NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028800010042-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: April 24, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
NTELLIGENCE
BOARD
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
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April 24, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
CHINA: Low-level officials
openly criticize Mao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LEBANON: Franjiyah delays signing
amendment allowing election of successor . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGAL: Government moves to counter
violence in Sunday's election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
SPAIN: King considering measures
to counteract obstructionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
WEST GERMANY: Security Council membership
may lead to difficult foreign policy decisions . . . . . . . . . . . 6
WEST GERMANY: Communist participation in
West European governments troubles Bonn . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
USSR-INDOCHINA: Sovietscontinue
to court Indochinese Communists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
THAI LAND: Death of Krit may
jeopardize government unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
ARGENTINA: Junta delaying
decision on role for labor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
Although the current campaign in China remains officially confined to criticism
of Teng Hsiao-ping and has not produced the disruption and violence of the Cultural
Revolution-or even of the anti-Confucius campaign in 1974-it has engendered
widespread dissatisfaction and bitterness among both middle and lower level cadres
and the general population.
This discontent appears in a number of instances to have loosened the tongues
of some lower level officials, who have shown a surprising willingness to discuss
candidly Chinese internal politics with foreigners-a departure from attitudes that
have prevailed for decades. A number of Chinese serving abroad as well have been
remarkably candid in assessing current political events in China with foreigners. Even
more startling, a considerable number of officials seem willing to criticize Mao
Tse-tung himself.
Widespread and sometimes outspoken cadre support for Teng and for the
policies he and the late Chou En-lai represented has been evident since the initial
announcement in early February that the former vice premier had been blocked
from the premiership. Many Chinese seem to see the attack on Teng as an assault on
the memory of Chou En-lai, and this has added to Teng's support. Both the general
public and Chinese officials at home and abroad reacted to the initiation of the
campaign against Teng with confusion and unhappiness. Some of this discontent
abated in March, when the attack on Teng seemed to have stalled and his political
stock seemed to rise; it welled up rapidly again following the riots in Peking early
this month and Teng's subsequent dismissal.
In a sense, Teng may in fact be more popular today than he was before the
campaign against him began. Many Chinese have commented that the charges against
Teng are false and that he has been treated unfairly.
From the beginning of the anti-Teng campaign, in fact, many Chinese have
pointed an angry finger at Mao. The Chairman has been compared unfavorably with
Chou En-lai, criticized for practicing nepotism, and castigated as "selfish" and
"senile" by officials abroad.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
Since Teng's fall, the criticism of Mao has increased. A number of Chinese
diplomats have spoken candidly about Mao's diminishing political influence and the
lack of confidence he inspires in the people. One official went so far as to suggest
that Mao ought to step down. In an obvious allusion to Teng's dismissal, another
diplomat complained that Mao hurls false accusati nocent officials an li
to
cover u his intenti
There seems little doubt that Mao's political stock has fallen and that many
Chinese blame him for the latest leadership upheaval. The current criticism of the
Chairman appears to surpass that which surfaced following the failures of the Great
Leap Forward in the early 1960s, and it differs from that earlier period in that the
current disparaging remarks are expressed open) and directly rather than
and b analo as was the case in the 1960s.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
President Franjiyah has not yet signed the constitutional amendment that
would permit the election of a new president. The twice-postponed meeting of
principal Christian leaders to discuss this matter is set for today.
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To underscore Kamal Jumblatt's threat to establish a rival Muslim government,
the leftists yesterday moved to set up a new municipal council in Tripoli. The
leftist-controlled radio in Beirut also reported that Fatah has threatened to boycott
future meetings of the tripartite truce committee if the Christians do not take more
effective measures to enforce the cease-fire in their areas.
Although Syrian-controlled Palestine Liberation Army forces have established a
buffer zone between the combatants in Beirut, exchanges of artillery and mortar fire
continue to emphasize the fragility of the truce. Neither Christian nor Palestinian
forces charged with policing the cease-fire have been willing to crack down hard on
violators or clear disputed areas. In some parts of the capital, the combatants appear
only to have withdrawn from the streets to nearby buildings, permitting the PLA to
establish a nominal presence.
The Syrian press has given increasing play to charges that the US, Israel, and
Egypt are working together against Syria in Lebanon to distr ct attention from the
Sinai accord and undermine Palestinian-Syrian solidarity.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
Portugal's Revolutionary Council has ordered the military on full alert to
counter any attempt to disrupt the national legislative assembly elections tomorrow.
The Council's decision reflects its concern that there may be a repetition at the
polls of the violent incidents which have marred the three-week-long election
campaign.
On Thursday, security forces were rushed to key diplomatic missions in Lisbon
after a bomb destroyed the Cuban embassy. Two Cuban nationals were killed.
Official sources said they expected further attacks against foreign embassies prior to
the election. Some extremists have linked "American imperialism" to the incident,
and special security precautions are being taken to protect the US embassy.
