NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029400010002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Friday October 1, 1976 CI NIDC 76-231C
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INFORMATION
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Friday October 1, 1976.
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JT~eD Ca Die is or
senior US a icials.
LEBANON: Situation Report
Page 1
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JAPAN: Miki's Fortunes Improve
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NOWAY-USSR: Barents Sea Dispute
USSR - INDIAN OCEAN: Arms Control
USSR-CHINA: Soviet Gestures
USSR: Kirilenko Honored
JAMAICA: Radicals Gain Strength
NORTH KOREA: Peace Initiative
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LEBANON: Situation Report
The main Syrian offensive in the Mount Lebanon area
apparently paused yesterday, possibly to give the Palestin-
ians a chance to meet Syrian terms in the light of the changed
military situation.
casualty figures have
been low, indicating that the Palestinians made little effort
to resist the Syrian advance. They are probably demoralized
and might continue retreating if the Syrians decide to reopen
the fighting. They could, however, try to make a stand at
Alayh, where they are said to be concentrating after having
salvaged most of their heavy equipment.
It is not clear whether the Syrians have de-
cided to move on Alayh at this point. The Christians, how-
ever, are talking about resuming the campaign--if necessar
even without Syrian help.
The leftist radio claimed yesterday that the Syr-
ians were continuing to shell Alayh and several nearby vil-
lages on the main route to Damascus. The artillery fire may
be a prelude to another Syrian push.
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//Fatah is apparently correct in believing that
Syria has bolstered its forces in northern Lebanon, probably
by several thousand troops.
several Syrian battalions, including
armor and artillery, entered Lebanon on Tuesday or Wednesday.//
Press sources are speculating that the Christian
blueprint for the future involves a "regionalized" Lebanon di-
vided into three states: a Christian state in the mountains
of central Lebanon with its capital at Juniyah; a Sunni Mus-
lim state in the north and northeast with its capital at Tri-
poli; and a Shia Muslim state in the south with its capital
at Nabatiyah. The federal capital would remain in Beirut,
where defense, foreign affairs, and some public service func-
tions would be handled; the states would otherwise largely
administer their own affairs.
I ISuch a scheme would go a long way toward solving the
country- s confessional problems, although it does not address
the role to be played in Lebanon by either the Palestinians
or the Syrians.
An Egyptian newspaper reported yesterday that a
"mini summit" conference, long stalled because of failure by
Egypt and Syria to agree on who should be invited, has been
scheduled for Saturday in Jidda.
We suspect that the Saturday date is an Egyptian at-
tempt to railroad Damascus into going along. Damascus will be
reluctant to attend such a meeting at this juncture, but
would probably be unable to hold out against a summit if the
Saudis are determined to see one held.
Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi arrived unexpectedly
in Paris yesterday to consult President Giscard about the Leb-
anon situation. The French had only a few hours' notice of the
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visit, and Quai officials did not know even after Fahmi's ar-
rival what he would discuss. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry
told the US embassy only that the visit involves Lebanon.
Cairo newspapers reported on Wednesday speculation
that Lebanese Christians are considering requesting French
troops as a peace-keeping force, and the Egyptians may hope
Cairo is undoubtedly fearful that French troops
wou further tip the military balance in Lebanon toward the
Christians and Syrians. On the other hand, the Egyptians might
welcome and even encourage a French diplomatic effort.
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JAPAN: Miki's Fortunes Improve
Prime Minister Miki has gained some elbow room as a
resu t of the political truce with his opponents, and the pos-
sibility that he will remain in office through this year's
lower house elections has improved.
I I Liberal Democratic Party leaders are united on the
need to concentrate on passing a number of pending fiscal bills
during the session of the Diet that opened two weeks ago, and
Miki has dealt carefully with sensitive issues.
IMiki's rivals are increasingly pessimistic over the
chances of renewing the challenge to the Prime Minister,
largely because of the approach taken by Deputy Prime Minister
Fukuda who--as Miki's recognized successor--has had the key
role all along in the anti-Miki campaign.
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NORWAY-USSR: Barents Sea Dispute
The Norwegian government is increasingly concerned
over signs that the Soviets are taking a tough position toward
negotiating a demarcation line in the Barents Sea. The concern
has been reinforced by the Soviet rejection in recent months
of Norwegian demarches protesting Soviet missile firings into
the disputed area.
Norwegian Foreign Minister Frydenlund expressed to
Soviet Ambassador Kirichenko last month Oslo's unease about
the effects on fishing and maritime traffic of the latest mis-
sile firings. Kirichenko dismissed Frydenlund's representa-
tions, asserting that the area was Soviet territory and not in
dispute. Moscow rejected two previous Norwegian demarches on
the same issue.
