NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: November 15, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

OV AW AW ,AW AW AW AW AW AW AW AAFF
Approved For Release 2008/07/01 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO29500010026-6
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
ROUTING
TO:
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
1
2
3
4
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPAR
E REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOM
MENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
INFORMATION
SIGNATURE
REMARKS:
FROM:
NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Top Secret
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Monday November 15, 1976 CI NIDC 76-267C
0
0
1
State Dept. review
completed.
Top Secret
taecuni ulassiiicatlun
AAF AdV AdV Adr Adr AAF
AV
Approved For Relea
se 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79TOO975AO29500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, November 15, 1976.
The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
RHODESIA: Cross-Border Operations
ZAIRE-USSR: Relations
JAMAICA: Balance of Payments
LEBANON: Situation Report
USSR: Five-Year Plan
JAPAN-KOREA: Press Comments
NATO: West German Arms Sales
WEST GERMANY - EC: CIEC Developments
Page 1
Page 3
Page 3
Page 5
Page 6
Page 9
Page 9
Page 10
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
RHODESIA: Cross-Border Operations
//Aggressive actions by Rhodesian security forces
since late last month against nationalist guerrillas based in
neighboring countries seem to mark a return to tactics used by
the Rhodesians prior to Prime Minister Smith's acceptance in
September of the principle of majority rule within two years.
The security forces have been active against guerrillas inside
Rhodesia since Smith's announcement, but the attacks on guer-
rilla bases in Mozambique at the end of October were the first
significant cross-border operations since August.//
//The Rhodesians' main concern is the Mozambique
border area, where most of the guerrillas are concentrated.
The recent cross-border operation apparently was the most ex-
tensive to date; security officials assert that it was justi-
fied because the guerrillas were planning a major offensive
timed to coincide with the Geneva conference and the beginning
of the rainy season.//
//The Rhodesians reportedly are also giving assist-
ance to Mozambican dissident groups. These groups do not pose a
serious threat to the Mozambican government, but the Rhodesians
hope to divert some of its attention away from supporting
guerrilla activities against Rhodesia.//
//Rhodesia's operations into Mozambique do not
appear to have discouraged either the guerrillas or their
Mozambican allies, however, and the results of the recent
meeting of the "front-line" presidents point to an effort to
increase the military pressure on the Smith government. Addi-
tional cross-border operations might tempt the Mozambicans to
ask communist powers to play a greater role in the war effort.//
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
//In Zambia, officials have been complaining pri-
vately that Rhodesia is building up its forces along Zambia's
borders, and some allege that Rhodesian troops briefly entered
Zambia early this month. At about the same time, Rhodesian
troops apparently made a small incursion into Botswana for the
first time since August.//
//The Smith regime has always been more circum-
spect with regard to Zambia, which it sees as more moderate
and reasonable than Mozambique. Occasional strikes by Zambian-
based guerrillas into western Rhodesia have been relatively
minor irritants, and the Rhodesians are not likely, despite
Zambian fears, to retaliate with a large-scale operation.//
//The Rhodesians probably believe that troop move-
ments on their own side of the border will persuade Zambian
President Kaunda to continue to prevent any major attacks by
the guerrillas based in his country.//
//The Rhodesian government probably believes the
cross-border raids, in addition to yielding tactical military
advantages, would improve the morale of the security forces and
the white population. Although most Rhodesian whites accepted
Smith's announcement last September and the prospect of a black
government with apparent equanimity, many were clearly thinking
of leaving the country if conditions deteriorated. The security
forces have continued to perform well, but some troops have
showed signs of indiscipline and a growing reluctance to fight.//
//The Smith government has maintained contacts
with both Nkomo and Muzorewa and apparently believes it might
be able to reach an agreement with them that would safeguard
white interests if the militants leave Geneva. Smith probably
thinks that Nkomo and Muzorewa will not walk out because they
have few guerrillas loyal to them and little choice but to try
to gain power through a negotiated settlement.//
//Smith probably believes there is little or no
chance ot a settlement in the near future that would persuade
the guerrillas to lay down their arms voluntarily. As a result,
the government may feel that its security forces must hit the
guerrillas hard outside of the country's borders or else suffer
the consequences of heavier fighting within Rhodesia.
