NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A028600010028-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: February 18, 1976
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
National Intelligence
Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
February 18, 1976
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 18, 1976
CONTENTS
ZAIRE-ANGOLA: Conditions for
recognition of Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
USSR: SNIE on
implications of Soviet harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
MOROCCO-ALGERIA: Conflicting
accounts of last weekend's fighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ICELAND-UK: Relations to be broken
with UK; NATO membership retained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
FRANCE-USSR: Marchais will
not attend Soviet party congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
IRAQ: More arms
purchases from West . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
ANNEX: Cambodians Move Slowly on Border Problems
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Popular Movement Prime Minister Nascimento is scheduled to visit Kinshasa
next Saturday to discuss Zairian recognition of the Luanda-based regime
President Mobutu wants guarantees that the Popular Movement and its Cuban
forces will take no aggressive actions against Zaire. He also wants the Popular
Movement to return to Zaire some 4,000 exiled former Katangan troops,
secessionists who fled Zaire in 1963 and who have been fighting with the Popular
Movement in hope that Neto would support an insurgency into their home
area-now the Shaba region of Zaire.
Mobutu is also seeking secure access to the Benguela railroad and the port of
Lobito, the most efficient route for Zairian imports and exports. Finally, he wants
the Popular Movement to make arrangements to accept some 1 million Angolan
refugees who fled to Zaire.
The conditions, made public by Zaire on Monday, reportedly were passed
privately to the Popular Movement last weekend, following a meeting in Kinshasa
between Zairian President Mobutu and Congolese President Ngouabi. Ngouabi has
long supported the Popular Movement and was acting as its intermediary with
Mobutu.
For his part, Neto will want assurances that Mobutu will not underwrite
guerrilla operations into northern Angola by the Zairian-backed National Front, a
concession Mobutu probably will make if the Popular Movement shows a willingness
to establish even the facade of a government of national unity.
In the talks next weekend, Mobutu probably will also ask for a withdrawal of
all Cuban and Soviet forces in Angola, but would settle for the promise of an
eventual withdrawal of combat forces alone.
Neto is obviously in a good position to resist Mobutu's demands. He almost
certainly will refuse to make any commitment to return the Katangan secessionists;
Neto probably wants to keep them in Angola as insurance against Zairian
intervention. The Katangans would, in any case, resist to the point of open warfare
any attempt on the part of the Popular Movement to return them to Zaire.
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February 18, 1976
In Angola, National Union President Jonas Savimbi has established his
headquarters at Gago Coutinho in southeastern Angola, where he reportedly is
making plans for the guerrilla operations he has vowed to mount against the Popular
Movement. Some of his forces have occupied Calai, near the Namibian border, and
apparently hope to use it as a resupply base.
Savimbi's ability to wage an effective insurgency is limited; Zaire is already
moving toward accommodation with the Popular Movement, and Zambia is likely to
follow suit shortly.
South Africa, a potential backer, is also exploring the possibility of coming to
terms with Neto, following a recent statement by his foreign minister that the
Luanda regime "would be prepared to cooperate" with South Africa if it recognizes
the Popular Movement's sovereignty over Angola. The degree of accommodation
that Pretoria can or cannot reach with Neto will determine the amount of support
provided to the National Union.
In northern Angola, the National Front withdrew over the weekend from Sao
Salvador, its last major base in the area. With the exception of a few mercenaries and
a small group of its own troops hovering near the Zairian border, the National Front
has fully retreated to Zaire.
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 18, 1976
The Bulletin today publishes the Principal Judgments of a Special National
Intelligence Estimate, "Implications of the 1975 Soviet Harvest, " approved by the
United States Intelligence Board on February 10.
The 1975 harvest was the worst in the Brezhnev era. Grain production fell to
less than two thirds of stated needs, with the livestock sector especially hard hit by
feedgrain shortages. Despite cancellation of long-standing export commitments to
Eastern Europe, extensive purchases abroad, and resort to stringent conservation
measures, the regime will be unable to make up the shortfall.
Distress slaughtering, already begun, promises to set back Brezhnev's meat
production program for some years to come. The growth rate in GNP fell from less
than 4 percent to about 2.5 percent.
