NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 11, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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To Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
NSA review completed
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 11, 1976
LEBANON:
CHINA: Mao linked
to criticism of Teng . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
SAUDI ARABIA - SOUTH YEMEN: Reconciliation . . . . . . . . 6
USSR -WESTERN SAHARA: Moscow
reluctant to take sides in conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
USSR: Naval visit
to Mauritius . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
PORTUGAL: Election campaign begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
SPAIN: Military officers sentenced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
SINGAPORE: Military training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's
trip to Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
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National Intelligence Bulletin
The Israeli government leaders are closely monitoring the situation in southern
Lebanon, but they have so far refrained from any comment that would inflame the
situation. Israeli press articles suggest that the leadership is unsure of the
implications for Israel of recent developments in Lebanon, and has not decided
what, if any, action to take.
The Israelis undoubtedly fear that the spread of the mutiny to areas so close to
their border may draw additional Palestinian forces into the area. Previously, Israeli
leaders have indicated that they would consider the presence of major non-Lebanese
forces in southern Lebanon a direct threat to Israel's security.
March 11, 1976
According to unconfirmed
press reports, Mamari's forces also attacked a Lebanese air base.
The rebels' successes have sparked concern among Lebanese Christians that
Khatib and his sympathizers intend to form a renegade Muslim force encircling the
core Christian area of the country.
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March 11, 1976
Prime Minister Karami tried yesterday to gloss over the deepening controversy
between Christian and Muslim leaders over how to handle the mutineers. He
admitted, however, that the problem had forced a temporary interruption in
negotiations to form a new cabinet. Leftist leader Kamal Jumblatt-an outspoken
supporter of the Muslim rebels-apparently has so alienated Christian leaders on the
mutiny issue that they have refused to participate in further political talks until the
problem is solved. Jumblatt reportedly has also rejected an alleged Syrian plan
simply to announce a new cabinet without further talks with quarreling Muslim and
Christian politicians.
Despite Jumblatt's obstinacy, Syrian negotiators apparently still favor the
creation of a new cabinet as quickly as possible, and may use the growin security
problems as additional leverage against Christian and Muslim leaders.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 11, 1976
Peking's most authoritative statement to date on the campaign to criticize Teng
Hsiao-ping, while linking Mao Tse-tung directly to this effort, also reflects some
differences within the party over how far to pursue the current campaign.
A People's Daily.editorial of March 10 quotes Mao'on the need to "narrow the
target" of the attack, implying that Teng alone should be criticized, but, at the same
time, leaves the door open to criticism of other officials who are associated with
Teng and who, like him, were returned to public office after being ousted a decade
ago. While the editorial stops short of calling for Teng to be overthrown, stating only
that he should be criticized, Teng is separated from other officials who, the editorial
notes, should be "helped" to correct their past mistakes.
The party's left wing will undoubtedly use one of the passages in the editorial
that is linked directly to Mao to broaden the attack on Teng to include many of the
rehabilitees who once again hold important party, military, and government
positions. The editorial nevertheless calls for people to remain "coolheaded" and
strictly prohibits the kind of disruptive political activity that characterized the
Cultural Revolution.
These prohibitions, which are at the operative heart of the editorial, strongly
suggest that more moderate leaning members of the leadership still retain a major
voice in defining the scope of the campaign. These leaders almost certainly prefer at
the least to limit the attacks to Teng himself and to keep the campaign from gaining
enough momentum to encompass large numbers of rehabilitated officials and to
undercut major domestic and foreign policies.
The restrictions may be particularly important in view of the greater
identification in the editorial of Mao with the leftist cause in general and with the
attacks on Teng in particular. The editorial introduces two new "quotations" from
the Chairman which tie him closer to the campaign; in the past he had been
identified unequivocally only with the leftist effort to preserve Cultural Revolution
reforms in the educational field and with a more general injunction to persevere in
"class struggle." But even this new invocation of the Chairman's authority is
somewhat ambiguous.
The editorial states the campaign is being conducted under the direction of the
"central committee headed" by Mao-a power sharing formulation that was
conspicuously absent throughout the Cultural Revolution. It was only reintroduced
after the Lin Piao incident, when the central authorities were unsure of army loyalty
and Mao was somewhat tarnished by his previous relationship with the disgraced
defense minister.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 11, 1976
The central authorities also seem to be making other efforts to define the scope
of the campaign. In a briefing for foreign diplomats in Peking on March 6, a
university official stated that Teng is the only target of the current attack and
implied that he could remain in power if he agreed to admit his mistakes. He added,
however, that Teng had not yet done so.
