NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: February 19, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review
completed
DIA review(s) completed.
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79T00975A0286000N 8306l78
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
CONTENTS
SPAIN: Arias agrees to head
centrist coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WARSAW PACT - MBFR: Pact presents
new force reduction proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
ICELAND: NATO support again
sought to resolve fishing dispute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: New attempt to
revive mediation efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ARGENTINA: Pressure
on Peron may ease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
SPAIN - WESTERN EUROPE: Madrid's
campaign for closer ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
PORTUGAL: Lisbon may soon recognize
Popular Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
NIGERIA: Rumors of foreign
involvement in recent coup attempt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
EGYPT: "Swedish-type"
mobilization being tried . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: First economic
agreement concluded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
FOR THE RECORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Approved For Release 2 - 00975AO28600010030-1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin February 19, 1976
Prime Minister Arias has reportedly agreed to head a broad centrist political
grouping to contest future elections.
Arias reportedly held a meeting earlier this month with Areilza, Fraga, and two
other key cabinet ministers. He announced then that King Juan Carlos strongly
supported his heading a center-right reformist association. Accordingly, Arias said he
would accept the leading role if the four ministers present could produce an
acceptable platform and begin the process of combining disparate individual
organizations into a single unit. Each of the four ministers agreed to draw up a basic
platform paper and will meet again on February 23 to meld the contributions into a
single document.
Fraga strongly endorsed Arias' proposal and this time apparently did not insist
that his group dominate the coalition. The acceptance of a secondary role by the
ambitious interior minister may have been influenced by several factors: his attempt
to organize a political machine of his own has not been proceeding as smoothly or
rapidly as he had hoped; many influential members of the military hierarchy are
reportedly opposed to the current pace of reform and blame Fraga's liberalizing
policies for some recent political demonstrations; and he probably still hopes to take
over the centrist coalition when Arias leaves the cabinet, which could be as early as
this summer.
1A Mr%n7n
Approved For Release 2 07/03/07 m - T00975AO28600010030-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
The Warsaw Pact Tuesday presented a new proposal at the force reduction talks
in Vienna. It calls for reductions to take place in two stages.
In the first stage, which would be carried out this year, the US and the USSR
would reduce their forces in Central Europe by 2 to 3 percent of the overall
numerical strength of their respective alliances, and the withdrawn units would be
disbanded. The Stage I agreement would freeze force strengths of the other
participating states at the present level. The proposal calls for equal quantitative
reductions of US and Soviet armaments-aircraft, missiles, and tanks-including
nuclear weapons and delivery systems. This represents the first time the Soviets have
officially acknowledged that they have nuclear weapons in the reduction area. The
size of Stage I I was not stipulated.
The new proposal is evidently intended to counter the "Option III" proposal
introduced by NATO last December. The Pact countries hope to capitalize on what
they regard as the positive aspects of Option I11, primarily the expressed willingness
of NATO to reduce its nuclear armaments.
The proposal is essentially a reworking of previous Warsaw Pact reduction
programs. It retains the fundamental Pact approach of equal percentage reductions
and rejection of NATO's concept of asymmetrical reduction to a "common ceiling."
The East now accepts the Western idea of phased reductions, with US and Soviet
forces being cut back first, and goes into more detail regarding the armaments to be
reduced than was the case in earlier proposals. In some respects, however, the new
package is even more disadvantageous to the US than earlier proposals, since the
proposed reductions involve second-rate Soviet systems (SU-7 aircraft, SA-2 missiles)
as opposed to more advanced American equipment (F-4 aircraft, and Nike and Hawk
missiles).
The Soviets are under no illusion that their proposal would be acceptable to the
West or that the NATO countries would even regard it as a substantial concession.
Nevertheless, they evidently hope that it would serve as a way of capitalizing on
NATO's willingness to include nuclear elements in the reductions. Moscow may be
thinking of a mixed package trade of additional Soviet tank reductions in return for
more American nuclear elements.
To the West, the most attractive feature of the Soviet plan is likely to be its
apparent acceptance of phased reductions. But the Allies will be suspicious of the
Soviet demands for commitments by them. The West Germans, in particular, want
to avoid any commitment that would seem to sanction a Soviet role in monitoring
future West European defense arrangements.
Approved For Release 2007/03/072 CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
 Approved For Release 2
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
The West will continue to oppose the basic Soviet demand for equal reductions
and to attempt to overcome Eastern resistance to the common ceiling. The Allies
will also object to the Soviet attempt to extend equipment reductions beyond the
one-time Western nuclear proposals contained in Option I11.