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
Relations between Zaire and the USSR, brought to the
brink of a diplomatic break by their support for rival groups
during the Angolan civil war, may be on the mend. Any movement
toward improved relations will probably be gradual, however,
given President Mobutu's long-standing suspicions of Soviet
intentions in southern Africa.
According to the US Embassy in Kinshasa, the Soviet
ambassa or to Zaire recently returned from consultations in
Moscow with instructions to do everything possible to strengthen
relations and particularly to facilitate early signature of
cultural and commercial accords. The Zairian commerce minister
is preparing for a trip to Moscow to sign a commercial agree-
ment.
Mobutu sent Soviet President Podgorny a congratula-
tory message on the occasion of the anniversary of the October
revolution, something he did not do last year. The message ex-
pressed the wish of Zaire's official party to strengthen co-
operative relations. The Soviet anniversary reception in Kin-
shasa was well-attended by high-ranking Zairian officials, al-
though Mobutu himself did not appear.
Mobutu certainly will move cautiously in expanding
his relations with the USSR. Even before their differences
over Angola, he kept the Soviets at arm's length.
Nevertheless, Mobutu probably believes he must adapt
to the strong position the Soviets have established in Angola
and to the good relations they have with most of Zaire's other
neighbors. Moreover, Mobutu would like to discourage any So-
viet or Angolan support for Zairian dissidents, many of whom
are in Angola.
JAMAICA: Balance of Payments
Jamaica's increasingly tight foreign payments posi-
tion probably will result in more severe economic austerity
measures over the next six months. Continuing economic prob-
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
lems have already cut Jamaica's real gross national product by
about 5 percent this year and have increased unemployment to
at least 25 percent of the labor force.
The prospect of continuing economic decline may lead
Prime Minister Manley to move elections to December rather than
wait until the constitutional deadline in May. Recent private
statements by officials of Manley's party and of the opposition
point to a mid-December election date. In a related develop-
ment, Manley asked Parliament last week to permit him to re-
duce the period between the calling of elections and election
day itself.
Jamaica's current-account deficit is likely to reach
a recor 270 million this year. Unless imports are cut back,
Jamaica will likely accumulate at least a $200 million current-
account deficit next year. Export earnings have dropped 20 per-
cent, mainly because of lower bauxite and alumina sales. Al-
though bauxite and alumina exports are picking up, higher oil
import costs will offset much of the gain. Tourism receipts,
cut sharply because of growing unrest, show no prospects for
improvement.
Manley still must borrow at least an additional $75
million to cover his 1976 obligations. Otherwise, drawings on
foreign exchange holdings of this magnitude would reduce the
country's reserves to under $100 million--less than six weeks'
import cover.
Jamaica's recent efforts to round up new loans have
fared poorly:
--The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' Spe-
cial Fund probably will not provide help.
--Canada promised $25 million in short-term cash--part
of a $100 million package, the rest of which is longer
term project credits--during Manley's visit in October.
--The International Monetary Fund added a meager $15 mil-
lion this week.
--China refused a $30 million request.
25X1
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
Rising private capital flight and the government's
difficulty in garnering large new funds point to a payments gap
in 1977 that dwindling reserves would be unable to cover. Man-
ley's settlement with Alcoa last month setting an eight-year
ceiling on bauxite taxes leaves little chance of help from a
bauxite tax hike.
Whichever party wins the election, Jamaica will have 25X1
little choice but to tighten import controls and take other
measures, including a possible devaluation. Such moves, however,
LEBANON: Situation Report
The entry of Syrian peacekeeping forces into Beirut
was held up again yesterday, apparently to give Lebanese
President Sarkis more time to work out arrangements with all
sides for a peaceful occupation of the city. There is press
speculation that the Syrians will move in today.
