NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A029300010014-1
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• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 9, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
T rsday September 9, 1976 CI NIDC 76-212C
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Thursday September 9. 1976.,
The NID a e is tor the purpose ot in orming
LEBANON: Situation Report
USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Pravda Statement
USSR: Tikhonov
PORTUGAL: Economic Austerity
POLAND: Leadership
POLAND: Party Plenum
CHINA: Anti-Teng Campaign
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SOUTH AFRICA: Summit Results
I I The few details available thus far on the summit
con erence of five southern African presidents and Rhodesian
nationalist leaders in Dar es Salaam indicate that much of the
two day meeting focused on strengthening the military effort
against Rhodesia. The brief communique issued at the conclusion
of the talks mentioned only that the liberation struggle would
be intensified.
I I The five presidents probably have held off making
any ina decisions until they assess the results of Secretary
Kissinger's meeting with South African Prime Minister Vorster
last weekend. Reliable reports confirm that no progress was
made toward uniting the fragmented nationalist movement.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Vorster will meet wi
o esian Prime Minister Smith early next week to brief Smith
on the results of his talks with Secretary Kissinger.
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Rhodesian security forces claim that they have been
inflicting heavy casualties on guerrillas, but the level of
insurgent activity appears not to have been affected.
According to government figures, 131 guerrillas were
killed in Rhodesia during August--the highest monthly total
since the fighting began in 1972. Press reports indicate, how-
ever, that the insurgents last week made one of their largest
attacks ever. Some 100 guerrillas are said to have followed up
a mortar and rocket barrage by raiding a Rhodesian army outpost
near Mtoko in northeast Rhodesia.
//In southeastern Rhodesia, the guerrillas,
according to press reports, shot down a helicopter last week. The
Rhodesian air force faces a serious shortage of trained heli-
copter pilots following the withdrawal of South African pilots
Although the heaviest guerrilla action is still in
eastern l odesia, there have been further reports of small-scale
activity in the west. A guerrilla was killed after killing two
policemen in a suburb of Bulawayo, Rhodesia's second largest
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LEBANON: Situation Report
I The Syrians are apparently stressing in talks with
Lebanese leaders this week the need for full cooperation with
the future government of president-elect Sarkis.
25X1 Damascus' main concern is the inauguration itself,
which as now been officially scheduled for September 23, the
expiration date of President Franjiyah's term.
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The Syrians would like to hold the swearing-in cere-
mony at Shaturah, which is well within Lebanese territory con-
trolled by Syrian forces. This would allow the 25 or 30 members
of the Lebanese parliament who are now living in Syria to attend.
I Several sites in Beirut reportedly are also under
consi er ion, but the Syrians no doubt are concerned that hold-
ing the ceremony in the capital would lead to a potentially ex-
plosive security situation similar to the convocation of the
parliament there last April. Moreover, if significant numbers
of parliamentary deputies are prevented from attending the ses-
sion, Sarkis' inauguration could be challenged on legal grounds.
I Before his departure for Damascus yesterday, Shamun
apparently remarked publicly that current efforts to forge a
new basis for negotiations will come to naught and that the
fighting will escalate dramatically before Sarkis is able to
take office. Shamun's railings will reinforce the suspicion
among many Palestinians and Lebanese Muslims that the current
round of talks in Damascus is laying the groundwork for another
major Christian-Syrian offensive.
I I Tensions in Beirut have risen markedly over the last
severer ays as the various factions steel themselves for the
crucial period before the scheduled inauguration. The US em-
bassy in Beirut reports that artillery duels along the main
dividing line between the Christian and Muslim sectors of the
city have intensified. The Arab League security forces patrolling
the main cross-over point have also come under direct fire from
combatants who apparently want to prevent any movement between
the two zones.
I In their talks with Phalanges Party leader Pierre
Jumayyi early this week, the Syrians pushed the idea that re-
constituting a military that will be responsive to Sarkis must
begin immediately. They reportedly presented a detailed proposal
for rebuilding the Lebanese army with the Syrian-controlled
"Vanguards of the Lebanese Army" as the core of the new command.