Inside the USSR, the effects of the harvest are only now beginning to show up
in consumer supplies. Meat shortages will become fairly widespread before long, and
the quality of the national diet is likely to deteriorate by early summer.
There will be widespread grumbling in the urban centers and possibly
occasional disorders outside the major cities. Criticism and debate within the regime
on agricultural policy can be expected to mount.
Nevertheless, the regime's control mechanisms are adequate to cope with
popular dissatisfaction even if malaise becomes pervasive. In any event, existing
military programs will not be affected, and military programs would be among the
last to be altered in any series of agricultural crises.
Nor is the power position of the present leadership likely to be challenged,
although Brezhnev's prestige and that of certain of his colleagues can hardly escape
some damage.
Another poor harvest in 1976 or 1977, however, could generate domestic
difficulties on a scale that would affect regime cohesion. The succession problem
would then take on more urgency, and the chances of factionalism would increase as
the agricultural issue became critical.
In any event, even if the Soviets manage to cope adequately with the effects of
the 1975 harvest, climatic handicaps and the cumbersome agricultural system make
it likely that their grain targets over the next five years will not be met. If so, the
Soviets will periodically need more than the 8 million tons of imports to which they
now have ready access under terms of the US-USSR grain deal.
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In terms of "leverage," the five-year grain import agreement was an example of
the Soviets' yielding to US pressure for regularized behavior in the grain market in
order to obtain needed supplies. However, unless requirements for US supplies
substantially exceed 8 million tons, reliance on the US will normally have only
marginal moderating influence on other aspects of the USSR's international
behavior:
--Moscow already has assurances that some US grain will be available every year
for the next five.
--The Soviets doubt the capacity or willingness of the US Government, given
domestic considerations, to impose and maintain effective controls on exports.
--Short-term purchases can usually be made from other suppliers as well.
--Over the longer term, the Soviets could shift the patterns of their imports
toward non-US suppliers.
Another major harvest failure during the next year or two would throw the
USSR into acute temporary dependence on foreign grain supplies. In that
contingency, Moscow would probably judge it advisable to avoid threatening or
highly offensive behavior for a time. And the recurring and heightened need for US
grain would be one of the significant arguments in Moscow in favor of keeping
US-USSR bilateral relations on an even keel and promoting mutual interests.
But in terms of implications for US policy, the "leverage" inherent in such a
temporary dependency is limited. The stringencies that would face the regime are
unlikely to be so desperate, nor the extent of US power to withhold goods so great,
as to compel the USSR to alter substantially any important element of its domestic
or foreign policies in response to outside pressure.
Indeed, overt pressure from abroad would probably unify the leadership behind
a negative reaction. If the result were reduced access to foreign grain, the regime
would, we judge, be able to maintain control over increasingly disgruntled
consumers.
The East European regimes stand to be tested as a result of the harvest failure
last year. More than half of their normal grain imports come from the USSR, and
these have been cut off for the current crop year, forcing them into Western
markets. This phenomenon is likely to recur, probably compelling a reduction in
East European imports of Western capital goods (of which the US share is small).
Any sharp reduction in living standards in Eastern Europe carries with it a
heightened risk of popular disorders, more so than would be the case in the USSR.
While the USSR probably will provide some financial assistance to its clients in their
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time of troubles, it will resist any accelerated redirection of their trade patterns
toward the West. This will be a persistent dilemma for both the Soviets and the East
Europeans.
As for the USSR's own trade, grain imports will be the main cause of a
hard-currency trade deficit of $3 to $5 billion this year, following a record deficit
estimated.at $4 to $7 billion last year. This will force the USSR to bargain hard for
low-interest credits and to sell gold. Some major purchases may be deferred, but the
USSR presently intends to continue to increase its im orts of high-technology
Western products.
Widely -conflicting accounts of the fighting last weekend in northeastern
Spanish Sahara continue to comb from Algerian and Moroccan sources.
Reports from' the US.embassies in both Rabat and Algiers suggest, however,
that Algerian forces may have-been involved in the clashes. The embassy in Algiers
,,notes that the, Algerians' irdtiar denial was somewhat equivocal. Rabat has so far
offered-no evidence to substantiate its charge of Algerian involvement.
