NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028800010010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: April 6, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
April 6, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 6, 1976
RHODESIA: Efforts to
control aid to guerrillas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
ALGERIA-MOROCCO: Algiers attempting
to keep Sahara dispute alive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
SPAIN: Christian Democrats
endorse opposition front . .
PORTUGAL: Efforts to
control campaign violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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PANAMA: UN Representative
Boyd replaces Tack as foreign minister . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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PERU-USSR: Lima may purchase
high-performance aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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ANNEX: Israeli Options if Syria Moves into Lebanon
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April 6, 1976
Tanzanian President Nyerere and Mozambican President Machel are seeking to
tighten their control over outside aid to the Rhodesian nationalists, in part to limit
non-African involvement with the guerrillas.
The presidents are also concerned that direct Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese aid to
the rival factions of the nationalist African National Council could widen the
existing divisions and weaken the insurgency against the Smith government.
Last week, the Tanzanian foreign minister called in the ambassadors of a
number of communist countries, as well as some Western envoys, and said that all
outside support for the nationalists was to be channeled through Tanzania and
Mozambique by the African Liberation Committee of the OAU. According to the
East Germans, the Tanzanians directed the communist countries to discontinue
bilateral support for the various rival nationalist factions.
Nyerere and Machel agreed with Zambian President Kaunda and Botswanan
President Khama at their recent meeting in Lusaka that no Cuban or other foreign
combat troops would be allowed to join the fighting in Rhodesia. The four
presidents are prepared to accept aid and training for the guerrillas from wherever it
is available, but they are opposed to direct Soviet and Cuban involvement such as
occurred in Angola.
The pressure on the Africans to allow greater communist participation will
increase if the fighting drags on with no end in sight. The four presidents reportedly
are looking for fairly rapid successes on the battlefield, which seems unlikely. The
Zambians are said to be concerned that if the fl hting does not go well, it will be
necessary to reconsider the use of foreign troops.
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April 6, 1976
Algeria is making a fresh attempt to keep its dispute with Morocco over
Western Sahara alive at the UN.
A senior Algerian Foreign Ministry official, in a recent conversation with the
US ambassador in Algiers, said the return to the area last week of UN Secretary
General Waldheim's special envoy demonstrated that the international community
was still involved in the Sahara problem. He urged the US to "encourage" UN efforts
to resolve the dispute. He failed to break any new ground on the substance of the
dispute, however, avoiding mention of any possible areas for compromise.
The official claimed Algiers welcomed all attempts at mediation, even from
countries such as Senegal that have supported Morocco in the dispute. Senegalese
Foreign Minister Seck visited Nouakchott, Algiers, and Rabat last week. The
Senegalese ambassador in Algiers described the visit as merely an exploratory
mission, but he said Seck was encouraged by Algeria's apparent interest in a dialogue
on the Sahara question. Senegalese
President Senghor has offere to mediate the dispute.
Algiers probably is more interested in delaying international acceptance of the
Moroccan-Mauritanian take-over of Western Sahara than it is in genuine mediation.
The Algerians have not given any indication that they are willing to compromise,
and they continue to support Polisario Front guerrillas seeking independence for the
territory.
Meanwhile, Morocco and Mauritania have refused to receive Waldheim's special
envoy. The envoy visited Algiers from March 30 to April 2, meeting with Polisario
representatives and inspecting Saharan refugee camps in southwestern Algeria. On
April 4, Rabat and Nouakchott cabled Waldheim that because the envoy had
exceeded his mandate he no longer had any authority to complete his mission.
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The decision of two major Christian Democratic groups to endorse the newly
formed Spanish opposition front indicates that even the moderate left will challenge
the government's ban on the Communist Party.
On Sunday, Ruiz Gimenez' Christian Democratic Left agreed to support the
move of the Socialist-led Platform of Democratic Convergence to merge with the
Communist-dominated Democratic Junta. More surprising was the decision by Gil
Robles' Popular Democratic Federation to join the opposition front. The Gil Robles
group is not a member of either the Platform or the Junta and was believed to
oppose the formation of the front.
The Gil Robles faction's willingness to discard its previous rejection of
cooperation with the Communists apparently stemmed from its desire to
consummate the long-discussed merger with the Christian Democratic Left. At their
separate congresses over the weekend, the two factions agreed to unite and pledged
to work toward cooperation between all Christian Democratic groups in Spain.
Both Christian Democratic parties stipulated that their participation in the
opposition front-the Democratic Coordination-depends on its renunciation of the
use of violence. There has been no indication so far whether the front will accept
this proviso.
