NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010042-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: March 24, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Too Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
N2 699
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 24, 1976
LEBANON: Heavy fighting prevents
progress toward political compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ARGENTINA: Military coup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PORTUGAL: Postponement of
legislative election considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
RHODESIA: Four African presidents to
meet to discuss negotiations breakdown . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR-US: Moscow increasingly
discomfited by US debate on "detente" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
YUGOSLAVIA: Tito returns from
14-day Latin American tour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
CHINA-LAOS: Interest-free
Chinese loans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 24, 1976
Heavy fighting in Beirut yesterday prevented any progress toward
implementing the Syrian-sponsored political compromise approved by the Lebanese
cabinet on Monday. Syrian mediators reportedly persuaded the Christian Phalangists
and leaders of some Muslim forces to agree to a cease-fire late yesterday, but leftist
leader Kamal Jumblatt apparently has not accepted the agreement nor has he
dropped his demand for President Franjiyah's immediate resignation.
The Syrians reportedly suspect that Jumblatt and his allies are trying to
undermine peace efforts; Damascus may now decide it must send more Syrian
troops into Lebanon.
The US defense attache in Damascus believes the Syrians may be making
contingency preparations to intervene in Lebanon on a large scale. During a tour
yesterday of the Al Qutayfah area north of Damascus, he observed that the
antiaircraft artillery units were manned and on alert. He also noted that there were
virtually no troops in as many as three of the military installations at Al Qutayfah,
the home garrison of Syria's 3rd Armored Division. A large convoy of troops,
apparently from the 3rd Division, was heading in the direction of Damascus.
The attache feels that an intervention force might involve any one of Syria's
five regular divisions, or might consist of a task force of units taken from several
divisions. Damascus might use "defense" companies that are organized and equipped
along regular military lines, but the attache considers this less likely.
The absence of elements of the 3rd Armored Division from their home
garrisons could indicate that they are preparing to move into Lebanon. According to
a source of the US embassy, the "defense" companies have been put on full alert
and some are outside their usual stations, although still in Syria.
We have no indication of unusual Israeli military activity. Tel Aviv continues to
monitor the situation in Lebanon closely, and we believe that any large-scale Syrian
move into Lebanon could cause the Israelis to react.
Some 2,000-3,000 Syrian regulars are in Lebanon, integrated into units of the
5,000-man Palestine Liberation Army force and the 3,000-man Saiqa fedayeen
group. Together these forces are restraining rebel Muslim army troops led by
Lieutenant Khatib at Khaldah south of Beirut, and forces headed by Kamal
Jumblatt in the Alayh area east of the capital.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 24, 1976
There are unconfirmed reports that some Saiga troops may have joined leftist
militiamen in the battle for control over Beirut's hotel district. Although the major
fedayeen groups have given logistical support to Muslim and leftist forces, we believe
that they generally have stayed out of the fighting.
Leftist forces regained most of the hotel district yesterday, but fighting
elsewhere in the capital appears to have subsided. The Christians reportedly have
been badly shaken by their losses in the hotel area, and are worried that leftist and
Muslim troops are preparing for a major drive today on the port area and the
presidential palace at Babda. The palace came under artillery fire for a brief period
yesterday.
The proposed constitutional amendment providing for the election of a new
president-the key proposal in the Syrian peace plan-was sent to the Lebanese
parliament yesterday. Ambiguity in the bill over the timing of the transfer of power
from President Franjiyah to a newly elected president has prompted calls from
several deputies for a revision of the amendment. The large majority of parliament
that signed a petition last week calling on Franjiyah to resign presumably would
want assurances that he will not use the amendment to prolong his stay in office.
According to press reports, the parliament will try to convene tomorrow for final
deliberation of the bill.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 24, 1976
The armed forces early this morning put the finishing touches on a long
expected coup against Maria Estela Peron, who was flown from the capital in the
military's custody. A junta composed of the three service chiefs is to assume
responsibility for governing, with army commander in chief General Jorge Rafael
Videla as its probable head.
The military's final push, which got under way in earnest several days ago, met
with virtually no resistance. Most Argentines had long since come to regard Peron's
ouster as inevitable. The US embassy reported this morning that activity in the
capital was normal, a possible sign that there was no great concern over the ouster.