Although the bombing may have been the work of militant rightists or of
Angolan refugee groups resentful of Cuba's role in the Angolan civil war, the
Communists have accused the extremist Workers and Peasants Alliance of
connivance in the incident. The far left party's election propaganda has included
strong condemnation of the Cuban intervention.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
King Juan Carlos and the reform-minded members of the Spanish government
are reportedly considering strong measures to counteract foot-dragging by Prime
Minister Arias as well as right-wing obstructionism in parliament.
Foreign Minister Areilza told the US ambassador that Juan Carlos will insist
that Arias give specifics of the government's reform program in his speech next
week. If Arias refuses, Juan Carlos will consider asking for his resignation. According
to Areilza, the King will make his decision within the next two or three days.
Juan Carlos is in a dilemma. If he forces Arias' resignation, he knows that the
conservative Council of the Realm probably would thwart any attempt to replace
Arias with a reformist.
If the King allows Arias to give an ambiguous speech, the government may be
deserted by many of its reformist supporters. Areilza has not directly threatened to
quit, but has said that he and other ministers would lose credibility at home and
abroad and would find it difficult to continue in office.
The resignation of Areilza could have strong repercussions in Western Europe,
where the Foreign Minister has been instrumental in promoting the image of Spain
as moving steadily toward democracy.
reilza is aware o the impact his resignation would have an
can probably be persuaded to stay.
A more likely casualty than Areilza might be Interior Minister Fraga-the chief
architect of the government's reform program-who would be reluctant to remain in
a government that seemed to be backing away from promised reforms.
The reform program is encountering heavy resistance in parliament, where the
draft law on freedom of political associations has run into stiff opposition from
conservatives. This opposition has caused Areilza and others to begin to look to their
trump card-a direct call by the King for a referendum that would give him the
authority to change the constitution. The King would probably be reluctant to take
the step, however, and the reformists agreed that the King should use the
referendum as a last resort; it would destroy Juan Carlos' carefully cultivated image
of aloofness from political infighting and could antagonize the conservative military
leadership.
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April 24, 1976
With an eye to a possible showdown, Juan Carlos has been making a bid to
enhance his popularity by touring the provinces. He has made extended visits to
Catalonia and Andalucia and has been enthusiastically received in both areas. A
recent popular opinion poll shows strong support for the King. Almost 50 percent of
those questioned feel he should direct role in running the country.
I
WEST GERMANY
Bonn views prospective West German membership in the UN Security Council
with mixed feelings.
As a Security Council member, West Germany will have more difficulty than
heretofore in balancing its support for US positions with its desire to coordinate
policy with other EC members and to seek to improve its relations with third world
countries. Moreover, East German membership in the council could provide a new
forum for antagonisms between East and West Germany.
West Germany's candidacy for election to the Security Council for a two-year
term beginning on January 1 was approved by the West German cabinet on April 14.
The Western nations had endorsed West Germany and Canada to replace Italy and
Sweden, whose terms will expire at the end of this year. According to government
spokesman Gruenewald, East Germany is also expected to become a Security
Council member in January 1978. These moves will allow both East and West
Germany to join the 15-member Security Council in 1978.
A statement by an opposition spokesman that the participation of both East
and West Germany in the Security Council would be undesirable for all concerned
was strongly rejected by Foreign Minister Genscher. He said Bonn will not withdraw
from world affairs by refusing to enter an international forum in which East
Germany was present. Genscher has said that West Germany will use its Security
Council membership to advorata the independence of third world countries.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 24, 1976
The issue of communist participation in the Italian and other NATO
governments has become a political football in the West German election campaign.
Chancellor Schmidt's Social Democrats and the opposition Christian Democrats
are trading charges over the growing political uncertainty in Southern Europe-the
one blaming it on the decades of corrupt administration by conservative
governments and the other pointing to the dangers of collaboration between
socialists and communists.
The controversy reached a new peak this week following a widely publicized
television interview in which Schmidt made typically blunt remarks about the
political situation in southern Europe in general and Italy in particular. The West
German leader:
--Deplored the political "vacuum" in Italy, which he attributed largely to the
absence of a vigorous socialist party and the long tenure in power of the
Christian Democrats.
--Cautioned that the accession to "decisive" power by West European
communist parties is by no means inevitable and noted that NATO has
managed to adjust to communist participation in the Portuguese and Icelandic
governments.
--Called for more "restraint" on the part of Italy's allies in commenting on its
political problems.
Schmidt's comments stirred a hornet's nest of reaction in Italy, although Rome
stopped short of filing a diplomatic protest. Some West German critics, moreover,
chided Schmidt for his implicit criticism of Washington and suggested that the
Italian Christian Democrats should be supported rather than condemned.
Schmidt is in a delicate political position. In the past, he has taken a hard line
against communist participation in NATO governments. At a conference of
European socialist leaders in Denmark last January, he warned that NATO
governments which rely on communist support could not be considered reliable
allies.