The official refused to be drawn out specifically on what Teng's ultimate fate
would be or on his current status, but the general low-key tenor of his comments
suggests that Peking is making a concerted effort to play down the campaign for
foreign audiences-and that important elements in the leadership are concerned
about the possible impact that indications of political instability may have abroad.
This briefing is unprecedented, and represents a major departure from practice
during the Cultural Revolution when far fewer diplomats were in Peking-and during
the anti-Confucius campaign of 1974.
In general, the tenor of the briefing accords with the comments of a senior
communist official in Hong Kong who gave a relaxed explanation of the campaign to
an American diplomat and suggested that more moderate leaders in Peking, who are
opposed to the current situation, will eventually be heard from. An indication of
what this official had in mind may be contained in recent reports that wall posters
appeared in Canton attacking Chiang Ching, Mao's leftist wife.
In the meantime, the party's left wing continues its active pursuit of Teng. The
Ministry of Culture, which is closely associated with leftist political leaders, has
withdrawn from circulation all films in which Teng appears. Posters have been cited
in Shanghai and in Kwangtung Province calling for Teng's ouster. I
posters attacking rehabilitated provincial officials
have begun to appear in several scattered locations. Moreover, some reports of the
attacks on Teng in scattered areas carry the implication that the late Chou En-lai is
also to blame for his role in returning Teng to power. If this line is pursued, there is
likely to be a strong anti-leftist backlash from Chou's many former supporters and
adherents.
Equally important, there are signs that civilian leftists are courting the military
as allies in the current campaign. The military was conspicuously absent during the
campaign's initial stages but some units are now beginning to participate in the
criticism of Teng. In what seems to be a direct appeal to China's powerful regional
military commanders in the provinces, wall posters reportedly have accused Teng of
seeking to undercut their authority by concentrating military power in Peking and
more particularly in his own hands. The posters also charge Teng with opposing a
system of rapid promotions in the armed forces.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 11, 1976
SAUDI ARABIA - SOUTH YEMEN
Saudi Arabia and South Yemen announced in a joint statement yesterday their
intention to normalize relations, capping a reconciliation process initiated by Cairo
in 1974. The Saudis and the radical National Front regime in Aden have been at
loggerheads since South Yemen became independent in 1967.
The communique declared that the two countries would refrain from
interfering in each other's internal affairs while cooperating in cultural and economic
affairs. It also expressed both countries' opposition to "foreign interference" in the
Arabian Peninsula. The reference to "foreign interference" is broad enough to
encompass both the Saudi objection to the Soviet presence in South Yemen and
Aden's opposition to Iran's military role in Oman.
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The late King Faysal's overnment refused to have anything- to do with the
ruling group in Aden.
The Saudis probably also believe that they can widen-to their benefit-the
reported differences within the National Front hierarchy. For several years there
have been indications that President Salim Rubayi Ali and pro-Soviet party secretary
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 11, 1976
general Abd-al-Fattah Ismail have been involved in a power struggle. The Saudis are
betting that Ali, with whom they have negotiated the accommodation, can
overcome Ismail and be brought into Riyadh's camp.
Our initial assessment is that prospects for remaking South Yemen into a
moderate state are not very promising. The party leadership role of Ismail-a
hard-line Marxist and key backer of the Dhofar rebellion-has enabled him to place
his supporters throughout the party, government, and military apparatus. South
Yemen's willingness to negotiate the deal with the Saudis probably was dictated
more by economic necessity than an interest in modifying its present political
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National Intelligence Bulletin
USSR -WESTERN SAHARA
March 11, 1976
Soviet efforts to straddle the Western Sahara issue are irritating Algiers but
pleasing Rabat.
The USSR has handled the proclamation of the "Saharan Democratic Arab
Republic" by the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas with caution. The Soviets have
taken public note of the declaration and reported that Algeria considers the entity a
"national liberation movement," but their press coverage has also reported
Moroccan opposition to the move.
Soviet op osition to a war over Western Sahara appears to be registering on
Algiers.