The armed forces moved methodically, deploying troops along major roads and
occupying provincial cities. Late last night troops were patrolling the streets of
Buenos Aires and more soldiers were reported to be arriving soon.
The officers, poised to intervene for months, made their move with deliberate
slowness. They underscored the fact that they only reluctantly were taking over, in
the face of consistent civilian failures. The officers also apparently wished to give
Peron every possible opportunity to step down voluntarily.
The armed forces, largely at the behest of Videla, have shown great restraint,
tolerating numerous provocations on the part of the administration. Videla finally
acceded to coup pressure, however, when it became increasingly difficult to bridle
the military's growing restiveness.
The ousted government was in trouble almost from its inception, when Juan
Peron died nearly two years ago leaving his wife as constitutional successor. Her
administration proved hopelessly inept and aroused widespread opposition by its
almost exclusive reliance on a small circle of rightwing Peronist loyalists.
The new government inherits a badly deteriorated economy, widespread
terrorist violence, and political divisiveness. The magnitude of the country's
problems could enforce the arguments of some officers that there is a need for
stricter controls than Videla is likely to advocate.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 24, 1976
The all-military Revolutionary Council met yesterday to discuss postponing the
legislative election scheduled for April 25.
A decision has not been announced. Before the meeting, most Council
members were said to believe that a delay is justified, because of the constituent
assembly's inability to complete the draft constitution on time and administrative
difficulties, such as delays in printing ballots.
If the Council agrees to ost one the vote, the setting of another date could
cause major difficulties.
Less politically minded officers, the so-called "operationals," reportedly had
organized close to half the Council against the President before the meeting began
and appeared convinced that they could block a move to delay the election. They
believe Costa Gomes has been influenced by the Communists, who want to delay the
election either to give them more time to work on the Socialists to obtain a role in a
post-election government or to try to cancel the election altogether.
The "operationals" would probably accept a delay of about two weeks, but
they do not want the election put off for long. An indefinite delay would bring
protests from moderate political parties and would call into question the military's
real intentions regarding their role in politics.
Former president Spinola, who fled the country after being implicated in a
coup attempt a year ago, is rumored to be returning to Portugal in an effort to clear
his name and to be available for the presidential election. His return could turn into
a major election issue, raising charges of an imminent turn to the right and providing
additional ammunition to those who hope to postpone or even to cancel the
elections.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 24, 1976
The four African presidents who have been backing the Rhodesian nationalists
are meeting today to consider the consequences of the breakdown last Friday of
settlement negotiations between Prime Minister Ian Smith and nationalist Joshua
Nkomo.
Zambian President Kaunda is host; presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Machel of
Mozambique, and Khama of Botswana are in Lusaka for the meeting. Rival
Rhodesian nationalists-from both the internal and the external wings of the African
National Council-have reportedly been invited.
The four presidents once again seem to be trying to bring about a reconciliation
between Nkomo, who gained control of the Council's organizational structure inside
Rhodesia last September, and the exiled nationalists who have been pregaring an
all-out military effort to defeat Smith.
The four presidents have avoided taking sides between the two factions; in fact
Machel and Nyerere have had such trouble with several of the exiled Rhodesian
politicians that they have tried to develop new leaders among the active guerrillas.
Now that Nkomo's talks with Smith have ended, the four presidents may hope that
a reunification of the Council's internal and external wings will help them build a
unified liberation army.
We do not think, however, that Nkomo or many of his supporters inside
Rhodesia would want to join the guerrillas in exile, or risk the reprisals that would
face them if they return home after having shown solidarity with the guerrillas.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 24, 1976
Moscow is increasingly discomfited by the debate over US-Soviet relations in
the US. The Soviets continue to profess faith in the health and prospects of
"detente," but they are now warning the home audience that Washington's
dissatisfaction with Soviet behavior is having an adverse effect on state-to-state
relations.
The recent US decision to postpone several scheduled meetings related to joint
cooperative endeavors was carried by Pravda on March 19, giving Washington's
displeasure about events in Angola as the reason. By way of response, the Soviets
have quoted Senator Mansfield's statement that "threats" will not advance US
interests, and they have stuck with their oft-repeated position that "detente" does
not inhibit Soviet support of "progressive" forces in the world.
