NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028800010040-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: April 23, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

b/141,
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Top Secret
NTLLIdENCE
. BOARD
National Intelligence
Bulletin
25X1!
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 23, 1976
N?_ 699
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
CONTENTS
LEBANON: Sporadic
fighting continues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USSR: Andropov delivers
Lenin birthday speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
PORTUGAL: Government concerned about
voter apathy in Sunday's election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
INDIA-BANGLADESH: Border
clashes strain relations further . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
IRAQ-SYRIA: Baghdad cuts
off oil flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
USSR-TUNISIA: New economic
aid agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
PANAMA: Reaction to US
election campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CHILE: Leftist exiles trying
to create unified opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
MEXICO: Squatters' demands
may lead to violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
VIETNAM: Elections on Sunday to
lead to unified government . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
MALAYSIA: Attack on communist
base camp near Thai border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
Palestine Liberation Army troops, under the direction of the tripartite truce
committee, reportedly have gained control of Beirut's commercial district and have
begun taking up positions in the disputed area between Muslim and Christian
sections of the city. Sporadic fighting continues in the suburbs and in several areas in
northern and southern Lebanon.
In addition to the PLA troops operating in Beirut, a 500-man special force
drawn mainly from Fatah is being used against Muslim and Palestinian truce
violators. The force has met stiff resistance from Iraqi-sponsored fedayeen and
forces led by Muslim radical Ibrahim Qulaylat, one of Kamal Jumblatt's chief allies.
The main problem, however, is the continuing exchange of artillery fire
between the Christian and Muslim suburbs of Beirut. Under the terms of the truce,
Palestinian forces are not permitted to enter Christian areas and, therefore, hold out
little hope of stopping the shelling.
According to Beirut press dispatches, President Franjiyah's representatives
returned from Damascus yesterday with assurances from the Syrians that President
Asad has made no secret commitments to the Palestinians. US embassy sources
believe this will clear the way for Franjiyah to sign the constitutional amendment
that will permit the election of his successor. These sources suggest he will deliver a
signed copy of the document to parliament today. The Christians may still insist,
however, that the elections await an improvement in security.
Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt is keeping up the pressure on the Christians with
more threats to set up a rival Muslim government if Franjiyah continues to delay.
Jumblatt has set May 2 as the final deadline for Franjiyah's departure.
In the south, a battle between a small group of soldiers from the renegade
Muslim army and about 50 Christian troops based at Qulayah reportedly drew fire
from the Israelis. Qulayah is only four kilometers from the Israeli border. The leader
of the rebel Muslim troops had been cooperating with Syrian efforts to enforce the
cease-fire, but apparently triggered the fighting when he refused to allow food
supplies to reach the Christian outpost.
The Syrian forces that were sent to Lebanon's eastern border area two weeks
ago appear to be prepared to stay indefinitely if necessary. Syrian forces on the
Syrian side of the border have set up normal field camps, and have established a
regular logistic system to Damascus.
Most Syrian forces in eastern Lebanon are remaining in place, but are no longer
patrollin the Bekaa Valley. Relations between the Syrians and the local populace
are poor.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
Most of Yury Andropov's Lenin birthday speech yesterday was devoted to
Soviet domestic matters, but his remarks on those issues generally were pro forma.
His comments on relations with the US, however, reflected concern over a possible
deterioration in bilateral ties.
The foreign policy portion of the speech concentrated on two of Moscow's
current preoccupations: the status of "detente" and the ideological challenge posed
by the West European communists. Andropov's rhetoric was relatively restrained
and his formulations for the most part conventional, but his criticism of the "peace
through strength" policy is Moscow's most authoritative to date.
Citing General Secretary Brezhnev's report to the party congress, Andropov
stated unequivocally that the USSR would continue to work for a "relaxation of
tension." He also reiterated a refrain common in Soviet rhetoric, particularly since
Angola became an issue, that the ideological struggle inevitably continues under
conditions of a relaxation of tension. He did not go so far as to say, as other Soviets
have, that the ideological struggle will intensify.