Perhaps to show its pique, Algiers summoned its ambassador to the USSR
home before the Soviet party congress last month. Later, the Algerian delegate to
the congress made a quick trip home to consult with Boumediene before talking
with Soviet leaders.
Soviet overtures have apparently convinced Morocco that the Kremlin is not
adopting, a blatantly pro-Algerian stand. Moroccan Prime Minister Osman has told
US officials that he was pleased by his discussions with Premier Kosygin last month
in Moscow. Kosygin evidently told Osman that Boumediene had placed himself on a
limb and that a way should be found to get the Algerian President off it without
embarrassment.
Early this week, Rabat demonstrated its satisfaction with the Soviet show of
evenhandedness by resuming relations with East Germany. The East Germans
pledged that they would not interfere in Rabat's "internal affairs"-implying they
would not extend diplomatic recognition to the new Polisario "republic." Morocco
had broken ties with East Berlin last November as a signal to Moscow that Rabat was
disturbed over Soviet meddling in the Western Sahara question.
Despite its show of evenhandedness, Moscow's instinctive sympathies lie with
the "progressive" regime in Algeria over the US-supported monarchy in Morocco.
Soviet use of Algerian airfields during the Angola conflict and the USSR's desire to
curry favor with a regime that has standing in nonaligned circles and at least a part
of the Arab world also play a part.
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March 11, 1976
The Soviets, however, do not want to push strategically located Morocco
further into the arms of the US. They also value their commercial dealings with
Rabat and want access to Moroccan phosphates, which may prove increasingly
important to Soviet agriculture.
In view of these conflicting interests, the Kremlin would probably like to
continue to avoid having to choose sides in the conflict. Moscow's bias toward
Algiers may nevertheless propel the USSR toward stronger support of the Algerian
position, particularly, if-against Soviet desires-the Sahara situation deteriorates into
a large-scale conflict.
Moscow has announced that two naval ships are taking part in an official
friendship visit to Port Louis, Mauritius for the island's independence day tomorrow.
Rear Admiral Yasakov, the officer in tactical command of the Soviet Indian
Ocean naval squadron, will be in Port Louis until March 17 aboard a Krivak-class
destroyer. An Alligator-class tank landing ship is also taking part in the port visit. A
supporting Soviet naval oiler is in the Mauritius area but is not expected to
participate in the visit.
Although Soviet naval units have made many calls at Port Louis in the past, this
is the first by a Soviet naval combatant since last August. The visit emphasizes
Moscow's continued interest in pursuing closer ties with Mauritius. Soviet naval
auxiliaries called there as recently as last month when a space support ship made a
one-day stop.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 11, 1976
PORTUGAL
The campaign for legislative elections in Portugal is swinging into full gear with
election day less than two months away.
Fourteen parties have entered slates, but the bulk of the vote will be divided
among only four-the Socialists, the centrist Popular Democrats, the conservative
Social Democratic Center, and the Communists. Eight of the competing parties are
minor groups to the left of the Communists.
The shift to the right since last November is expected to narrow the gap
between the Socialists and the Popular Democrats-who received 38 percent and 26
percent respectively in last year's vote-and to bring the Social Democratic Center
into contention for a leading role in a post-election government.
To kick off their campaign, the Socialists have arranged a star-studded
gathering of West European socialist leaders in the northern Portuguese city of Porto
this weekend. Participants will include Brandt from West Germany, Mitterrand from
France, Kreisky from Austria, Palme from Sweden, and party leaders from the
Netherlands, Norway, Italy, and Spain. The session is intended to give the Socialists
a boost in the heavily Popular Democratic north. Popular Democratic leader Sa
Carneiro has already labeled the meeting as foreign interference in Portuguese
politics and has scheduled a rally in Porto on Saturday in an effort to draw attention
away from the Socialists.
The Socialists have also come out a step ahead of the Popular Democrats in the
number of nationally recognized figures heading their list of candidates and are
benefiting from better media exposure. The Socialists profess to be hopeful of
gaining enough votes to control the new national assembly and claim that they will
"govern alone or not at all."
The Popular Democrats are concentrating on widening their margin of victory
in the densely populated north by courting Angolan returnees and conservative
farmers. They are also counting on the vote of Portuguese workers living abroad and
have challenged the Socialists, Communists, and far left in the constituent assembly
in an effort to ease restrictions on voting by emigrant workers.