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The Syrians began building the Vanguards soon after
ei.r intervention in Lebanon, and although it is not a large
force, its members have been hand-picked. Most are Shia and
Sunni Muslims who are sympathetic to Damascus and have no affil-
iation with any Lebanese militia.
The Syrians emphasized to Jumayyil and presumably
aiso to Camille Shamun the need for cooperation among the Chris-
tian parties. The Syrians want Sarkis to have sufficient stature
to conduct meaningful negotiations, and they recognize that this
stature must derive primarily from Sarkis' ability to control
his fellow Christians. Jumayyil has from the start been a sup-
porter of Sarkis; however, Shamun has a long-standing personal
grudge against the president-elect, and in any case, opposes
negotiations under any auspices until the Palestinians have
been more thoroughly chastened.
USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Pravda Statement
The USSR has issued an authoritative and relatively
moderate statement on Lebanon to convey its support for a negoti-
ated settlement. A statement in Tuesday's Pravda, signed "observer"
to signify Kremlin endorsement, criticizes both the Syrian inter-
vention in Lebanon and--for the first time--"leftist elements"
within the Palestinian movement.
I I The US embassy views the article as an attempt by the
Soviets o put moderate, reasoned views on record. In calling
for a "reasonable compromise" as the "only" way out, Moscow is
admitting its inability to do anything to improve the Palestin-
ians' worsened military and political situation. The item also
omits any indication that Moscow would be able to play any sort
of international role in resolving the crisis.
The statement criticizes Palestinian leftists for
'rejecting out of hand any peaceful proposals," and calls atten-
tion to the deep split within the Palestinian leadership over
negotiations. This will be interpreted by Palestine Liberation
Organization leader Yasir Arafat as an endorsement of his
position.
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The Pravda article--which is also Moscow's most
authoritative criticism so far of the intervention of Syrian
forces in Lebanon--terms the Syrian decision "harmful."
IThe Soviets are still pulling their punches, however,
by retraining from forthrightly calling for a Syrian withdrawal
and instead expressing tacit agreement with the demands of
"many Arab countries and other countries" that Syrian forces
leave. Soviet commentary is obviously bent on not antagonizing
Damascus more than necessary.
Unlike the last "Observer" article on Lebanon, in April,
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or to raise the possibility of US military intervention.
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Recently appointed Soviet First Deputy Premier Tikho-
nov wi. andle foreign economic relations, a field to which
the USSR attaches great importance, according to an official of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Premier Kosygin has exercised overall direction of
oreign economic relations. In view of his illness, it would
seem logical that Tikhonov should ick up this responsibility.
PORTUGAL: Economic Austerity
//Portuguese Prime Minister Soares has postponed
_ntii today tie announcement of the first of a series of eco-
nomic austerity measures.//
//Press reports attributed the delay to the
Prime Minister's "slight indisposition." Soares is known to be
somewhat nervous and high-strung, but he has shown a great deal
of resilience during the past two years of turbulent Portuguese
politics.//
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//The delay of the announcement may be the re-
sult of the difficulty Soares has had in getting his cabinet to
agree on the proposed economic measures. More conservative mem-
bers of the predominantly Socialist cabinet, probably including
Soares, favor a comprehensive package that would include tax
hikes on imports, wage curbs, and a devaluation of the escudo.//
//Members of the Socialist Party's left wing,
however, are re uctant to go along with any measures that might
provoke opposition from the Communist Party, which has vowed to
fight measures deemed contrary to workers' interests.//
//Soares is probably particularly anxious to
institute economic reforms to support the request he made last
week for a $300-million balance-of-payments support loan from
the US this year and an additional $1 billion in 1977.//
/Soares told the US ambassador that his gov-
ernment agrees with US suggestions concerning economic recov-
ery measures and urgently needs a loan commitment to permit
mapping out an appropriate program. He conceded, however, that
his advisers are evenly divided on the question of devaluation.
