NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029400010034-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: October 21, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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0 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Thursday October 21, 1976 CI NIDC 76-247C
0 On file Department of Agriculture
0release instructions apply.
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0 NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
AMMINED
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State Dept. review completed Top Secret
(Securit Classification
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday October 21, 1976.
IThe NID Cable is for tie purpose o intorming
WORLD GRAIN: Forecast
LEBANON: Situation Report
JAPAN: Leadership
CHINA: Announcement
RHODESIA: Nationalists
WESTERN. SAHARA: Polisario Attack
ITALY: Communist Discontent
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//Our revised estimate of world grain production
for 1976-1977--excluding rice--is slightly more than a billion
tons. This would be 8 percent above the figure for the last
crop year and 3 percent above the record set in 1973-1974.
World import demand for all grains will fall below the record
level of last year.//
//These forecasts are based largely on the improved
outlook for the grain market this year in the northern hemi-
sphere, particularly in the USSR. The gains in the Soviet har-
vest more than offset the production losses and higher projected
imports for Western and Eastern Europe as well as the expected
drop in Australian production.//
I //World grain stocks this crop year are likely to
increase by 15 to 20 million tons. Wheat, primarily US and Cana-
dian, will account for most of this increase.//
//Our estimate of world wheat production for this
year is 390 million tons, about 10 percent above last year's
level and generally in line with estimates by the US Department
of Agriculture, the International Wheat Council, and the Food
and Agricultural Organization.//
//Of the four major wheat exporters--Argentina,
Australia, Canada, and the US--only Australia is expected to
harvest a smaller crop this ear.
ana a s announce record crop is a
third larger than ast year, and the US harvest is only slightly
below last year's record.//
/The USSR boasts the largest increase of any major
producer, 24 million tons more than last year's poor harvest.
Although the wheat crop in both Western and Eastern Europe suf-
fered from drought conditions, it still exceeds last year's low
level.//
//We expect that global import demand for wheat for
1976-1977 will fall 6 million tons below last year's level and
will be the smallest amount since 1971-1972. Improved wheat
crops in Brazil, North Africa, and India will help ease overall
import demand, and the cut in Soviet imports will more than off-
set larger European import requirements.//
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//A ready supply of wheat--especially in the US,
Canada, and Argentina--points to strong competition for sales
in the coming year.//
//We estimate that. demand for US exports of wheat
will total 28.5 million tons compared with about 31.5 million
last year. On the basis of US Department of Agriculture produc-
tion and consumption estimates, this level of exports would
generate a 40-percent jump in global stocks by June 30, 1977.
Aggressive marketing by Canada and Argentina could further cut
US exports.//
//Largely because of the increased use of wheat for
livestock feed, the Department of Agriculture is forecasting a
4-percent rise in global wheat consumption. Attractive wheat
prices already have prompted some European buyers to switch
from corn to wheat. Relatively low prices may boost wheat con-
sumption and also lead to increased stockpiling in countries
such as the USSR and India.//
//World coarse grain production probably also will
reach record levels, increasing by 40 million tons over last
year largely because of the improved crop situation in the
USSR.//
//We estimate world corn production will be about
332 million tons, surpassing last year's record of 319 million
tons. A bumper US harvest is expected to be supplemented by
large increases in Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa. In-
creases in these countries will more than offset predicted
shortfalls in Thailand and Europe.//
//Our estimate of world import demand for corn is
4.1 million tons below the figure for the last market year. So-
viet demand for corn imports will probably be 9.5 million tons
below last year, but demand in Western and Eastern Europe is up
because of the drought this summer.//
//The exact level of Eastern Europe grain purchases
from the West has been clouded by recent statements of possible
increased Soviet shipments. Last year the USSR provided negli-
gible amounts of grain to Eastern Europe and earlier this sum-
mer implied that this policy would continue another year. More
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recent reports suggest that these Soviet grain exports--notably
to East Germany and Poland--may displace some quantities now
expected to come from Western sources.//
//Most corn exports will continue to come from the
US until southern hemisphere crops become available next spring.