Andropov never mentioned President Ford, but had unkind words for the
"peace through strength" formulation, which Andropov said was an echo of the cold
war. He made clear, again without explicitly saying so, that the Soviets regard some
of the statements emanating from the US as election-year politics. In keeping with
recent Soviet coverage of the US scene, Andropov asserted that such "rhetoric"
could have harmful consequences.
In raising the possibility not only of a delay in the process of relaxing tension
but also of some "slipping back," Andropov was more pessimistic than either
Brezhnev had been in his report to the party congress, or Politburo member Suslov
had been in his Lenin anniversary speech last year. Andropov argued that delay or
slippage, however temporary, could lead to a waste of material resources for "no
purpose." This may have been an allusion to the strategic arms limitations talks.
These passages seem directed to Washington and are reminiscent of statements
made last summer by Brezhnev in urging US leaders to be more openly supportive of
"detente." Andropov's reference to the inevitability of the deepening of detente,
"irrespective of developments in the near future," sounds as if the Soviets anticipate
tougher days ahead.
In speaking of the international communist movement, Andropov included
some passages intended to be conciliatory to the independent-minded West
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April 23, 1976
European parties. He argued that the Soviet party is not imposing its revolutionary
experience on other parties, but is pleased when they use it "creatively" and add
their own "tactical methods" and "new approaches" to solving problems.
At the same time, he said there are still some fundamental Leninist laws that
are ineluctable. One of these is that socialist transformation "requires" the
establishment of government by the working class-that is, a communist-led
government. In a separate passage, Andropov made a strong defense of the
dictatorship of the proletariat, a fundamental Leninist precept recently abandoned
by the French Communist Party.
Andropov touched as well on proletarian internationalism, but buried that
reference in the context of support for "national liberation" struggles. This is part of
a continuing Soviet effort to find a definition of the phrase that can satisfy various
parties. Andropov, in effect, was pointing to broad support by the left for the
Popular Movement in An ola as an example of what-at least in part-proletarian
internationalism means.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
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April 23, 1976
Portugal's political parties, concerned that two years of non-stop political
activity may have turned off large numbers of voters, are engaged in an
eleventh-hour effort to overcome voter apathy before the legislative assembly
election on Sunday. The ruling Revolutionary Council has also issued an appeal for a
strong voter turnout.
Parties of both the left and right-which end their campaigns this evening-as
well as many political observers in Lisbon, believe that abstentions will be
significantly higher than last year, when 91.7 percent of registered voters
participated in the highly charged constituent assembly elections.
The centrist Popular Democratic Party and the center-right Social Democratic
Center are worried that many of those who abstain will be conservatives who are fed
up with Portugal's "revolution of the carnations."
Communist concern that some of the party's moderate left-wing supporters
might be among the no-shows was indicated in recent remarks by party leader
Alvaro Cunhal, who has been emphasizing that "no good democrat should abstain."
Faced with the prospect of his party being excluded from the new government
to be formed this summer, Cunhal continues to press for a Communist-Socialist
coalition. Cunhal on Wednesday threatened to withhold Communist support from
the Socialists in parliament if they attempt to form a minority government on their
own.
The Socialists, who have steadfastly rebuffed overtures by the Communists,
ignored the latest Communist threat, saying that any alliance with the Communists
would be a betrayal of the Portuguese people. The Socialists have also complained
about a campaign sticker cleverly contrived by the Communists that shows a
worker's clenched fist, the Socialists' emblem, holding the Communist hammer and
sickle and featuring an appeal for unity between the two parties.
Meanwhile, several military candidates are already jockeying for position in the
important follow-up presidential election, which will be held in two months. Prime
Minister Azevedo recently reaffirmed his intention to be a candidate and issued a
thinly disguised appeal to the parties for their support.