Sarkis and the Syrians on Saturday persuaded the
Iraqis to agree to withdraw their forces from Beirut. Some 800
Iraqis are said. to have already left west Beirut for the Shuf
region. Their withdrawal will be a blow to the Lebanese leftist
and Palestinian radical forces still in the city; they have
sought to delay the Syrian advance by demanding security
guarantees and objecting to the absence of other Arab league
units from the peacekeeping forces now ringing the capital.
The Syrians may have taken advantage of the delays
to send reinforcements to Lebanon. According to press reports,
two brigades with armor reportedly are on their way to Beirut,
and a third brigade is said to be heading for the Shuf, the
stronghold of leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt whose forces have
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
been stockpiling their weapons in the area to avoid confiscation.
one of the Syrians'
stated objectives tor months has been to disarm the Palestinians
and all of the private militias in Lebanon.//
The Palestinians, in anticipation of the occupation
of Beirut, reportedly have begun moving arms, artillery, and
ammunition in increasing amounts to Sidon, Tyre, and Nabatiyah.
The Soviet economy has not regained the momentum lost
because of last year's crop disaster. Even the improvement we
and the Soviets expect next year probably will not get the
economy back on the schedule established by the tenth five-year
plan (1976-1980).
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
The five-year plan was nevertheless formally ratified
by the Suprene Soviet and a Party Plenum in late October virtu-
ally unchanged from the version presented to the 25th Party
Congress last March. Although the plan goals are relatively un-
ambitious, the prospects for fulfillment are not good.
We project a 3 percent growth in gross national product
for 1976, compared with the planned average annual growth of 5
percent for 1976 and 1980. Industrial production grew by an es-
timated 4 percent during January-September--the lowest rate
since World War II--largely because of a decline in industrially
processed food production, which is suffering from last year's
harvest shortfall.
Our estimate for a low GNP growth rate this year also
rests on a projected 1 percent growth in total farm output. Al-
though the harvest--particularly of grains--was good, livestock
production is likely to drop by 13.5 percent.
Few details of the 1977 plan were revealed last month,
but most goals seem surprisingly modest, considering that the
economy will be bolstered by a good supply of agricultural raw
materials. The growth rate planned for industry, for example, is
only 5.6 percent compared with the average annual rate of 6.5
percent projected in the five-year plan.
Given the slow start in 1976, the Soviets must sustain
high rates of growth throughout the remainder of the plan period
if the 1980 targets are to be met. Industry would have to grow
by an annual average rate of almost 7 percent and agriculture by
more than 6.5 percent in 1977 to 1980. Both rates exceed the So-
viet record since 1970 and seem beyond reasonable expectations.
The final version of the five-year plan leaves intact
--Relatively rapid industrial growth.
--Ambitious farm targets backed by a large allocation of
resources.
--Continued pledges to the consumer.
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01 : CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6 25X1
--Slower growth in new investment with emphasis on complet-
ing old projects.
--Stress on increasing productivity.
The final goals for consumer goods output, industrial
materials, agricultural output, and investment are at the upper
end of the range given last March. A few targets are at the lower
end, particularly those for total industrial output and producer
goods. Only the labor productivity goal falls below the original
target. The lowering of this goal is particularly ominous for the
Soviets since they must now depend largely on increases in pro-
ductivity for growth.
General Secretary Brezhnev's unusually frank and
forceful presentation of the plan to the Party Plenum identi-
fied the areas most crucial for the plan's success as agriculture,
investment, and productivity. While indicating that the economy
was not doing particularly well in these areas, his tone was
optimistic.
According to Brezhnev, the most pressing task in 1976
to 1980 is to improve the performance of the agricultural sector.
In a rare acknowledgment of the close competition for resources,
he called the investment allocation to this sector "a tremendous
sum" which necessitated "curtailing some of the requirements of
other branches of the economy."
Brezhnev said that neglect of the consumer sector by
production and planning organizations would not be tolerated.