-CIA, DIA, INR-
POLAND: Leadership
Poland's current economic troubles have led to specu-
about party
chief Gierek's future.
Several influential Polish journalists recently told
a US diplomat that they were "absolutely fed up" with the Gierek
regime. They appeared, however, to place the blame on the system
as a whole and did not hold Gierek personally responsible. One
predicted that Prime Minister Jaroszewicz would be the first to
go, but implied that within a year Gierek would follow.
I Gierek is undoubtedly in a weaker position now than
he was before June. We have seen no indications, however, of
any movement within the party or from the Soviets to unseat him.
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Occasional reports over the past 18 months have suggested grow-
ing dissention and factionalism within the Politburo, but no
Pole or foreign observer has yet been able to link these asser-
tions with specific names. Decision-making is evidently still
by consensus and not fiat.
Several factors argue that Gierek will stay on as
first secretary for at least the next year:
--Prior to June, Gierek was generally regarded as favoring
a go-slow policy on raising prices.
--There has been no public outcry for Gierek's removal. In
1970, when Gierek came to power during riots over food
price increases, the public had become incensed by brutal
police suppression, and demanded the ouster of Gierek's
predecessor. During the demonstrations this year, the po-
lice were held in check, and Jaroszewicz has taken much of
the blame for the price fiasco.
--Gierek's resignation would publicly underscore the re-
gime's weakness, something neither the party nor Moscow
wants.
--No one is standing in the wings ready to take over.
Gierek has no designated heir-apparent, and the leadership
realizes that a mere change in face at the top will not
satisfy the public, which is concerned about solutions to
serious economic problems. Any replacement would more than
likely be one of the current Politburo members, and no one
in that body could ins ire more public confidence than
does Gierek himself.
POLAND: Party Plenum
I I Polish party leaders have evidently decided not to
risk pu is anger by raising food prices in the near future.
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In a speech to workers last Friday, party chief Gierek
said the politburo will propose the establishment of five teams,
one of which will deal with establishing principles for pricing
meat. He added that these teams will have at least a year to
carry out their studies.
The leadership thus appears to have backed away from
Prime Minister Jaroszewicz's proposal in July to increase the
prices of meat and meat products by 35 percent this year, while
holding other foodstuffs stable.
I I The public has been showing its discontent since the
abortive attempt to raise food prices in June. The current ten-
sion is mainly the result of severe shortages of sugar, meat,
and other consumer goods, and the leadership has probably de-
cided that it is politically too dangerous to introduce higher
prices on top of the shortages.
I Sugar rationing was introduced in mid-August to halt
a speculative surge in buying that threatened to deplete stocks.
Forgoing meat price increases this year could lead to meat ra-
tioning to assure a more equitable distribution of available
supplies.
I I In his speech, Gierek called for public patience un-
til the economy can work its way out of the present difficul-
ties. He frankly admitted that there are serious problems in
supplying the population with meat and other products. He also
commented favorably on church-state relations in an obvious bid
to win support from the church during troubled times.
I I Today's Central Committee plenum will consider Polit-
uro recommendations on the food price issue and also on stimu-
lating agricultural production. The Central Committee plenum,
the first since February, is long overdue. The leadership evi-
dently chose not to consult the Central Committee before an-
nouncing the June price package, and this failure irritated
many of its members.
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USSR - US - SOUTH AFRICA
Soviet commentary on the US - South African talks
in Zuric has stressed the role played by Secretary Kissinger,
indicating Moscow's apprehension over the possibility that
"shuttle diplomacy" will be resumed.
Writing in Pravda on Tuesday, senior political
commentator Yuriy Zhukov charged that the US role in Africa
may cause "new dangerous complications" in the area and that
the Secretary was trying to maintain "racists" in power.
I iDuring the talks, Soviet media accused the US of
resorting to "illusory compromises, dubious half-measures,
and political maneuvers" to create the "semblance" of a solu-
tion. The message to black African leaders is to be wary in
dealing with the US.