The Popular Democrats, however, are caught between the Socialists and the
Social Democratic Center. The party's tactical shifts to the left or right in the past
have left it without a firm ideological base. In recent months, the party has moved
away from the Socialists and adopted views closer to those of the center-right Social
Democratic Center. The latter, however, is stressing its role as an opposition and is
lumping the Popular Democrats with the left, tarring them with participation in past
ineffective governments.
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The Communists appear to be steadily losing ground and are
trying-unsuccessfully so far-to promote an alliance with the Socialists to preserve a
role in Portuguese politics. The Communists are already preparing their supporters
for a bad showing, and one party leader has already said that the Communists will
not recognize the results of the election because his party will not be allowed to
ca
mpaign in "reactionary " areas, such as the north or the Azores.
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Nine Spanish military officers were sentenced yesterday to periods of
imprisonment ranging from two to eight years for belonging to the secret officers'
society called the Military Democratic Union and for attempting to foment military
rebellion. The verdict must still be approved by the commander of the Madrid
Military Region.
Two of the nine qualify for immediate release under the terms of the royal
pardon issued last November; the other seven must serve their sentences and suffer
automatic dismissal from the service if the verdicts are approved.
The sentences seem to indicate that hardliners in the military hierarchy won
the upper hand over more moderate generals who favored leniency. The relatively
harsh treatment of the nine officers could upset many younger officers who, like the
rest of Spanish society, are becoming more politically aware and who already resent
the ultra conservative bias of many officers in the upper echelons. The military
authorities have apparently decided that they would rather risk this resentment than
ease disciplinary control over junior officers.
In the northwestern coal mining region of Asturias, heavily armed security
forces yesterday successfully prevented a mass rally by miners to protest the killing
of four demonstrators in the Basque country last week. Paramilitary civil guards set
up road blocks around the town of Oviedo to prevent miners from gathering there
and dispersed a crowd of about 2,000. At least four leaders of the clandestine
workers commissions wer taken into custody early yesterday morning.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 11, 1976
SINGAPORE
The UK will permit the Singapore armed forces to use British military training
facilities in Brunei. The Singapore air force will begin survival training in late March
or early April. The UK has tentatively agreed to begin training Singapore instructors
at the jungle warfare school in June or July.
The development of Singapore's military establishment has been seriously
hampered by a lack of areas suitable for jungle and conventional training. To
overcome this obstacle, Singapore has sought the assistance of its neighbors and
commonwealth allies. Only Thailand, Taiwan, and the oil-rich protectorate of
Brunei, however, have responded favorably to requests for ground force training.
Singapore's antiaircraft artillery units have trained in Brunei for the past two years,
and Singapore hopes that a similar agreement can be negotiated to permit its
infantry battalions to conduct unit jungle training there.
The UK had been hesitant to approve Singapore's requests for training because
of its plans to leave Brunei in 1978. Although British responsibility for the defense
of Brunei is currently embodied in a mutual agreement, London is under fire from
Malaysia and other Third World countries for hanging on to this "colonial vestige."
The limited training and Malaysia's failure to react adversely to past use of Brunei
'
s request.
probably induced the British to accede to Singapore
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National Intelligence Bulletin
YUGOSLAVIA
March 11, 1976
President Tito officially began his Latin American tour yesterday, following a
flight the day before from Yugoslavia to Bermuda.
Throughout the trip, Tito will probably preach the principles of nonalignment
to his hosts and urge a more active role in the movement by Latin American
governments. Belgrade hopes that the trip will strengthen ties between Yugoslavia
and Latin America.
While in Mexico from March 10 to 14, Tito will sign agreements for
scientific-technical exchanges, trade, and tourism. Tito subsequently will go to
Panama for a four-day state visit. He may feel obligated to support publicly
Panamanian sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Yugoslavia is aware, however, of
Washington's sensitivity over the negotiations. In Caracas, the Yugoslav leader is
expected to push nonalignment and may also emphasize Yugoslavia's view that
OPEC members like Venezuela have an obligation to help improve economic
conditions in the less developed countries.
Originally, Tito was also to have visited Cuba, but arrangements were canceled
i
n favor of meetings from March 6 to 8 with Prime Minister Castro in Yugoslavia.
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