The Soviets have somewhat altered their initial line on the administration's
decision to avoid the term "detente." At first, Moscow assured the Soviet public
that nothing important had changed, but more recent reporting has been sharper.
The Soviets have criticized the concept of "peace through strength," a term
they have linked directly to President Ford. A lead editorial in last week's New
Times asked whether such a phrase is not a throwback to cold-war policies, warning
that to follow a policy of "position of strength" is to "chase the ghost" of
"preponderant power."
Moscow's suspicions regarding the administration's intentions may have been
compounded in recent weeks by a sharp rise in incidents directed against Soviet
personnel and installations in the US. Soviet party secretary Dolgikh implied in a
speech on March 20 that such attacks are the result of deliberate US policy, an
opinion that may be shared by some of his colleagues.
Moscow is still quick to publicize "evidence" in support of its thesis that the
great majority in the US continues to favor improved relations with the USSR. It
still portrays "anti-Soviet" sentiment in the US as a temporary electoral
phenomenon, one which is proving unpopular with the voters and therefore is
destined to subside.
It is clear, however, that the Soviets are not sanguine and that they fully
recognize that their own behavior in the international arena may have an effect on
the short-term prospects for bilateral relations.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 24, 1976
President Tito returned to Belgrade on Monday after official visits to Mexico,
Panama, and Venezuela, as well as rest stops at Hamilton, Bermuda, and a "friendly
working" visit to southern Portugal.
In Tito's arrival speech at the Belgrade airport, he indicated that Yugoslavia has
much in common with developing Latin American countries. Drawing on a familiar
theme, Tito claimed the countries he had visited are resolutely resisting all forms of
outside interference and are working to strengthen their national identities and
independence. Not unexpectedly, Tito asserted that his host countries either favored
nonalignment or at least were in agreement with its principles.
During his tour of Latin America, Tito reportedly was accompanied by eight
doctors. In Mexico, the Yugoslav leader spent most of his time at the Yucatan resort
city of Cancun in order to avoid the high altitudes of Mexico City. In Panama, plans
were revamped because the pace was considered excessive, and in Venezuela a press
conference and ceremony for signing the joint communique were postponed for one
day because Tito was fatigued.
Consideration for Tito's health apparently prompted authorities in Belgrade to
announce recently that protocol for future state visits will be modified to omit
official dinners and receptions. Tito is scheduled to visit Sweden from March 29 to
April 1, and the precautions evident during the Latin American tour will probably
prevail.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 24, 1976
Peking and Vientiane have agreed to an economic and technical agreement
providing for interest-free Chinese loans to Laos.
The agreement was reached during a recent visit to Peking by Lao Prime
Minister and Party Secretary General Kaysone Phomvihan. This is the first visit to
China by a foreign head of state since the death of Chou En-Iai in early January and
is the first high-level Lao delegation to visit China since July 1972. The Lao
delegation is now touring southern China and is expected to return to Vientiane
today.
Kaysone's trip to Peking followed stops in Hanoi and Moscow, which have
already concluded aid agreements with the new government in Laos. Peking has
played up the visit, and senior Chinese leaders, including Mao Tse-tung, met with the
delegation.
In a banquet speech, acting Prime Minister Hua Kuo-feng emphasized the
mutual fraternal friendship that traditionally has characterized relations between
both countries. He also warned Kaysone of Moscow's intentions to "extend its
grabbing claws everywhere...." Hua's warning was a continuation of the theme that
Vientiane should be more self-reliant and more concerned with increasing Soviet
influence in Laos. An edition of a local Lao newspaper on March 17 omitted all
remarks by Hua that might offend Moscow.
Despite China's obvious concerns over the need to balance the Soviet role in
Laos, Peking's influence in Vientiane clearly lags behind that of Moscow and Hanoi.
The Lao have given more favorable publicity to Soviet assistance, and Chinese
diplomats in Vientiane have reportedly found it difficult to gain access to senior Lao
officials.
Chinese forces are continuing to work on extending the road network in
northern Laos. Other Chinese aid to Laos in the past two years has included trucks,
rice, fuel, medicines, and textiles.
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