Ustinov on day-to-day matters. Ogarkov may in fact be needed
too much in his present post to be reassigned just now.//
25X1 //Kulikov is another possibility. His appointment
would forma y be a move upward for him, but it would remove
him somewhat from the center of decision making on defense mat-
ld make less
ters. It would put him in a position where he cou
trouble for Ustinov, with whom
25X1 ~~ he has been at odds.//
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 Approved For
25X1
//Such a move could be interpreted as
re
ti
p
para
on
or t e defense minister's job in the event that post is re-
turned to a professional officer after Ustinov leaves. It might
also enable Ustinov to move Ogarkov, a former first deputy
chief of the General Staff, into Kulikov's present position,
where he would be more closely involved with the defense min-
ister and all aspects of military planning.//
//Other candidates for the top post in the Wars
ac command
Forces in Ge
aw
include generals Ivanovsky, commander of the Soviet
rmany; and Petrov, first de ut commander of the
Soviet ground forces. 25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005 6 - -
 Approved For Rel
LIBYA-USSR: Qadhafi to Soviet Union
Li ya, t e Soviets would probably be willing to provide Libya
with some additional military equipment on a cash basis, de-
spite the fact that the Libyans have no real need for more
hardware even if their armed forces are expanded as planned.
Libya alread has more militar e ui ment than its armed forces
can absorb
e es ima e e va ue
o a t e equipmen e were an ye o come to be about
$730 million.//
Qadhafi pushed through a recent "people's congress"
in repo i a resolution that gave unusually high praise to the
Soviets' "historic friendship" with Libya and noted that such
ties must be strengthened to serve the cause of development in
Libya.
Rumors circulating in Tripoli that Libya and the
USSR wi sign a friendship treaty during Qadhafi's visit are
probably unfounded. Although Qadhafi has recently been moving
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Libyan President Qadhafi will visit the USSR this
~In the hopes of increasing their influence in
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 25X1
Approved For
toward warmer ties with the USSR, he remains deeply suspicious
of the Soviets and is unlikely to commit himself to the tangi-
ble and symbolic ties that a friendship treaty implies.
25X1 Qadhafi has consistently refused to grant the Soviets
ase rig is in Libya or even permission far naval visits, and
Soviet military advisers have not been allowed to work with
Libyan ground units.
25X1
25X1
25X6
The Soviets, for their part, would no doubt be par-
icu ar y wary of concluding a treaty with Libya. An alliance
with Qadhafi would not improve Soviet stature among the Arab
states, although it would cause deep concern in Egypt.
and they would be hesitant, after the embarrassment of Egypt's
The Soviets know Qadhafi's erratic nature, moreover,
abrogation early this year of its friendship treaty with the
USSR, to run the high risk of having another treaty annulled.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 25X6 gpproved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
 Approved For R~
25X1
25X6
25X1
25X1
25X1
CHILE-PERU-BOLIVIA: Corridor to the Sea
Chile's blunt rejection of a Peruvian formula for
prove ing Bolivia with a corridor to the sea seems to set the
stage for a deadlock that could get the US involved in the
long-festering dispute.
Chile had earlier offered to grant Bolivia exclusive
sovereignty in a corridor on the Chilean side of the present
Chile -Peru border. The Peruvian counterformula called for tri-
partite control in part of the corridor.
Chile asserts that the Peruvian initiative represents
a c ear and manifest modification" of Chilean sovereignty as
established by a 1929 treaty. Chile argues that Peru's preroga-
tives under the treaty are limited to approving or rejecting
Chilean plans involving disposition of the territory, which
Chile conquered from Peru about a century ago.
25X1 If the two sides are unable to come to terms, the US
may ecome involved under a provision of the 1929 treaty that
refers any dispute over interpretation of the treaty to the US
president.
25X1
25X1
week, before Chile's rejection, that if Chile and Bolivia re-
jected Peru's counterproposal, the situation would return to
"point zero." An official response to Chile on November 26,
however, implied that Peru is still willing to talk.
Peruvian Foreign Minister de la Puente announced last
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/09: CIA-RDP79T00975A02 -
 pproved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9
Top ecret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
(Security Classification)
Approved For Release 2005/06/09 :CIA-RDP79T00975A029600010004-9