Both Norway and the USSR earlier agreed to hold
talks that would delineate each country's control over fish-
ing and mineral exploitation in 200-mile economic zones. The
Norwegians are now convinced that the Soviets will reject any
proposal short of complete capitulation--even a mutual under-
standing that the area remain an undefined "gray zone" to be
settled later.
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USSR - INDIAN OCEAN: Arms Control
Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement at the UN on
Tuesday that Moscow is prepared to talk to "other powers" about
reducing outside military activity in the Indian Ocean is prob-
ably more a tactic to put the US on the defensive than an ex-
pression of a genuine Soviet goal. We believe the Soviets will
approach the US bilaterally if they are serious about pursuing
an Indian Ocean arms control agreement.
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Gromyko's offer comes on the heels of other signs of
Soviet concern about Washington's success over the last year
both in gaining support from coastal countries against Soviet
naval activity in the Indian Ocean and in persuading these coun-
tries to grant the US military additional access to monitor So-
viet activity.
I I The Soviets are especially concerned about policy
changes by Australia and New Zealand permitting port calls by
US nuclear-powered ships. They also suspect that the US may re-
place the UK when it withdraws from Gan in the Maldives and
from Oman's Masirah Island.
Despite General Secretary Brezhnev's denial, both at
the party congress last February and during Indian Prime Minis-
ter Gandhi's visit to the USSR in June, that the Soviets had
any bases in the Indian Ocean, most of the countries in the
area agree that Moscow has a base in Somalia.
The Soviets probably calculate that by coming out
publicly in favor of talks on the Indian Ocean they will put
the onus on the US for being insensitive to the concerns of
countries on the ocean's periphery. They may also hope to
strengthen US congressional opposition to any further expansion
of US naval activity in the Indian Ocean.
Moscow's enthusiasm for arms control in the Indian
Ocean seems to have waned considerably since the Soviets first
approached the US in March 1971 about the idea of issuing a
joint declaration limiting military bases and fleet concentra-
tions there.
I lAcceptance of special restrictions for the Indian
Ocean wou d establish a precedent that could erode Soviet posi-
tions at the Law of the Sea Conference and on freedom of the
seas.
I I In addition, the Soviet navy presumably does not rel-
ish the idea of restrictions on its activities and would be es-
pecially reluctant to engage in talks on the Indian Ocean while
the USSR is in an inferior bargaining position. The navy proba-
bly would also object to talking only with the US as long as
the French have significant naval forces in the Indian Ocean.
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USSR-CHINA: Soviet Gestures
I China's rejection of the Soviet party's message of
condolences last month has not deterred the USSR from continu-
ing to take a conciliatory approach toward Peking. This morn-
ing Moscow has used the occasion of China's national day to
send two additional signals to the Chinese leadership:
--The Soviet government's message of greetings to China
emphasizes that the "normalization" of their relations
would serve those "interested in the building of social-
ism and communism."
--An article today in Pravda stresses that the USSR is
"prepared to normalize relations."
I ISoviet greetings to the Chinese on their anniversary
have become a traditional event, but the reference to serving
the interests of those building socialism and communism is
somewhat warmer than usual. Similarly, the article in Pravda
does not harp on Sino-Soviet differences, but instead points
out that there are "no problems" that cannot be solved given
the "mutual desire to... take into account each other's inter-
ests."
I IThese signals are in line with previous Soviet
moves. in addition to the condolence note--the first public
message from the Soviet party in 10 years--the USSR has tai-
lored its media treatment of China to appeal to those Chinese
leaders who may favor some normalization in state relations.
During his speech to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, For-
eign Minister Gromyko also pointed to Moscow's readiness to
"normalize" relations.
I I The USSR has thus gone a long way in building a case
that as done everything possible to improve relations,
while the Chinese continue to be intractable. The frequency
of Soviet gestures also suggests that. General Secretary
Brezhnev does not want to be open to the charge made against
Nikita Khrushchev in the early 1960s of pursuing an unneces-
sarily militant policy toward China and of failing to try a
more tactful approach.
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USSR: Kirilenko Honored
Soviet party secretary Andrey Kirilenko's 70th
birthday last month was saluted with appropriate honors, in-
cluding the publication of his collected speeches and articles.
I I As General Secretary Brezhnev's unofficial deputy,
iri enko still seems the most likely interim successor in the
event of Brezhnev's sudden death or incapacitation. These al-
most obligatory honors serve to draw attention to his favor-
able position in the hierarchy.
Kirilenko received his second "Hero of Socialist
Labor" award and official praise for his speeches. Other
senior leaders--President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, and party
secretary Suslov--had already been so honored on their 70th
birthdays.