The apparent front-runner, northern military region commander Pires Veloso,
is planning an election gambit of his own-a trip to the US early next month to meet
with congressmen and leaders of the Portuguese immigrant community. Labor
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April 23, 1976
Minister Tomas Rosa, a member of the powerful "operational" wing of the military,
claimed on Tuesday that the military is beginning to coalesce around Pires Veloso's
candidacy. He already enjoys some support in all three of the major non-Communist
parties.
Lisbon radio announced yesterday that a far left splinter party has endorsed
former security chief Otelo de Carvalho for president. Carvalho has become a
political "unperson" following his implication in the abortive November rebellion,
and his candidacy is not likely to be taken seriously.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
Relations between New Delhi and Dacca, sour since a military coup in Dacca
last August in which pro-Indian president Mujib was killed, have deteriorated further
this week, following several border clashes and continuing protests by the
Bangladesh government over India's diversion of Ganges River water near the border.
Both governments lodged protests this week blaming the other for several
mortar and gunfire exchanges that occurred along a sector of the northern border of
Bangladesh. Dacca has also claimed that India is supporting insurgents opposed to
the present regime in Bangladesh who have been active in the border areas. The
clashes may have been triggered by Bengalee troops firing on the Indians in the
mistaken belief they were insurgents approaching the border.
The two countries are also bickering over alleged withdrawals by India of more
than its fair share of water from the Ganges at the Farakka dam site. The Indians say
they are willing to discuss a more equitable division only of the water taken during
the yearly spring lean period. Bangladesh wants to talk about withdrawals for the
entire year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
Iraq cut off oil to Syria on April 9, forcing Damascus to seek high-quality crude
elsewhere to meet its commercial and military needs. The Syrians have temporarily
curtailed or suspended domestic air service to conserve aviation fuel and have
approached the Saudis to help make up the shortfall.
The transit pipeline agreement between Iraq and Syria, under which Syria had
been buying 50,000 barrels per day of Iraqi crude at a price of only $3.00 per barrel,
expired last December. Since then, differences over the future sale price of Iraqi oil
and over Syrian transit fees have prevented Damascus and Baghdad from concluding
a new agreement.
Syria depends exclusively on Iraq for light crude. Syria earned some $150
million last year in transit fees on the oil passing from Iraq through Syria.
Damascus could buy light crude from other suppliers-at world market prices
of more than $11.50 per barrel. Syria would also incur additional transport costs in
getting the oil to the Homs refinery. If Damascus purchases light crude from Saudi
Arabia, the Saudis might provide some concessions, but Syria would still have to pay
substantially more than under the Iraqi terms in effect until last December.
The Iraqi decision to cut off the oil flow may have been in response to Syrian
efforts to remove more from the pipeline than allowed under the old agreement.
The move may also have been timed to hamper Syria's efforts to resolve the
Lebanese crisis. The Iraqis have supplied arms and money to fedayeen radicals in an
effort to undercut Syrian mediation efforts there and have been vocal in their
criticism of recent Syrian policies. Baghdad would like to see a Syrian failure in
Lebanon lead to the overthrow of President Asad,
The two rival Baathist regimes of Syria and Iraq have been bickering more or
less openly since last spring when Damascus cut off water to Iraq from the
Euphrates River after Iraq allegedly meddled in Syria's internal affairs. If Syria
decides to put pressure on Iraq to resume oil shipments, cutting the flow of water
again would be the most obvious and effective way of doing so.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
Moscow and Tunis have announced the signing of an agreement extending
substantial new Soviet economic aid to Tunisia.
The $76-million agreement gives concrete form to earlier discussions between
Tunisian President Bourguiba and Soviet Premier Kosygin, according to a joint
communique of April 15. It is not clear how much of this amount is new aid. It may
incorporate some $13 million in unused credits from an earlier agreement. The new
agreement makes the USSR one of Tunisia's major aid donors.