Iceland is hoping that its decision to break diplomatic relations with the UK
can be translated into support, from other countries, for the Icelandic position in
the fishing dispute. Reykjavik probably hopes that the break will encourage the US,
West Germany, and Norway to continue their efforts to settle the dispute.
Norway yesterday proposed at a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels
that London withdraw its warships and trawlers in return for financial compensation
for losses incurred by the fishermen during negotiations. The money would come
from a common NATO fund. Oslo apparently hopes that the proposal will lead to a
new round of negotiations.
If the break in relations does not bead to progress in settling the fishing dispute,
the Icelandic cabinet may vote to withdraw its NATO delegation from Brussels. A
similar motion on February 17 was defeated by only one vote.
A complete break with the Alliance seems less likely at this time. Reykjavik
needs NATO as a forum for its dispute with London, and Icelandic leaders are aware
that concern and sympathy for their position would end with a NATO break. If the
present impasse drags on, however, Icelandic emotions could take over and prompt
Reykjavik to withdraw from the Alliance.
At stake, as far as the US and NATO are concerned, is the US-manned NATO
base at Keflavik, which serves primarily as an anti-submarine warfare and early
warning site. In addition, Iceland's withdrawal from NATO would have a certain
psychological impact on the other member countries.
Approved For Release 2007/03/073 CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
 Approved For Release 2q
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
Arab League Secretary General Riad will attempt today to revive the flagging
Arab mediation efforts in the dispute between Morocco and Algeria over Spanish
Sahara.
According to press reports from Cairo, Riad has informed Moroccan King
Hassan, Algerian President Boumediene, and Mauritanian President Ould Daddah
that he is prepared to take any action they wish to resolve the dispute. He urged the
three to enter into a dialogue to avoid further fighting.
Riad's decision is an abrupt about-face. He has resisted past attempts to engage
his services, apparently because he was unwilling to risk the prestige of his office in a
venture that has little prospect for success. Riad's change of heart may be the result
of pressure from Egypt.
Neither Rabat nor Algiers, however, seems willing to compromise. In a press
conference on Tuesday, Moroccan Foreign Minister Laraki equated the Polisario
Front guerrillas with Algeria and declared that Morocco could not remain indifferent
to Algerian "acts of aggression."
Algeria continues to insist that a referendum on self-determination is the only
basis for settling the dispute. Yesterday, Algiers sent a memorandum to Spain
criticizing Madrid for abandoning its role as the "administering state" of Sahara. In
addition to again condemning the tripartite agreement turning over control of
Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania, the memorandum warned Madrid that it had
assumed a dangerous responsibility by ignoring the rights of the Saharan people.
Little is expected from the recently concluded five-day visit to Sahara by UN
Secretary General Waldheim's personal envoy.
25X1 he will
probably try to limit its involvement in the dispute to pro forma consideration of
the UN mission's report.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 ? CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
President Maria Estela Peron's announcement last night that she will not seek
re-election may ease the pressure for her immediate ouster. She repeated, however,
her determination to finish her present term, which ends in May of next year.
The President was forced to take this step when the Peronist labor movement
and members of her own party threatened to join her opponents in protesting the
controversial moves she made earlier this week. Peron had adjourned congress,
closed down a critical newspaper, and called for a revision of the constitution.
The adjournment of congress was designed to head off a move to declare Peron
"unable" to carry out her presidential duties. The President's call to revise the
constitution had been widely interpreted as a ploy to extend the length of her
present term or somehow pave the way for her re-election.
A number of congressmen quickly announced their intention to reconvene
congress in defiance. Such a move is permitted under the constitution, provided it is
approved by one fourth of the members of each chamber. Late yesterday, the
government yielded and announced it would reconvene the legislature in a special
session.
Peron, under constant fire since taking office in 1974, has become increasingly
defiant. In recent weeks she has refused a demand by the military service chiefs for
her resignation, replaced all but two members of her eight-man cabinet, and sought
to weaken labor opposition to her policies by sowing dissension among top labor
leaders.
Even if the current drive to-remove Peron is slowed, she may be forced to make
further concessions. Labor, for example, is pressing for still more cabinet changes.