A review of Kirilenko's collected works in Pravda on
September 29 is not yet available here, but the embassy reports
that Kirilenko is depicted as a wise, experienced leader in
internal party affairs, economics, defense, and foreign policy.
Earlier reviews of the collected works of the other leaders
were also laudatory.
With his second award, Kirilenko has joined a select
group entitled to have a bust erected in his hometown Brezh-
.nev's was unveiled with some fanfare in May, Podgorny's with
less publicity last month. Kosvain's and 1Suslov's have not yet
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JAMAICA: Radicals Gain Strength
The radical wing of Jamaica's ruling People's Na-
tional Party, with the apparent support of Prime Minister Man-
ley, is gaining strength at the expense of the moderates. At
the recent party congress, the radical gains were reflected in
the election of parliamentary candidates and in the prominence
given to the visiting Cuban delegation.
The radicals, who until now have been virtually
shut out of the House of Representatives, stand a good chance
of obtaining several seats in the next parliament. At least
two of the three prominent radicals selected as candidates at
the congress are almost certain to be elected. All three are
likely to head key ministries in a second Manley administration
if they win.
The radicals succeeded in having dropped from the
list of candidates three moderate incumbent members of par-
liament; several other members of the party's old guard are
retiring of their own accord.
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These developments, coupled with the decision to
increase -by seven the number of parliamentary seats, opened
the way for selection of younger candidates who are likely to
go along with Manley's brand of "democratic socialism." In
fact, 21 of the 57 candidates who were announced will be run-
ning for parliament for the first time.
For the second consecutive year, the Cuban delega-
tion was given center stage at the congress. Jesus Montane, a
member of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee and a man
who sometimes acts as Fidel Castro's personal emissary, headed
the three-man Cuban delegation. Montane addressed the congress,
met privately with Manley and Foreign Minister Thompson, con-
ferred with leaders of a ruling party labor union affiliate
and a party women's group, and visited various Cuban technical
assistance projects.
The radicals in the party are not having it all their
way, however. The choice of parliamentary candidates was ap-
parently agreed upon only after considerable backstage wran-
gling between radicals and moderates. The moderates were also
successful recently in getting Manley to suspend indefinitely
the radical head'of the party's youth arm for demanding the
ouster of a ruling member of parliament.
The foreign exploration subsidiary of Brazil's state
petroleum monopoly, Braspetro, has made a promising oil strike
in Iraq near Basra and not far from one of Iraq's major pro-
ducing areas.
I Despite Braspetro estimates that the new find may
produce between 300,000 and 1 million barrels per day, the
one producing well drilled so far has produced only 4,000 bar-
rels per day, low by Iraqi standards. Additional drilling
will be required to evaluate the field.
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If Braspetro decides to proceed with development,
it will receive 20 percent of the oil produced and an option
to buy the rest at world market prices under the terms of its
contract with the National Iraqi Oil Company.
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I I Brazil hopes that the availability of oil from such
project s aring contracts will reduce its petroleum import bill,
now running at $3.5 billion annually, nearly 30 percent of to-
tal imports. Braspetro is exploring and drilling in seven coun-
tries in the Middle East, Africa, and South America. A strike
of some importance was made recently in Algeria, and strikes
of less than commercial value have been made in Egypt.
steadily to over 800,000 barrels per day.
1969 at about 175,000 barrels per day, and imports have grown
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Brazil's domestic oil production has stagnated since
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NORTH KOREA: Peace Initiative
North Korea may be considering some kind of "peace
initiative," in part to counter the embarrassing setback in-
curred by the withdrawal last week of its draft resolution from
the agenda of the UN General Assembly. Any diplomatic initiative
probably would involve a repackaging of earlier proposals, but
the North Koreans may display greater flexibility to try to
draw the US into their long-proposed bilateral talks on a "peace
agreement" to replace the 1953 armistice agreement.
North Korea may want to cover its retreat at the UN
by modifying earlier positions on talks with the US and South
Korea. One option would be to propose bilateral talks with the
US without conditions or a prescribed agenda to discuss means
for reducing tensions in Korea.
I Alternatively, North Korea. might announce qualified
acceptance of the US concept of four-power talks, perhaps with
a proviso that South Korea, China--and possibly additional
interested powers--should participate only as observers after
the ground was initially explored in private US - North Korean
talks. North Korea might also indicate willingness at some point
to revive the dialogue with the South which was sharply down-
graded in 1973.
Any North Korean political initiative at this time
almost certainly would be formulated with a view to encouraging
,a reassessment of US policy toward Korea after the US election.
North Korea may therefore downplay its blunt demands for the
immediate dissolution of the UN Command and the withdrawal of
US forces and attempt instead to convey an impression that a
phased disengagement of the US military presence would be ac-
ceptable.
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