I IThe Soviets are already concerned that Secretary
Kissinger s efforts may bear fruit. The chief of the USA
Institute's Foreign Policy Department, G. A. Trofimenko, re-
marked to a US embassy official on Tuesday that he personally
viewed the Secretary's activities in Africa as a "carbon
copy" of the US approach in the Middle East.
The selection of Zhukov--a well-connected commentator
who usually deals with major East-West issues--to write the
Pravda commentary strongly suggests that more than just Afri-
can issues are being addressed. Zhukov's direct criticism of
Secretary Kissinger appears to be part of an increasing inclin-
ation on the part of the Soviets to find fault with the US ad-
ministration in general and the Secretary's role in particular.
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CHINA: Anti-Teng Campaign
Since China's major earthquake last July, Peking
has been strongly emphasizing production goals at the expense
of the political campaign criticizing former vice premier Teng
Hsiao-ping and his supporters.[ I
I
A People's Daily editorial on Tuesday--its fourth
on the same subject in less than a month--called for using the
anti-Teng campaign to boost the economy. This argument essen-
tially relegates the political campaign to the back burner.
The e i orial noted in particular the need to improve railway
work,
The editorial forcefully reiterated the prohibition
against local factionalism that was contained in an editorial
of August 23. That editorial, which was somewhat conciliatory
toward errant officials, was quickly replayed in the provinces,
and at least two province chiefs under attack as supporters
of Teng highlighted the editorial's stricture against fac-
tionalism and its lenient attitude toward mistaken officials.
I There is some evidence, however, that the August 23
editorial was not endorsed by the entire leadership. Several
articles in the national media published within days of the
editorial diverged from it by arguing for a continuation and
broadening of the anti-Teng campaign.
olitical commentator Liang Hsiao, writing
Leftist
p
on August 26, focused his attention on whom should be attacked,
and another article referred to people like Teng, calling for
them to be toppled.
I IThese pseudonymous articles are less authoritative
than the editorial with which they are taking issue. They also
have not been widely replayed in China, suggesting that most
provincial leaders are in agreement with the dominant editorial
line rather than the criticism of it.
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The fact that People's DaiZiy has seen fit to publish
so many editorials on boosting production and curbing faction-
alism, however, suggests some resistance to concentrating on
economic rather than political issues. Teng in fact has been
attacked by the leftists all year for doing just that.
Media treatment of Premier Hua Kuo-feng further
suggests that, although the more conservative members of the
leadership are in the ascendancy, the political infighting is
far from over.
Hua has finally emerged as the leading spokesman for
earthquake relief efforts. At a reception on September 1 for
"heroes" in relief work, he gave his most impressive speech to
date on a domestic issue, emphasizing economic priorities and
paying only perfunctory attention to the anti-Teng campaign.
I I Immediately following the earthquake, however, Hua's
activities as the leader of the relief group received very
little publicity. It was several days after the group had left
Peking to visit the stricken areas before Hua was publicly
identified as head of the group, and People's Daily did not
begin showing pictures of him in the earthquake area until
nearly two weeks after the earthquake.
//This delay in publicizing Hua's activity caused
some Peking residents to grumble that the Premier had been slow
to react,// which apparently was not the case. The delay did
suggest, however, that those in charge of the media were not
anxious to push Hua into the limelight.
(S NF) Even more unusual is the see-saw media treatment
of Wu Te, Peking's party boss and a member of the Politburo.
Wu was the only leader of an earthquake-stricken area not to
participate publicly in relief activities,
The controversy surrounding Wu probably involves his
position in the national government. He is the leading candi-
date to succeed the late Chu Te as de facto head of state, but
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he has not been named to the job and has not consistently
performed the basically protocol duties associated with it. Wu
seems to be in the moderate camp, and it is possible that
art leftists are attempting to block his formal promotion.
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232
ANNEX to the National Intelligence Daily Cable
for Thursday September 9, 1976. The NID Cable
is for the purpose of informing senior US
officials. This is a CIA late item.
