NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010030-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: March 17, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
HR,
National Intelligence
Bulletin
Top Secret
N2 699
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National Intelligence Bulletin
EGYPT: Reaction to
abrogation of treaty with Soviets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
WEST GERMANY: Labor accepts
smaller than expected wage hike . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
USSR: A new minister of agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
BRAZIL-POLAND: Four-year
bilateral trade agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
INDONESIA: UN team's report on Timor . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ZAIRE: Debt rescheduling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
ANNEX: Southern African Leaders' Views on Rhodesia
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 17, 1976
The US embassy in Cairo reports that initial reaction in Egypt to President
Sadat's abrogation of the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty is generally
favorable, although Sadat apparently took the step against the counsel of some of
his advisers.
The embassy said the abrogation surprised most Egyptians, who had noted the
recent lull in Egyptian-Soviet polemics and who had believed Sadat wanted to
maintain a semblance of balance in Egypt's ties with the USSR and the US. The
embassy's impression is that large numbers of Egyptians welcome the step as "long
overdue."
planes, and rockets" for six US C-130 aircraft.
Jthere is no evidence to suggest that Sadat does not
have the support of his government. Fahmi put the full weight of his support behind
the treaty abrogation in a speech to the People's Assembly on Monday; as just
grounds for the move, he catalogued a long list of Egypt's grievances with Moscow.
Most Arab states have ignored Sadat's announcement; some have reported it
factually, but none has supported it. Virtually the only commentary has come from
Jordan, where two newspapers criticized the abrogation as a move taken at the
behest of the US. Both papers imply that the Soviet refusal to supply Egypt with
arms has been Sadat's fault entirely and deride him for trading "thousands of tanks,
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 17, 1976
A smaller than anticipated wage increase accepted by 500,000 metalworkers
last Friday will help ensure a continued upswing in the economy this year. The
5.4-percent wage boost probably can be offset by increases in labor productivity,.
The settlement establishes a pattern for the remaining 3.3 million metalworkers and
will strongly influence pending wage agreements for 2 million public service workers.
The wage settlement will be welcome news to Chancellor Schmidt and his
government. Schmidt told a US official last week that he believed labor would seek a
higher increase, and said that he would not be surprised if a series of strikes were
staged during the coming months.
Big business representatives as well as Bonn's economic spokesmen have argued
that wage increases of less than 6 percent are necessary to allow profit margins to
grow and to spur new investment. Investment is cited as the weakest element in the
West German economy by most observers, and a strong improvement in this area
will be crucial both for sustaining the recovery and reducing unemployment, which
now stands at 1.3 million.
reduced by 250,000, indicating that further production gains were probably
registered. If the favorable trends continue, the still cautious business community
percent in real terms from the previous month (seasonally adjusted), while industrial
output increased 3 percent. In February, the number of workers on short time was
The favorable wage developments come on the heels of reports of increased
demand for West German industrial products. In January, new orders rose about 5
will probably upgrade investment plans for later in the year.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 17, 1976
Moscow announced yesterday that Dmitry Polyansky has been dismissed as
minister of agriculture. His replacement is Valentin Mesyats, a 48-year-old
agronomist.
Polyansky's dismissal was foreshadowed by the loss of his Politburo seat at the
party congress less than two weeks ago. Polyansky may not, however, be headed for
complete obscurity. He was re-elected a full member of the 287-person Central
Committee, and yesterday's announcement stated that he has been assigned other
duties. The announcement did not elaborate on what Polyansky would be doing, but
there has been speculation that he may be slated for a diplomatic post.
. For the past five years, Mesyats has been serving as second secretary of the
party organization in Kazakhstan under General Secretary Brezhnev's protege,
Kazakh party boss Dinmukhamed Kunayev. Before that, Mesyats served for a
number of years as deputy minister of agriculture in the Russian republic. He began
his career in the Moscow region, where he held a number of party posts dealing with
farm affairs.
Mesyats may owe the appointment to his good political connections as well as
to his record of neutrality on controversial agrarian issues. Very little is known
about his views on agricultural policy. He seems to have avoided involvement in any
of the debates that have divided the agricultural bureaucracy in recent years.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 17, 1976
Brazil's decision to sign a four-year bilateral trade agreement with Poland,
involving $3.2 billion, is a dramatic expression of Brazilian intentions to improve ties
with the Soviet Union and East European states.
The agreement constitutes a major development in Brazilian foreign economic
policy. Until last year, Poland had been virtually excluded from Brazil's markets.
Poland now will become one of Brazil's important trading partners.
The agreement covers a wide range of matters: long-term contracts for raw
materials and agricultural products; industrial cooperation in manufactured goods;
and "integration" in the fishing and ship construction industries. Most important, it
will facilitate an exchange of the two countries' major export commodities,
incorporating an accord signed last year providing fora ten-year barter of Brazilian
iron ore for Polish coal.
Diplomatically, the new relationship is in line with Brazil's efforts to expand
foreign markets and strengthen economic relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe. It doubtless will give impetus to lobbying efforts by other
communist countries in Brasilia. The agreement also boosts the image of Foreign
Minister Silveira, who has staked his reputation in large measure on the success of his
strategy of developing independent and pragmatic foreign policies for Brazil.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 17, 1976
The report on the UN investigation of the situation in Timor should cause
Jakarta few problems.
It states that an accurate assessment of the situation as a whole "remains
elusive, but makes no judgments on Fretilin accusations of intervention by
Indonesian armed forces. It contains a straightforward account of the UN
representative's trip to Timor and restates the positions of the various Timorese
factions and interested countries. The report concludes that all the parties and
countries concerned agree that the people of eastern Timor should determine their
own fate, but notes that they disagree on how this should be accomplished.