The aid will reportedly be used to develop and distribute northern water
resources and further develop the Soviet-built Tunisian National Engineering School.
Both projects are important to Tunisia's continued economic progress.
The Soviets probably hope to take advantage of Tunisia's strategic location on
the narrow western Mediterranean. Over the past two years, and as recently as last
month, the Soviets have applied political pressure in attempting to increase their
access to Tunisian ports-particularly Bizerte and Tunis-for naval visits.
Tunisia has in the past objected to Soviet violations of its territorial waters, and
has so far refused to be pressured into granting access to its ports.
The new aid agreement may be intended to gain additional leverage for the
Soviets. Tunis, however, is not likely to alter its essentially pro-Western stance in the
near future.
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April 23, 1976
Panama's reaction to campaign statements by US presidential candidates on the
canal negotiations has been generally low-key.
The government has begun to comment on the negotiations because of its
perceived need to react to canal-oriented campaign statements by US presidential
hopefuls as well as the need to show some progress on negotiations during what the
Panamanian public sees as a slack period in the talks with the US.
The naming of a new foreign minister and chief negotiator on April 1 also
brought the canal issue back into the limelight. According to US officials, the new
foreign minister and de facto chief negotiator, Aquilino Boyd, has been cooperative.
In a speech on April 19, Boyd described Panama's relations with the US as "very
special" and was optimistic that a new treaty with Washington would be concluded.
Boyd indicated, however, that the new canal treaty would not extend beyond the
year 2000. Public references to the year 2000 over the last several months will make
it extremely difficult for Panama to deviate from its announced negotiating
schedule.
Most of the political statements in the US on the canal issue have generally
been accepted in Panama as part of the US election process. Nonetheless, one
candidate's recent uncomplimentary description of General Torrijos as a "tinhorn
dictator" and criticism of the negotiations have drawn an ascerbic reaction.
In a lengthy interview with a US correspondent on Apri15, Torrijos rejected
former governor Reagan's contentions that the canal was US territory and said the
governor's statements aided the extreme left in Panama. Torrijos also alluded to the
possibility of student violence and repeated his now traditional reference to violent
alternatives if peaceful negotiations are not successful.
Torrijos remarked that 1977 would mark the limit of Panama's patience on
securing a new treaty. The press has also echoed the reference to 1977. Thus, while
Torrijos continues to have faith in US intentions to conclude a new agreement and
retains an attitude of forbearance for the vicissitudes of the US electoral process, he
apparently wants to continue pressuring the US. F7 I
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April 23, 1976
Left-wing exiles of Salvador Allende's former Popular Unity government plan
to convene in Mexico in mid-May in an effort to create a unified Chilean
revolutionary movement. The more immediate objective, however, may be to
consider ways to embarrass the Chilean government when it hosts the OAS General
Assembly meeting in early June.
According to an interview with Allende's former foreign minister, Clodomiro
Almeyda, the disparate members of the leftist political parties intend to forge a
common program of resistance to the current military regime. The parties that made
up the Popular Unity government are now banned in Chile, and their leaders are
scattered around the globe. Almeyda glossed over the divergence of views among
those who oppose President Pinochet, contending that "there are no deep
differences at present," but added that ways must be found "to structure unity."
Past efforts to organize a broad opposition front have faltered because of the
same rivalries and quarreling that weakened Allende's administration. Whatever
successes have been achieved by the exiles seem limited to promoting international
censure of the junta.
The exiles probably hope to attract dissident leftists of the Christian
Democratic Party, who have gradually become disillusioned with the growing
atrophy of their party and expect no early end to the political moratorium imposed
by the military government. The exiles apparently are also counting on picking up
the pieces of the decimated extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left, which
has been the major target of Chilean security forces.
Carlos Altamirano, secretary general of Allende's Socialist Party
is already in Mexico
to commemorate the founding of the party. His presence is likely to put another
obstacle in the way of any unifying trend.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 23, 1976
The Echeverria government, already under fire from the business community
over a controversial draft law on urban land use, is now being challenged by angry
campesinos demanding more land from rich estate holders.