CI NIDC 76-212
No. 0439/76
5041 z
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The death of Mao Tse-tung, announced this morning, will
no come as a traumatic surprise to the Chinese populace; the
regime has been preparing the public for this event for some
time through wide dissemination of photographs showing an in-
creasingly aged and infirm Chairman. The political repercussion
9f his demise, however, may well last for years.
I Mao had been an important member of the Chinese Com-
munist Party since its founding in 1921, and Chairman since
the mid-1930s. He has been the most important man in China
since the Communists took power in 1949 and the central refer-
ence point in the often confused politics of the party for
much longer. Even when his will was partly thwarted by others
in the Chinese leadership whose policy views differed from his
own, his personality and programs could never be ignored;
even his opponents claimed to be speaking in his name and to
be carrying out his commands.
As the dominating force in Chinese politics, a
oun er of the party, the formulator of the "Chinese way" to
communism and the man who led the Chinese revolution to
triumph, Mao will be irreplaceable. There is no one on the
Chinese scene today who even remotely commands the authority
that has been accorded to him or who can easily assume the
charismatic role of leader of the Chinese people he exercised
for years.
In the upper echelons of the party, however, the
Chairman's death may come as something of a relief to a con-
siderable number of second-level leaders. Mao's autocratic
actions, suspiciousness and sometimes erratic policy shifts
were almost certainly resented by some of his associates and
subordinates, particularly in the past decade. Some of these
individuals are now likely to believe that more orderly and
rational approaches to policy problems can be taken without
fear of reprisals from the Chairman.
Although Mao's place in the three-thousand-year-old
history of the Chinese state is likely to loom large, one
conspicuous failure in his long domination of the political
scene is already glaringly evident and is likely to have
serious implications for the future. The Chairman did not
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succeed in providing for a widely acknowledged and recognized
successor. Two designated successors, Liu Shao-chi and Lin
Piao, fell by the wayside in 1966 and 1971 respectively.
A third, Teng Hsiao-ping, who appeared in a position
to Inherit much of Mao's authority if not the formal title
of party chairman, was removed from all his high positions
in early April. At the same time, the young Wang Hung-wen,
who by virtue of his position in the hierarchy seemed to
have a shot at succession to the formal title of party
chairman--but probably without much of the authority that
normally could accrue to that post--was passed over for
promotion last April. Finally, Chou En-lai, who by virtue
of his experience and the respect accorded him by most Chi-
nese was perhaps the most logical of all possible successors
to Mao, died last January.
For several years the Chinese have talked about
post-Mao arrangements in terms of a collegial group which
would in effect share the Chairman's authority among them-
selves. Such an arrangement is entirely possible, at least
in the short run, since it seems clear that no single in-
dividual has the stature to replace Mao in his full leader-
ship capacity.
It is possible, in fact, that the post of party
chairman may now be retired, as a post that could only be
held by the irreplaceable leader who has just died. The
Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan followed a similar procedure
at the death of Chiang Kai-shek last year. In this case,
Peking would probably revive the post of party secretary-
general, which has been dormant since the start of the Cul-
tural Revolution, in order to provide a manager for party
affairs.
If the post of Chairman is to be filled, however, the
most likely candidate for the job is Premier Hua Kuo-feng,
who is now "first" party vice chairman, a new post created
in early April, at the time of the fall of Teng Hsiao-ping.
Hua is, however, a compromise figure who lacks a strong power
base and who has operated at the center of power for only a
few years. In his hands the post of chairman would be less
important than it was when Mao occupied the position. Moreover,
there are almost certainly a number of senior leaders of the
party who would prefer that additional power and prestige did
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not accrue to Hua. There have been occasional covert attacks
on Hua in the media since January, and his deputy in Hunan
Province, which he ran before coming to Peking, has been under
heavy political pressure for several months.
I frt is possible, therefore, that Hua's elevation to
the chairmanship could be contested, and in fact any deci-
sion to fill the post might be put off for some time. It
is also possible that if Hua were elevated to the chairman-
ship, he could be balanced off by a reconstitution of the
post of secretary-general. In this case a leading candidate
for that job would be the leftist political boss of Shanghai,
Chang Chun-chiao, who probably performs the functions of
secretary-general on a de facto basis at present. There is
certain to be opposition to this appointment from the party's
right wing, however.