EC corn will not be exported to third countries, and Thailand's
exports are expected to drop.//
//We estimate that demand for US exports of corn
will total 39.6 million tons compared with the record 43.2 mil-
lion tons shipped last year. Using the Department of Agricul-
ture's production and domestic consumption estimates, we esti-
mate that carryover stocks on September 30, 1977 will total
nearly 10 million tons, compared with the low stock level of 7.9
million tons on October 1 of this year. 25X1
LEBANON: Situation Report
The cease-fire agreed on at Riyadh is scheduled to
take effect this morning. It is unlikely that the combatants--
particularly the Christians who have been fighting to improve
their position in areas near the Israeli border--are prepared
to honor the truce.
25X1 Assuming that the cease-fire goes into general effect
today, it is supposed to lead to the withdrawal of armed troops
and weapons from the major contested areas--first Mount Lebanon
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Even the Christians, who have been unhappy about Syrian
and the south, which are to be cleared within five days; then
Beirut, with seven days; then the area around Tripoli, within
ten days. This timetable is unrealistic at best. The existing
Arab League peacekeeping force, only 3,000 strong, is in no posi-
tion to supervise withdrawals or set up buffer zones and check
points.
I According to Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud, the
composition of the Arab League peacekeeping forces will be re-
sponsive to the desires of Lebanese President Sarkis--a formu-
lation that suggests a large number of Syrian troops will be
allowed to remain in Lebanon under the guise of participating in
the security forces. If this is the case, it is unlikely that
there will be any significant withdrawal by the Palestinians,
leftists, or Christians.
gains in the Mount Lebanon area in recent weeks, can be expected
to balk at turning over to their allies territory they have
won--particularly in the south.
Yasir Arafat would seem to have little hope of induc-
ing his- ollowers--let alone the Lebanese leftists--to accept
such terms. The leftists are already suspicious because the
Riyadh agreement made no mention of withdrawal by Syrian troops
or the extent of Syrian participation in the peacekeeping forces.
Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt has already warned that the agree-
ment cannot succeed unless the Syrians withdraw.
Christian spokesmen, for their part, have complained
about the 90-day lag between the various withdrawals and the
time the Cairo accords--which would restrict the Palestinians
to their camps--are to go into effect. Many Christian leaders
believe that even if the accords--which are ambiguous and in
part merely verbal--are fully implemented, they would be insuf-
ficient.
It is not clear, for example, whether the Cairo ac-
cords would allow the fedayeen to retain heavy weapons inside
the refugee camps. The Christians have said they are determined
to exact such a provision. The Palestinians have been equally
determined to resist.
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JAPAN: Leadership
Prime Minister Miki's opponents in the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party are preparing another attempt to replace him
as party president at the party convention on October 31.
Leaders of the anti-Miki camp, including Finance Minister Ohira,
are expected to endorse Deputy Prime Minister Fukuda's candidacy
publicly today.
With the end of a relatively successful Diet session
now in sight and with Miki insisting on serving a full three-
year term, Miki's rivals are concerned that he will strengthen
his hold as Prime Minister by presiding in December over the
lower house election in which the Liberal Democrats expect to
retain their controlling majority.
By backing Fukuda for party president now, they hope
to deny Miki credit for the party's electoral success and to
set the stage for his removal as Prime Minister soon after the
election.
Fukuda generally can count on the support of about
two thirds of the party, but is by no means assured of success
at the convention. There is some sentiment--among both Miki's
supporters and his opponents--that the leadership question
should be resolved after, rather than before, the election. Un-
less Fukuda moves into open opposition by resigning from the
cabinet before the convention, the convention probably will not
even address the leadership question.
I J As a result, Fukuda's supporters are once more urging
nim to make the decisive move--something he has refrained from
doing since the beginning of the intra-party struggle last May.