Approved For Release 2007/03/697 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
 Approved For Release
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
Spanish Foreign Minister Areilza this week took Madrid's campaign for closer
ties with Western Europe to Brussels where he met with EC Commission President
Ortoli and NATO Secretary General Luns. In contrast to the optimism the Spanish
government has been expressing, Areilza apparently was realistic in recognizing that
negotiations for Spanish ties with both organizations will take time.
At a press conference following his meeting with Ortoli, the foreign minister
described the talks as useful because he had been able to explain the government's
liberalization program. Areilza said he had enumerated a number of important
reforms Madrid has already made, but that he told Ortoli that the EC now would
have to judge Spain on its intentions since time is needed to implement reforms such
as free elections.
The foreign minister stressed that his country has not yet formally applied for
EC membership. Noting that he is visiting each of the nine member states to explain
Spain's democratization program, he stated that when his tour is over at the end of
March, the EC and Spain would each assess the situation to see if negotiations
toward membership should begin.
Areilza recognized that negotiations would be long and arduous because of the
very difficult issues to be covered, particularly in the agricultural sector. He cited
some positive factors, however, claiming that Spain, as the tenth ranking industrial
country in the Western world, is better prepared economically for membership than
Denmark or Ireland were when they applied.
Areilza further said his government is not interested in merely reopening the
trade negotiations that were suspended by the EC last October but would like to see
the last EC agreement broadened to cover the three new EC members. He said any
negotiations to improve the agreement must be in a framework leading to EC
membership. The EC, for its part, while generally favoring Spanish membership, sees
this as a long-term objective, contingent upon concrete progress toward
democratization.
In his meeting with NATO Secretary General Luns, Areilza said Spain would
not ask for NATO membership until it was clear that Spanish accession would be
welcome. He noted Spain's satisfaction with the new US-Spanish bilateral
agreement, especially the reference to NATO and to coordination between the
Spanish armed forces and those of the IJS and other Western nations.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 9CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
 Approved For Release 20 j7/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T 0975A028600010030-1 25X1
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
Areilza also cited an important domestic consideration for seeking eventual
NATO membership. Spain wants to shift the orientation of its armed forces,
formerly preoccupied with defense of the state, to the larger role of contributing to
Western defense. Areilza claimed that integration of the Spanish armed forces with
those of the Western democracies would prevent Spanish forces from sliding into a
reactionary posture.
The NATO Secretary General admitted the military value of the US-Spanish
treaty, but pointed out that some NATO allies wanted to await further
developments in Spain before linking Spain to NATO.
Lisbon may soon join the rush of West European nations in recognizing the
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
President Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Antunes have intensified their
campaign for the recognition of the Popular Movement within the past few days.
They maintain that the Movement's recent military victories and recognition by the
Organization of African Unity and most West European countries oblige Portugal to
act soon. Antunes also feels recognition would help reduce the Movement's
dependence on the Soviets and Cubans and enable the West to collaborate with the
more moderate factions within the group.
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares has been a leading opponent of recognition,
but pressure on him to fall into line has become almost overwhelming.
Diplomatic ties could spark violent reactions from the large number of
conservative, mostly anti-Movement Angolan refugees. It could also lead to
intensified coup plotting by rightist, Spanish-based exile groups who would view the
discontented refugees as likely recruits. Working together, the two groups could pose
a threat to the government.
Approved For Release 2007/03/071CPIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 - CIA-RDP7911700975A028600010030-1
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
Nigeria is full of rumors of foreign involvements, particularly by the US, in last
Friday's coup attempt.
Anti-US feeling is running high among Nigerian students and faculty. Student
demonstrations against US offices in various parts of the country have been
accompanied by calls for tighter security, strict surveillance of foreign nationals, and
the removal of "intelligence agents" from the country.
Allegations also are being made against the British because Lieutenant Colonel
Dimka, the coup leader, visited the British high commissioner after broadcasting his
announcement of the coup.
The Nigerian government has made no official accusations against either
Washington or London, and there is no evidence that Lagos is encouraging the
student demonstrators.
Eulogies in the media on the achievements of former head of state Muhammed
have stressed his resistance to alleged US "arm twisting" over Angola, but the US
embassy believes these comments should be read more in praise of Nigerian firmness
in standing up to a superpower than as part of an officially sanctioned anti-US
campaign. Nigerian radio broadcasts !have been highlighting the signing of a major
telecommunications contract with a US firm.
A large student demonstration honoring Muhammed is scheduled to be held in
Lagos on Friday, the last day of official mourning. After that, the US embassy
believes, student emotions should subside.
