NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010032-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: March 18, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
NOUN M- =1
OwNEOPIWO"Lem
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
N? 697
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
LEBANON: Threat to force Franjiyah's
resignation withdrawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
THAILAND: Government bracing for
anti-US demonstrations on Saturday . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-SOMALIA: President Siad
lobbying for support of his policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
UK: Labor Party leadership
race gets under way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SPAIN: Rumors of a cabinet
shuffle involving Arias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
PORTUGAL: Colonial policy
causing problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
AUSTRIA: PLO seeking to open
office in Vienna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ISRAEL: West Bank demonstrations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
LEBANON
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Brigadier Ahdab yesterday publicly withdrew his threat to force the resignation
Most of the Lebanese and Palestinian leaders who traveled to Damascus early
this week returned to Beirut yesterday cautiously optimistic that a political
settlement can be worked out. Only Socialist leader Kamal Jumblatt, who
condemned Syria's military and political intervention and who refused to join the
talks in Damascus, continues to call for a military showdown.
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Damascus radio last night broadcast a statement by Asad affirming that the
Syrian mediation effort will continue. Asad called on all sides "to maintain their
self-control" during the negotiations. This close and public identification of Asad
with the negotiations suggests that Damascus sees some signs of progress in the talks.
Damascus, which has tried to remain neutral in the current crisis, yesterday
moved closer to open criticism of Ahdab. Isam Qansu, leader of the Syrian Baath
Party in Lebanon, publicly ridiculed Ahdab's "television coup."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
Bangkok is bracing for possible leftist-inspired anti-US demonstrations this
Saturday-the deadline imposed last year by the government for the withdrawal of
all foreign military forces from Thailand.
Student and leftist groups anticipate that the government will permit a limited
US military presence to remain after the deadline passes, and they plan to organize
protests against any such agreement. The activists are not optimistic about attracting
much public support, however, and they are prepared to move cautiously to avoid a
confrontation with violence-prone, right-wing groups.
How the demonstrations evolve will depend in part on the outcome of current
Thai-US negotiations over a residual US military presence. If an agreement cannot be
reached by Saturday, and all US forces are required to depart, the political left will
be denied its key issue. If an agreement is reached, however, the odds of potentially
violent demonstrations will increase.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 18, 1976
Somali President Siad, who has been in Moscow since the Soviet party congress,
appears to be lobbying hard for increased Soviet diplomatic, military, and economic
support for his policies in the Horn of Africa. He may be encountering some
difficulty, however, in gaining Moscow's open backing for an aggressive policy in
pursuit of his ultimate goal of annexing the French Territory of the Afars and Issas.
Siad met late last week with Soviet President Podgorny. According to Pravda,
the two presidents "exchanged views" with "mutual understanding" on the situation
in Africa, on national liberation movements, and on issues in bilateral relations. This
description of the talks suggests that the two sides differed on substantive matters.
Pravda's glowing reference to the 1974 Soviet-Somali friendship treaty reflects
Moscow's continued commitment to Mogadiscio. No mention was made of the FTAI
dispute, however, suggesting that Moscow remains reluctant to identify itself with
Siad's position.
The Soviet armed forces newspaper Red Star also failed to mention the FTAI
in its front-page coverage of Siad's discussions early this week with Defense Minister
Grechko which, like the Podgorny talks, were said to have been held in a
"comradely atmosphere of mutual understanding."
Siad reiterated his commitment to self-determination for the FTAI in his
speech to the Soviet party congress. His actual objectives are the complete and
immediate withdrawal of French forces, the replacement of the present head of the
territorial administration by a pro-Somali official, and the eventual incorporation of
the territory into Somalia.
Moscow has said little publicly on the FTAI issue, and privately has cautioned
Siad to rely on political pressure and subversion to achieve his ends in the territory.
The Soviets evidently do not want Siad to precipitate a war with Ethiopia that
would compel them to come to his assistance to the detriment of their relations with
Addis Ababa.
Moscow would also like to see the situation evolve in such a way that the
French could bow out with a minimum of disruption to Franco-Soviet relations.
Tass, for example, applauded French Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues' recent
statement that Paris intends to grant independence to the FTAI after "broad
consultations" with all political parties and a referendum attended by "international
observers."
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
British Foreign Secretary Callaghan and four other cabinet members have
formally announced their candidacies to succeed Harold Wilson.
The other contenders are Energy Secretary Anthony Benn and Employment
Secretary Michael Foot on the left, and Home Secretary Roy Jenkins and
Environment Secretary Anthony Crosland from the center-right.
There have been some indications that Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis
Healey may not enter the race. If he stays out, Callaghan has a good chance of
winning on the first ballot. Other candidates have until Monday to declare their
intentions.
Whoever becomes prime minister will probably feel compelled to seek an
endorsement of his leadership by calling a national election before the end of the
year. Labor's election prospects appear to be relatively good as the British economy
seems to be emerging from its deep recession. Although unemployment will remain
at exceptionally high levels, Labor would still benefit from the sharp decline in the
rate of inflation as well as a public perception that better times are in store.
These potential gains, however, could be wiped out by losses to nationalist
opponents in Scotland, thus preventing a Labor majority at Westminster. Labor's
Scottish losses could be minimized if the new leader was willing to grant a greater
amount of autonomy to Scotland. Callaghan has not been closely identified with the
devolution issue and might be just the person to make these concessions.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
Rumors of a cabinet shuffle involving Prime Minister Arias are being sparked by
serious labor disturbances, persistent economic problems, and widespread allegations
that, privately, King Juan Carlos is critical of Arias.
Opposition groups say Arias is too conservative, overly cautious, and closely
linked to the remnants of Franco's political apparatus. A leftist magazine has
accused the government of ineptitude, and the influential weekly Cambio 16
proclaimed that Arias' strategy of gradual reform had failed.