He called for "achieving breakthroughs in the entire sphere of
consumer goods output and services," identifying the satisfaction
of consumer demands as a major prerequisite to the success of
the five-year plan. Although acknowledging the looming labor
shortage, Brezhnev offered no solutions other than a general
appeal for a more rational use of labor resources.
The latest industrial investment date shows that most
funds will continue to go into those sectors deemed important to
scientific and technical progress--chemicals, petroleum, metal-
lurgy, electronics, and the heavy machine building industries.
Brezhnev called the implementation of the investment program
"probably the central problem" and admitted the difficulties of
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
achieving a large boost in the stock of plant and equipment with
minimal investment funds. He promised adoption of unspecified
new measures to speed up the process of completing unfinished
construction projects.
Japan is publicly underscoring its desire for a con-
tinued US military presence in South Korea, an effort which re-
flects Japanese concern over the future course of US-South
Korean relations.
Over the past week, this theme has been emphasized in
a speech by Japanese Ambassador Togo in Minneapolis, in an in-
terview given by the Japanese ambassador in Seoul, and in remarks
by Japanese Defense Agency and Foreign Ministry officials. Heavy
Japanese press coverage and editorial comment also reflect the
apprehension that relations between the US and South Korea may
be strained for some time to come.
Japanese officials so far have not publicly raised
questions about the US commitment to defend South Korea. The
Japanese, however, are clearly uneasy about the possible effects
of alleged South Korean improprieties in the US and uncertain
about the policies of the next US administration.
The North Koreans have given heavy propaganda play to
US press accounts of alleged South Korean improprieties. They
undoubtedly hope that friction between the US and South Korea
will continue to develop and thus provide additional opportuni-
ties for exploitation.
//The West German government is considering a
proposal that would change current policy on arms exports
to non-NATO areas.//
//The Germans now refuse to sanction sales to
so-called "areas of tension." Under guidelines recommended by a
recent interministerial study, West Germany would allow weapons
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
produced with other countries to be sent to any country where
there is not an "imminent threat" of war, with the exception
of South Africa.//
//West Germany hopes that if it makes the change
it will remove a long-standing irritant in its relations with
France. Under the new policy, France would not have to secure
prior German approval to sell co-produced weapons in the
Middle East.//
//West German Chancellor Schmidt, mindful of West
Germany's special relationship with Israel, recently turned
down a French-Egyptian request for the export of 120 Alpha Jets
to Egypt because the trainer version being developed by France
can be converted to a ground attack aircraft. That decision
may soon be reversed.//
//West Germany still has no immediate plans to
expand the relatively low volume of its arms-"x orts to
WEST GERMANY - EC: CIEC Developments
k'/Under intense pressure from its EC partners,
West Germany has agreed to participate in an EC Council dis-
cussion next week on proposals to improve developed-country of-
fers to developing states in the North-South dialogue. Although
Germany may indicate some flexibility at next week's EC Coun-
cil, definite changes in the Community position for the North-
South talks may have to await the meeting of EC heads-of-gov-
ernment.//
//EC officials are not optimistic that the Ger-
mans will accept proposals from the EC Commission on debt and
related aid issues. The meetings may, however, initiate a Com-
munity debate urged by German Chancellor Schmidt on linking
concessions by developed states to oil price rises and the
overall economic situation in the Community.//
//Schmidt has been stressing that concessions
to the developing countries could adversely affect the econo-
mies, especially the trade balances, of the weak Community mem-
bers.//
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
 Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
//Representatives of the Nine in Brussels still
Economic Cooperation at the December ministerial meetinc7
want to aim for a conclusion of the Conference on International
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6
 I
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975A029500010026-6
0 Top Secret
(Security Classification)
0
,0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0 Top Secret
0
0
1
(Security Classification)
AV AV AV AV AW Adw AAF Alw Adw Aj
Approved For Release 2008/07/01: CIA-RDP79T00975AO29500010026-6