I I
Demonstrations have begun in Peking, apparently to
celebrate the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as chairman of the
Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Word spread informally yesterday in Peking that the
official announcement of Hua's promotion and the purge of four
leading radicals was imminent. This morning the US Liaison Of-
fice and journalists in the capital reported that organized
groups were marching through the streets and chanting support
for Hua and denunciation of the radicals.
//Preliminary talks in Geneva involving the Smith
regime, ac nationalist leaders, and representatives of the
British government are scheduled to begin today. The formal
conference opens next Thursday. We present today brief sketches
of the four black leaders invited to attend.//
//Joshua Nkomo is the long-time president of the
Zimbabwe rican People's Union. Nkomo sees himself as the log-
ical head of a black government in Rhodesia, and is willing to
compromise considerably to achieve this. He is a relative mod-
erate, well known inside Rhodesia; he draws most of his politi-
cal support from the 15 percent of the black population belong-
ing to the Ndebele-speaking ethnic group. Nkomo's faction has
an organized military wing, but only a small minority of the
guerrillas in the field belong to it.//
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//Nkomo realizes that his future is largely tied
to a negotiated settlement. He has the support of Zambian Presi-
dent Kaunda and is the black nationalist leader most accept-
able to Ian Smith and many other Rhodesian whites. Paradoxi-
cally, Nkomo's faction has also long received support from the
USSR. //
//Robert Mugabe is secretary general of the Zim-
babwe-African National Union, which broke off from Nkomo's
ZAPU in 1963. ZANU members come mainly from the Shona-speaking
ethnic group, which includes 70 percent of Rhodesia's Africans
but is badly divided among rival sub-groups. Mugabe reportedly
will be installed as ZANU president at a party congress in
//Mugabe is currently working with Nkomo, but has
indicated that this is only a temporary expedient. Although
Mugabe is not a military commander, most of the guerrillas who
relate politically to ZANU have accepted him as their spokes-
man at Geneva. Mugabe also enjoys the support of Mozambican
President Machel and possibly Tanzanian President Nyerere.//
//Ndabaningi Sithole, who received a belated invi-
tation to t e conference at the request of the "front-line"
presidents, is the founder and, at this point, still the tit-
ular president of ZANU. He has lost considerable influence
among the black nationalists, however.//
//Sithole's presence in Geneva will sit poorly
with e other blacks, especially if he is treated as their
equal by any of the white participants. Sithole will probably
try to enhance his own position by making deals with one or
more of the other African groups.//
//Abel Muzorewa, the Methodist Bishop of Rhodesia,
as teen significant political leader since 1972 when his
African National Council organized the defeat of a compromise
Rhodesian settlement favored by Ian Smith. In 1974 Muzorewa
became head of an umbrella nationalist organization, also
called the African National Council, which the "front-line"
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African presidents sponsored in an unsuccessful attempt to
bridge the differences between ZAPU and ZANU. The umbrella
group split last year into factions headed by Muzorewa and
Nkomo, with ZANU aligned for a while with the Bishop but even-
tually opting out.//
blacks. His faction has operated legally within the country,
where ZAPU and ZANU have long been banned. Muzorewa does not
control any military forces.//
//Muzorewa, who is from one of the Shona sub-
groups, apparently has considerable support among Rhodesian
porarily with Nkomo and Mugabe in a loose alliance. During the
talks, however, Muzorewa will probably be even more willing
than the others to play whatever game appears most likely to
further his ambitions.
//Although Muzorewa has attempted to carve out
an independent position for himself, he may agree to join tem-
ports. The attack reportedly is the largest conducted against
El Aaiun since Morocco and Mauritania took over the territory
from Spain last February. We have no indication of the extent
of damages inflicted on Moroccan forces.