Armed campesinos have occupied private lands in several states in the past
month. In the agriculturally rich Yaqui Valley area in the state of Sonora, over
3,000 squatters have held a 400-hectare plot since April 3. Landowners in Sonora,
where large and highly productive privately owned farms predominate, fear that the
reluctance of authorities to dislodge these squatters will encourage others.
At the root of the problem is Mexico's burgeoning population growth, which is
outstripping the government's ability to provide jobs or productive farm lands for
the campesinos. With over 3 million campesinos demanding lands that they have
been led to believe belong to them, the government is under increasing pressure to
act, even though land grants would have to be made at the expense of the more
efficient private producers.
The government is trying to stave off a major crisis, as it has in the past, by
sending cabinet ministers to the scene to make promises to the campesinos and to
relieve the fears of landowners. This time, however, officials are concerned that the
practice of buying time is wearing thin and that serious violence is a real possibility.
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Vietnamese in the North and South will go to the polls Sunday to elect a new
national assembly, which will then formally approve a new unified government of
Vietnam including representatives from both zones. The new assembly will probably
draft a new constitution, and adopt a new flag and national anthem by early this
summer.
There is some concern among communist officials that dissidents in the South
will try to disrupt the election with terrorist acts and by encouraging the voters to
invalidate their ballots. Strict security measures are being enforced in most of the
southern provinces, and rallies and other large meetings have been prohibited in the
South until after the election.
With the establishment of a formally unified government, the Viet Cong's
Provisional Revolutionary Government will be eliminated, and with it the pretense
of an independent southern regime that has been maintained since the military
take-over last April. North Vietnam already has notified foreign representatives that
the new capital will be Hanoi and that embassies and other official offices will be
permitted only in that city.
Foreign access to Vietnam will be permitted only through Hanoi. Although
travel to the South will be allowed, no consular or other foreign offices will be
permitted in Saigon. All representatives of Western news organizations will be
required to leave Saigon shortly after the election.
Formal political unification is likely to be followed by new policy guidelines
from the party on economic and social unification. Hanoi has conceded that the
integration of the South with the socialist North poses unique problems, and there
apparently is some debate over how rapidly this process should be completed. A
recent editorial in Hanoi's theoretical journal underscores the difficulty of
establishing socialism in the South and maintains that it should be implemented
gradually.
Other official commentary in the party and army journals, however, has
advocated a more rapid transition, suggesting that firm decisions have not yet been
made. These are likely to emerge from the Fourth Party Congress, which has been
tentatively scheduled for sometime this year.
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April 23, 1976
Kuala Lumpur has launched a major assault against a communist base camp on
the Thai border. Between April 16 and 19, over 50 sorties were directed against the
camp, with Malaysian F-5E aircraft being used in a combat role for the first time. An
assault on April 17 failed; a second assault was to have been mounted on April 21.
Some 1,600 ground troops were to be involved in the operation.
The communist camp, reportedly well-fortified and capable of accommodating
200 to 300 people, is very near the Thai border. It is likely that some air strikes have
been flown inside Thailand. There is no evidence, however, that Thai ground troops
have moved to the border to block a retreat by the communists into Thailand.
More operations can be expected as new camps are discovered. The problem
posed by Thai border sanctuaries, however, will not be solved until the Thais can be
persuaded to cooperate more closely with Malaysian officials. Given the current
mutual distrust of local commanders, such cooperation is not expected.
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FOR THE RECORD
April 23, 1976
ETHIOPIA: Troops yesterday restored order in Addis Ababa after several
hours of demonstrations against the policies of the ruling military council. One
person was killed and at least two wounded; a number of arrests also were made.
Some of the demonstrators were workers demanding the right to form their own
unions. Students, who have demonstrated almost daily for several weeks demandin
a return to civilian rule, were probably also involved
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