No date has been set for Security Council consideration of the report, and
there appears to be little sentiment to renew debate on Timor. The Indonesians are
anxious to avoid debate as long as possible in order to allow time for carefully
managed elections to choose a Timorese delegation that would visit Jakarta and
"appeal" for incorporation into Indonesia. The Indonesians have even proposed that
Secretary General Waldheim's envoy return to Timor to visit previously contested
areas to obtain a more comprehensive view of the situation.
Indonesian forces now control all significant population and military
installations in the Portuguese half of the island, but Fretilin forces are still active in
the rugged hinterlands and have frustrated the Indonesian advance in the past few
weeks with hit-and-run attacks. Although morale among Indonesian troops
reportedly is deteriorating, Fretilin appears incapable of seriously disrupting
Jakarta's plans for eastern Timor.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 17, 1976
Zaire reportedly has begun discussions with ambassadors of creditor countries
in Kinshasa on rescheduling its foreign debt, the latest in a series of steps taken this
year to cope with the country's debt crisis.
President Mobutu requested new funding from the International Monetary
Fund last month, agreeing to conditions set by a Zairian government commission for
curbing government spending and reversing nationalization measures enacted in
1974. He also devalued the currency by 40 percent to improve the trade balance.
Fund and Western governments, and efforts to curb foreign exchange spending
should enable Kinshasa to cope with its foreign exchange needs for the rest of the
Zaire's foreign debt is now close to $3 billion, about 75 percent of it held by
private banks and suppliers in the US, Canada, and Western Europe.
Already in default on repayments scheduled in 1975, and faced with low
copper prices again this year, Zaire would need an estimated $700 to $800 million in
new foreign loans to meet foreign exchange requirements for its current-account
deficit and payments on principal.
The International Monetary Fund reportedly will recommend that Zaire's debt
be renegotiated sufficiently to halve Zaire's ratio of debt service payments to
exports, now at about 25 percent. Debt renegotiations, anticipated loans from the
year.
AFGHANISTAN-USSR: A Soviet military delegation is expected to arrive in
Kabul this week, most likely to formalize protocols negotiated last year. The
emphasis of this agreement reportedly will focus on armor, especially armored
personnel carriers, for Afghanistan's three armored divisions, possibly to implement
an armor reorganization. The Afghan army will be able to absorb more equipment
into existing units, but it is doubtful that its capabilities will be significantly
increased. It suffers from a rudimentary logistic system and a shortage of skilled
manpower.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
Southern African Leaders' Views on Rhodesia
March 17, 1976
The African leaders-presidents Kaunda of Zambia, Nyerere of Tanzania, and
Machel of Mozambique-who have been working hard to bring about a negotiated
settlement in Rhodesia fear that Cuba and the USSR may become excessively
involved in the effort to end white rule in southern Africa. In their view, direct
Cuban and Soviet involvement such as occurred in Angola would transform an
African problem into a US-Soviet confrontation.
Basically, the three African leaders would prefer a negotiated settlement
pressed on the Smith regime through economic sanctions and the threat of war,
rather than a solution imposed by use of force. Their preference is based in part on a
realistic appraisal of the limited capabilities of the Rhodesian insurgents and the
serious economic dislocations, particularly to Zambia, that would ensue from a
full-blown insurgency. They are especially sensitive to the possibility that a sudden
escalation of guerrilla warfare against Rhodesia could result in the Cubans assuming
an ever-increasing share of the fighting.
Among African leaders, Zambian President Kaunda has taken the strongest
stand against Cuban involvement. Kaunda has tied his prestige to a peaceful
settlement of the Rhodesian problem.
When the talks between Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith and nationalist leader
Joshua Nkomo began late last year, Kaunda only reluctantly agreed to support
preparations for expanded insurgency, hoping that the threat of insurgency would
be enough to convince Smith to accept a settlement. Since then, however, the
Zambian leader has become less sanguine that an insurgency can be avoided.
Kaunda viewed the Cuban role during the civil war in Angola as a dangerous
precedent for the Rhodesian problem,
Kaunda's foreign affairs adviser recently told the US ambassador that
preparations for guerrilla war were well-advanced and that time has virtually run out
for the Smith regime. The adviser's comments were clearly designed to impart a
sense of urgency to the guerrilla threat and to prod the US into supporting Kaunda's
policies. A recent editorial in the newspaper of Zambia's ruling party charged that
US policy on Rhodesia might cause Washington to intervene on the side of the white
Rhodesians as a counter to what it may see as the threat of Soviet and Cuban
expansion in southern Africa.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 17, 1976
Kaunda and Nyerere fear that during an intensified insurgency guerrilla leaders
with no political savvy will push aside black Rhodesian political leaders, making it
more difficult for the African leaders to exert their influence over a black Rhodesian
government.
Tanzania and Mozambique
Nyerere and Machel have long believed that Nkomo's talks with Smith would
fail and that full-scale insurgency would be required to bring down the Smith
regime. Both are willing to accept Cuban advisers and Soviet arms. They do not want
to be pushed too far too fast, however, and they want assistance funneled through
such established channels as the African Liberation Committee of the Organization
of African Unity.
competitive Soviet and Chinese arms supplies, Cuban intervention, support from the
West for "their friends," and South African military operations.
Nyerere and other Tanzanian
officials do not want Rhodesia to become another Angola, complete with
asked of them.
The Soviets-judging from the mild tone taken toward the southern African
problem at the recent party congress-apparently are sensitive to African feelings
and are willing to sit tight for the time being. If the Smith-Nkomo talks fail,
however, both Havana and Moscow are prepared to provide whatever assistance is
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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