Guerrilla units of the Algerian-backed Polisario
Front last night attacked El Aaiun, the capital of the Moroc-
can sector of Western Sahara, according to Algerian press re-
25X1 I IMoroccan forces apparently were caught by surprise,
even though the guerrillas have been generally expected to :In-
crease their operations against Moroccan and Mauritanian forces
as the Saharan summer heat gives way to more moderate tempera-
tures.
25X1 The guerrillas recently have increased their small
scale attacks against Moroccan garrisons as well as ambushes
against supply columns. The attack on El Aaiun, however, is the
most daring action conducted by the Polisario since an early
June attack on the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott.
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The guerrillas have been operating in the area and
I I According to a spokesman of the Polisario--a Saharan
political-military organization that opposes the annexation of
Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania--the guerrillas have
interdicted three roads leading from El Aaiun. The roads men-
tioned include one to Tarfaya in southern Morocco, one to Se-
mara, which is the traditional religious center for the desert
territory, and one that runs along the coast to Cabo Bojador, a
port probably used by the Moroccans to resupply El Aaiun and
various outposts in the region.
could possibly have interdicted the roads temporarily. If true,
however, Moroccan forces undoubtedly will engage in operations
to clear the area.
I IThe Italian Communist Party is increasingly troubled
by internal dissent stemming from its policy of cooperation
with the Andreotti government.
I I The Communist rank-and-file and some party leaders
have always harbored doubts about Communist chief Berlinguer's
"historic compromise" strategy, which envisions gradually in-
creasing collaboration with the Christian Democrats culminating
eventually in a full-scale governing alliance with them. Ber-
linguer has repeatedly silenced skeptics, however, by scoring
major successes at the ballot box and arguing that the party's
gains vindicate his policies.
More recently, the Communists held a 10-day nation-
wide series of meetings with party members to hear their views
and explain the leadership's objectives. Nevertheless, discon-
tent appears to have grown as Andreotti has moved to enact an
economic austerity program--an effort that the Communist lead-
ership has supported to a greater degree than any other major
party. Some party members reportedly say it is hard to see what
the party is getting in return for its cooperation with the
government.
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Discontent with the austerity program among Communist
supporters in the labor movement, meanwhile, has obliged the
party to dispatch officials to key industrial centers to assure
workers that their interests are not being sacrificed for poli-
tical reasons.
Dissension has also surfaced at the leadership level.
According to press reports, party president Longo in a speech
to the party central committee yesterday appeared to associate
himself with labor's grievances and suggested that Berlinguer's
policy had yet to produce much in the way of tangible benefits
for party supporters.
Berlinguer will probably try to secure Christian
Democratic agreement in Parliamnet to amend the austerity pro-
gram so as to lighten its impact on lower income groups and
put more of the burden on the wealthy. He could then claim
that the party's relationship with the Christian Democrats en-
abled it to shield Communist supporters from an austerity pro-
gram that would have been necessary in any event.
//The party is likely to step up its propaganda
activities among its rank and file to convince them that the
party line is correct. There are signs, however, that the Com-
munist leadership is resigned to a certain amount of dissension
as it maneuvers to attain more influence in the governing pro-
Internal problems do not seem likely to pose a chal-
lenge to Berlinguer's leadership and policies in the near or
medium term. He might come under heavier pressure eventually,
however, if he fails to secure additional political concessions
from the Christian Democrats.
I Berlinguer hinted at the central committee meeting
is wee that a bid for such concessions might be forthcoming
in the near future. Although he observed that conditions were
not yet ripe for the historic compromise, he argued that ways
must be found to involve the Communists more actively in deci-
sion making and policy execution.
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Berlinguer's strongest card in dealing with the Ch '
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tian Democrats is their continuing need for assistance in keep-
ing organized labor in line. Despite the problems the Communists
are having with the unions, they remain the most influential
party in the labor movement. Communist intervention was prob-
ably the crucial factor last week in the decision by Italy's
main labor federation to protest the austerity program with a
series of staggered local work stoppages instead of the nation-
wide general strike that more militant unions wanted.
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