King Hassan's public challenge to Algerian President Boumediene has evoked a
popular response among the Moroccan people, promising continued popular pressure
on the King to. maintain a hard line.
Boumediene continues to say Algeria will not be provoked into war with
Morocco. According to press reports, however, Boumediene said the "deepening
crisis" threatens to become "a war against Algeria." He called on world leaders to
step in to help reduce tensions.
Neither side appears to want a wider dispute. Further incidents involving
charges of Algerian military participation are likely, however, as the Moroccans try
to consolidate their hold on the territory before February 28, the formal date for
Spain's withbrawl.
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The Icelandic cabinet voted yesterday to break diplomatic relations with the
UK either today or tomorrow.
A motion introduced by Olafur Johannesson, leader of the Progressive
Party-the second party in Iceland's governing coalition-simultaneously to
withdraw Iceland's NATO delegation from Brussels was narrowly defeated. Foreign
Minister Agustsson broke ranks with the other Progressives and voted against the
proposal.
As reasons for its decision to break relations, the cabinet listed the presence of
British warships, the UK's disregard of Iceland's conservation efforts, and repeated
rammings by British warships.
London has asserted that withdrawal of the warships would leave British fishing
boats vulnerable to Icelandic attack and that Reykjavik has provoked the incidents
that have occurred. In addition, Britain has insisted that Reykjavik's conservation
measures, introduced in January, were not a part of the fishing agreement made
between the two countries in 1973.
Despite Prime Minister Hallgrimsson's efforts to head off the break, the
hard-line members of his cabinet were determined to act. Hallgrimsson was able to
stall off an earlier threat to break relations until NATO Secretary General Luns had
another chance to mediate the dispute. At Luns' urging, the British offered a new set
of bargaining proposals, but Reykjavik ignored them.
Hallgrimsson's political position has been seriously eroded. His efforts to reach
a compromise with London have been met with disfavor even among members of his
own Independence Party. With Johannesson calling for withdrawal from NATO and
with the vice chairman of the Independence Party anxious to replace him,
Hallgrimsson may be out of office soon. He has repeatedly said that he will resign
rather than head a government that votes to withdraw from NATO.
If the Hallgrimsson government falls, it almost certainly will be replaced by a
leftist coalition that would favor a break with NATO.
Hallgrimsson is also faced with the most extensive general strike in Icelandic
history. Almost half of the country's labor force walked off the job yesterday,
demanding higher wages and benefits. All incoming and outgoing air traffic has been
suspended, and most stores in Reykjavik are closed.
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The government has been so occupied with the cod war that it has been unable
to attend to the labor dispute. The break in relations with London and the
possibility of a withdrawal from NATO will further divert its attention.
The French Communist Party, in a gesture clearly intended to improve its
credentials as a bona fide national party independent of Moscow, has announced
that Secretary General Georges Marchais will not attend the Soviet party congress
scheduled to open on February 24. Except for one case of serious illness, this will be
the first time that the French Communist Party has not been represented by its top
officer at a Soviet party congress.
. In a terse statement, Marchais said that his decision "follows the line" of his
party's 22nd congress, held earlier this month. The French party congress
unanimously accepted Marchais' proposal to drop the phrase "dictatorship of the
proletariat" and applauded his criticism of the lack of human rights in the Soviet
Union. By absenting himself from Moscow, Marchais spares himself the
embarrassment of seeming to have to report back to Moscow for his "bad manners"
during the French congress.
The French party will be represented at the Soviet congress by a five-member
delegation headed by Gaston Plissonnier, secretary of the Central Committee, and
Jean Kanapa, the party's foreign affairs expert. Kanapa had previously been
associated with the pro-Soviet forces in the French leadership, but over the past year
he reportedly has become disenchanted by Moscow's refusal to accept the realities
of the situation in which the French party must operate. Marchais' decision is
certain to increase the displeasure Moscow has already shown over the French
party's increasing signs of independence and flexibility.