One popular magazine has tested the limits of the new freedom of the press in
Spain by declaring recently that the government should not continue in office after
the killing of four demonstrators by police in Vitoria on March 3.
Arias appears to be losing what little support he had from the right. The far
right accuses him of being overly tolerant of the opposition, pointing to the loss of
police control in Vitoria as an example of what could occur elsewhere in Spain if the
left is not restrained.
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The prestigious Madrid daily Informaciones claimed on Monday that Arias had
already advised the King that he wanted to resign. According to press sources, a
senior government official denied the report, but admitted that further bloodshed or
labor strife could bring down the government.
There are formidable obstacles to replacing Arias. Last December, the King
reportedly wanted to appoint a more liberal prime minister but was forced to retain
Arias when he encountered opposition in the conservative Council of the Realm-the
advisory body that must present the King with a slate of three names.
There have been no signs of any moves in the council to clear the way for a
new prime minister more to the King's liking.
If Arias stays, Finance Minister Villar Mir may become the scapegoat. He is
widely disliked, particularly by the workers, because of his insistence on applying
strict limits to wage raises. Villar Mir's departure, however, would have little effect
on the central problem of how to proceed with reforms at a pace sufficient to satisfy
the left without enraging the far right.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
The rapid dismantling of Portugal's colonial empire is creating biter divisions
at home, and relations with its former African colonies are off to a rocky start.
Rapid decolonization was the hallmark of the revolution that brought the
Armed Forces Movement to power in April 1974 and provided the cornerstone for a
foreign policy that envisioned Portugal as an intermediary between Europe and the
Third World. The idealistic officers who initiated the decolonization process,
however, have encountered far greater frustrations and difficulties than they had
expected.
The number-two man in the inter-territorial cooperation ministry, which is
responsible for Lisbon's policy toward its former colonies, resigned yesterday to
protest the government's tendency to yield to the demands of the ex-colonies in its
attempt to cultivate amicable relations and to curry favor with the Third World.
Deputy Minister for Cooperation Gomes Mota submitted his resignation after
returning from an eight-day negotiating session in Maputo, where he failed to elicit a
guarantee for basic human rights for the nearly 50,000 white Portuguese citizens still
in Mozambique. Talks are to resume at the ministerial level, possibly as soon as next
week, but will be hampered by disagreements over air rights and economic
dispensations. Lisbon's tendency to grant independence first and work out the
details later has left it little leverage in negotiations with the former territories.
Mozambique's black Marxist leaders-avowedly opposed to racism-have
stepped up harassment of white Portuguese residents since the beginning of the year.
Large numbers of colonists have been jailed or placed in work camps and their
property confiscated. Over 100,000 Portuguese have left Mozambique since
independence last June, and Portuguese officials are predicting a mass exodus of the
remainder if no guarantees can be obtained.
In Guinea-Bissau, the first Portuguese colony to receive independence, the
regime's demands for reparations from Lisbon have deadlocked negotiations
between the two governments. Disagreements over the transfer of Bissau's central
bank-still in Portuguese hands-and over settlement of Bissau's debt to Portugal led
Guinea-Bissau to nationalize the central bank in February. Lisbon responded by
holding in abeyance all Bissau claims on Portugal and negotiations have not resumed.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
A Palestine Liberation Organization spokesman has initiated inq Jr es into the
possibility of opening an information office in Vienna.
Abdul Jayab, head of the PLO office in Budapest, recently claimed to Austrian
journalists that approval could help reduce the influence of extremist Palestinian
splinter groups. He said Austria is considered a friend of the Palestinians and denied
any link by his organization to last December's violent attack on the OPEC
headquarters in Vienna. In any event, the PLO appears anxious to open an office in
the Austrian capital for information purposes and to have in place an accredited
observer staff for UN specialized agencies headquartered there.
An official response probably will not be made until Chancellor Kreisky returns
from his third fact-finding mission to the Middle East on behalf of Socialist
International. Approval for some form of PLO office is probable in as much as
Austria wants to expand trade with the Arab countries and retain the OPEC
headquarters in Vienna.
Although of Jewish descent, Kreisky maintains he has no political sympathies
for Zionism, even though he wants Israel's existence assured. He favors a solution to
the Palestinian problem and foresees that there may be less terrorism by fedayeen
radicals if the PLO is recognized.
March 18, 19-1/6
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 18, 1976
Yesterday's accidental shooting by a panicky Israeli soldier of three young West
Bank demonstrators on the outskirts of Jerusalem is the most serious incident to
date since the series of anti-Israeli outbursts on the West Bank began nearly seven
weeks ago. It is unlikely, however, to cause the Israelis to reconsider their tough
methods of dealing with the disorders.
In fact, the Israelis are likely to crack down even harder if the disturbances
continue. Justice Minister Zadok said in Hebron yesterday-even as demonstrations
were under way in the town-that the government is determined to restore law and
order on the West Bank. Defense Minister Peres warned West Bank mayors that the
Israeli army will not hesitate to act vigorously if local West Bank administrations
cannot keep order.
The Israeli military administration for the West Bank has already clamped a
curfew on two major West Bank towns and closed at least one high school. The
Israelis could also impose more drastic measures, such as trade and travel restrictions
between West Bank towns and Jordan and direct military rule, if necessary.
Although Israeli military officers are telling the press that the Palestine
Liberation Organization and Jordanian communists are inciting the students, the
protests appear to be largely unorganized and spontaneous. The continuing disorders
and the reluctance of some West Bank leaders to give in to Israeli urgings to help
restore calm more accurately reflect growing Palestinian -nationalism and
self-assertiveness in the face of Israeli rule.
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