NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028700010008-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: March 4, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
DIA & DOS review(s) completed.
Top Secret
25X1
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 Approved For Releas
National Intelligence Bulletin
March 4, 1976
MOZAMBIQUE-RHODESIA: Border closure
will cause economic problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
UK-RHODESIA: Concern over
situation in Rhodesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
MOROCCO: King Hassan's speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
USSR-ASIA: Attendance
at party congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
NORWAY: Probable
restriction on aid to Cuba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 4, 1976
President Machel's decision yesterday to impose sanctions against the
Rhodesian white minority regime by closing Mozambique's borders with Rhodesia
will have serious economic consequences for both countries.
Rhodesian Prime Minister Smith will now be under intense pressure to
negotiate a settlement with his country's black nationalists because of the economic
dislocation caused by the border closure. Up to half of Rhodesia's foreign trade had
been passing through Mozambique. The Rhodesians will try to make up as much as
they can of the loss by increasing traffic through South Africa's transport links with
Salisbury. Although Pretoria will accommodate some of this extra burden, the South
Africans are not likely to disrupt their own commerce significantly to accommodate
the.Smith government.
Closing the border will also entail risks for Machel. Economic problems and
tribal tensions have been troublesome for Machel, and the loss of revenue and the
resulting unemployment which will follow the end of trade with Rhodesia will be a
further blow to Mozambique's economy. Severe food shortages will pose the most
serious problem, since Mozambique had been dependent on Rhodesian wheat, corn,
and meat shipments.
The Mozambique government probably is counting on commonwealth leaders
to make good their pledges of last year to make up the revenue that would be lost
by imposing sanctions. British officials say that they are expecting a request for
assistance in the next few days.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 4, 1976
The Wilson government has only recently faced up to the fact that events in
Angola could directly affect other parts of southern Africa, which in turn could have
serious political repercussions in Britain.
Lord Greenhill found no significant changes in Prime Minister Smith's hard-line
position during his special mission to Rhodesia last week. A Foreign Office official
told the US embassy in London that, while Greenhill detected some apprehension
about the future among white Rhodesians, he found no willingness to do anything
to avert the gathering storm.
The Labor government, for its part, does not seem to know how it can
influence the situation in Rhodesia. The British, however, can hardly remain
unconcerned because:
--many white Rhodesians are recent emigrants from Britain and retain strong
family ties to the homeland;
--London still has a "legal" responsibility for its breakaway colony;
--British economic interests in South Africa would be threatened by a calamity
in Rhodesia; and
--vocal right-wing elements in the media and parliamentary opposition would
criticize Labor's passivity in the face of a struggle between "kith and kin" and
an externally aided guerrilla movement.
Although the time for a peaceful settlement may have passed, Britain might be
willing to subsidize the costs of transition to majority rule should an unexpected
breakthrough occur in the talks between Smith and black nationalists led by Joshua
Nkomo. Prime Minister Wilson and his senior foreign policy advisers have publicly
said that Britain will not give the Smith regime military support.
Most Britons would be unwilling to support military aid, and the government
believes that in the long run it has more to gain by protecting its trading position
with black African states than with Rhodesia and South Africa.
If internal security deteriorates in Rhodesia, London would probably help
evacuate refugees. Most refugees probably could escape by land to South Africa, but
some airlift capability would be needed. The British probably would also help
Rhodesian refugees to resettle in the UK.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 4, 1976
King Hassan, in his annual Throne Day speech yesterday, shed no new light on
his plans for consolidating Morocco's position in Western Sahara.
He did not describe how the territory is to be partitioned between Morocco
and Mauritania, suggesting that the demarcation line is an unresolved issue with
Nouakchott.
The 24th parallel is the rumored dividing line. Morocco would acquire the
phosphate reserves in the northern sector and Mauritania would gain one of the
world's most lucrative fishing areas and an established fishing industry at Dakhla.
Hassan asserted that Western Sahara will be transformed into a paradise, but he
glossed over the economic, administrative, and security problems that would need to
be surmounted. He emphasized the legitimacy of Morocco's Sahara policy and his
determination to remain in the territory at all costs.
Predictably, the King blamed Algeria for the present tensions in the region, but
his criticism was low key and he deliberately avoided adding to the friction with
Algiers.
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 Approved For Release
Asian Parties Attending
25th Soviet Party Congress
Ruling
Communist Parties
Non-Ruling
Communist Parties
Progressive Movements
Mongolia
North Korea
North Vietnam
Sri Lanka (one port-
folio in coalition
dominated by
Freedom Party)
Indonesia
New Zealand
Philippines
Australian So-
cialist Party
(pro-Moscow)
National Liberation
Front (South Vietnam)
Asian Parties Not Attending
Australian Communist
Party (pro-Peking)
Socialist Program
Party (Burma)
Bangladesh
Japan
Malaysia
Thailand
Socialist Party
(Japan)
-
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National Intelligence Bulletin
March 4, 1976
Asian absenteeism at the Soviet 25th party congress underscores how little
Moscow has accomplished in the past five years in its efforts to improve Soviet
relations with Asian communist and "progressive" parties. The most important
absentee is the Cambodian Communist Party, but also missing are four other parties
that sent representatives in 1971.
The reasons for the absences vary. The Cambodians are still angry because the
Soviets refused to take the Cambodian Communist movement seriously almost until
the fall of Phnom Penh. The independent Japanese Communist Party is not
represented because Moscow persists in interfering in its internal affairs. The
Communist Party of Bangladesh is not present because the party is operating
underground as a result of a ban on all political activity last August. The Japanese
Socialists planned to go but were not invited, apparently because of Soviet pique
over Socialist endorsements of some Chinese foreign policy positions.
Of the ruling Asian communist parties at the congress, only one-Mongolia-is
fully pro-Moscow, and the non-ruling parties in all cases represent only one faction
of the communist movement in their countries-and generally the least important
one. None has any real prospect of achieving power at any time in the foreseeable
future.
Moscow has no ties with the communist parties of Burma, Malaysia, and
Thailand-all of which have connections with Peking.
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National Intelligence Bulletin March 4, 1976
Strong domestic opposition to Cuban involvement in Angola has sparked calls
for immediate cessation of aid to Havana. At issue is a $2.5 million construction
project in Havana harbor scheduled to be completed in 1978. Parliamentary debates
are expected to result in a decision to grant no new aid but to honor existing
commitments.
The three major nonsocialist opposition parties-Conservative, Center, and
Christian People's-have in the past argued against aid to Cuba on ideological
grounds and as being economically unjustifiable. Their position has been
strengthened by Bonn's recent decision to halt Cuban aid because of Castro's
military intervention in Angola.
Norwegian labor government leaders have tried to respond to growing public
sentiment against Cuba without compromising their control of foreign aid projects
or losing support of leftists who are still sympathetic to Havana and the Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Prime Minister Nordli said recently that
Oslo would not use its foreign aid programs as political weapons and maintained that
existing commitments should be honored.
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. Top Secret
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