The endorsement of the new front by the Christian Democrats suggests that the
government has failed to isolate the Communist Party. The government has taken a
tough line with the front, denouncing it as Communist-dominated, but so far has
limited prosecution to the most leftist and extremist groups in the alliance.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 6, 1976
An upsurge in political violence in Portugal over the weekend, coinciding with
the opening of the official campaign period, could prompt military leaders to take
stronger actions to ensure that the legislative election will be held peacefully on
April 25.
The military has vowed to use force if necessary to maintain order during the
campaign. A new 400-man paramilitary intervention force has been formed to deal
with unlawful demonstrations in the Lisbon area. Outside of Lisbon, the commander
of the central military region has scheduled air and ground maneuvers to begin
tomorrow, apparently in the belief that a show of force will help quiet the situation.
To discourage media abuse, the Revolutionary Council has empowered the
National Electoral Commission to suspend political broadcasts by any party seeking
to use its allotted time to incite disorder.
Despite the military's precautions and tough words, violence is likely to
continue or even increase. In the north, extremists may seek to avenge the bombing
death of a leftist politician last Saturday. Revolutionary Council member Pinho
Freire believes sporadic violence will continue in the south, where the government
has been unable or unwilling to take hard decisions on returning illegally
expropriated lands to their rightful owners.
A meeting of the Portuguese Confederation of Farmers in southeastern
Portugal to protest land reform legislation was broken up on Sunday by leftist farm
workers who are opposed to any backtracking on agrarian reform. The conservative
farmers had issued an ultimatum to the government demanding that it begin
restoring seized lands by April 5, but apparently this deadline will slip, as has been
the case twice before.
Meanwhile, the last remaining legal impediment to the legislative assembly
election was removed with the promulgation of the new Portuguese constitution last
Friday. The document, which will come into force on April 25, presents a mixture
of Marxist and more conservative ideals, reflecting the political changes during the
10 months the constituent assembly was in session.
Those sections of the constitution dealing with the economy will probably be
the first to be disputed by the legislative assembly, to be elected on April 25. The
constitution declares that the Portuguese economy will be organized along socialist
lines through the collective appropriation of the principal means of production and
the implementation of an agrarian reform program. Past nationalizations may not be
rescinded.
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The groundwork for an early challenge to these provisions was laid when the
Social Democratic Center voted against the final document. The party did, however,
agree to abide by the new constitution and seek recourse through legal channels.
Conservatives will no doubt be better represented in the new legislature than
they were in the constituent assembly, but the Socialists and Communists
anticipated this shift and have erected barriers to any effort to undo their work. A
compromise was reached permitting the legislative assembly to amend the
constitution, but certain major constitutional principles must remain on the books
until a second legislature is elected in four years.
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UN Representative Aquilino Boyd has replaced Juan Tack as foreign minister.
Tack was temporarily removed from the position in June 1975 to concentrate on his
primary job as chief canal treaty negotiator. There are also indications Boyd will
replace Tack as head of Panama's treaty team. The change is not expected to alter
Panama's treaty stance or relations with the US.
Boyd had been foreign minister from 1956 to 1958 and permanent UN
representative since April 1962. He has long been the government's top adviser on
UN affairs. While frank and cooperative with US representatives at the UN on some
issues, he has consistently assumed a hard-line, ultranationalist stance on treaty
negotiations, taking advantage of every opportunity to advance Panama's treaty
stance from his UN post. He has on occasion been harshly critical of the US presence
in the canal zone. In most instances, he has spoken with the full knowledge and
authority of Chief of Government Torrijos.
The Panamanian government has given assurances Boyd's assignment does not
represent a shift in orientation. In his new posts, Boyd, like Tack, will closely reflect
Torrijos' thinking. Should relations with the US deteriorate, Bo yd's talent at
Washington-baiting will come into play. 17
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Since the USSR is the only country
willing to provide high-performance aircraft for immediate delivery, and on generous
long-term credit arrangements, Lima reportedly may purchase as many as 25 to 50
of these fighters.
Although the air force's leadership would prefer the US A-4M Skyhawk,
Washington has so far offered only F-5 interceptors. The UK has made a vague offer
to sell the Jaguar tactical jet fighter, a jointly produced British-French aircraft.