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National Intelligence Bulletin April 24, 1976
The Soviets are continuing to court the Indochinese communists.
On April 20, Soviet leaders rolled out the red carpet for a party-government
delegation from Laos, headed by Lao communist leader and prime minister,
Kaysone Phomvihan. Kaysone had attended the recent Soviet party congress, but
this is his first state visit to the USSR since the communist victories in Indochina last
year.
The purpose of the visit, like Kaysone's recent state visits to China and
Vietnam, was to thank the Soviets for past assistance and to learn what Laos can
expect from Moscow in the future. Kaysone has already had two sessions with a
contingent of Soviet Politburo members headed by party ideologist Suslov and
Premier Kosygin, and on April 22 the two countries staged an impressive ceremony
in the Kremlin Palace for the signing of four new aid and trade agreements.
As usual, there is not much public information about the content of the
agreements, but Moscow, which is well aware of and hopes to profit from the
current strains in China's relations with Vietnam and Laos, probably was at least
moderately responsive.
Since last year, Soviet aid has reportedly totaled about $50 million. Moscow
has provided petroleum, foodstuffs, medical supplies, and other commodities. The
Soviets have also promised project assistance for hydroelectric facilities, mineral
exploration, upgrading of road transportation and communications facilities, the
rebuilding of a town on the Plaine de Jarres, and construction of fuel depots,
warehouses, garages, and hospitals. About 600 Soviets may now be in Laos working
on construction projects, communications, and air transport. They are handling
much,, if not all, of aircraft maintenance, pilot training, airport management, and air
facilities upgrading.
Moscow is also following up on the aid commitments made last fall during
North Vietnamese party leader Le Duan's state visit to the USSR. Deputy Premier
Arkhipov has just returned to Moscow from Hanoi, where he attended the third
session of the Soviet-Vietnamese Commission on Economic and Scientific and
Technical Cooperation and signed a new protocol on aid and trade. The commission
was established during President Podgorny's visit to North Vietnam in October
1971, ostensibly to coordinate the economic development plans of the two
countries; in fact, it seems to have served as a forum for working out the details of
the Soviet economic aid program to North Vietnam. The Soviets and the Vietnamese
had signed an umbrella five-year aid agreement last December.
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April 24, 1976
Moscow has enjoyed less success with the Cambodian communists, who for
well over a year have spurned all of the USSR's efforts to establish relations and still
seem intent on keeping the Soviets out of Phnom Penh. The Soviets nevertheless
persist. In the last few days, President Podgorny and Premier Kosygin have sent
congratulatory telegrams to their newly "elected" Cambodian counterparts, and
Soviet media have carried several articles lauding the domestic and foreign policy
"accomplishments" of the new regime.
The death yesterday of Thailand's former army commander, General Krit
Siwara, could jeopardize the cohesiveness of the Seni Pramot coalition government,
which has yet to face the necessary parliamentary vote of confidence.
Krit's value to Seni had been his ability to ensure the support of numerous
conservative groups, including key army commanders. Over the short run, his
absence will create a leadership vacuum on the political right. Rightist support is
crucial to the stability of the Seni coalition.
Praman Adireksan, the outgoing defense minister and Krit's foremost political
rival, probably will make an early attempt to convince the conservative elite that he
should succeed Krit as the spokesman for the right. Although his political base is
relatively shallow, he may renew his demand for the defense post in the new
government. Were he to obtain this post, he could significantly increase his following
in the military command structure, currently dominated by Krit's supporters.
Praman is regarded as unscrupulous by many in the Democrat Party, however,
and his nomination to the defense post could prompt new tensions within the
coalition. Praman has alienated many potential conservative supporters, and it is
unlikely that he could hold the conservatives together as effectively as Krit did.
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The junta's delay in formally announcing how it intends to treat organized
labor has led to a scramble among top unionists for control of the movement, which
has been virtually leaderless since the coup on March 24.
The junta has remained silent about its plans for labor over the long run, but
some of its actions suggest leaner times for the long-privileged workers. The recently
announced economic plan, for example, stressed incentives and advantages for
industry, price increases, and wage limits. Moreover, the government threatened to
use force to end a recent wildcat strike at a Buenos Aires auto plant.
Some officers probably hope that squabbles within the unions will lead to
labor's demise as a major political force. For the moment, however, the movement
remains largely intact, although the main unions and the principal confederation are
under federal control. The unionists are seeking to stave off drastic restrictions of
day-to-day union activities, or even abolition of the movement. At least some of the
military favor such repression.
The US embassy reports that three distinct groups of labor leaders are vying for
the attention of the new military government, although none has made much
headway thus far. One of the groups centers on the former governor of Buenos Aires
Province, Victorio Calabro, an official of the important metalworkers' union.
Calabro stands a good chance of playing an important role in labor nationally if he
emerges unscathed from an investigation of h i s alleged corruption.
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