Members of President Giscard's government have chosen to characterize
Marchais' efforts to move away from the Soviet line as mere tactical maneuvers
aimed at increasing Communist voting strength. The French Socialists, with whom
the Communists are allied, have also expressed skepticism over Marchais' seeming
new course.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 18, 1976
Iraq is buying a larger share of its arms from the West with its greatly increased
oil revenues. Baghdad is trying to reduce its dependence on Soviet arms because it
fears that Moscow might again use arms as a political weapon as it has in Egypt.
Nevertheless, Iraq is likely to continue to buy most of its advanced weapons from
the USSR for some time to come.
Iraq ordered $1.7 billion worth of arms during the past two years, about half
from the West and Yugoslavia. Until 1974, Western suppliers had sold only about $5
million worth of arms annually to Iraq. Most of the orders in the West have been for
ammunition and support equipment.
France is providing almost $500 million worth of modern arms, including
Super Frelon and Alouette helicopters, some armored vehicles, and the Milan and
Harpon antitank missile systems. Italy, the second largest West European supplier,
contracted to deliver $40 million worth of military and transportation aircraft and
howitzers. Orders were placed in Belgium for large amounts of ammunition and
communications equipment, in the UK for Leyland vehicles, and in Spain for
106-mm. recoilless rifles.
India has agreed to provide about $35 million worth of aircraft ammunition,
rockets, and napalm. Purchases from Yugoslavia-worth nearly $200 million-were
mainly fore mortars, artillery, ammunition, gas masks, and military support
equipment. Most of the larger pieces of ground equipment and aircraft ordered from
the West have not yet been delivered.
Major deliveries from Eastern Europe included Czech L-39 jet trainers-the first
to a non - Warsaw Pact country-some older L-29 jet trainers, and Czech and
Hungarian armored vehicles and artillery.
Under arms agreements signed with the Soviets since 1973, Baghdad has
received for the first time MIG-23 jet fighter aircraft, the SA-6 surface-to-air missile
system, Osa II and Zhuk patrol boats, Yevgenia-class minesweepers, 180-mm. field
guns, and the Frog-7 tactical surface-to-surface rocket. Iraq became the third
country in the Middle East-after Egypt and Syria-to get the Scud
surface-to-surface missile system.
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National Intelligence Bulletin February 18, 1976
Cambodians Move Slowly on Border Problems
The Khmer communists are moving slowly and cautiously in negotiating
territorial problems with Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, while trying to impose
tighter control over their side of the border. Although French delineations of the
border in the late 19th and early 20th centuries have been generally accepted by all
sides, disputes over precise border alignment have been frequent and have even
intensified since the fall of the Lon Nol government and the establishment of a
defensive regime in Phnom Penh obsessed with "territorial integrity" as a symbol of
its authority.
While the border situation varies from one part of Cambodia to another, several
main problems contribute to continuing conflict:
--In most border areas there has never been any strong control by the central
governments concerned. Traditional patterns of movement and trade are
difficult to alter or restrict.
--Several offshore islands in the Gulf of Thailand are in dispute, and continental
shelf claims, involving potential undersea resources, are ill-defined.
--Local Cambodian commanders are quick to react to real or imagined
provocations, particularly against persons attempting to flee Cambodia and
intrusions by military units from neighboring countries.
Fighting occurred along Cambodia's 480-mile border with Thailand last May
over an alignment dispute; subsequent tension has been fostered by people trying to
escape communist rule in Cambodia, smuggling, and cross-border forays by
Cambodians seeking food.
am o ian installation o mines a ong
the border as a so resulted in recent inci ents between Cambodian security forces
and Thai border police.
Nevertheless, the Cambodians and Thai have taken initial steps to reduce
tension. The border liaison offices that were opened late last year, following a visit
by Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister leng Sary to Bangkok, are functioning, and
government-sponsored trade has begun.
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The Cambodians, however, are apparently in no hurry to follow up this initial
progress and have not responded to a Thai proposal to establish a joint commission
to rule on an alignment controversy near one Thai town that was the scene of a
serious clash in mid-December. Phnom Penh, moreover, waited until this week to
agree to Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai's December appeal for another meeting with
Sary. The talks are apparently set for February 27 in Cambodia. In light of ongoing
Khmer communist efforts to seal the border and continuing unrest in northwestern
Cambodia involving small groups of dissidents, Phnom Penh's slowness may be based
on a desire to put its own house in order before moving into a new round of
negotiations with the Thai.