The Peruvian air force has sought modern aircraft to replace its antiquated
combat aircraft inventory, especially its F-86 and Hawker Hunter fighters. Lima is
not interested in further French Mirage purchases because it has had continuing
spare parts and maintenance problems with its French supplier. It also faced
unexpected add-on charges for the three squadrons of Mirage Ills and 5s it
purchased since 1967.
Peru's army has received about $85 million of Soviet ground equipment and
helicopters from the USSR since 1973. Peru has increased the number of Soviet
advisers and maintenance personnel in the country from 15 in late 1973 to at least
35 in 1975. An order for Soviet aircraft would raise that number to perhaps over
100 within a year of initial deliveries.
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The Peruvian government will have to weigh purchasing the Soviet aircraft
against the political implications of a deepening military relationship with Moscow.
Lima is facing pressures from rightists in the military; some opposition within the air
force already has surfaced. It must also consider the potential impact on Peru's
neighbors, particularly Chile. The Andean countries are currently holding arms
limitations talks.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
April 6, 1976
ANNEX
ISRAELI OPTIONS IF SYRIA MOVES INTO LEBANON
Lebanon's internal strife carries with it the risk of eventual Syrian intervention
in force and an Israeli countermove that could lead to a general Arab-Israeli war.
An Israeli decision to intervene following the large-scale movement of Syrian
forces into Lebanon would be based on whether Israel considered:
--The movement as a direct threat.
--Failure to act as damaging to Israel's credibility.
--The situation in southern Lebanon as constituting a vacuum that could be
filled by elements hostile to Israel unless preventive action were taken.
While rapid intervention based on such considerations cannot be entirely ruled
out, a more cautious approach by Israel appears more likely.
Any decision to intervene would be made only after a careful assessment of the
situation and potential consequences. Intervention carries the risk of a crisis in
relations with the US, a degradation of relations with other countries, the definite
possibility of sparking a general Arab-Israeli conflict, and the economic dislocation
associated with the large-scale mobilization necessary for both intervention and
reinforcement of the Golan front. The most important of these is probably the risk
of a crisis with the US while Tel Aviv faced a generalized war. Israel regards its
relationship with the US as crucial to its security.
Israeli intervention in Lebanon would be likely to close Arab ranks behind
Syria, something that Syria has not been able to accomplish and Israel has actively
sought to avoid. While Israel is confident in its ability to defeat Syria, many Israelis
would be reluctant to risk a war unless Israel's security were truly threatened.
The economic costs of mobilization involving more than 100,000 reserve
personnel would probably not be decisive by themselves in determining the decision.
Israeli leaders have not given a clear picture of what would cause Israel to move
its forces into Lebanon. They have indicated, however, that Israel would not
intervene unless a threat to the security of its northern border developed. We believe
the movement of regular Syrian forces into southern Lebanon and/or the buildup of
significant Palestinian or radical Lebanese Muslim forces south of the Litani River
would constitute such a threat. The large-scale movement of Syrian regular forces
into Lebanon for whatever purpose could also provoke an Israeli countermove.
Al
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Israeli objectives in intervening would be primarily military and would be
determined by the immediacy of the threat. A buildup of hostile forces in the
border area would almost certainly elicit combined air-ground operations to destroy
the enemy units involved or drive them north of the Litani River line. Should Israel
conclude that Syrian forces intended to or were in fact moving into southern
Lebanon, an attempt would probably be made to occupy temporarily the Litani
crossings and create a buffer zone between the river and the border.
Israel could be expected to retain a sizable portion of Lebanese territory for as
long as Israeli security planners see fit. There will be domestic pressures to remain
once in place, but significant diplomatic and internal economic pressures would act
to limit it. Israel might also use its presence as a bargaining chip in an attempt to
obtain both Syrian withdrawal and Syrian and Lebanese assurances of a quiet
border. No attempt to occupy all of Lebanon is expected.
The Northern Command, headquartered at Nazareth, has enough forces, except
airmobile, to accomplish Israeli objectives in a move into Lebanon and
simultaneously to reinforce the Golan front.
Full mobilization of the Northern Command, including reserves, would provide
a force of three armored divisions, two mechanized infantry brigades, and three
infantry brigades, with 45,000 to 50,000 troops in combat units, and 900 to 1,000
tanks. At least one airborne brigade from General Headquarters probably would be
used as part of the intervention force. It is estimated that combat units of such a
brigade could be deployed to the Litani River in about six hours. Selected units
from other commands would be activated, and a high state of alert called
throughout the services.
Israeli intervention will most likely be carried out only under a direct threat
because of the inherent risks of such a major venture.
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