Tribal and religious tensions, meanwhile, are on the rise, according to the
embassy. Some Hausas, the Muslim group that dominates northern Nigeria, have
been seen leaving Lagos and Ibadan for the north. Such precautionary moves
apparently are motivated by memories of Nigeria's history of tribal violence. The
recently assassinated Murtala Muhammed was a Hausa; his successor, General
Obasanjo, is a Christian and a Yoruba, whose homeland is in the west, where Lagos
and lbadan are located.
11
Approved For Release 2 0975A028600010030-1
 Approved For Release ~
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
US officials in Cairo report that the Egyptian Ministry of War is experimenting
with a new mobilization system, one that is said to have been tried twice with highly
successful results.
The Egyptians refer to it as the "Swedish" system, presumably because it was
patterned after Sweden's plan under which no standing tactical units are maintained
during peacetime. The mission of the small regular army is to provide training for
conscripts and to be ready to mobilize the wartime army's combat brigades and
supporting units.
The US defense attache in Cairo believes that the testing of this plan indicates
Egypt may reduce somewhat the size of its large standing forces in favor of an
efficient reserve mobilization system. Egypt is having a difficult time with rising
defense expenditures, and Cairo would prefer to use more of its limited funds to
modernize its equipment.
It is unlikely that Egypt will adopt Sweden's system totally, although Cairo
may choose a version that would have support units and military units in rear areas
reduce their peacetime strength while maintaining combat-ready units in forward
positions opposite Israeli forces. Should the Egyptians decide to implement this
plan, it will require some time and organizational planning to be effective.
Approved For Release 2007/03/071 : 2CIA-RDP79TOO975AO28600010030-1
 Approved For Release g
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
The USSR has reportedly signed its first economic agreement with
Mozambique since the country's indeperidence on June 25, 1975.
According to the press in Mozambique, agreements in the fields of commerce,
fishing, shipping, and civil aviation were recently concluded in Moscow. Although
the details are not yet known, Soviet aid agreements with other African countries
have frequently contained secret annexes pertaining to military assistance. Two
Mozambican ministers have been in the Soviet capital since February 8, the first
high-level delegation to visit the USSR since independence.
The agreements have been under consideration for over a year. During a visit to
the USSR in December 1974, Samara Machel, leader of the Front for the Liberation
of Mozambique (Frelimo), was said to have been promised $10 million in economic
aid. Last April, a Soviet economic delegation visited Mozambique, followed by a
merchant marine delegation in late May.
Despite Moscow's years of support for the Frelimo independence movement,
the presence of Soviet parliamentary leader Ilyashenko and Deputy Foreign
Minister Ilichev at independence ceremonies in June, and efforts by both countries
in assisting Popular Movement forces in Angola, no formal aid agreements quickly
materialized. Peking, however, did move promptly to the forefront by offering
Mozambique an interest-free, long-term loan for $56 million.
Moscow's relations with Machel, now Mozambique's president, remained cool
until recently. It was not until December 4 that the Soviet charge was replaced by
the USSR's first ambassador to Mozambique, Petr Evsiukov, who had coordinated
Soviet aid efforts to liberation groups in Portugal's former African colonies.
President Machel has consistently sought to steer an independent course in
foreign relations and has said he would welcome aid from any quarter. His radical
socialist government and public commitment to continue aiding African liberation
movements, however, will serve to limit Western influence while the USSR and
China vie for a larger role in the country's development.
13
T00975AO28600010030-1
25X1 Approved For Release 007103107 -
 25X1 Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
 25X1
Approved For Release 2 07/03/07 : CIA-RDP79 00975A028600010030-1
National
ntelligence Bulletin
February 19, 1976
EC-PORTUGAL: Negotiations between the EC and Lisbon on improving and
extending their 1973 trade agreement remain on track. If the Portuguese do not
demand major concessions from the Nine in sensitive trade areas-primarily textiles
and wine-an accord could be announced before Portugal's national election on
April 25. EC officials may try to revive a scheme-first proposed by Portuguese
Foreign Minister Antunes last October-to accelerate the removal of Community
tariffs on Portuguese industrial goods. The tariffs are now scheduled to be
eliminated by, July 1, 1977. By removing the tariffs much earlier, the Community
could make a major, and relatively inexpensive, show of political support for the
present government.
Approved For Release 2007/03/0716CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010030-1
 Top Sepprezed For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO28600010030-1