As much as Phnom Penh's attitude appears to rankle the Thai military,
Bangkok often plays down conflict along the Cambodian frontier in support of the
higher priority goal of improving diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh. The Thai
have attempted to mediate flare-ups through their liaison officials stationed on the
border.
The Khmer may also be reluctant to reach any broad territorial understanding
with the Thai as long as more difficult and sensitive border problems with the
Vietnamese remain unresolved. The Khmer communists, in fact, from the beginning
appear to have given higher priority to resolving the situation along the Vietnamese
frontier. During the course of the Cambodian war, relations between Khmer and
Vietnamese communist forces along their 740-mile border steadily worsened and
occasionally resulted in full-scale fighting that rivaled the intensity of communist
attacks against the Lon Nol government.
The end of the war did not bring an end to such conflict and, following serious
clashes last summer, the Cambodians and Vietnamese finally moved to prevent the
situation from getting out of hand. Meetings between representatives took place in
July;
Despite such mutual efforts toward accommodation, the Vietnamese frontier is
likely to remain an area of preoccupation for the Khmer communists. While
recognizing that it would probably fare badly in any major military confrontation
with its communist neighbors, Phnom Penh is determined to demonstrate that the
eastern Cambodian border is now off limits to Vietnamese forces. Repeated public
warnings that Phnom Penh will not tolerate the presence of foreign bases on
Cambodian territory-a proclamation now included in the recently promulgated
constitution-are clearly aimed at the Vietnamese.
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The Khmer appear to be particularly concerned about the Vietnamese presence
along the border in the remote northeastern section of Cambodia, which was an
important logistic area for the Vietnamese during the war. Most, if not all,
Vietnamese units presumably returned home following the fall of Saigon, 1
Although no large-scale fighting has been reported, several clashes took place
last month and, while recent local negotiations have resulted in the withdrawal of
some Vietnamese troops in the Route 19 area as well as a "cease-fire," Vietnamese
units apparently remain in at least one other area where the alignment of the border
is still in dispute.
The Khmer have now increased their own military presence in the northeast,
indicating that they are not yet ready to rely on negotiations alone to protect their
territory from Vietnamese encroachment.
For Hanoi, the border dispute is only one element in an uneasy relationship
with the new regime in Phnom Penh. The Vietnamese are unhappy about the extent
of Chinese influence in Cambodia, and Phnom Penh's apparent willingness to
undercut Hanoi's policy objectives in dealing with Bangkok. Hanoi clearly does not
want the border dispute to get out of hand, but it may not be averse to linking any
further progress on the issue to a Cambodian readiness to align itself more closely
with its communist neighbors in Indochina.
Cambodia's 325-mile border with Laos is probably of less concern to Phnom
Penh, but even here local Cambodian commanders have reported a number of
intrusions by Lao forces since last fall. The Khmer have followed the same approach
toward the Lao as toward the Vietnamese-local negotiations, deployment of troops
along the border, and the movement of local residents into the interior.
Although the Cambodian and Lao communists last December publicly pledged
to respect each other's sovereignty "on the basis of the present border," Phnom
Penh regards minor friction with the Lao as a reflection of more serious difficulties
with the Vietnamese.
Even the halting progress made toward reducing tension along Cambodia's
mainland borders with Vietnam and Thailand will be difficult to duplicate in the
disputed waters of the Gulf of Thailand. Several of the islands in the Gulf are
claimed by Cambodia and Vietnam, and all three countries have overlapping claims
to potential offshore oil deposits that will be difficult to resolve.
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Cambodian troops may have reoccupied some parts of the Poulo Wai Islands
that Vietnamese forces seized last June. Subsequently, small clashes with the
Vietnamese have taken place farther south around the Vietnamese island of Phu
Quoc. Less serious offshore incidents with Vietnamese forces have occurred as
recently as early January.
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