If the post of chairman were abolished, that of the
current party vice chairman would also have to be abolished.
In addition to Hua, the other vice chairmen are Wang Hung-wen,
whose youth makes him suspect to many older party members
and whose alignment with the left wing of the party is
a major disability in the eyes of the rightists, and Defense
Minister Yeh Chien-ying, a long-time associate of the late
Chou En-lai who has been identified with the party's right
wing and who came under criticism earlier this year for
his vehement support of Teng Hsiao-ping.
argument The balance these two men provide could be an
for preserving the system of chairman and vice
chairmen. If, however, that system is scrapped, Hua Kuo-feng
would be an obvious candidate for the secretary-general's
post. Since Chang Chun-chiao also has claims on this job,
a clash between the two could easily develop.
Insofar as the principle of collegiality is fol-
lowed by the Chinese, the three current vice chairmen, Chang
Chun-chiao and Peking Military Region Commander Chen Hsi-
lien would almost certainly form the core of the collective.
These five men are the most powerful in China today. They
are not likely to work easily together, however. The
left-right split between Yeh, on the one hand, and Wang and
Chang, on the other, is already pronounced, and as already
noted there is potential for serious friction between Chang
and Hua.
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I IChen, even more than Yeh, the defense minister, is
likely to represent military interests in the collective.
Many important military figures have resented the leftist
leaders since the days of the Cultural Revolution, and to
the degree that Chen speaks for them, he could. come into
conflict with Chang and Wang. Chen, however, appears to be
an ambitious man whose personal interests could lead him
into temporary and expedient alliances with any civilian
faction. He is reported to have abandoned Teng Hsiao-ping
at a crucial juncture last January, for example, and this
move may have been an important factor in Teng's subse-
quent political demise.
Latent factionalism among the ruling group is
likely to come to the fore rather quickly, in fact. Mao's
death occurs at a tense and rather fluid moment in Chinese
politics. Repercussions from the Teng purge are still
echoing throughout the country--in the provinces and in
Peking. The fissure between the party's right and left wings
is perhaps wider than at any time since the late stages of
the Cultural Revolution, and the issue of relations between
the military and civilian members of the party is still not
fully resolved. Since the attacks on Teng began, the army
has begun to reemerge as an important factor in political
affairs; this tendency is likely to become more pronounced
in the wake of Mao's death.
his confused situation makes a struggle among the
various factions in the leadership all but inevitable, and
this struggle is likely to make itself manifest. sooner rather
than later. Mao has died at an unpropitious moment for the
party's left wing, however. This group--a minority in
the party and among the leadership--has not yet managed to
achieve a solid and largely unassailable position, as it
clearly hoped to do before the Chairman's death. Mao had
his differences with the leftists in recent years, but they
were at most times able to play on his obsessive concern
for the development of an equalitarian China, and their
enemies were inhibited by fear that Mao could intervene
on their behalf in unexpected fashion. This inhibition has now
been removed.
one likely victim of these changed circumstances
is Mao s wife, the termagant Chiang Ching. She is widely
disliked, and without the Chairman's potential protection
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she may well fall by the wayside rather quickly. The left
as a whole is in fact now in a somewhat unenviable position.
It is likely to be on the defense in whatever struggle
develops in the wake of Mao's death. Nevertheless, leftist
leaders, although a minority, speak for a significant
portion of the Chinese party, and the struggle, if it
develops, is not likely to be resolved quickly.
I I This fact, plus the obvious difficulty the Chinese
will have in adjusting to a China without Mao, is likely
to inhibit the development of new policy initiatives and to
slow the implementation of policies already adopted, both
in the domestic and foreign policy spheres. If the military
gains an increased voice in policy-making, however, it is
possible that Peking may become more receptive to the idea
of moderating somewhat its unyielding opposition to the
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